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**Dual-Stack Lite Broadband Deployments Following IPv4 Exhaustion**  
**draft-ietf-softwire-dual-stack-lite-11**

Abstract

This document revisits the dual-stack model and introduces the Dual-Stack Lite technology aimed at better aligning the costs and benefits of deploying IPv6 in service provider networks. Dual-Stack Lite enables a broadband service provider to share IPv4 addresses among customers by combining two well-known technologies: IP in IP (IPv4-in-IPv6) and Network Address Translation (NAT).

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## Table of Contents

<a href="#">1.</a>	<a href="#">Introduction . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">2.</a>	<a href="#">Requirements language . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">3.</a>	<a href="#">Terminology . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">4.</a>	<a href="#">Deployment scenarios . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">4.1.</a>	<a href="#">Access model . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">4.2.</a>	<a href="#">CPE . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">6</a>
<a href="#">4.3.</a>	<a href="#">Directly connected device . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">7</a>
<a href="#">5.</a>	<a href="#">B4 element . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">7</a>
<a href="#">5.1.</a>	<a href="#">Definition . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">7</a>
<a href="#">5.2.</a>	<a href="#">Encapsulation . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">7</a>
<a href="#">5.3.</a>	<a href="#">Fragmentation and Reassembly . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">7</a>
<a href="#">5.4.</a>	<a href="#">AFTR discovery . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">8</a>
<a href="#">5.5.</a>	<a href="#">DNS . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">8</a>
<a href="#">5.6.</a>	<a href="#">Interface Initialization . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">5.7.</a>	<a href="#">Well-known IPv4 address . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">6.</a>	<a href="#">AFTR element . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">6.1.</a>	<a href="#">Definition . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">6.2.</a>	<a href="#">Encapsulation . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">6.3.</a>	<a href="#">Fragmentation and Reassembly . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">6.4.</a>	<a href="#">DNS . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">10</a>
<a href="#">6.5.</a>	<a href="#">Well-known IPv4 address . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">10</a>
<a href="#">6.6.</a>	<a href="#">Extended binding table . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">7.</a>	<a href="#">Network Considerations . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">7.1.</a>	<a href="#">Tunneling . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">7.2.</a>	<a href="#">Multicast considerations . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">8.</a>	<a href="#">NAT considerations . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">8.1.</a>	<a href="#">NAT pool . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">8.2.</a>	<a href="#">NAT conformance . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">8.3.</a>	<a href="#">Application Level Gateways (ALG) . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">8.4.</a>	<a href="#">Sharing global IPv4 addresses . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">8.5.</a>	<a href="#">Port forwarding / Keep alive . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">9.</a>	<a href="#">Acknowledgements . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">10.</a>	<a href="#">IANA Considerations . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">11.</a>	<a href="#">Security Considerations . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">13</a>
<a href="#">12.</a>	<a href="#">References . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">14</a>
<a href="#">12.1.</a>	<a href="#">Normative references . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">14</a>
<a href="#">12.2.</a>	<a href="#">Informative references . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">14</a>
<a href="#">Appendix A.</a>	<a href="#">Deployment considerations . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">16</a>



<a href="#">A.1.</a>	AFTR service distribution and horizontal scaling . . . . .	<a href="#">16</a>
<a href="#">A.2.</a>	Horizontal scaling . . . . .	<a href="#">16</a>
<a href="#">A.3.</a>	High availability . . . . .	<a href="#">16</a>
<a href="#">A.4.</a>	Logging . . . . .	<a href="#">17</a>
<a href="#">Appendix B.</a>	Examples . . . . .	<a href="#">17</a>
<a href="#">B.1.</a>	Gateway based architecture . . . . .	<a href="#">17</a>
<a href="#">B.1.1.</a>	Example message flow . . . . .	<a href="#">20</a>
<a href="#">B.1.2.</a>	Translation details . . . . .	<a href="#">24</a>
<a href="#">B.2.</a>	Host based architecture . . . . .	<a href="#">25</a>
<a href="#">B.2.1.</a>	Example message flow . . . . .	<a href="#">28</a>
<a href="#">B.2.2.</a>	Translation details . . . . .	<a href="#">32</a>
Authors'	Addresses . . . . .	<a href="#">32</a>



## **1. Introduction**

The common thinking for more than 10 years has been that the transition to IPv6 will be based solely on the dual stack model and that most things would be converted this way before we ran out of IPv4. However, this has not happened. The IANA free pool of IPv4 addresses has now depleted, well before sufficient IPv6 deployment had taken place. As a result, many IPv4 services have to continue to be provided even under severely limited address space.

This document specifies the Dual-Stack Lite technology which is aimed at better aligning the costs and benefits in service provider networks. Dual-Stack Lite will enable both continued support for IPv4 services and incentives for the deployment of IPv6. It also decouples IPv6 deployment in the service provider network from the rest of the Internet, making incremental deployment easier.

