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**Deployment Considerations for Dual-Stack Lite**  
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Abstract

This document discusses the deployment issues and describes requirements for the deployment and operation of Dual-Stack Lite. This document describes the various deployment considerations and applicability of the Dual-Stack Lite architecture.

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## Table of Contents

|                        |   |                    |
|------------------------|---|--------------------|
| <a href="#">1.</a>     | <a href="#">Overview . . . . .</a>  | <a href="#">3</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.</a>     | <a href="#">AFTR Deployment Considerations . . . . .</a>                        | <a href="#">3</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.1.</a>   | <a href="#">Interface Consideration . . . . .</a>                               | <a href="#">3</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.2.</a>   | <a href="#">MTU Considerations . . . . .</a>                                    | <a href="#">3</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.3.</a>   | <a href="#">Fragmentation . . . . .</a>   | <a href="#">3</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.4.</a>   | <a href="#">Lawful Intercept Considerations . . . . .</a>                       | <a href="#">4</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.5.</a>   | <a href="#">Logging at the AFTR . . . . .</a>                                   | <a href="#">4</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.6.</a>   | <a href="#">Blacklisting a shared IPv4 Address . . . . .</a>                    | <a href="#">5</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.7.</a>   | <a href="#">AFTR's Policies . . . . .</a>                                       | <a href="#">5</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.8.</a>   | <a href="#">AFTR Impacts on Accounting Process . . . . .</a>                    | <a href="#">6</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.9.</a>   | <a href="#">Reliability Considerations of AFTR . . . . .</a>                    | <a href="#">7</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.10.</a>  | <a href="#">Strategic Placement of AFTR . . . . .</a>                           | <a href="#">7</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.11.</a>  | <a href="#">AFTR Considerations for Geographically Aware Services . . . . .</a> | <a href="#">8</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.12.</a>  | <a href="#">Impacts on QoS . . . . .</a>  | <a href="#">8</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.13.</a>  | <a href="#">Port Forwarding Considerations . . . . .</a>                        | <a href="#">9</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.14.</a>  | <a href="#">DS-Lite Tunnel Security . . . . .</a>                               | <a href="#">9</a>  |
| <a href="#">2.15.</a>  | <a href="#">IPv6-only Network Considerations . . . . .</a>                      | <a href="#">9</a>  |
| <a href="#">3.</a>     | <a href="#">B4 Deployment Considerations . . . . .</a>                          | <a href="#">10</a> |
| <a href="#">3.1.</a>   | <a href="#">DNS deployment Considerations . . . . .</a>                         | <a href="#">10</a> |
| <a href="#">3.2.</a>   | <a href="#">IPv4 Service Monitoring . . . . .</a>                               | <a href="#">10</a> |
| <a href="#">3.2.1.</a> | <a href="#">B4 Remote Management . . . . .</a>                                  | <a href="#">10</a> |
| <a href="#">3.2.2.</a> | <a href="#">IPv4 Connectivity Check . . . . .</a>                               | <a href="#">10</a> |
| <a href="#">4.</a>     | <a href="#">Security Considerations . . . . .</a>                               | <a href="#">11</a> |
| <a href="#">5.</a>     | <a href="#">Conclusion . . . . .</a>  | <a href="#">11</a> |
| <a href="#">6.</a>     | <a href="#">Acknowledgement . . . . .</a>                                       | <a href="#">11</a> |
| <a href="#">7.</a>     | <a href="#">IANA Considerations . . . . .</a>                                   | <a href="#">12</a> |
| <a href="#">8.</a>     | <a href="#">References . . . . .</a>  | <a href="#">12</a> |
| <a href="#">8.1.</a>   | <a href="#">Normative References . . . . .</a>                                  | <a href="#">12</a> |
| <a href="#">8.2.</a>   | <a href="#">Informative References . . . . .</a>                                | <a href="#">12</a> |
|                        | <a href="#">Authors' Addresses . . . . .</a>                                    | <a href="#">13</a> |



## **1. Overview**

Dual-stack Lite (DS-Lite) [[RFC6333](#)] is a transition technique that enable operators to multiplex public IPv4 addresses while provisioning only IPv6 to users. DS-Lite is designed to continue offering IPv4 services while operators upgrading their network incrementally to IPv6. DS-Lite combines IPv4-in-IPv6 [[RFC2473](#)] software and NAT44 [[RFC1631](#)] to enable more than one user to share a public IPv4 address. This document discusses various DS-Lite deployment considerations for operators.

