

SIP Core  
Internet-Draft  
Updates: [3261](#) (if approved)  
Intended status: Standards Track  
Expires: April 14, 2020

R. Shekh-Yusef  
Avaya  
C. Holmberg  
Ericsson  
V. Pascual  
webrtchacks  
October 12, 2019

**Third-Party Token-based Authentication and Authorization for Session  
Initiation Protocol (SIP)  
draft-ietf-sipcore-sip-token-authnz-03**

**Abstract**

This document defines a mechanism for SIP, that is based on the OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect Core 1.0 specifications, to enable the delegation of the user authentication and SIP registration authorization to a dedicated third-party entity that is separate from the SIP network elements that provide the SIP service.

**Status of This Memo**

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of [BCP 78](#) and [BCP 79](#).

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at <https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/>.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on April 14, 2020.

**Copyright Notice**

Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to [BCP 78](#) and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info>) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English.

## Table of Contents

<a href="#">1.</a>	<a href="#">Introduction</a>	<a href="#">2</a>
<a href="#">1.1.</a>	<a href="#">Terminology</a>	<a href="#">3</a>
<a href="#">1.2.</a>	<a href="#">SIP User Agent Types</a>	<a href="#">3</a>
<a href="#">2.</a>	<a href="#">SIP Procedures</a>	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">2.1.</a>	<a href="#">UAC Behavior</a>	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">2.1.1.</a>	<a href="#">Obtaining Tokens</a>	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">2.1.2.</a>	<a href="#">Protecting the Access Token</a>	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">2.1.3.</a>	<a href="#">REGISTER Request</a>	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">2.1.4.</a>	<a href="#">Non-REGISTER Request</a>	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">2.2.</a>	<a href="#">UAS and Registrar Behavior</a>	<a href="#">6</a>
<a href="#">2.3.</a>	<a href="#">Proxy Behavior</a>	<a href="#">6</a>
<a href="#">3.</a>	<a href="#">WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field</a>	<a href="#">6</a>
<a href="#">4.</a>	<a href="#">'sip.token' Media Feature Tag</a>	<a href="#">7</a>
<a href="#">5.</a>	<a href="#">Example Flows</a>	<a href="#">8</a>
<a href="#">5.1.</a>	<a href="#">Registration</a>	<a href="#">8</a>
<a href="#">5.2.</a>	<a href="#">Registration with Pre-Configured AS</a>	<a href="#">10</a>
<a href="#">6.</a>	<a href="#">Security Considerations</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">7.</a>	<a href="#">IANA Considerations</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">7.1.</a>	<a href="#">SIP Media Feature Tag</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">7.1.1.</a>	<a href="#">sip.token</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">8.</a>	<a href="#">Acknowledgments</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">9.</a>	<a href="#">Normative References</a>	<a href="#">13</a>
	<a href="#">Authors' Addresses</a>	<a href="#">14</a>

## [1. Introduction](#)

The SIP protocol [[RFC3261](#)] uses the framework used by the HTTP protocol for authenticating users, which is a simple challenge-response authentication mechanism that allows a server to challenge a



client request and allows a client to provide authentication information in response to that challenge.

OAuth 2.0 [[RFC6749](#)] defines a token based authorization framework to allow clients to access resources on behalf of their user.

The OpenID Connect 1.0 [[OPENID](#)] specifications defines a simple identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol, which enables clients to verify the identity of the user based on the authentication performed by a dedicated authorization server, as well as to obtain basic profile information about the user.

This document defines an mechanism for SIP, that is based on the OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect Core 1.0 specifications, to enable the delegation of the user authentication and SIP registration authorization to a dedicated third-party entity that is separate from the SIP network elements that provide the SIP service.

### **[1.1.](#) Terminology**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

### **[1.2.](#) SIP User Agent Types**

[RFC6749] defines two types of clients, confidential and public, that apply to the SIP User Agents.

- o Confidential User Agent: is a SIP UA that is capable of maintaining the confidentiality of the user credentials and any tokens obtained using these user credentials.
- o Public User Agent: is a SIP UA that is incapable of maintaining the confidentiality of the user credentials and any obtained tokens.



