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Authors: B. Moran            H. Tschofenig    H. Birkholz  
          Arm Limited                Fraunhofer SIT  
          K. Zandberg    Ø. Rønningstad  
          Inria                    Nordic Semiconductor

## **A Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based Serialization Format for the Software Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT) Manifest**

### **Abstract**

This specification describes the format of a manifest. A manifest is a bundle of metadata about code/data obtained by a recipient (chiefly the firmware for an IoT device), where to find the code/data, the devices to which it applies, and cryptographic information protecting the manifest. Software updates and Trusted Invocation both tend to use sequences of common operations, so the manifest encodes those sequences of operations, rather than declaring the metadata.

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## **1. Introduction**

A firmware update mechanism is an essential security feature for IoT devices to deal with vulnerabilities. The transport of firmware images to the devices themselves is important security aspect. Luckily, there are already various device management solutions

available offering the distribution of firmware images to IoT devices. Equally important is the inclusion of metadata about the conveyed firmware image (in the form of a manifest) and the use of a security wrapper to provide end-to-end security protection to detect modifications and (optionally) to make reverse engineering more difficult. Firmware signing allows the author, who builds the firmware image, to be sure that no other party (including potential adversaries) can install firmware updates on IoT devices without adequate privileges. For confidentiality protected firmware images it is additionally required to encrypt the firmware image and to distribute the content encryption key securely. The support for firmware and payload encryption via the SUIT manifest format is described in a companion document [[I-D.ietf-suit-firmware-encryption](#)]. Starting security protection at the author is a risk mitigation technique so firmware images and manifests can be stored on untrusted repositories; it also reduces the scope of a compromise of any repository or intermediate system to be no worse than a denial of service.

A manifest is a bundle of metadata about the firmware for an IoT device, where to find the firmware, and the devices to which it applies.

This specification defines the SUIT manifest format and it is intended to meet several goals:

- \*Meet the requirements defined in [[RFC9124](#)].
- \*Simple to parse on a constrained node.
- \*Simple to process on a constrained node.
- \*Compact encoding.
- \*Comprehensible by an intermediate system.
- \*Expressive enough to enable advanced use cases on advanced nodes.
- \*Extensible.

The SUIT manifest can be used for a variety of purposes throughout its lifecycle, such as:

- \*a Network Operator to reason about compatibility of a firmware, such as timing and acceptance of firmware updates.
- \*a Device Operator to reason about the impact of a firmware.
- \*a device to reason about the authority & authenticity of a firmware prior to installation.

\*a device to reason about the applicability of a firmware.

\*a device to reason about the installation of a firmware.

\*a device to reason about the authenticity & encoding of a firmware at boot.

Each of these uses happens at a different stage of the manifest lifecycle, so each has different requirements.

It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the high-level firmware update architecture [[RFC9019](#)] and the threats, requirements, and user stories in [[RFC9124](#)].

The design of this specification is based on an observation that the vast majority of operations that a device can perform during an update or Trusted Invocation are composed of a small group of operations:

\*Copy some data from one place to another

\*Transform some data

\*Digest some data and compare to an expected value

\*Compare some system parameters to an expected value

\*Run some code

In this document, these operations are called commands. Commands are classed as either conditions or directives. Conditions have no side-effects, while directives do have side-effects. Conceptually, a sequence of commands is like a script but the language is tailored to software updates and Trusted Invocation.

The available commands support simple steps, such as copying a firmware image from one place to another, checking that a firmware image is correct, verifying that the specified firmware is the correct firmware for the device, or unpacking a firmware. By using these steps in different orders and changing the parameters they use, a broad range of use cases can be supported. The SUIT manifest uses this observation to optimize metadata for consumption by constrained devices.

While the SUIT manifest is informed by and optimized for firmware update and Trusted Invocation use cases, there is nothing in the SUIT Information Model [[RFC9124](#)] that restricts its use to only those use cases. Other use cases include the management of trusted applications (TAs) in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), as discussed in [[RFC9397](#)].