## **2. AFTR Deployment Considerations**

### **2.1. Interface Consideration**

Address Family Transition Router (AFTR) is a network element that deployed inside the operator's network. AFTR can be a standalone device or embedded into a router. AFTR is the IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnel termination point and the NAT44 device. It is deployed at the IPv4-IPv6 network border where the tunnel interface is IPv6 and the external NAT44 interface is IPv4. Although an operator can configure a dual-stack interface for both functions, we recommend to configure two individual interfaces (i.e. one dedicated for IPv4 and one dedicated for IPv6) to segregate the functions.

### **2.2. MTU Considerations**

DS-Lite is part tunneling protocol. Tunneling introduces overhead to the packet and decreases the effective MTU size after encapsulation. The DS-lite users may experience problems with applications such as not being able to download Internet pages or transfer large file. To mitigate the tunnel overhead, the access network may increase the MTU size to account the necessary tunnel overhead. If simple IPv4-in-IPv6 software [[RFC2473](#)] is used, the overhead is the size of an IPv6 header. If the access network MTU size is fixed and cannot be changed, the B4 element and the AFTR must support fragmentation defined in [[RFC6333](#)].

### **2.3. Fragmentation**

The IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnel is established between B4 and AFTR. When a host behind the B4 element communicates with a remote peer, both end nodes are not aware of the tunnel. For example, the peers may use the MTU size associated with their connected interfaces. In fact, the IPv4 packet isn't over-sized, it is the IPv6 encapsulation that may cause the oversize of the encapsulating packets. So the tunnel endpoints are responsible for handling the fragmentation. In



general, the Tunnel-Entry Point and Tunnel-Exit Point should fragment and reassemble the oversized datagram. If the DF bit is set in the IPv4 header, the B4 element should send an ICMP "Destination Unreachable" with "Fragmentation Needed and Don't Fragment was Set" and drop the packet. If the DF is unset in the IPv4 header, the B4 element should fragment the IPv6 packet after the encapsulation. This mechanism is transport protocol agnostic and works for transport protocol such as TCP and UDP over IP.

#### **2.4. Lawful Intercept Considerations**

Because of the IPv4-in-IPv6 tunneling scheme, interception of IPv4 sessions in DS-Lite framework is likely performed on the AFTR. Subjects can be uniquely identified by the IPv6 address assigned to the B4 element. If an operator is legally requested to intercept packets of a subject, the AFTR should extract the IPv4 packets from the IPv6 payload before sending it to the interception point.

Monitoring of a subject may require statically mapping the subject to a certain range of ports of a single IPv4 address, to remove the need to follow dynamic port mappings. A single IPv4 address, or some range of ports for each address, might be set aside for monitoring purposes to simplify such procedures. This requires creating a static mapping of a B4 element's IPv6 address to a public IPv4 address and port range that are used for lawful intercept.

#### **2.5. Logging at the AFTR**

Timestamped logging is essential for back tracking specific users when a problem is identified with one of the AFTR's NAT-ed addresses. Such a problem is usually a misbehaving user in the case of a spammer or a Deny-of-Service (DoS) source, or someone violating a usage policy. Without time-specific logs of the address and port mappings, a misbehaving user stays well hidden behind the AFTR.

In DS-Lite framework, each B4 element is provisioned with one or more unique source IPv6 addresses. The AFTR uses the B4's tunnel IPv6 address to identify the B4 element. Thus, to uniquely identify a specific user, the AFTR is required to log more than just IPv4 address. There are two types of logging:

- o Source-Specific Log
- o Destination-Specific Log

For Source-Specific Log, the AFTR must timestamped log the B4's IPv6 address, transport protocol, source IPv4 address after NAT-ed, and source port. If a range of ports is dynamically assigned to a B4



element, the AFTR may create one log per range of ports to aggregate number of log entries. For Destination-Specific Log, the AFTR must create a timestamped log of the B4's IPv6 address, transport protocol, source IPv4 address after NAT-ed, source port, destination address and destination port.

Destination-Specific Log is session-based, the operators can't really aggregate log entries. When using Destination-Specific Log, the operator must be careful of the large number of log entries created by the AFTR. Destination-Specific Log may raise privacy concerns. Operators should apply the same privacy policies for both regular and DS-Lite users.

Depedning on the rate of NAT table changes, real-time logging can be demanding to the AFTR if AFTR must send a log message per NAT entry change to the syslog server in real-time. If operators requires only near real-time logs, they may configure the AFTR to log changes locally and send the logs in a batch file in a pre-configured interval (e.g. every 5 minutes). The files may be compressed before transferring to better utilize bandwidth and storage. Other optimizaitons are also under consideration such as AFTR pre-allocating a set of ports to users. After creates only one log entry when a user allocates the port-set instead of log per port allocation.