Dual-Stack Lite enables a broadband service provider to share IPv4 addresses among customers by combining two well-known technologies: IP in IP (IPv4-in-IPv6) and NAT.

This document makes a distinction between a dual-stack capable and a dual-stack provisioned device. The former is a device that has code that implements both IPv4 and IPv6, from the network layer to the applications. The latter is a similar device that has been provisioned with both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address on its interface(s). This document will also further refine this notion by distinguishing between interfaces provisioned directly by the service provider from those provisioned by the customer.

Pure IPv6-only devices (i.e. devices that do not include an IPv4 stack) are outside of the scope of this document.

This document will first present some deployment scenario and then define the behavior of the two elements of the Dual-Stack Lite technology: the B4 and the AFTR. It will then go into networking and NAT-ing considerations.

## **2. Requirements language**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].



### **3. Terminology**

The technology described in this document is known as Dual-Stack Lite. The abbreviation DS-Lite will be used along this text.

This document also introduces two new terms: the DS-Lite Basic Bridging BroadBand element (B4) and the DS-Lite Address Family Transition Router element (AFTR).

Dual-stack is defined in [[RFC4213](#)].

NAT related terminology is defined in [[RFC4787](#)].

CPE stands for Customer Premise Equipment. This is the layer 3 device in the customer premise that is connected to the service provider network. That device is often a home gateway. However, sometimes computers are directly attached to the service provider network. In such cases, such computers can be viewed as CPEs as well.

### **4. Deployment scenarios**

#### **4.1. Access model**

Instead of relying on a cascade of NATs, the Dual-Stack Lite model is built on IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnels to cross the network to reach a carrier-grade IPv4-IPv4 NAT (the AFTR) where customers will share IPv4 addresses. There are numbers of benefits to this approach:

- o This technology decouples the deployment of IPv6 in the service provider network (up to the customer premise equipment or CPE) from the deployment of IPv6 in the global Internet and in customer applications and devices.
- o The management of the service provider access networks is simplified by leveraging the large IPv6 address space. Overlapping private IPv4 address spaces are not required to support very large customer bases.
- o As tunnels can terminate anywhere in the service provider network, this architecture leads itself to horizontal scaling and provides some flexibility to adapt to changing traffic load. More discussion of horizontal scaling can be found in [Appendix A](#).
- o Tunnels provide a direct connection between B4 and the AFTR. This can be leveraged to enable customers and their applications to control how the NAT function of the AFTR is performed.





A key characteristic of this approach is that communications between end-nodes stay within their address family. IPv6 sources only communicate with IPv6 destinations, IPv4 sources only communicate with IPv4 destinations. There is no protocol family translation involved in this approach. This simplifies greatly the task of applications that may carry literal IP addresses in their payload.

#### [4.2.](#) CPE

This section describes home Local Area networks characterized by the presence of a home gateway, or CPE, provisioned only with IPv6 by the service provider.

A DS-Lite CPE is an IPv6 aware CPE with a B4 Interface implemented in the WAN interface.

A DS-Lite CPE SHOULD NOT operate a NAT function between an internal interface and a B4 interface, as the NAT function will be performed by the AFTR in the service provider's network. That will avoid accidentally operating in a double NAT environment.

However, it SHOULD operate its own DHCP(v4) server handing out [[RFC1918](#)] address space (e.g. 192.168.0.0/16) to hosts in the home. It SHOULD advertise itself as the default IPv4 router to those home hosts. It SHOULD also advertise itself as a DNS server in the DHCP Option 6 (DNS Server). Additionally, it SHOULD operate a DNS proxy to accept DNS IPv4 requests from home hosts and send them using IPv6 to the service provider DNS servers, as described in [Section 5.5](#).

Note: if an IPv4 home host decides to use another IPv4 DNS server, the DS-Lite CPE will forward those DNS requests via the B4 interface, the same way it forwards any regular IPv4 packets. However, each DNS request will create a binding in the AFTR. A large number of DNS requests may have direct impact to the AFTR's NAT table utilization.

IPv6 capable devices directly reach the IPv6 Internet. Packets simply follow IPv6 routing, they do not go through the tunnel, and are not subject to any translation. It is expected that most IPv6 capable devices will also be IPv4 capable and will simply be configured with an IPv4 [RFC1918](#) style address within the home network and access the IPv4 Internet the same way as the legacy IPv4-only devices within the home.

Pure IPv6-only devices (i.e. devices that do not include an IPv4 stack) are outside of the scope of this document.



### **[4.3.](#) Directly connected device**

In broadband home networks, some devices are directly connected to the broadband service provider. They are connected straight to a modem, without a home gateway. Those devices are, in fact, acting as CPEs.

