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## Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route Server to Peers [draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-02](#)

### Abstract

This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community [[RFC8097](#)] to signal prefix origin validation results from a route server to its peers. Upon reception of prefix origin validation results peers can use this information in their local routing decision process.

### Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)] only when they appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English words, without normative meaning.

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 Internet-Draft Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from April 2017

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## Table of Contents

<a href="#">1.</a>	Introduction . . . . .	<a href="#">2</a>
<a href="#">2.</a>	BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Utilized at Route-Servers	<a href="#">3</a>
<a href="#">3.</a>	Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route Server to Peers . . . . .	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">4.</a>	Operational Recommendations . . . . .	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">4.1.</a>	Local Routing Decision Process . . . . .	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">4.2.</a>	Route Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community . . . . .	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">4.3.</a>	Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not Available at a Route-Server . . . . .	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">4.4.</a>	Error Handling at Peers . . . . .	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">5.</a>	IANA Considerations . . . . .	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">6.</a>	Security Considerations . . . . .	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">7.</a>	References . . . . .	<a href="#">6</a>
<a href="#">7.1.</a>	Normative References . . . . .	<a href="#">6</a>
<a href="#">7.2.</a>	Informative References . . . . .	<a href="#">6</a>
	Authors' Addresses . . . . .	<a href="#">7</a>

[1.](#) Introduction

RPKI-based prefix origin validation [[RFC6480](#)] can be a significant operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt. In order to boost acceptance and usage of prefix origin validation and ultimately increase the security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may provide RPKI-based prefix origin validation at the route server [[RFC7947](#)]. The result of this prefix origin validation is signaled

to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community as introduced in [[RFC8097](#)].

Peers receiving the prefix origin validation result from the route server(s) can use this information in their local routing decision

Internet-Draft Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from April 2017

process for acceptance, rejection, preference, or other traffic engineering purposes of a particular route.

## [2.](#) BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Utilized at Route-Servers

A route server that is aware of a BGP Prefix Origin Validation state for a certain route can handle this information in one of the following modes of operation:

**Simple Tagging:** The prefix origin validation state is tagged to the route as described in [Section 3](#).

This mode of operation is like the traditional way route servers work, however, the prefix origin validation state information is additionally available for peers.

**Dropping and Tagging:** Routes for which the prefix origin validation state is "invalid" (according to [[RFC6811](#)]) are dropped by the route server. Routes which show a prefix origin validation state of "not found" and "valid" (according to [[RFC6811](#)]) are tagged accordingly to [Section 3](#).

Security is higher rated than questionable reachability of a prefix by this mode of operation.

**Prioritizing and Tagging:** If the route server learned for a particular prefix more than one route it removes firstly the set of "invalid" routes and secondly the "not found" routes unless the set of routes is empty. Based on the set of routes left over the BGP best path section algorithm is executed. The selected route is marked accordingly to [Section 3](#).

The BGP best path selection algorithm is changed by this mode of operation in such a way that "valid" routes are preferred even if they are unfavorable by the traditional best path selection algorithm. This puts prefix origin validation on top of the best path selection.

A route server MUST support the Simple Tagging mode of operation. Other modes of operation are OPTIONAL. The mode of operation MAY be configured by the route server operator for a route server instance or for each BGP session with a peer separately.

These mode of operations might be used in combination with [[RFC7911](#)] in order to allow a peer to receive all routes and take the routing decision by itself.

## Internet-DraSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from April 2017

### [3.](#) Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route Server to Peers

The BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community (as defined in [[RFC8097](#)]) is utilized for signaling prefix origin validation result from a route server to peers.

[[RFC8097](#)] proposes an encoding of the prefix origin validation result [[RFC6811](#)] as follows:

Value	Meaning
0	Lookup result = "valid"
1	Lookup result = "not found"
2	Lookup result = "invalid"

Table 1

This encoding is re-used. Route servers providing RPKI-based prefix origin validation set the validation state according to the prefix origin validation result (see [[RFC6811](#)]).

### [4.](#) Operational Recommendations

#### [4.1.](#) Local Routing Decision Process

A peer receiving prefix origin validation results from the route

server MAY use the information in its own local routing decision process. The local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the rules as described in [section 5 \[RFC6811\]](#).

A peer receiving a prefix origin validation result from the route server MAY redistribute this information within its own AS.

#### [4.2.](#) Route Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community

An IXP route server receiving routes from its peers containing the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers. This is required regardless of whether the route server is executing prefix origin validation or not.

Failure to do so would allow opportunistic peers to advertise routes tagged with arbitrary prefix origin validation results via a route

Internet-Draft Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from April 2017

server, influencing maliciously the decision process of other route server peers.

#### [4.3.](#) Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not Available at a Route-Server

In case information about the validity of a BGP prefix origin is not available at the route server (e.g., error in the ROA cache, CPU overload) the route server MUST NOT add the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community to the route.

#### [4.4.](#) Error Handling at Peers

A route sent by a route server SHOULD only contain none or one BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community.

A peer receiving a route from a route server containing more than one BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community SHOULD only consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in the validation result field and disregard the other values. Values larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded.

## 5. IANA Considerations

None.

## 6. Security Considerations

All security considerations described in RFC [RFC6811](#) [[RFC6811](#)] fully apply to this document.

Additionally, threat agents polluting ROA cache server(s) run by IXP operators could cause significant operational impact, since multiple route server clients could be affected. Peers should be vigilant as to the integrity and authenticity of the origin validation results, as they are provided by a third party, namely the IXP operator hosting both the route server as well as any ROA cache server(s).

Therefore, a route server could be misused to spread malicious prefix origin validation results. However, peers already trust the route server for the collection, filtering (e.g. IRR database filtering), and redistribution of BGP routing information to other peers. So, no change in the trust level is needed for this proposal.

To facilitate trust and help with peers establishing appropriate controls in mitigating the risks mentioned above, IXPs SHOULD provide out-of-band means for peers to ensure that the ROA validation process has not been compromised or corrupted.

While being under DDoS attacks, it is a common practice for peers connected to an IXP to make use of blackholing services (see [[RFC7999](#)]). Peers are using blackholing to drop traffic, typically by announcing a more specific prefix, which is under attack. A peer SHOULD make sure that this prefix is covered by an appropriate ROA.

## 7. References

### 7.1. Normative References

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- [RFC7947] Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker, "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", [RFC 7947](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC7947, September 2016, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7947>>.

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