

SIPPING
Internet-Draft
Expires: May 30, 2006

J. Rosenberg
Cisco Systems
G. Camarillo, Ed.
Ericsson
D. Willis
Cisco Systems
November 26, 2005

Requirements for Consent-Based Communications in the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP)
[draft-ietf-sipping-consent-reqs-02.txt](#)

Status of this Memo

By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with [Section 6 of BCP 79](#).

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at <http://www.ietf.org/ietf/lid-abstracts.txt>.

The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at <http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html>.

This Internet-Draft will expire on May 30, 2006.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) supports communications across many media types, including real-time audio, video, text, instant messaging, and presence. In its current form, it allows session invitations, instant messages, and other requests to be delivered

Internet-Draft

Consent Requirements

November 2005

from one party to another without requiring explicit consent of the recipient. Without such consent, it is possible for SIP to be used for malicious purposes, including spam and denial-of-service attacks. This document identifies a set of requirements for extensions to SIP that add consent-based communications.

Table of Contents

1.	Introduction	3
2.	Problem Statement	3
3.	Requirements	5
4.	Security Considerations	6
4.1.	IANA Considerations	6
5.	References	6
5.1.	Normative References	6
5.2.	Informational References	7
	Authors' Addresses	8
	Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements	9

1. Introduction

The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [[1](#)] supports communications across many media types, including real-time audio, video, text, instant messaging, and presence. This communication is established by the transmission of various SIP requests (such as INVITE and MESSAGE [[3](#)]) from an initiator to the recipient, with whom communication is desired. Although a recipient of such a SIP request can reject the request, and therefore decline the session, a SIP network will deliver a SIP request to the recipient without their explicit consent.

Receipt of these requests without explicit consent can cause a number of problems in SIP networks. These include spam and DoS (Denial of Service) attacks. These problems have plagued email. Fortunately, most SIP networks, at time of writing, were not interconnected with each other, and so the incidences of such problems have been lower. However, once such broad interconnection occurs, these problems will arise. Therefore, it is important to address them proactively, before it is too late.

This document elaborates on the problems posed by the current open model in which SIP was designed, and then goes on to define a set of requirements for adding a consent framework to SIP.

2. Problem Statement

In SIP networks designed according to the principles of [RFC 3261](#) [[1](#)] and [RFC 3263](#) [[2](#)], anyone on the Internet can create and send a SIP request to any other SIP user, by identifying that user with a SIP URI. The SIP network will usually deliver this request to the user identified by that URI. It is possible, of course, for network services, such as call screening, to block such messaging from occurring, but this is not widespread and certainly not a systematic solution to the problem under consideration here.

Once the SIP request is received by the recipient, the user agent typically takes some kind of automated action to alert the user about receipt of the message. For INVITE requests, this usually involves "ringing the phone", or creating a screen pop. These indicators frequently convey the subject of the call and the identity of the caller. Due to the real-time nature of the session, these alerts are typically disruptive in nature, so as to get the attention of the user.

For MESSAGE requests, the content of the message is usually rendered to the user.

SUBSCRIBE [4] requests do not normally get delivered to the user agents residing on a user's devices. Rather, they are normally processed by network-based state agents. The watcher information event package allows a user to find out that such requests were generated for them, affording the user the opportunity to approve or deny the request. As a result, SUBSCRIBE processing, and most notably presence, already has a consent-based operation. Nevertheless, this already-existing consent mechanism for SIP subscriptions does not protect network agents against DoS attacks.

There are two principal problems that arise when MESSAGE and INVITE requests can be delivered to user agents directly, without their consent. The first is spam. For INVITE requests, this takes the form of typical "telemarketer" calls. A user might receive a stream of never-ending requests for communications, each of them disrupting the user and demanding their attention. For MESSAGE requests, the problem is even more severe. The user might receive a never-ending stream of screen pops that deliver unwanted, malicious, or otherwise undesired content.

The second problem is DoS attacks. SIP proxies provide a convenient relay point for targeting a message to a particular user or IP address, and in particular, relaying to a recipient which is often not directly reachable without usage of the proxy. Worse, some proxies or back to back user agents generate multiple outgoing requests upon receipt of an incoming request. This occurs in forking proxies, and in URI-list services. Examples of URI-list services are subscriptions to resource lists, dial out conference servers, and MESSAGE URI-list services. These SIP elements can be used as an

amplifier, allowing the transmission of a single SIP request to flood packets to a single recipient or network. For example, a user can create a buddy list with 100 entries, each of which is a URI of the form "sip:identifier@target-IP", where target-IP is the IP address to which the attack is to be directed. Sending a single SIP SUBSCRIBE request to such a list will cause the resource list server to generate 100 SUBSCRIBE requests, each to the IP address of the target, which does not even need to be a SIP node.