## 2. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Additionally, the following terminology is used throughout this document:

\*SUIT: Software Update for the Internet of Things, also the IETF working group for this standard.

\*Payload: A piece of information to be delivered. Typically Firmware for the purposes of SUIT.

\*Resource: A piece of information that is used to construct a payload.

\*Manifest: A manifest is a bundle of metadata about the firmware for an IoT device, where to find the firmware, and the devices to which it applies.

\*Envelope: A container with the manifest, an authentication wrapper with cryptographic information protecting the manifest, authorization information, and severable elements. Severable elements can be removed from the manifest without impacting its security, see [Section 8.5](#).

\*Update: One or more manifests that describe one or more payloads.

\*Update Authority: The owner of a cryptographic key used to sign updates, trusted by Recipients.

\*Recipient: The system, typically an IoT device, that receives and processes a manifest.

\*Manifest Processor: A component of the Recipient that consumes Manifests and executes the commands in the Manifest.

\*Component: An updatable logical block of the Firmware, Software, configuration, or data of the Recipient.

\*Component Set: A group of interdependent Components that must be updated simultaneously.

\*Command: A Condition or a Directive.

\*Condition: A test for a property of the Recipient or its Components.

\*Directive: An action for the Recipient to perform.

\*Trusted Invocation: A process by which a system ensures that only trusted code is executed, for example secure boot or launching a Trusted Application.

\*A/B images: Dividing a Recipient's storage into two or more bootable images, at different offsets, such that the active image can write to the inactive image(s).

\*Record: The result of a Command and any metadata about it.

\*Report: A list of Records.

\*Procedure: The process of invoking one or more sequences of commands.

\*Update Procedure: A procedure that updates a Recipient by fetching dependencies and images, and installing them.

\*Invocation Procedure: A procedure in which a Recipient verifies dependencies and images, loading images, and invokes one or more image.

\*Software: Instructions and data that allow a Recipient to perform a useful function.

\*Firmware: Software that is typically changed infrequently, stored in nonvolatile memory, and small enough to apply to [\[RFC7228\]](#) Class 0-2 devices.

\*Image: Information that a Recipient uses to perform its function, typically firmware/software, configuration, or resource data such as text or images. Also, a Payload, once installed is an Image.

\*Slot: One of several possible storage locations for a given Component, typically used in A/B image systems

\*Abort: An event in which the Manifest Processor immediately halts execution of the current Procedure. It creates a Record of an error condition.

### 3. How to use this Document

This specification covers five aspects of firmware update:

\*[Section 4](#) describes the device constraints, use cases, and design principles that informed the structure of the manifest.

\*[Section 5](#) gives a general overview of the metadata structure to inform the following sections

\*[Section 6](#) describes what actions a Manifest processor should take.

\*[Section 7](#) describes the process of creating a Manifest.

\*[Section 8](#) specifies the content of the Envelope and the Manifest.

To implement an updatable device, see [Section 6](#) and [Section 8](#). To implement a tool that generates updates, see [Section 7](#) and [Section 8](#).

The IANA consideration section, see [Section 11](#), provides instructions to IANA to create several registries. This section also provides the CBOR labels for the structures defined in this document.

The complete CDDL description is provided in [Appendix A](#), examples are given in [Appendix B](#) and a design rational is offered in [Appendix C](#). Finally, [Appendix D](#) gives a summarize of the mandatory-to-implement features of this specification.

Additional specifications describe functionality of advanced use cases, such as:

\*Firmware Encryption is covered in [\[I-D.ietf-suit-firmware-encryption\]](#)

\*Update Management is covered in [\[I-D.ietf-suit-update-management\]](#)

\*Features, such as dependencies, key delegation, multiple processors, required by the use of multiple trust domains are covered in [\[I-D.ietf-suit-trust-domains\]](#)

\*Secure reporting of the update status is covered in [\[I-D.ietf-suit-report\]](#)

A technique to efficiently compress firmware images may be standardized in the future.