## **2. SIP Procedures**

[Section 22 of \[RFC3261\]](#) defines the SIP procedures for the Digest authentication mechanism procedures. The same procedures apply to the Bearer authentication mechanism, with the changes described in this section.

### **2.1. UAC Behavior**

#### **2.1.1. Obtaining Tokens**

When a UAC sends a request without credentials (or with credentials that are no longer valid), and receives a 401 (Unauthorized) or a 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response that contains a WWW-Authenticate header field (in case of a 401 response) or a Proxy-Authenticate header field (in case of a 407 response) that indicates "Bearer" scheme authentication and contains an address to an Authorization Server, the UAC contacts the Authorization Server in order to obtain tokens. The tokens returned to the UA depend on the type of server: with an OAuth AS, the tokens provided are the access token and refresh token. With an OpenID Connect server, an additional ID-Token is returned, which contains the SIP URI and other user specific details. The method used to authenticate the user and obtain these tokens is out of scope for this document, with one potential method is the Native App mechanism defined in [\[RFC8252\]](#).

NOTE: The address of the Authorization Server might be known to the UAC e.g., using means of configuration, in which case the UAC can contact the Authorization Server in order to obtain the access token before it sends SIP request without credentials.

#### **2.1.2. Protecting the Access Token**

[\[RFC6749\]](#) mandates that Access Tokens are protected with TLS when in transit. However, TLS only guarantees hop-to-hop protection when used to protect SIP signaling. Therefore the Access Token MUST be protected in a way so that only authorized SIP servers will have access to it. Endpoints that support this specifications MUST support encrypted JSON Web Tokens (JWT) [\[RFC7519\]](#) for encoding and protecting Access Token when included in SIP requests, unless some other mechanism is used to guarantee that only authorized SIP endpoints have access to the Access Token.



### **2.1.3. REGISTER Request**

The procedures in this section assumes that the UAC has obtained a token as specified in section [Section 2.1.1](#)

When a UAC sends a REGISTER request in order to create a binding, it MUST include an Authorization header field with a Bearer scheme, carrying the access token, in the request, as specified in [[RFC6750](#)]. Based on local policy, the UAC MAY include an access token that has been used for another binding associated with the same AOR in the request.

When the UAC sends a binding refresh REGISTER request, it SHOULD include an Authorization header field with either the access token previously used for the binding, or a new access token (obtained using the refresh token) if the previous one has expired.

If the access token included in a REGISTER request is not accepted, and the UAC receives a 401 response or a 407 response, the UAC follows the procedures in [Section 2.1.1](#).

### **2.1.4. Non-REGISTER Request**

The procedures in this section assumes that the UAC has obtained a token as specified in section [Section 2.1.1](#)

When a UAC sends a request in order to initiate a SIP dialog, or sends a stand-alone request, the UAC MUST include an Authorization header field with a Bearer scheme, carrying the access token, in the request, as specified in [[RFC6750](#)]. Based on local policy, the UAC MAY include an access token that has been used for another dialog, or for another stand-alone request, if the target of the new request is the same.

When the UAC sends a mid-dialog request, the UAC SHOULD include an Authorization header field with either the access token previously used within the dialog, or with a new access token if the previous one has expired or the UAC refreshed the access token before its expiry time.

If the access token included in a request is not accepted, and the UAC receives a 401 response or a 407 response, the UAC follows the procedures in [Section 2.1.1](#).





## **2.2. UAS and Registrar Behavior**

When a UAS or a Registrar receives a SIP request that does not contain an Authorization header field with a valid access token, and the UAS/Proxy decides to challenge the originator of the request, the proxy **MUST** challenge the request and send a 401 (Unauthorized) response. The UAS/Proxy **MUST** include a Proxy-Authentication header field in the response, indicate "Bearer" scheme and include an address to an Authorization Server from there the originator can obtain an access token.

When a UAS/Registrar receives a SIP request that contains an Authorization header field with an access token, the UAS/Registrar **MUST** validate the access token, using the procedures associated with the type of access token used. If the validation is successful the UAS/Registrar can continue to process the request using normal SIP procedures. If the validation fails, the UAS/Registrar **MUST** reject the request.

