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Sean Turner, IECA
Daniel Brown, Certicom
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Update to Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms
in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
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Abstract

[RFC 3278](#) describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This document updates [RFC 3278](#) to add support for the SHA2 family of hash algorithms.

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Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[MUST](#)].

Discussion

This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-smime' mailing list. To subscribe, send a message to ietf-smime-request@imc.org with the single word subscribe in the body of the message. There is a Web site for the mailing list at <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/>.

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[1. Introduction](#)

[RFC 3278](#) describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This document updates [RFC 3278](#) to add support for the SHA2 family of hash algorithms.

The following summarizes the changes:

- Paragraph 2.1.1 limited the digest algorithm to SHA-1. This document expands the allowed algorithms to SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.

- Paragraph 3.1.1 used SHA1 in the KDF with ECDH std and cofactor methods. This document expands the options to the allowed algorithms to SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.

- Paragraph 3.1.2 used SHA1 in the KDF with ECMQV. This document expands the options to the allowed algorithms to SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
- Paragraph 5 was update to include requirements for hash algorithms and recommendations for matching curves and hash algorithms. It also was expanded to indicate which ECDH and ECMQV variants are required.
- Paragraph 7 was update to include S/MIME capabilities for ECDSA with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. It was also updated to include S/MIME capabilities for ECDH and ECMQV using SHA2 algorithms as the KDF.
- Paragraph 8.1 listed the algorithm identifiers for SHA-1 and SHA-1 with ECDSA. This document adds algorithms for SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 and SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 with ECDSA. This document also updates the list of algorithm identifiers for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV with SHA2 algorithms as the KDF.
- Paragraph 9 references need to be updated.
- Added ASN.1 module.
- Security considerations paragraph referring to definitions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 needs to be deleted.

[2.](#) Updates to Paragraph 2.1.1

Old:

digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier sha-1 (see [Section 8.1](#)) which identifies the SHA-1 hash algorithm.

signatureAlgorithm contains the algorithm identifier ecdsa-with-SHA1 (see [Section 8.1](#)) which identifies the ECDSA signature algorithm.

New:

digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash algorithm (see [Section 8.1](#)) which MUST be one of the following: id-sha1 identifies the SHA-1 hash algorithm, id-sha224 identifies the SHA-224 hash algorithm, id-sha256 identifies the SHA-256 hash algorithm, id-sha384 identifies the SHA-384 algorithm, and id-sha512 identifies the SHA-512 algorithm.

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signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier (see [Section 8.1](#)): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512.

[3.](#) Updates to Paragraph 3.1.1

Old:

keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme object identifier (see [Section 8.1](#)) if standard ECDH primitive is used, or the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme object identifier (see [Section 8.1](#)) if the cofactor ECDH primitive is used. The parameters field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm used to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with the key-encryption key (KEK).

New:

keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the key encryption algorithm object identifier (see [Section 8.1](#)). The parameters field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm used to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with the key-encryption key (KEK). Algorithm requirements are found in paragraph 5.

[4.](#) Updates to Paragraph 3.2.1

Old:

keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST be the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme algorithm identifier (see [Section 8.1](#)), with the parameters field KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric

encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm.

New:

keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST be the key encryption algorithm identifier (see [Section 8.1](#)), with the parameters field KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm. Algorithm requirements are found in paragraph 5.

[5](#). Updates to Paragraph 5

Add the following to the end of the section:

Implementations of this specification MUST implement the SHA-256 hash algorithm. The SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms MAY be supported.

When ECDSA, ECDH, or ECMQV is used, it is RECOMMENDED that the P-256 curve be used with SHA-256, the P-384 curve be used with SHA-384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-512.

Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData with ephemeral-static ECDH standard primitive MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also support the id-aes128-wrap algorithm.

Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData with ephemeral-static ECDH cofactor primitive MUST support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also support the id-aes128-wrap algorithm.

Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData with ECMQV MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also support the id-aes128-wrap algorithm.

Implementations of this specification that support AuthenticatedData with ECMQV MUST support the

mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also support the id-aes128-wrap algorithm.

6. Updates to Paragraph 7

Old:

The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the ECDSA signature algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA1 with NULL parameters. The DER encoding is:

```
30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00
```

New:

The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the ECDSA signature algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object identifiers ecdsa-with-SHA* object

identifiers (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) all with NULL parameters. The DER encodings are:

```
ecdsa-with-SHA1: 30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00
```

```
ecdsa-with-SHA224: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 01 05 00
```

```
ecdsa-with-SHA256: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 05 00
```

```
ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03 05 00
```

```
ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04 05 00
```

Old:

The SMIMECapability capabilityID object identifiers for the supported key agreement algorithms in this document are dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme, and mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme. For each of these SMIMECapability SEQUENCES, the parameters field is present and indicates the supported key-encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier. The DER encodings that indicate capability of the three key agreement algorithms with

CMS Triple-DES key wrap are:

```
30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0f 06
0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00
```

for ephemeral-static ECDH,

```
30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0f 06
0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00
```

for ephemeral-static ECDH with cofactor method, and

```
30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0f 06
0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00
```

for ECMQV.