## 4. Background

Distributing software updates to diverse devices with diverse trust anchors in a coordinated system presents unique challenges. Devices have a broad set of constraints, requiring different metadata to make appropriate decisions. There may be many actors in production IoT systems, each of whom has some authority. Distributing firmware in such a multi-party environment presents additional challenges. Each party requires a different subset of data. Some data may not be accessible to all parties. Multiple signatures may be required from parties with different authorities. This topic is covered in more depth in [[RFC9019](#)]. The security aspects are described in [[RFC9124](#)].

### 4.1. IoT Firmware Update Constraints

The various constraints of IoT devices and the range of use cases that need to be supported create a broad set of requirements. For example, devices with:

- \*limited processing power and storage may require a simple representation of metadata.
- \*bandwidth constraints may require firmware compression or partial update support.
- \*bootloader complexity constraints may require simple selection between two bootable images.
- \*small internal storage may require external storage support.
- \*multiple microcontrollers may require coordinated update of all applications.
- \*large storage and complex functionality may require parallel update of many software components.
- \*extra information may need to be conveyed in the manifest in the earlier stages of the device lifecycle before those data items are stripped when the manifest is delivered to a constrained device.

Supporting the requirements introduced by the constraints on IoT devices requires the flexibility to represent a diverse set of possible metadata, but also requires that the encoding is kept simple.

## 4.2. SUIT Workflow Model

There are several fundamental assumptions that inform the model of Update Procedure workflow:

- \*Compatibility must be checked before any other operation is performed.

- \*In some applications, payloads must be fetched and validated prior to installation.

There are several fundamental assumptions that inform the model of the Invocation Procedure workflow:

- \*Compatibility must be checked before any other operation is performed.

- \*All payloads must be validated prior to loading.

- \*All loaded images must be validated prior to execution.

Based on these assumptions, the manifest is structured to work with a pull parser, where each section of the manifest is used in sequence. The expected workflow for a Recipient installing an update can be broken down into five steps:

1. Verify the signature of the manifest.
2. Verify the applicability of the manifest.
3. Fetch payload(s).
4. Install payload(s).
5. Verify image(s).

When installation is complete, similar information can be used for validating and invoking images in a further three steps:

1. Verify image(s).
2. Load image(s).
3. Invoke image(s).

If verification and invocation is implemented in a bootloader, then the bootloader **MUST** also verify the signature of the manifest and the applicability of the manifest in order to implement secure boot workflows. The bootloader may add its own authentication, e.g. a

Message Authentication Code (MAC), to the manifest in order to prevent further verifications.


## 5. Metadata Structure Overview

This section provides a high level overview of the manifest structure. The full description of the manifest structure is in [Section 8.4](#)

The manifest is structured from several key components:

1. The Envelope (see [Section 5.1](#)) contains the Authentication Block, the Manifest, any Severable Elements, and any Integrated Payloads.
2. The Authentication Block (see [Section 5.2](#)) contains a list of signatures or MACs of the manifest.
3. The Manifest (see [Section 5.3](#)) contains all critical, non-severable metadata that the Recipient requires. It is further broken down into:
  1. Critical metadata, such as sequence number.
  2. Common metadata, such as affected components.
  3. Command sequences, directing the Recipient how to install and use the payload(s).
  4. Integrity check values for severable elements.
4. Severable elements (see [Section 5.4](#)).
5. Integrated payloads (see [Section 5.5](#)).

The diagram below illustrates the hierarchy of the Envelope.



## 5.1. Envelope

The SUIT Envelope is a container that encloses the Authentication Block, the Manifest, any Severable Elements, and any integrated payloads. The Envelope is used instead of conventional cryptographic envelopes, such as COSE\_Envelope because it allows modular processing, severing of elements, and integrated payloads in a way that avoids substantial complexity that would be needed with existing solutions. See [Appendix C.1](#) for a description of the reasoning for this.

See [Section 8.2](#) for more detail.