## **2.3. Proxy Behavior**

When a proxy receives a SIP request that does not contain a Proxy-Authentication header field with a valid access token, and the proxy decides to challenge the originator of the request, the proxy **MUST** challenge the request and send a 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response. The proxy **MUST** include a Proxy-Authentication header field in the response, indicate "Bearer" scheme and include an address to an Authorization Server from there the originator can obtain an access token.

When a proxy receives a SIP request that contains an Proxy-Authentication header field with an access token, and the proxy has previously challenged the originator of the request, the proxy **MUST** validate the access token, using the procedures associated with the type of access token used. If the validation is successful the proxy can continue to process the request using normal SIP procedure. If the validation fails, the UAS/Registrar **MUST** reject the request.

## **3. WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field**

This section describes the syntax of the WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field when used with the Bearer scheme to challenge the UA for credentials.



```
challenge =/ ("Bearer" LWS bearer-cln *(COMMA bearer-cln))
bearer-cln = realm / scope / authz-server / error /
             auth-param
authz-server = "authz_server" EQUAL authz-server-value
authz-server-value = quoted-string
```

The realm and auth-param parameters are defined in [[RFC3261](#)].

As per [[RFC3261](#)], the realm string alone defines the protection domain. [[RFC3261](#)] states that the realm string must be globally unique and recommends that the realm string contains a hostname or domain name. It also states that the realm string should be human-readable identifier that can be rendered to the user.

The scope and error parameters are defined in [[RFC6749](#)].

The scope parameter could be used by the registrar/proxy to indicate to the UAC the minimum scope that must be associated with the access token to be able to get service. As defined in [[RFC6749](#)], the value of the scope parameter is expressed as a list of space-delimited, case-sensitive strings. The strings are defined by the authorization server. The values of the scope parameter is out of scope for this document.

The error parameter could be used by the registrar/proxy to indicate to the UAC the reason for the error, with possible values of "invalid\_token" or "invalid\_scope".

#### **4. 'sip.token' Media Feature Tag**

The sip.token media feature tag, when inserted in the Contact header field of a SIP REGISTER request, conveys that the SIP UA associated with the tag supports a token based authentication mechanism, where the user authentication and SIP registration authorization is performed by a third party. The media feature tag has no values.


```
token-mt = "+sip.token"
```



## 5. Example Flows

### 5.1. Registration

The figure belows show an example of a SIP registration, where the UA is informed about the Authorization Server (AS) from where to obtain an access token by the registrar in a 401 response to the REGISTER request.



In step [1], the UA starts the registration process by sending a SIP REGISTER request to the registrar without any credentials. The REGISTER request includes an indication that the UA supports token-based authentication, using a sip.token media feature tag.



In step [2], the registrar challenges the UA, by sending a SIP 401 (Unauthorized) response to the REGISTER request. In the response the registrar includes information about the AS to contact in order to obtain a token.

In step [3], the UA collects the user credentials associated with the AS.

In steps [4] and [5], the UA contacts the AS in order to authenticate the user and to obtain tokens to be used to get access to the SIP network.

The tokens returned to the UA depend on the type of server: with an OAuth AS, the tokens provided are the access token and refresh token. With an OpenID Connect server, an additional ID-Token is returned, which contains the SIP URI of the user. The method used to authenticate the user and obtain these tokens is out of scope for this document.

In step [6], the UA retries the registration process by sending a new SIP REGISTER request that includes the access token that the UA obtained in steps [10] and [11].

The registrar validates the access token. If the access token is a reference token, the registrar MAY perform an introspection, as in steps [7] and [8], in order to obtain more information about the access token and its scope, as per [\[RFC7662\]](#). Otherwise, after the registrar validates the token to make sure it was signed by a trusted entity, it inspects its claims and act upon it.


In step [9], once the registrar has successfully verified and accepted the access token, it sends a 200 (OK) response to the REGISTER request.





## 5.2. Registration with Pre-Configured AS

The figure belows show an example of a SIP registration, where the UA is has pre-configured information about the Authorization Server (AS) from where to obtain the access token.



In step [1], the UA collects the user credentials associated with the AS.

In steps [2] and [3], the UA contacts the AS in order to authenticate the user and to obtain tokens to be used to get access to the SIP network.

The tokens returned to the UA depend on the type of server: with an OAuth AS, the tokens provided are the access token and refresh token. With an OpenID Connect server, an additional ID-Token is returned, which contains the SIP URI of the user. The method used to authenticate the user and obtain these tokens is out of scope for this document.