## **2.6. Blacklisting a shared IPv4 Address**

AFTR is a NAT device. It enables multiple users to share a single public IPv4 address. [[RFC6269](#)] discusses some considerations when sharing an IPv4 address. When a public IPv4 address is blacklisted by a remote peer, this may affect multiple users. Internet hosts such as servers must no longer rely solely on IP address to identify an abused user. The server should combine the information stored in the transport layer (e.g. source port) and application layer (e.g. HTTP) to identify an abused user [[RFC6302](#)]. [[I-D.boucadair-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis](#)] analyzes different approaches to identify a user in a shared address environment.

## **2.7. AFTR's Policies**

There are two types of AFTR polices:

- o Outgoing Policies
- o Incoming Policies

The outgoing policies should be implemented on the AFTR's internal interface connected to the B4 elements. The policies may include





Access Control List (ACL) and Qualify of Service (QoS) settings. For example: the AFTR may only accept B4's connections originated from the IPv6 prefixes configured in the AFTR. The AFTR may also give priority to the packets marked by certain DSCP values [[RFC2475](#)]; the AFTR may also limit the rate of port allocation for a single B4's IPv6 address.

An operator may create multiple outgoing policies in the AFTR, each identified by a software. When provisioning a user, the system will pass the software identifier associated to a specific incoming policy to the user. Two standardized mechanisms to pass software identifier to the B4 element are DHCPv6 [[RFC6333](#)] and RADIUS [[RFC6519](#)]. Outgoing policies could be applied to an individual B4 element or to a set of B4 elements.

The incoming policies should be implemented on the AFTR's external interface connected to the IPv4 network. Similar to the outgoing policies, the incoming policies may include ACL and QoS settings. Incoming policies are usually more general and generic. They usually applied to all users rather than to an individual user.

## **[2.8.](#) AFTR Impacts on Accounting Process**

DS-Lite introduces challenges to IPv4 accounting process. In a typical broadband access scenario (e.g. DSL or Cable), the B4 element is embedded in the Residential Gateway and the edge router (e.g. BRAS or CMTS) is the IPv6 edge router. The edge router is usually responsible for IPv6 accounting and the subscriber management functions such as authentication, authorization and accounting. However, given the fact that IPv4 traffic is encapsulated in an IPv6 packet at the B4 and only decapsulated at the AFTR, the edge router will require additional function to collect IPv4 accounting information. If DS-lite is the only application using IP-in-IP protocol, the edge router could check the IPv6 Next Header field in the IPv6 header and identify the protocol type (i.e. 0x04) and collect IPv4 accounting information.

Alternatively, AFTR is a logical place to perform IPv4 accounting, but it will potentially introduce some additional complexity because the AFTR does not have detailed customer identity information. The accounting process at the AFTR is only necessary if the operator requires separating per user accounting records for IPv4 and IPv6 traffic. If the per user IPv6 accounting records, collected by the edge router, are sufficient, the additional complexity of enabling IPv4 accounting at the AFTR is not required. It is important to notice that, since the IPv4 traffic is encapsulated in IPv6 packets, the data collected by the edge router for IPv6 traffic already contain the total amount of traffic (i.e. IPv4 and IPv6).



Even if detailed accounting records collection for IPv4 traffic may not be required, it would be useful for an operator in some scenarios to have information that is generated by the edge router for the IPv4 traffic and can be used to identify the AFTR who is handling the IPv4 traffic for that user. This can be achieved by adding additional information the IPv6 accounting records. For example: xw operators can use RADIUS attribute information specified in [[RFC6519](#)].

## **2.9. Reliability Considerations of AFTR**

The operator can use techniques such as various types of clusters to achieve high availability of the IPv4 service. High availability techniques include the cold standby mode. In this mode the AFTR states are not replicated from the Primary AFTR to the Backup AFTR. When the Primary AFTR fails, all the existing established sessions will be flushed out. The internal hosts are required to re-establish sessions with the external hosts. Another high availability option is the hot standby mode. In this mode the AFTR keeps established sessions while failover happens. AFTR states are replicated on-the-fly from the Primary AFTR to the Backup AFTR. When the Primary AFTR fails, the Backup AFTR will take over all the existing established sessions. In this mode the internal hosts are not required to re-establish sessions with the external hosts. The final option is to deploy a mode in between these two whereby only selected sessions such as critical protocols are replicated. Criteria for sessions to be replicated on the backup would be explicitly configured on the AFTR devices of a redundancy group.