## 5.2. Authentication Block

The Authentication Block contains a bstr-wrapped SUIT Digest Container, see [Section 10](#), and one or more [\[RFC9052\]](#) CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) authentication blocks. These blocks are one of:

\*COSE\_Sign\_Tagged

\*COSE\_Sign1\_Tagged

\*COSE\_Mac\_Tagged

\*COSE\_Mac0\_Tagged

Each of these objects is used in detached payload mode. The payload is the bstr-wrapped SUIT\_Digest.

See [Section 8.3](#) for more detail.

### 5.3. Manifest

The Manifest contains most metadata about one or more images. The Manifest is divided into Critical Metadata, Common Metadata, Command Sequences, and Integrity Check Values.

See [Section 8.4](#) for more detail.

#### 5.3.1. Critical Metadata

Some metadata needs to be accessed before the manifest is processed. This metadata can be used to determine which manifest is newest and whether the structure version is supported. It also **MAY** provide a URI for obtaining a canonical copy of the manifest and Envelope.

See [Section 8.4.1](#), [Section 8.4.2](#), and [Section 8.4.3](#) for more detail.

#### 5.3.2. Common

Some metadata is used repeatedly and in more than one command sequence. In order to reduce the size of the manifest, this metadata is collected into the Common section. Common is composed of two parts: a list of components referenced by the manifest, and a command sequence to execute prior to each other command sequence. The common command sequence is typically used to set commonly used values and perform compatibility checks. The common command sequence **MUST NOT** have any side-effects outside of setting parameter values.

See [Section 8.4.5](#) for more detail.

#### 5.3.3. Command Sequences

Command sequences provide the instructions that a Recipient requires in order to install or use an image. These sequences tell a device to set parameter values, test system parameters, copy data from one place to another, transform data, digest data, and run code.

Command sequences are broken up into three groups: Common Command Sequence (see [Section 5.3.2](#)), update commands, and secure boot commands.

Update Command Sequences are: Payload Fetch, Payload Installation and, System Validation. An Update Procedure is the complete set of

each Update Command Sequence, each preceded by the Common Command Sequence.

Invocation Command Sequences are: System Validation, Image Loading, and Image Invocation. An Invocation Procedure is the complete set of each Invocation Command Sequence, each preceded by the Common Command Sequence.

Command Sequences are grouped into these sets to ensure that there is common coordination between dependencies and dependents on when to execute each command (dependencies are not defined in this specification).

See [Section 8.4.6](#) for more detail.

#### **5.3.4. Integrity Check Values**

To enable severable elements [Section 5.4](#), there needs to be a mechanism to verify the integrity of the severed data. While the severed data stays outside the manifest, for efficiency reasons, Integrity Check Values are used to include the digest of the data in the manifest. Note that Integrated Payloads, see {#ovr-integrated}, are integrity-checked using Command Sequences.

See [Section 8.4.12](#) for more detail.

#### **5.3.5. Human-Readable Text**

Text is typically a Severable Element ([Section 5.4](#)). It contains all the text that describes the update. Because text is explicitly for human consumption, it is all grouped together so that it can be Severed easily. The text section has space both for describing the manifest as a whole and for describing each individual component.

See [Section 8.4.4](#) for more detail.

### **5.4. Severable Elements**

Severable Elements are elements of the Envelope ([Section 5.1](#)) that have Integrity Check Values ([Section 5.3.4](#)) in the Manifest ([Section 5.3](#)).

Because of this organisation, these elements can be discarded or "Severed" from the Envelope without changing the signature of the Manifest. This allows savings based on the size of the Envelope in several scenarios, for example:

\*A management system severs the Text sections before sending an Envelope to a constrained Recipient, which saves Recipient bandwidth.

\*A Recipient severs the Installation section after installing the Update, which saves storage space.

See [Section 8.5](#) for more detail.

## 5.5. Integrated Payloads

In some cases, it is beneficial to include a payload in the Envelope of a manifest. For example:

\*When an update is delivered via a comparatively unconstrained medium, such as a removable mass storage device, it may be beneficial to bundle updates into single files.

\*When a manifest transports a small payload, such as an encrypted key, that payload may be placed in the manifest's envelope.

See [Section 7.5](#) for more detail.