Under this scenario, the customer device is a dual-stack capable host that is only provisioned by the service provider with IPv6 only. The device itself acts as a B4 element and the IPv4 service is provided by an IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnel, just as in the home gateway/CPE case. That device can run any combinations of IPv4 and/or IPv6 applications.

A directly connected DS-Lite device SHOULD send its DNS requests over IPv6 to the IPv6 DNS server it has been configured to use.

Similarly to the previous sections, IPv6 packets follow IPv6 routing, they do not go through the tunnel, and are not subject to any translation.

The support of IPv4-only devices and IPv6-only devices in this scenario is out of scope for this document.

## **[5.](#) B4 element**

### **[5.1.](#) Definition**

The B4 element is a function implemented on a dual-stack capable node, either a directly connected device or a CPE, that creates a tunnel to an AFTR.

### **[5.2.](#) Encapsulation**

The tunnel is a multi-point to point IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnel ending on a service provider AFTR.

See [section 7.1](#) for additional tunneling considerations.

Note: at this point, DS-Lite only defines IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnels, however other types of encapsulation could be defined in the future.

### **[5.3.](#) Fragmentation and Reassembly**

Using an encapsulation (IPv4-in-IPv6 or anything else) to carry IPv4 traffic over IPv6 will reduce the effective MTU of the datagram.

Unfortunately, path MTU discovery [[RFC1191](#)] is not a reliable method



to deal with this problem.

A solution to deal with this problem is for the service provider to increase the MTU size of all the links between the B4 element and the AFTR elements by at least 40 bytes to accommodate both the IPv6 encapsulation header and the IPv4 datagram without fragmenting the IPv6 packet.

However, as not all service providers will be able to increase their link MTU, the B4 element **MUST** perform fragmentation and reassembly if the outgoing link MTU cannot accommodate for the extra IPv6 header. The original IPv4 packet is not oversized. The packet is oversized after the IPv6 encapsulation. The inner IPv4 packet **MUST** not be fragmented. Fragmentation **MUST** happen after the encapsulation of the IPv6 packet. Reassembly **MUST** happen before the decapsulation of the IPv4 packet. Detailed procedure has been specified in [\[RFC2473\]](#) [Section 7.2](#).

#### **5.4. AFTR discovery**

In order to configure the IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnel, the B4 element needs the IPv6 address of the AFTR element. This IPv6 address can be configured using a variety of methods, ranging from an out-of-band mechanism, manual configuration or a variety of DHCPv6 options.

In order to guarantee interoperability, a B4 element **SHOULD** implement the DHCPv6 option defined in [\[I-D.ietf-softwire-ds-lite-tunnel-option\]](#).

#### **5.5. DNS**

A B4 element is only configured from the service provider with IPv6. As such, it can only learn the address of a DNS recursive server through DHCPv6 (or other similar method over IPv6). As DHCPv6 only defines an option to get the IPv6 address of such a DNS recursive server, the B4 element cannot easily discover the IPv4 address of such a recursive DNS server, and as such will have to perform all DNS resolution over IPv6.

The B4 element can pass this IPv6 address to downstream IPv6 nodes, but not to downstream IPv4 nodes. As such, the B4 element **SHOULD** implement a DNS proxy, following the recommendations of [\[RFC5625\]](#).

To support security-aware resolver behind the B4 element, the DNS proxy in the B4 element must be also security-aware. Details can be found in [\[RFC4033\]](#) [Section 6](#).



## **[5.6.](#) Interface Initialization**

B4 element can be implemented in a host and CPE in conjunction with other technologies such as native dual-stack. The host and the CPE SHOULD select to start only one technology during initialization. For example: if the CPE selects to start in native dual-stack mode, it SHOULD NOT initialize the B4 element. This selection process is out-of-scope for this document.

## **[5.7.](#) Well-known IPv4 address**

Any locally unique IPv4 address could be configured on the IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnel to represent the B4 element. Configuring such an address is often necessary when the B4 element is sourcing IPv4 datagrams directly over the tunnel. In order to avoid conflicts with any other address, IANA has defined a well-known range, 192.0.0.0/29.

192.0.0.0 is the reserved subnet address. 192.0.0.1 is reserved for the AFTR element and 192.0.0.2 is reserved for the B4 element. If a service provider has special configuration which prevents the B4 element from using 192.0.0.2, the B4 element MAY use any other addresses within the 192.0.0.0/29.

Note: a range of addresses has been reserved for this purpose. The intent is to accommodate nodes implementing multiple B4 elements.

# **[6.](#) AFTR element**

## **[6.1.](#) Definition**

An AFTR element is the combination of an IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnel end-point and an IPv4-IPv4 NAT implemented on the same node.