## **2.10. Strategic Placement of AFTR**

In DS-lite, IPv4 traffic from B4 must pass through the AFTR to reach the IPv4 Internet. Managing large numbers of tunnels and a large NAT table could be resource intensive (e.g. CPU and memory), so the placement of the AFTR could affect the traffic flows in the access network and have operation implications. In general, there are two placement models to deploy AFTR. Model One is to deploy the AFTR in the edge of the network to cover a small region. Model Two is to deploy the AFTR in the core of network to cover a large region.

When an operator considers where to deploy the AFTR, it must make trade-offs. AFTR in Model One serves few B4 elements, thus, it requires less powerful AFTR. Moreover, the traffic flows are more evenly distributed to the AFTRs. However, it requires deploying more AFTRs to cover the entire network. Often the operation cost increases proportionally to the number of network equipment.

AFTR in Model Two covers a large area, thus, it serves more B4 elements. The operator could deploy only few AFTRs to support the



entire subscriber base. However, this model requires more powerful AFTR to sustain the load at peak hours. Since the AFTR would support B4 elements from different regions, the AFTR would be deployed closer to the core network.

DS-Lite framework can be incrementally deployed. An operator may consider to start with Model Two. When the demand increases, they could push the AFTR closer to the edge which would effectively become Model One.

#### **2.11. AFTR Considerations for Geographically Aware Services**

By centralizing public IPv4 addresses, each address no longer represents a single machine, a single household, or a single small office. The address now represents hundreds of machines, homes, and offices related only in that they are behind the same AFTR. Identification by IP address becomes more difficult and thus applications that assume such geographic information may not work as intended. Placement of AFTR could impact the geographical aware services. To minimize the impact, an operator could deploy AFTR closer to users so that existing location based assumptions of the clients source IP address by geographically aware servers can be maintained. Another possibility is that the applications could rely on location information such as GPS co-ordination to identify the user's location. This technique is commonly used in mobile deployment where the mobile handheld devices are probably usually behind a NAT device.

#### **2.12. Impacts on QoS**

Operators commonly use DSCP [[RFC2475](#)] to classify and prioritize different types of traffic. DS-Lite tunnel can be seen as a particular case of uniform conceptual tunnel model described in [section 3.1 of \[RFC2983\]](#). The uniform model views an IP tunnel as just a necessary mechanism to forward traffic to its destination, but the tunnel has no significant impact on traffic conditioning. In this model, any packet has exactly one DS Field that is used for traffic conditioning at any point and it is the field in the outermost IP header. In DS-Lite model this is the Traffic Class field in IPv6 header. According to [[RFC2983](#)] implementations of this model copy the DS value to the outer IP header at encapsulation and copy the outer header's DSCP value to the inner IP header at decapsulation. Applying the described model to DS-Lite scenario, it is recommended that the AFTR copies the DSCP value in the IPv4 header to the IPv6 header after the encapsulation for the downstream traffic and similarly the B4 copies the DSCP value in the IPv4 header to the IPv6 header after the encapsulation for the upstream traffic.



### **2.13. Port Forwarding Considerations**

Some applications require the B4 to accept incoming requests. When the remote host is on IPv4, the incoming request will be directed towards the B4's IPv4 address. Some applications use UPnP-IGD (e.g., popular gaming consoles) or ICE [[RFC5245](#)] (e.g., SIP, Yahoo!, Google, Microsoft chat networks) to request incoming ports. Some applications rely on ALGs or manual port configuration to reserve a port in the NAT. In usual DS-Lite deployment, B4 does not own a dedicated public IPv4 address or all the available ports, so it must coordinate with its serving AFTR and the applications to reserve the incoming ports. Port Control Protocol (PCP) [[I-D.ietf-pcp-base](#)] is designed to address this issue.

### **2.14. DS-Lite Tunnel Security**

[Section 11 of \[RFC6333\]](#) describes security issues associated to DS-Lite mechanism. To restrict the service offered by AFTR only to registered customers, an operator can implement IPv6 ingress filter on the AFTR's tunnel interface to accept only the IPv6 prefixes defined in the filter. This approach requires knowing in advance the IPv6 prefixes provisioned to the customers for the softwire in order to configure the filter.

Using DHCPv6 Leasequery defined in [[RFC5007](#)] is another option of achieving the same goal and providing some form of access control to AFTR. When the AFTR receives a packet from an unknown IPv6 prefix, it issues a DHCPv6 Leasequery based on the DUID to the DHCPv6 server in order to verify if that prefix was previously provisioned by the DHCPv6 server to the specific DUID. If known, the DHCPv6 server will reply with the IPv6 prefix and the associated lease. If both prefixes match, the AFTR accepts the packet otherwise it drops the packet and denies the service.