## 6. Manifest Processor Behavior

This section describes the behavior of the manifest processor and focuses primarily on interpreting commands in the manifest. However, there are several other important behaviors of the manifest processor: encoding version detection, rollback protection, and authenticity verification are chief among these.

### 6.1. Manifest Processor Setup

Prior to executing any command sequence, the manifest processor or its host application **MUST** inspect the manifest version field and fail when it encounters an unsupported encoding version. Next, the manifest processor or its host application **MUST** extract the manifest sequence number and perform a rollback check using this sequence number. The exact logic of rollback protection may vary by application, but it has the following properties:

\*Whenever the manifest processor can choose between several manifests, it **MUST** select the latest valid, authentic manifest.

\*If the latest valid, authentic manifest fails, it **MAY** select the next latest valid, authentic manifest, according to application-specific policy.

Here, valid means that a manifest has a supported encoding version and it has not been excluded for other reasons. Reasons for excluding typically involve first executing the manifest and may include:

\*Test failed (e.g. Vendor ID/Class ID).

- \*Unsupported command encountered.
- \*Unsupported parameter encountered.
- \*Unsupported Component Identifier encountered.
- \*Payload not available.
- \*Application crashed when executed.
- \*Watchdog timeout occurred.
- \*Payload verification failed.
- \*Missing required component from a Component Set.
- \*Required parameter not supplied.

These failure reasons **MAY** be combined with retry mechanisms prior to marking a manifest as invalid.

Selecting an older manifest in the event of failure of the latest valid manifest is one possible strategy to provide robustness of the firmware update process. It may not be appropriate for all applications. In particular Trusted Execution Environments **MAY** require a failure to invoke a new installation, rather than a rollback approach. See [[RFC9124](#)], [Section 4.2.1](#) for more discussion on the security considerations that apply to rollback.

Following these initial tests, the manifest processor clears all parameter storage. This ensures that the manifest processor begins without any leaked data.

## 6.2. Required Checks

The **RECOMMENDED** process is to verify the signature of the manifest prior to parsing/executing any section of the manifest. This guards the parser against arbitrary input by unauthenticated third parties, but it costs extra energy when a Recipient receives an incompatible manifest.

When validating authenticity of manifests, the manifest processor **MAY** use an ACL (see [Section 9](#)) to determine the extent of the rights conferred by that authenticity.

Once a valid, authentic manifest has been selected, the manifest processor **MUST** examine the component list and check that the number of components listed in the manifest is not larger than the number in the target system.



For each listed component, the manifest processor **MUST** provide storage for the supported parameters. If the manifest processor does not have sufficient temporary storage to process the parameters for all components, it **MAY** process components serially for each command sequence. See [Section 6.6](#) for more details.

The manifest processor **SHOULD** check that the shared sequence contains at least Check Vendor Identifier command and at least one Check Class Identifier command.

Because the shared sequence contains Check Vendor Identifier and Check Class Identifier command(s), no custom commands are permitted in the shared sequence. This ensures that any custom commands are only executed by devices that understand them.

If the manifest contains more than one component, each command sequence **MUST** begin with a Set Component Index [Section 8.4.10.1](#).

If a Recipient supports groups of interdependent components (a Component Set), then it **SHOULD** verify that all Components in the Component Set are specified by one update, that is:

1. the manifest Author has sufficient permissions for the requested operations (see [Section 9](#)) and
2. the manifest specifies a digest and a payload for every Component in the Component Set.

### 6.3. Interpreter Fundamental Properties

The interpreter has a small set of design goals:

1. Executing an update **MUST** either result in an error, or a correct system state that can be checked against known digests.
2. Executing a Trusted Invocation **MUST** either result in an error, or an invoked image.
3. Executing the same manifest on multiple Recipients **MUST** result in the same system state.

NOTE: when using A/B images, the manifest functions as two (or more) logical manifests, each of which applies to a system in a particular starting state. With that provision, design goal 3 holds.

#### 6.3.1. Resilience to Disruption

As required in [Section 3](#) of [\[RFC9019\]](#) and as an extension of design goal 1, devices must remain operable after a disruption, such as a

power failure or network interruption, interrupts the update process.