Note that the target-IP does not need to be the same in all the URIs in order to attack a single machine. For example, the target-IP addresses may all belong to the same subnetwork, in which case the target of the attack would be the access router of the subnetwork.

Though the spam and DoS problems are not quite the same, both can be alleviated by adding a consent-based communications framework to SIP. Such a framework keeps servers from relaying messages to users without their consent.

The framework for SIP URI-list services [5] identifies these two problems (spam and DoS attacks) in the context of URI-list services. That framework mandates the use of opt-in lists, which are a form of consent-based communications. The reader can find an analysis on how a consent-based framework help alleviating spam-related problems in [6].

3. Requirements

The following identify requirements for a solution that provides consent-based communications in SIP.

REQ 1: The solution must keep relays from delivering a SIP request to a recipient unless the recipient has explicitly granted permission to the relay.

REQ 2: The solution shall prevent relays from generating more than one outbound request in response to an inbound request, unless permission to do so has been granted by the resource to whom the outbound request was to be targeted.

REQ 3: The permissions shall be capable of specifying that messages from a specific user, identified by a SIP AoR, are permitted.

REQ 4: It shall be possible for a user with a particular AoR to specify permissions separately for each resource that wishes to relay requests to that AOR.

REQ 5: It shall be possible for a user to revoke permissions at any time.

REQ 6: It shall not be required for a user or user agent to store information in order to be able to revoke permissions that were previously granted for a relay resource.

REQ 7: The solution shall work in an inter-domain context, without requiring pre-established relationships between domains.

REQ 8: The solution shall work for all current and future SIP methods.

REQ 9: The solution shall be applicable to forking proxies.

REQ 10: The solution shall be applicable to URI-list services, such as resource list servers, MESSAGE URI-list services, and conference servers performing dial-out functions.

REQ 11: The solution shall be applicable to both stored and request-contained URI-list services.

REQ 12: The solution shall allow anonymous communications, as long as the recipient is willing to accept anonymous communications.

REQ 13: If the recipient of requests wishes to be anonymous, it shall be possible for them to grant permissions without a sender knowing their identity.

REQ 14: The solution shall prevent against attacks that seek to

undermine the underlying goal of consent. That is, it should not be possible to "fool" the system into delivering a request for which permission was not, in fact, granted.

REQ 15: The solution shall not require the recipient of the communications to be connected to the network at the time communications is attempted.

REQ 16: The solution shall not require the sender of a SIP request to be connected at the time that a recipient provides permission.

REQ 17: The solution should scale to Internet-wide deployment.

[4.](#) Security Considerations

Security has been discussed throughout this specification.

[4.1.](#) IANA Considerations

This document does not require the IANA to take any actions

[5.](#) References

[5.1.](#) Normative References

- [1] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", [RFC 3261](#), June 2002.
- [2] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP): Locating SIP Servers", [RFC 3263](#), June 2002.

- [3] Campbell, B., Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Huitema, C., and D. Gurle, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension for Instant Messaging", [RFC 3428](#), December 2002.

[5.2.](#) Informational References

- [4] Roach, A., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-Specific Event Notification", [RFC 3265](#), June 2002.

- [5] Camarillo, G. and A. Roach, "Framework and Security Considerations for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)-List Services", [draft-ietf-sipping-uri-services-04](#) (work in progress), October 2005.
- [6] Rosenberg, J. and C. Jennings, "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Spam", [draft-rosenberg-sipping-spam-01](#) (work in progress), October 2004.

Jonathan Rosenberg
Cisco Systems
600 Lanidex Plaza
Parsippany, NJ 07054
US

Phone: +1 973 952-5000
Email: jdrosen@cisco.com
URI: <http://www.jdrosen.net>

Gonzalo Camarillo (editor)
Ericsson
Hirsalantie 11
Jorvas 02420
Finland

Email: Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com

Dean Willis
Cisco Systems
2200 E. Pres. George Bush Turnpike
Richardson, TX 75082
USA

Email: dean.willis@softarmor.com

Intellectual Property Statement

The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in [BCP 78](#) and [BCP 79](#).

Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at <http://www.ietf.org/ipr>.

The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org.

Disclaimer of Validity

This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Copyright Statement

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in [BCP 78](#), and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.

Acknowledgment

Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the

Internet Society.

Rosenberg, et al.

Expires May 30, 2006

[Page 9]