New:

The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the ECDH standard key agreement algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object identifier dhSingPass-stdDH-sha*kdf-scheme (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) with the parameters present. The parameters indicate the

supported key-encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier. The DER encodings that indicate some capabilities are as follows (KA is key agreement, KDF is key derivation function, and Wrap is key wrap algorithm) and NOTE this is not a complete list:

KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA1 Wrap=3DES

```
30 1c
  06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02
  30 0f
    06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
    05 00
```

KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128

```
30 1a
  06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 TBD
```

```
30 0f
    06 09 60 83 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
    05 00
```

KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES256

```
30 1a
    06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 TBD
30 0f
    06 09 60 83 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
    05 00
```

The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the ECDH cofactor key agreement algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object identifier dhSingPass-cofactorDH-sha*kdf-scheme (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) with the parameters present. The parameters indicate the supported key-encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier. The DER encodings that indicate some capabilities are as follows (KA is key agreement, KDF is key derivation function, and Wrap is key wrap algorithm) and NOTE this is not a complete list:

KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA256 Wrap=3DES

```
30 1c
    06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03
30 0f
    06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
    05 00
```

KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128

```
30 1a
    06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 TBD
30 0f
```



```
06 09 60 83 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
05 00
```

KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES256

```
30 1a
    06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 TBD
    30 0f
        06 09 60 83 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
        05 00
```

The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the 1-Pass ECMWV key agreement algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object identifier `mqvSinglePass-sha*kdf-scheme` (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) with the parameters present. The parameters indicate the supported key-encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier. The DER encodings that indicate some capabilities are as follows (KA is key agreement, KDF is key derivation function, and Wrap is key wrap algorithm) and NOTE this is not a complete list:

KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA256 Wrap=3DES

```
30 1c
    06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10
    30 0f
        06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
        05 00
```

KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128

```
30 1a
    06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 TBD
    30 0f
        06 09 60 83 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
        05 00
```

KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES256

```
30 1a
    06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 TBD
    30 0f
        06 09 60 83 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
        05 00
```

7. Updates to Paragraph 8.1

Old:

The algorithm identifiers used in this document are taken from [X9.62], [SEC1] and [SEC2].

The following object identifier indicates the hash algorithm used in this document:

```
sha-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
    oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 }
```

New:

The algorithm identifiers used in this document are taken from [[SMIME-SHA2](#)]

The following object identifier indicates the hash algorithm used in this document:

```
id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-
    organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 }
```

```
id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
    nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 }
```

```
id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
    nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }
```

```
id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
    nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 }
```

```
id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 }
```

Old:

The following object identifier indicates the digital signature algorithm used in this document:

```
ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62
signatures(4) 1 }
```

When the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA1 is used within an algorithm identifier, the associated parameters field contains NULL.

New:

The following object identifier indicates the digital signature algorithm used in this document:

```
ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62
signatures(4) 1 }
```

```
ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62
signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }
```

```
ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62
signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
```

```
ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62
signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
```

```
ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62
signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }
```

When the object identifiers ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512 is used within an algorithm identifier, the associated parameters field contains NULL.

Old:

The following object identifiers indicate the key agreement algorithms used in this document:

```
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
    x9-63-scheme 2}
```

```
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
    x9-63-scheme 3}
```

```
mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
    x9-63-scheme 16}
```

where

```
x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)  
    identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)  
    x9-63(63) schemes(0) }
```

When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm identifier, the associated parameters field contains the CMS KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.

New:

The following object identifiers indicate the key agreement algorithms used in this document:

```
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
    x9-63-scheme 2 }
```

```
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
    x9-63-scheme TBD }
```

```
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
    x9-63-scheme TBD }
```

```
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
    x9-63-scheme TBD }
```

```
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
    x9-63-scheme TBD }
```

```
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
    x9-63-scheme 3 }
```

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```
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ x9-63-scheme TBD }
```

```
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ x9-63-scheme TBD }
```

```
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ x9-63-scheme TBD }
```

```
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ x9-63-scheme TBD }
```

```
mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
  x9-63-scheme 16 }
```

```
mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
  x9-63-scheme TBD }
```

```
mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
  x9-63-scheme TBD }
```

```
mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
  x9-63-scheme TBD }
```

```
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
  x9-63-scheme TBD }
```

where