## **[6.2.](#) Encapsulation**

The tunnel is a point-to-multipoint IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnel ending at the B4 elements.

See [section 7.1](#) for additional tunneling considerations.

Note: at this point, DS-Lite only defines IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnels, however other types of encapsulation could be defined in the future.

## **[6.3.](#) Fragmentation and Reassembly**

As noted previously, fragmentation and reassembly need to be taken care of by the tunnel end-points. As such, the AFTR MUST perform





fragmentation and reassembly if the underlying link MTU cannot accommodate the encapsulation overhead. Fragmentation MUST happen after the encapsulation on the IPv6 packet. Reassembly MUST happen before the decapsulation of the IPv6 header. Detailed procedure has been specified in [\[RFC2473\] Section 7.2](#).

Fragmentation at the Tunnel Entry-Point is a light-weight operation. In contrast, reassembly at the Tunnel Exit-Point can be expensive. When the Tunnel Exit-Point receives the first fragmented packet, it must wait for the second fragmented packet to arrive in order to reassemble the two fragmented IPv6 packets for decapsulation. This requires the Tunnel Exit-Point to buffer and keep track of fragmented packets. Consider that the AFTR is the Tunnel Exit-Point for many tunnels. If many devices simultaneously source large number of fragmented packets through the AFTR to its managed B4 elements, this will require the AFTR to buffer and consume enormous resources to keep track of the flows. This reassembly process will significantly impact the AFTR performance. However, this impact only happens when many clients simultaneously source large IPv4 packets. Since we believe that majority of the clients will receive large IPv4 packets (such as watching video streams) instead of sourcing large IPv4 packets (such as sourcing video streams), so reassembly is only a fraction of the overall AFTR's workload.

When AFTR's resources are running below a pre-defined threshold, it SHOULD generate a notification to the administrator before the resources are completely exhausted. The threshold and notification procedures are implementation dependent and are out-of-scope for this document.

Methods to avoid fragmentation, such as rewriting the TCP MSS option or using technologies such as Subnetwork Encapsulation and Adaptation Layer defined in [\[RFC5320\]](#) are out of scope for this document.

#### **[6.4.](#) DNS**

As noted previously, DS-Lite node implementing a B4 element will perform DNS resolution over IPv6. As a result, DNS packets are not expected to go through the AFTR element.

#### **[6.5.](#) Well-known IPv4 address**

The AFTR SHOULD use the well-known IPv4 address 192.0.0.1 reserved by IANA to configure the IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnel. That address can then be used to report ICMP problems and will appear in traceroute outputs.



## **[6.6.](#) Extended binding table**

The NAT binding table of the AFTR element is extended to include the source IPv6 address of the incoming packets. This IPv6 address is used to disambiguate between the overlapping IPv4 address space of the service provider customers.

By doing a reverse look-up in the extended IPv4 NAT binding table, the AFTR knows how to reconstruct the IPv6 encapsulation when the packets comes back from the Internet. That way, there is no need to keep a static configuration for each tunnel.

## **[7.](#) Network Considerations**

### **[7.1.](#) Tunneling**

Tunneling MUST be done in accordance to [[RFC2473](#)] and [[RFC4213](#)]. Traffic classes ([[RFC2474](#)]) from the IPv4 headers MUST be carried over to the IPv6 headers and vice versa.

### **[7.2.](#) Multicast considerations**

Multicast is out-of-scope in this document.

## **[8.](#) NAT considerations**

### **[8.1.](#) NAT pool**

The AFTR MAY be provisioned with different NAT pools. The address ranges in the pools may be disjoint but MUST NOT be overlapped. Operators may implement policies in the AFTR to assign clients in different pools. For example, a AFTR can have two interfaces. Each interface will have a disjoint pool NAT assigned to it. In another case, a policy can apply to the AFTR that a set of B4s will use NAT pool 1 and a different set of B4s will use NAT pool 2.

### **[8.2.](#) NAT conformance**

A Dual-Stack Lite AFTR MUST implement behavior conforming to the best current practice, currently documented in [[RFC4787](#)], [[RFC5508](#)], and [[RFC5382](#)]. More discussions about carrier-grade NATs can be found in [[I-D.ietf-behave-lsn-requirements](#)].



### **8.3. Application Level Gateways (ALG)**

AFTR performs NAT-44 and inherits the limitations of NAT. Some protocols require ALGs in the NAT device to traverse through the NAT. For example: Active FTP requires ALG to work properly. ALGs consume resources and there are many different types of ALGs. The AFTR is a shared network device that supports a large number of B4 elements. It is impossible for the AFTR to implement every current and future ALGs.