In step [4], the UA retries the registration process by sending a new SIP REGISTER request that includes the access token that the UA obtained in steps [10] and [11].

The registrar validates the access token. If the access token is a reference token, the registrar MAY perform an introspection, as in steps [5] and [6], in order to obtain more information about the access token and its scope, as per [RFC7662]. Otherwise, after the registrar validates the token to make sure it was signed by a trusted entity, it inspects its claims and act upon it.

In step [7], once the registrar has successfully verified and accepted the access token, it sends a 200 (OK) response to the REGISTER request.

## 6. Security Considerations

The security considerations for OAuth are defined in [RFC6749]. The security considerations for bearer tokens are defined in [RFC6750]. The security considerations for JSON Web Tokens (JWT) are defined in [RFC7519]. These security considerations also apply to SIP usage of access token as defined in this document.

[RFC6749] mandates that Access Tokens are protected with TLS. However, TLS only guarantees hop-to-hop protection when used to protect SIP signaling. Therefore the Access Token MUST be protected in a way so that only authorized SIP endpoints will have access to it. Endpoints that support this specifications MUST support encrypted JSON Web Tokens (JWT) [RFC7519] for encoding and protecting Access Token when included in SIP requests, unless some other mechanism is used to guarantee that only authorized SIP endpoints have access to the Access Token.



## **7. IANA Considerations**

### **7.1. SIP Media Feature Tag**

#### **7.1.1. sip.token**

This section defines a new media feature tag that extends the "SIP Media Feature Tag Registration Tree" subregistry [RFC3840] under the "Media Feature Tags" registry (<https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-feature-tags>).

Media feature tag name: sip.token

Summary of the media feature indicated by this feature tag: This media feature tag, when inserted in the Contact header field of a SIP REGISTER request, conveys that the SIP UA associated with the tag supports a token based authentication mechanism, where the user authentication and SIP registration authorization is performed by a third party.

Values appropriate for use with this feature tag: none

Related standards or documents: RFC XXXX

Security considerations: This media feature tag does not introduce new security considerations, as it simply indicates support for a basic SIP feature. However, if an attacker manages to remove the media feature tag from a SIP REGISTER request, the SIP UA that inserted it might not be able to authenticate itself with the SIP registrar to which the SIP request is addressed, as the SIP registrar might not be aware that the SIP UA supports the feature associated with the media feature tag.

Contact: IESG ([iesg@ietf.org](mailto:iesg@ietf.org))

## **8. Acknowledgments**

The authors would also like to thank the following for their review and feedback on this document:

Paul Kyzivat, Olle Johansson, Roman Shpount, and Dale Worley.

The authors would also like to thank the following for their review and feedback of the original document that was replaced with this document:



Andrew Allen, Martin Dolly, Keith Drage, Paul Kyzivat, Jon Peterson, Michael Procter, Roy Radhika, Matt Ryan, Ivo Sedlacek, Roman Shpount, Robert Sparks, Asveren Tolga, and Dale Worley.

## 9. Normative References

- [OPENID] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", February 2014.
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.
- [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", [RFC 3261](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>>.
- [RFC3840] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., and P. Kyzivat, "Indicating User Agent Capabilities in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", [RFC 3840](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC3840, August 2004, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3840>>.
- [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC 6749](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>>.
- [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage", [RFC 6750](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>>.
- [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", [RFC 7231](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>>.
- [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", [RFC 7519](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>>.





- [RFC7523] Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants", [RFC 7523](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC7523, May 2015, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7523>>.
- [RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection", [RFC 7662](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>>.
- [RFC8252] Denniss, W. and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps", [BCP 212](#), [RFC 8252](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC8252, October 2017, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8252>>.

#### Authors' Addresses

Rifaat Shekh-Yusef  
Avaya  
425 Legget Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario  
Canada

Phone: +1-613-595-9106  
EMail: rifaat.ietf@gmail.com

Christer Holmberg  
Ericsson  
Hirsalantie 11  
Jorvas 02420  
Finland

EMail: christer.holmberg@ericsson.com

Victor Pascual  
webrtchacks  
Spain

EMail: victor.pascual.avila@gmail.com