```
x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
  iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
  x9-63(63) schemes(0) }
```

When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm identifier, the associated parameters field contains the CMS KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.

[8.](#) Updates to Paragraph 9

Add the following reference:

[SMIME-SHA2] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax", work-in-progress.

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Update the following references:

Old:

[PKI-ALG] Bassham, L., Housley R. and W. Polk, "Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", [RFC 3279](#), April 2002.

[FIPS-180] FIPS 180-1, "Secure Hash Standard", National Institute of Standards and Technology, April 17, 1995.

New:

[PKI-ALG] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information", work-in-progress.

[FIPS] FIPS 180-2, "Secure Hash Standard", National Institute of Standards and Technology, August 1, 2002.

[9.](#) Changes to Security Considerations

Delete the following:

When 256, 384, and 512 bit hash functions succeed SHA-1 in future revisions of [\[FIPS\]](#), [\[FIPS-186-2\]](#), [\[X9.62\]](#) and [\[SEC1\]](#), then they can similarly succeed SHA-1 in a future revision of this document.

[10](#). Add Annex A: ASN.1 Module

Add the following section as Annex A ASN.1 Module.

SMIMEECCAlgs-2008

```
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
  smime(16) modules(0) TBD }
```

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

-- EXPORTS ALL

IMPORTS

ALGORITHM, algorithmIdentifier, MessageDigestAlgorithms,
SignatureAlgorithms

ow-sha1, ow-sha224, ow-sha256, ow-sha384, ow-sha512,

sa-ecdsaWithSHA1

FROM PKIXAlgs-2008

```
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
  security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD }
```

id-aes128-CBC, id-aes192-CBC, id-aes256-CBC, AES-IV

id-aes128-wrap, id-aes192-wrap, id-aes1256-wrap

FROM CMSAesRsaes0aep

```
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
  smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) }
```

id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMPParameters

id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters

FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM

```

        { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
          smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) }

OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
    smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }

hMAC-SHA1, id-alg-CMS3DESWrap, CBCParameter
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
    smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) }

;

```

```

-- Constrains the SignedData digestAlgorithms field
-- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm field

MessageDigestAlgorithms ALGORITHM :: {
  ow-sha1      |
  ow-sha224    |
  ow-sha256    |
  ow-sha384    |
  ow-sha512,
  ... -- Extensible
}

-- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field

SignatureAlgorithms ALGORITHM :: {
  sa-ecdsaWithSHA1      |
  sa-ecdsaWithSHA224    |
  sa-ecdsaWithSHA256    |
  sa-ecdsaWithSHA384    |
  sa-ecdsaWithSHA512 ,
  ... -- Extensible
}

sa-ecdsa-with-SHA224 ALGORITHM ::= {
  OID ecdsa-with-SHA224 PARMS NULL }

ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {

```



```

iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }

sa-ecdsa-with-SHA256 ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID ecdsa-with-SHA256 PARMS NULL }

ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
    ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }

sa-ecdsa-with-SHA384 ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID ecdsa-with-SHA384 PARMS NULL }

ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
    ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }

sa-ecdsa-with-SHA512 ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID ecdsa-with-SHA512 PARMS NULL }

```

```

ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
    ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }

```

```

-- ECDSA Signature Value
-- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING

```

```

ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
    r  INTEGER,
    s  INTEGER
}

```

```

-- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
-- keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field

-- DH variants are not used with AuthenticatedData or
-- AuthEnvelopedData

```

```

KeyAgreementAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {

```

```

    kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf      |
    kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf    |
    kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf    |
    kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf    |
    kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf    |
    kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf |
    kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf |
    kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf |
    kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf |
    kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf |
    kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf           |
    kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf         |
    kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf         |
    kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf         |
    kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf,
    ... -- Extensible
}

x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
    x9-63(63) schemes(0) }

kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

```

```

dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme 2 }

kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme TBD }

kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme TBD }

kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

```

```

dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme TBD }

kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme TBD }

kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme 3 }

kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme
    PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme TBD }

kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme
    PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme TBD }

```

```

kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme
    PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme TBD }

kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme
    PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme TBD }

```

```

kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme 16 }

kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme TBD }

kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme TBD }

kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme TBD }

kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    x9-63-scheme TBD }

```

```

KeyWrapAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
    kwa-3des      |
    kwa-aes128    |
    kwa-aes192    |
    kwa-aes256,
    ... -- Extensible
}

```

```

kwa-3des ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-alg-CMS3DESWrap PARMS NULL }

kwa-aes128 ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-aes128-wrap PARMS ABSENT }

kwa-aes192 ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-aes192-wrap PARMS ABSENT }

kwa-aes256 ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-aes256-wrap PARMS ABSENT }

-- Constrains the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent
-- field

ContentEncryptionAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
    cea-des-edec3-cbc |
    cea-aes128-cbc |
    cea-aes192-cbc |
    cea-aes256-cbc |
    cea-aes128-ccm |
    cea-aes192-ccm |
    cea-aes256-ccm |
    cea-aes128-gcm |
    cea-aes128-gcm |
    cea-aes128-gcm,
    ... -- Extensible
}

cea-des-edec3-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID des-edec3-cbc PARMS CBCParameter }

cea-aes128-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-aes128-CBC PARMS AES-IV }

cea-aes192-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-aes192-CBC PARMS AES-IV }

```

```

cea-aes256-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-aes256-CBC PARMS AES-IV }

```

```

cea-aes128-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-aes128-CCM PARMS CCMPParameters }

cea-aes192-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-aes192-CCM PARMS CCMPParameters }

cea-aes256-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-aes256-CCM PARMS CCMPParameters }

cea-aes128-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-aes128-GCM PARMS GCMPParameters }

cea-aes192-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-aes192-GCM PARMS GCMPParameters }

cea-aes256-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-aes256-GCM PARMS GCMPParameters }

-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData
-- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData
-- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field

MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
    maca-sha1      |
    maca-sha224    |
    maca-sha256    |
    maca-sha384    |
    maca-sha512,
    ... -- Extensible
}

maca-sha1 ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID hMAC-SHA1 PARMS NULL }

maca-sha224 ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-hmacWithSHA224 PARMS NULL }

-- Would love to import the HMAC224-512 OIDS but they're not in a
-- module (that I could find)

id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) rsadsi(2) 8 }

```

```

maca-sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-hmacWithSHA256 PARMS NULL }

id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) rsadsi(2) 9 }

maca-sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-hmacWithSHA384 PARMS NULL }

id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) rsadsi(2) 10 }

maca-sha512 ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-hmacWithSHA512 PARMS NULL }

id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) rsadsi(2) 11 }

-- Constraints on KeyAgreeRecipientInfo OriginatorIdentifierOrKey
-- OriginatorPublicKey algorithm field

-- PARMS are NULL

OriginatorPKAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
    opka-ec,
    ... -- Extensible
}

opka-ec ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-ecPublicKey PARMS NULL }

-- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys

ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING

-- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
-- ECDH or ECmqv

MQVUserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
    ephemeralPublicKey      OriginatorPublicKey,
    addedukm                [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL
}

```

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```
-- Format for ECDH and ECMQV key-encryption keys when using
-- EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData
```

```
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyInfo      AlgorithmIdentifier { KeyWrapAlgorithms },
    entityUInfo  [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
    suppPubInfo  [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
}
```

```
SMIME-CAPS ::= CLASS {
    &Type  OPTIONAL,
    &id    OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE
}
WITH SYNTAX {TYPE &Type IDENTIFIED BY &id }
```

```
SMIMECapability ::= SEQUENCE {
    capabilityID  SMIME-CAPS.&id({SMimeCapsSet}),
    parameters    SMIME-CAPS.
                    &Type({SMimeCapsSet}{@capabilityID}) OPTIONAL
}
```

```
SMimeCapsSet SMIME-CAPS ::= {
    cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1
    cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224
    cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256
    cap-ecdsa-with-SHA384
    cap-ecdsa-with-SHA512
    cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf
    cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf
    cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf
    cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf
    cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf
    cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf
    cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf
    cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf
    cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf
    cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf
    cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf
    cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf
    cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf
    cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf
    cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf,
    ... -- Extensible
```


}

cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
 TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA1 }

cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
 TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA224 }

cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
 TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA256 }

cap-ecdsa-with-SHA384 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
 TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA384 }

cap-ecdsa-with-SHA512 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
 TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA512 }

cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf }

cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf }

cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf }

cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf }

cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf }

cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf }

cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf }

cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf }

```
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {  
    TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms  
    IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf }
```

```
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {  
    TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms  
    IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf }
```

```
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {  
    TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf }
```

```
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {  
    TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf }
```

```
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {  
    TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf }
```

```
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {  
    TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf }
```

```
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {  
    TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf }
```

END

[11](#). Security Considerations

No new security considerations to those already specified in [\[RFC3278\]](#), [\[SMIME-SHA2\]](#), and [\[PKI-ALG\]](#).

[12](#). IANA Considerations

None: All identifiers are already registered. Please remove this section prior to publication as an RFC.

[13.](#) References

[13.1.](#) Normative References

- [MUST] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [RFC 2119](#), [BCP 14](#), March 1997.
- [PKI-ALG] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information", work-in-progress.
- [SMIME-SHA2] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax", work-in-progress.
- [RFC3278] Blake-Wilson, S., Brown, D., and P. Lambert, "Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", [RFC 3278](#), April 2002.

[13.2.](#) Informative References

None.

Author's Addresses

Sean Turner

IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
Fairfax, VA 22031
USA

Email: turners@ieca.com

Daniel R. L. Brown

Certicom Corp
5520 Explorer Drive #400
Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1
CANADA

Email: dbrown@certicom.com

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