### **8.4. Sharing global IPv4 addresses**

AFTR shares a single IP with multiple users. This helps to increase the IPv4 address utilization. However, it also brings some issues such as logging and lawful intercept. More considerations on sharing the port space of IPv4 addresses can be found in [[I-D.ietf-intarea-shared-addressing-issues](#)].

### **8.5. Port forwarding / Keep alive**

PCP working group is standardizing a control plane to the carrier-grade NAT [[I-D.ietf-behave-lsn-requirements](#)] in IETF. Port Control Protocol (PCP) enables applications to directly negotiate with the NAT to open ports and negotiate lifetime values to avoid keep-alive traffic. More on PCP can be found in [[I-D.ietf-pcp-base](#)].

## **9. Acknowledgements**

The authors would like to acknowledge the role of Mark Townsley for his input on the overall architecture of this technology by pointing this work in the direction of [[I-D.droms-softwires-snat](#)]. Note that this document results from a merging of [[I-D.durand-dual-stack-lite](#)] and [[I-D.droms-softwires-snat](#)]. Also to be acknowledged are the many discussions with a number of people including Shin Miyakawa, Katsuyasu Toyama, Akihide Hiura, Takashi Uematsu, Tetsutaro Hara, Yasunori Matsubayashi, Ichiro Mizukoshi. The author would also like to thank David Ward, Jari Arkko, Thomas Narten and Geoff Huston for their constructive feedback. Special thanks go to Dave Thaler and Dan Wing for their reviews and comments.

## **10. IANA Considerations**

This draft request IANA to allocate a well know IPv4 192.0.0.0/29 network prefix. That range is used to number the Dual-Stack Lite interfaces. Reserving a /29 allows for 6 possible interfaces on a multi-home node. The IPv4 address 192.0.0.1 is reserved as the IPv4



address of the default router for such Dual-Stack Lite hosts.

## **11. Security Considerations**

Security issues associated with NAT have long been documented. See [[RFC2663](#)] and [[RFC2993](#)].

However, moving the NAT functionality from the CPE to the core of the service provider network and sharing IPv4 addresses among customers create additional requirements when logging data for abuse usage. With any architecture where an IPv4 address does not uniquely represent an end host, IPv4 addresses and a timestamps are no longer sufficient to identify a particular broadband customer. The AFTR should have the capability to log the tunnel-id, protocol, ports/IP addresses, and the creation time of the NAT binding to uniquely identify the user sessions. Exact details of what is logged are implementation specific and out of scope for this document.

The AFTR performs translation functions for interior IPv4 hosts using [RFC 1918](#) addresses or the IANA reserved address range (TBA by IANA). In some circumstances, ISP may provision policies in the AFTR and instructs the AFTR to bypass translation functions based on <IPv4 Address, port number, protocol>. When the AFTR receives a packet with matching information of the policy from the interior host, the AFTR can simply forward without translation. The addresses, ports and protocols information must be provisioned on the AFTR before receiving the packet. The provisioning mechanism is out-of-scope of this specification.

When decapsulating packets, the AFTR MUST only forward packets sourced by [RFC 1918](#) addresses, IANA reserved address range, or any other out-of-band pre-authorized addresses. The AFTR MUST drop all others packets. This prevents rogue devices from launching denial of service attacks using unauthorized public IPv4 addresses in the IPv4 source header field or unauthorized transport port range in the IPv4 transport header field. For example, rogue devices could bombard a public web server by launching a TCP SYN ACK attack [[RFC4987](#)]. The victim will receive TCP SYN from random IPv4 source addresses at a rapid rate and deny TCP services to legitimate users.

With IPv4 addresses shared by multiple users, ports become a critical resource. As such, some mechanisms need to be put in place by an AFTR to limit port usage, either by rate-limiting new connections or putting a hard limit on the maximum number of port usable by a single user. If this number is high enough, it should not interfere with normal usage and still provide reasonable protection of the shared pool. More considerations on sharing IPv4 addresses can be found in





[[I-D.ietf-intarea-shared-addressing-issues](#)]. Other considerations and recommendations on logging can be found in [[I-D.ietf-intarea-server-logging-recommendations](#)].

AFTRs should support ways to limit service only to registered customers. One simple option is to implement IPv6 ingress filter on the AFTR's tunnel interface to accept only the IPv6 address range defined in the filter.

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## **[Appendix A.](#) Deployment considerations**

### **[A.1.](#) AFTR service distribution and horizontal scaling**

One of the key benefits of the Dual-Stack Lite technology lies in the fact that it is a tunnel based solution. As such tunnel end-points can be anywhere in the service provider network.

Using the DHCPv6 tunnel end-point option

[\[I-D.ietf-softwire-ds-lite-tunnel-option\]](#), service providers can create groups of users sharing the same AFTR. Those groups can be merged or divided at will. This leads to an horizontally scaled solution, where more capacity is added with more AFTRs. As those groups of users can evolve over time, it is best to make sure that AFTRs do not require per-user configuration in order to provide service.

