Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from an RPKI Origin Validating BGP Speaker to BGP Peers
draft-ietf-sidrops-validating-bgp-speaker-01

Abstract

   This document defines a new BGP transitive extended community, as
   well as its usage, to signal prefix origin validation results from an
   RPKI Origin validating BGP speaker to other BGP peers. Upon
   reception of prefix origin validation results, peers can use this
   information in their local routing decision process.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

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   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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1. Introduction

   RPKI-based prefix origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant
   operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt. To
   facilitate acceptance and usage of prefix origin validation and
   ultimately increase the security of the Internet routing system,
   Autonomous Systems may provide RPKI-based prefix origin validation at
   certain vantage points. The result of this prefix origin validation
   is signaled to peers by using the EBGP Prefix Origin Validation State
   Extended Community as introduced in this document.

Peers receiving a prefix origin validation result from the validating
EBGP peer can use this information in their local routing decision
process for acceptance, rejection, preference, or other traffic
engineering purposes of a particular route.

2. EBGP Prefix Origin Validation Extended Community

The origin validation state extended community is a transitive Four-
octet AS Specific Extended Community [RFC5668] with the following
encoding:

```
 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|      0x02    |TBD1 (Sub-Type)|   Reserved    | Global Admin  :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
:        Global Administrator (cont.)         |validationstate|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 1

The value of the high-order octet of the extended Type field is 0x02,
which indicates it is transitive. The value of the low-order octet
(Sub-Type) of the extended Type field as assigned by IANA is TBD1.
The Reserved field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon receipt of this
community. The Global Administrator field MUST be set to the AS
number of the validating BGP speaker conducting the prefix origin
validation. The last octet of the extended community is an unsigned
integer that gives the route's validation state as described in
Section 4.

If the validating BGP speaker is configured to support the extensions
defined in this document, it SHOULD attach the origin validation
state extended community to BGP UPDATE messages sent to EBGP peers by
mapping the computed validation state in the last octet of the
extended community. A receiving BGP speaker, in the absence of a
local validation state, SHOULD derive a validation state from the
last octet of the received extended community, if present.

An implementation SHOULD NOT send more than one instance of the
origin validation state extended community. However, if more than
one instance is received, an implementation MUST disregard all
instances other than the one with the numerically greatest validation
state value. If the value received is greater than the largest
specified value (2), the implementation MUST apply a strategy similar
to attribute discard [RFC7606] by discarding the erroneous community
and logging the error for further analysis.

3. BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Utilized at Validating Peers

   A validating BGP speaker that is aware of a BGP Prefix Origin
   Validation state for a certain route can handle this information in
   one of the following modes of operation:

   Simple Tagging: The prefix origin validation state is tagged to the
        route as described in Section 2.
        This mode of operation is similar to the traditional BGP decision
        process, moreover, the prefix origin validation state information
        is available for peers.

   Dropping and Tagging: Routes for which the prefix origin validation
        state is "invalid" (according to [RFC6811]) are dropped by the
        validating BGP speaker. Routes which show a prefix origin
        validation state of "not found" and "valid" (according to
        [RFC6811]) are tagged accordingly, as discussed in Section 2.
        In this mode of operation, security is rated higher than
        questionable reachability of a prefix.

   Prioritizing and Tagging: If the validating BGP speaker holds for a
        particular prefix more than one route it removes the set of
        "invalid" routes first and secondly the "not found" routes unless
        the set of routes is empty. Based on the remaining set of
        routes, the BGP best path selection algorithm is executed. The
        selected route is marked according to Section 4. The BGP best
        path selection algorithm is changed by this mode of operation in
        such a way that "valid" routes are preferred even if they are
        unfavorable by the traditional best path selection algorithm.
        This mode promotes prefix origin validation to be the most
        important criterion for the path selection.

   A validating BGP speaker MUST support the Simple Tagging operation
   mode. Other modes of operation are OPTIONAL. The mode of operation
   MAY be configured by the validating BGP speaker operator for all
   connected peers, or for each BGP session with a peer separately.

   Path hiding, as originally discussed in [RFC7947], may impact end-to-
   end connectivity for peers receiving prefixes via validating peers,
   if the best path selected contains a prefix with an "invalid" prefix
   origin validation state, and is subsequently dropped, either at the
   peer (Simple Tagging operation mode) or the validating BGP speaker
   itself (Dropping and Tagging operation mode).

   However, these modes of operation might be used in combination with
   [RFC7911] in order to allow a peer to receive all routes and take the
   routing decision by itself.

4. **Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Validating Peer to Peers**

The EBGP Prefix Origin Validation State Community is utilized for signaling prefix origin validation result from a validating BGP speaker to other peers.

This draft proposes an encoding of the prefix origin validation result [RFC6811] as follows:

```
+-------+-----------------------------+
| Value | Meaning                     |
+-------+-----------------------------+
|   0   | Lookup result = "valid"     |
|   1   | Lookup result = "not found" |
|   2   | Lookup result = "invalid"   |
+-------+-----------------------------+
```

Table 1

This encoding is re-used. Validating peers providing RPKI-based prefix origin validation set the validation state according to the prefix origin validation result (see [RFC6811]).

5. **Operational Recommendations**

5.1. **Local Routing Decision Process**

A peer receiving prefix origin validation results from the route server MAY use the information in its own local routing decision process. The local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the rules as described in Section 5 [RFC6811].

A peer receiving a prefix origin validation result from the route server MAY redistribute this information within its own AS.

In cases where multiple ASes are being administered by the same authority, peers MAY also redistribute this information across EBGP boundaries of the authority in question.

5.2. **Validating Peers Receiving the EBGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community**

A validating BGP speaker receiving routes from peers containing the EBGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers. This is required regardless of whether the validating BGP speaker is executing prefix origin validation or not.

Failure to do so would allow opportunistic peers to advertise routes
tagged with arbitrary prefix origin validation results via validating
peers, influencing maliciously the decision process of other, non-
validating BGP speakers.

5.3. Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not Available at a Validating Peer

In case information about the validity of a BGP prefix origin is not
available at the validating BGP speaker (e.g., error in the ROA
cache, CPU overload) the validating BGP speaker MUST NOT add the EBGP
Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community to the route.

5.4. Error Handling at Peers

A route sent by a validating BGP speaker SHOULD only contain none or
one EBGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community.

A peer receiving a route from a validating BGP speaker containing
more than one EBGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community
SHOULD only consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in
the validation result field and disregard the other values. Values
larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded.

6. IANA Considerations

IANA is asked to assign a Transitive BGP Opaque Extended Community as
defined in Section 4 of [RFC7153].

7. Security Considerations

All security considerations described in RFC6811 [RFC6811] fully
apply to this document.

Additionally, threat agents polluting ROA cache server(s) run by AS
operators could cause significant operational impact, since multiple
validating BGP speaker clients could be affected. Peers should be
vigilant as to the integrity and authenticity of the origin
validation results as they are provided by a third party, namely the
AS operator hosting both the validating BGP speaker as well as any
ROA cache server(s).

Therefore, a validating BGP speaker could be misused to spread
malicious prefix origin validation results. However, in the case of
IXPs, peers already trust the route server for the collection,
filtering (e.g., IRR database filtering), and redistribution of BGP
routing information to other peers.

To facilitate trust and support with peers establishing appropriate controls in mitigating the risks mentioned above, AS operators SHOULD provide out-of-band means for peers to ensure that the ROA validation process has not been compromised or corrupted.

While being under DDoS attacks, it is a common practice for peers connected to other Autonomous Systems and make use of blackholing services. Peers are using blackholing to drop traffic, typically by announcing a more specific prefix, which is under attack. A peer SHOULD make sure that this prefix is covered by an appropriate ROA.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

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