### **2.15. IPv6-only Network Considerations**

In environments where the operator wants to deploy AFTR in the IPv6-only network, the AFTR nodes may not have direct IPv4 connectivity. In this scenario the operator extends the IPv6-only boundary to the border of the network and only the border routers have IPv4 connectivity. For both scalability and performance purposes, AFTR is located in the IPv6-only network closer to B4 elements. In this scenario the AFTR has only IPv6 connectivity and must be able to send and receive IPv4 packets. Enhancements to the DS-Lite AFTR are required to achieve this. [[I-D.boucadair-softwire-dslite-v6only](#)] describes such issues and enhancements to DS-Lite in IPv6-only deployments.





### **3. B4 Deployment Considerations**

In order to configure the IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnel, the B4 element needs the IPv6 address of the AFTR element. This IPv6 address can be configured using a variety of methods, ranging from an out-of-band mechanism, manual configuration, DHCPv6 option to RADIUS. If an operator uses DHCPv6 to provision the B4, the B4 element must implement the DHCPv6 option defined in [\[RFC6334\]](#). If an operator uses RADIUS to provision the B4, the B4 element must implement [\[RFC6519\]](#).

#### **3.1. DNS deployment Considerations**

[\[RFC6333\]](#) recommends the B4 element should send DNS queries to an external recursive resolver over IPv6. The B4 element should implement proxy resolver that will proxy DNS query from IPv4 transport to the DNS server in the IPv6 network. Alternatively, the DHCPv4 server on the B4 is configured to give its clients an IPv4 address of an external DNS recursive resolver. Then, the B4 can be statically configured to tunnel all DNS packets to the external resolver over IPv6 to the AFTR. Note that there is no effective way to provision an IPv4 DNS address to the B4 over IPv6, this may create complexity in B4 provisioning. Moreover, this will increase load to AFTR by creating short-live entries in the NAT table, this alternate solution is likely to be unsatisfactory in a production environment. It should be used in a testing or demonstration environment.

#### **3.2. IPv4 Service Monitoring**

##### **3.2.1. B4 Remote Management**

B4 is connected to IPv6 access network to offer IPv4 services. When users experience IPv4 connectivity issue, operators must be able to remotely access (e.g. TR-069) the B4 element to verify its B4's configuration and status. Operators should access B4 elements using native IPv6. Operators should not access B4 over the softwire.

##### **3.2.2. IPv4 Connectivity Check**

DS-Lite framework provides IPv4 services over IPv6 access network. Operators must be able to check the IPv4 connectivity from the B4 element to its AFTR. AFTR should be configured with an IPv4 address to enable PING test and traceroute test. An operator may assign the same IPv4 address (e.g. 192.0.0.2/32) to all AFTRs. This IPv4 address only used to respond to the requests from the B4 elements over the softwire. IANA allocates 192.0.0.0/29 [\[RFC6333\]](#) which can be used for this purpose.



#### **4. Security Considerations**

This document does not present any new security issues. [[RFC6333](#)] discusses DS-Lite related security issues. General NAT security issues are not repeated here.

Some of the security issues result directly from sharing routable IPv4 addresses. Addresses and timestamps are often used to identify a particular user, but with shared addresses, more information (i.e., protocol and port numbers) is needed. This impacts software used for logging and tracing spam, denial of service attacks, and other abuses. Devices on the customer's side may try to carry out general attacks against systems on the global Internet or against other customers by using inappropriate IPv4 source addresses inside the tunneled traffic. The AFTR needs to protect against such abuse. One customer may try to carry out a denial of service attack against other customers by monopolizing the available port numbers. The AFTR needs to ensure equitable access. At a more sophisticated level, a customer may try to attack specific ports used by other customers. This may be more difficult to detect and to mitigate without a complete system for authentication by port numbers, which would represent a huge security requirement.

#### **5. Conclusion**

DS-Lite provides new functionality to transition IPv4 traffic to IPv6 addresses. As the supply of unique IPv4 addresses diminishes, operators can now allocate new subscriber homes IPv6 addresses and IPv6-capable equipment. DS-Lite provides a means for the private IPv4 addresses behind the IPv6 equipment to reach the public IPv4 network.

This document discusses the issues that arise when deploying DS-Lite in various deployment modes. Hence, this document can be a useful reference for operators and network designers. Deployment considerations of the B4, AFTR and DNS have been discussed and recommendations for their usage have been documented.

#### **6. Acknowledgement**

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## **7. IANA Considerations**

This memo includes no request to IANA.

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