### **[A.2.](#) Horizontal scaling**

A service provider can start using just a few centralized AFTRs. Later, when more capacity is needed, more AFTRs can be added and pushed closer to the edges of the access network.

### **[A.3.](#) High availability**

An important element in the design of the Dual-Stack Lite technology is the simplicity of implementation on the customer side. An IP4-in-IPv6 tunnel and a default route over it in the B4 element are all is needed to get IPv4 connectivity. It is assumed that high availability is the responsibility of the service provider, not the customer devices implementing Dual-Stack Lite. As such, a single



IPv6 address of the tunnel end-point is provided in the DHCPv6 option defined in [[I-D.ietf-softwire-ds-lite-tunnel-option](#)]. Specific means to achieve high availability on the service provider side are outside the scope of this specification.

#### **A.4. Logging**

DS-Lite AFTR implementation should offer the functionality to log NAT binding creations or other ways to keep track of the ports/IP addresses used by customers. This is both to support troubleshooting, which is very important to service providers trying to figure out why something may not be working, as well as to meet region-specific requirements for responding to legally-binding requests for information from law enforcement authorities.

### **Appendix B. Examples**

#### **B.1. Gateway based architecture**

This architecture is targeted at residential broadband deployments but can be adapted easily to other types of deployment where the installed base of IPv4-only devices is important.

Consider a scenario where a Dual-Stack Lite CPE is provisioned only with IPv6 in the WAN port, no IPv4. The CPE acts as an IPv4 DHCP server for the LAN network (wireline and wireless) handing out [[RFC1918](#)] addresses. In addition, the CPE may support IPv6 Auto-Configuration and/or DHCPv6 server for the LAN network. When an IPv4-only device connects to the CPE, that CPE will hand out a [[RFC1918](#)] address to the device. When a dual-stack capable device connects to the CPE, that CPE will hand out a [[RFC1918](#)] address and a global IPv6 address to the device. Besides, the CPE will create an IPv4-in-IPv6 softwire tunnel [[RFC5571](#)] to an AFTR that resides in the service provider network.

When the device accesses IPv6 service, it will send the IPv6 datagram to the CPE natively. The CPE will route the traffic upstream to the IPv6 default gateway.

When the device accesses IPv4 service, it will source the IPv4 datagram with the [[RFC1918](#)] address and send the IPv4 datagram to the CPE. The CPE will encapsulate the IPv4 datagram inside the IPv4-in-IPv6 softwire tunnel and forward the IPv6 datagram to the AFTR. This contrasts what the CPE normally does today, which is, NAT the [[RFC1918](#)] address to the public IPv4 address and route the datagram upstream. When the AFTR receives the IPv6 datagram, it will decapsulate the IPv6 header and perform an IPv4-to-IPv4 NAT on the





source address.

As illustrated in Figure 1, this Dual-Stack Lite deployment model consists of three components: the Dual-Stack Lite home router with a B4 element, the AFTR and a softwire between the B4 element acting as softwire initiator (SI) [[RFC5571](#)] in the Dual-Stack Lite home router and the softwire concentrator (SC) [[RFC5571](#)] in the AFTR. The AFTR performs IPv4-IPv4 NAT translations to multiplex multiple subscribers through a pool of global IPv4 address. Overlapping address spaces used by subscribers are disambiguated through the identification of tunnel endpoints.






Figure 1: gateway-based architecture



## Notes:

- o The Dual-Stack Lite home router is not required to be on the same link as the host
- o The Dual-Stack Lite home router could be replaced by a Dual-Stack Lite router in the service provider network

The resulting solution accepts an IPv4 datagram that is translated into an IPv4-in-IPv6 software datagram for transmission across the software. At the corresponding endpoint, the IPv4 datagram is decapsulated, and the translated IPv4 address is inserted based on a translation from the software.

**B.1.1.1. Example message flow**

In the example shown in Figure 2, the translation tables in the AFTR is configured to forward between IP/TCP (10.0.0.1/10000) and IP/TCP (192.0.2.1/5000). That is a datagram received by the Dual-Stack Lite home router from the host at address 10.0.0.1, using TCP DST port 10000 will be translated a datagram with IP SRC address 192.0.2.1 and TCP SRC port 5000 in the Internet.










Figure 2: Outbound Datagram

Datagram	Header field	Contents
IPv4 datagram 1	IPv4 Dst	198.51.100.1
	IPv4 Src	10.0.0.1
	TCP Dst	80
	TCP Src	10000
IPv6 datagram 2	IPv6 Dst	2001:db8:0:2::1
	IPv6 Src	2001:db8:0:1::1
	IPv4 Dst	198.51.100.1
	IPv4 Src	10.0.0.1
	TCP Dst	80
	TCP Src	10000
IPv4 datagram 3	IPv4 Dst	198.51.100.1
	IPv4 Src	192.0.2.1
	TCP Dst	80
	TCP Src	5000

Datagram header contents

When datagram 1 is received by the Dual-Stack Lite home router, the B4 element encapsulates the datagram in datagram 2 and forwards it to the Dual-Stack Lite carrier-grade NAT over the softwire.

When it receives datagram 2, the tunnel concentrator in the AFTR forwards the IPv4 datagram to the NAT, which determines from its NAT table that the datagram received on the softwire with TCP SRC port 10000 should be translated to datagram 3 with IP SRC address 192.0.2.1 and TCP SRC port 5000.

Figure 3 shows an inbound message received at the AFTR. When the NAT function in the AFTR receives datagram 1, it looks up the IP/TCP DST in its translation table. In the example in Figure 3, the NAT changes the TCP DST port to 10000, sets the IP DST address to 10.0.0.1 and forwards the datagram to the softwire. The B4 in the home router decapsulates IPv4 datagram from the inbound softwire datagram, and forwards it to the host.






Figure 3: Inbound Datagram



Datagram	Header field	Contents
IPv4 datagram 1	IPv4 Dst	192.0.2.1
	IPv4 Src	198.51.100.1
	TCP Dst	5000
	TCP Src	80
IPv6 datagram 2	IPv6 Dst	2001:db8:0:1::1
	IPv6 Src	2001:db8:0:2::1
	IPv4 Dst	10.0.0.1
	IP Src	198.51.100.1
	TCP Dst	10000
	TCP Src	80
IPv4 datagram 3	IPv4 Dst	10.0.0.1
	IPv4 Src	198.51.100.1
	TCP Dst	10000
	TCP Src	80

Datagram header contents

### **B.1.2. Translation details**

The AFTR has a NAT that translates between software/port pairs and IPv4-address/port pairs. The same translation is applied to IPv4 datagrams received on the device's external interface and from the software endpoint in the device.

In Figure 2, the translator network interface in the AFTR is on the Internet, and the software interface connects to the Dual-Stack Lite home router. The AFTR translator is configured as follows:

Network interface: Translate IPv4 destination address and TCP destination port to the software identifier and TCP destination port

Software interface: Translate software identifier and TCP source port to IPv4 source address and TCP source port

Here is how the translation in Figure 3 works:

- o Datagram 1 is received on the AFTR translator network interface. The translator looks up the IPv4-address/port pair in its translator table, rewrites the IPv4 destination address to 10.0.0.1 and the TCP source port to 10000, and forwards the datagram to the software.



- o The IPv4 datagram is received on the Dual-Stack Lite home router B4. The B4 function extracts the IPv4 datagram and the Dual-Stack Lite home router forwards datagram 3 to the host.

```

+-----+-----+
|           Software-Id/IPv4/Prot/Port | IPv4/Prot/Port           |
+-----+-----+
| 2001:db8:0:1::1/10.0.0.1/TCP/10000 | 192.0.2.1/TCP/5000 |
+-----+-----+

```

#### Dual-Stack Lite carrier-grade NAT translation table

The Software-Id is the IPv6 address assigned to the Dual-Stack Lite CPE. Hosts behind the same Dual-Stack Lite home router have the same Software-Id. The source IPv4 is the [\[RFC1918\]](#) address assigned by the Dual-Stack home router which is unique to each host behind the CPE. The AFTR would receive packets sourced from different IPv4 addresses in the same software tunnel. The AFTR combines the Software-Id and IPv4 address/Port [Software-Id, IPv4+Port] to uniquely identify the host behind the same Dual-Stack Lite home router.

### **B.2. Host based architecture**

This architecture is targeted at new, large scale deployments of dual-stack capable devices implementing a Dual-Stack Lite interface.

Consider a scenario where a Dual-Stack Lite host device is directly connected to the service provider network. The host device is dual-stack capable but only provisioned an IPv6 global address. Besides, the host device will pre-configure a well-known IPv4 non-routable address (see IANA section). This well-known IPv4 non-routable address is similar to the 127.0.0.1 loopback address. Every host device implemented Dual-Stack Lite will pre-configure the same address. This address will be used to source the IPv4 datagram when the device accesses IPv4 services. Besides, the host device will create an IPv4-in-IPv6 software tunnel to an AFTR. The carrier-grade NAT will reside in the service provider network.

When the device accesses IPv6 service, the device will send the IPv6 datagram natively to the default gateway.

When the device accesses IPv4 service, it will source the IPv4 datagram with the well-known non-routable IPv4 address. Then, the host device will encapsulate the IPv4 datagram inside the IPv4-in-IPv6 software tunnel and send the IPv6 datagram to the AFTR. When the AFTR receives the IPv6 datagram, it will decapsulate the IPv6 header and perform IPv4-to-IPv4 NAT on the source address.





This scenario works on both wireline and wireless networks. A typical wireless device will connect directly to the service provider without CPE in between.

As illustrated in Figure 4, this Dual-Stack Lite deployment model consists of three components: the Dual-Stack Lite host, the AFTR and a softwire between the softwire initiator B4 in the host and the softwire concentrator in the AFTR. The Dual-Stack Lite host is assumed to have IPv6 service and can exchange IPv6 traffic with the AFTR.

The AFTR performs IPv4-IPv4 NAT translations to multiplex multiple subscribers through a pool of global IPv4 address. Overlapping IPv4 address spaces used by the Dual-Stack Lite hosts are disambiguated through the identification of tunnel endpoints.

In this situation, the Dual-Stack Lite host configures the IPv4 address 192.0.0.2 out of the well-known range 192.0.0.0/29 (defined by IANA) on its B4 interface. It also configures the first non-reserved IPv4 address of the reserved range, 192.0.0.1 as the address of its default gateway.






Figure 4: host-based architecture

The resulting solution accepts an IPv4 datagram that is translated into an IPv4-in-IPv6 software datagram for transmission across the software. At the corresponding endpoint, the IPv4 datagram is decapsulated, and the translated IPv4 address is inserted based on a translation from the software.



#### **B.2.1. Example message flow**

In the example shown in Figure 5, the translation tables in the AFTR is configured to forward between IP/TCP (192.0.0.2/10000) and IP/TCP (192.0.2.1/5000). That is, a datagram received from the host at address 192.0.0.2, using TCP DST port 10000 will be translated a datagram with IP SRC address 192.0.2.1 and TCP SRC port 5000 in the Internet.




Figure 5: Outbound Datagram





Datagram		Header field	Contents
IPv6 datagram 1	IPv6 Dst	2001:db8:0:2::1	
	IPv6 Src	2001:db8:0:1::1	
	IPv4 Dst	198.51.100.1	
	IPv4 Src	192.0.0.2	
	TCP Dst	80	
	TCP Src	10000	
-----		-----	
IPv4 datagram 2	IPv4 Dst	198.51.100.1	
	IPv4 Src	192.0.2.1	
	TCP Dst	80	
	TCP Src	5000	

Datagram header contents

When sending an IPv4 packet, the Dual-Stack Lite host encapsulates it in datagram 1 and forwards it to the AFTR over the software.

When it receives datagram 1, the concentrator in the AFTR hands the IPv4 datagram to the NAT, which determines from its translation table that the datagram received on the software with TCP SRC port 10000 should be translated to datagram 3 with IP SRC address 192.0.2.1 and TCP SRC port 5000.

Figure 6 shows an inbound message received at the AFTR. When the NAT function in the AFTR receives datagram 1, it looks up the IP/TCP DST in its translation table. In the example in Figure 3, the NAT translates the TCP DST port to 10000, sets the IP DST address to 192.0.0.2 and forwards the datagram to the software. The B4 in the Dual-Stack Lite hosts decapsulates IPv4 datagram from the inbound software datagram, and forwards it to the host.






Figure 6: Inbound Datagram



Datagram	Header field	Contents
IPv4 datagram 1	IPv4 Dst	192.0.2.1
	IPv4 Src	198.51.100.1
	TCP Dst	5000
	TCP Src	80
IPv6 datagram 2	IPv6 Dst	2001:db8:0:1::1
	IPv6 Src	2001:db8:0:2::1
	IPv4 Dst	192.0.0.2
	IP Src	198.51.100.1
	TCP Dst	10000
	TCP Src	80

Datagram header contents

### [B.2.2.](#) Translation details

The translations happening in the AFTR are the same as in the previous examples. The well known IPv4 address 192.0.0.2 out of the 192.0.0.0/29 (defined by IANA) range used by all the hosts are disambiguated by the IPv6 source address of the software.

Software-Id/IPv4/Prot/Port	IPv4/Prot/Port
2001:db8:0:1::1/192.0.0.2/TCP/10000	192.0.2.1/TCP/5000

Dual-Stack Lite carrier-grade NAT translation table

The Software-Id is the IPv6 address assigned to the Dual-Stack host. Each host has an unique Software-Id. The source IPv4 address is one of the well-known IPv4 address. The AFTR could receive packets from different hosts sourced from the same IPv4 well-known address from different software tunnels. Similar to the gateway architecture, the AFTR combines the Software-Id and IPv4 address/Port [Software-Id, IPv4+Port] to uniquely identify the individual host.



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