The manifest processor must be resilient to these faults. In order to enable this resilience, systems implementing the manifest processor **MUST** make the following guarantees:

One of: 1. A fallback/recovery image is provided so that a disrupted system can apply the SUIT Manifest again. 2. Manifest Authors **MUST** construct Manifests in such a way that repeated partial invocations of any Manifest always results in a correct system state. Typically this is done by using Try-Each and Conditions to bypass operations that have already been completed. 3. A journal of manifest operations is stored in nonvolatile memory. The journal enables the parser to re-create the state just prior to the disruption. This journal can, for example, be a SUIT Report or a journaling file system.

AND

1. Where a command is not repeatable because of the way in which it alters system state (e.g. swapping images or in-place delta) it **MUST** be resumable or revertible. This applies to commands that modify at least one source component as well as the destination component.

#### 6.4. Abstract Machine Description

The heart of the manifest is the list of commands, which are processed by a Manifest Processor -- a form of interpreter. This Manifest Processor can be modeled as a simple abstract machine. This machine consists of several data storage locations that are modified by commands.

There are two types of commands, namely those that modify state (directives) and those that perform tests (conditions). Parameters are used as the inputs to commands. Some directives offer control flow operations. Directives target a specific component. A component is a unit of code or data that can be targeted by an update. Components are identified by Component Identifiers, but referenced in commands by Component Index; Component Identifiers are arrays of binary strings and a Component Index is an index into the array of Component Identifiers.

Conditions **MUST NOT** have any side-effects other than informing the interpreter of success or failure. The Interpreter does not Abort if the Soft Failure flag ([Section 8.4.8.15](#)) is set when a Condition reports failure.

Directives **MAY** have side-effects in the parameter table, the interpreter state, or the current component. The Interpreter **MUST** Abort if a Directive reports failure regardless of the Soft Failure flag.

To simplify the logic describing the command semantics, the object "current" is used. It represents the component identified by the Component Index:

```
current := components[component-index]
```

As a result, Set Component Index is described as `current := components[arg]`.

The following table describes the semantics of each operation. The pseudo-code semantics are inspired by the Python programming language.

<b>pseudo-code operation</b>	<b>Semantics</b>
<code>assert(test)</code>	When test is false, causes an error return
<code>store(dest, source)</code>	Writes source into dest
<code>statement0 for-each e in l else statement1</code>	Performs statement0 once for each element in iterable l; performs statement1 if no break is encountered
<code>break</code>	halt a for-each loop
<code>now()</code>	return the current UTC time
<code>statement if test</code>	performs statement if test is true

Table 1

The following table describes the behavior of each command. "params" represents the parameters for the current component. Most commands operate on a component.

<b>Command Name</b>	<b>Semantic of the Operation</b>
Check Vendor Identifier	<code>assert(binary-match(current, current.params[vendor-id]))</code>
Check Class Identifier	<code>assert(binary-match(current, current.params[class-id]))</code>
Verify Image	<code>assert(binary-match(digest(current), current.params[digest]))</code>
Check Content	<code>assert(binary-match(current, current.params[content]))</code>
Set Component Index	<code>current := components[arg]</code>
Override Parameters	<code>current.params[k] := v for-each k,v in arg</code>
Invoke	<code>invoke(current)</code>
Fetch	<code>store(current, fetch(current.params[uri]))</code>

Command Name	Semantic of the Operation
Write	<code>store(current, current.params[content])</code>
Use Before	<code>assert(now() &lt; arg)</code>
Check Component Slot	<code>assert(current.slot-index == arg)</code>
Check Device Identifier	<code>assert(binary-match(current, current.params[device-id]))</code>
Abort	<code>assert(0)</code>
Try Each	<code>(break if (exec(seq) is not error)) for-each seq in arg else assert(0)</code>
Copy	<code>store(current, current.params[src-component])</code>
Swap	<code>swap(current, current.params[src-component])</code>
Run Sequence	<code>exec(arg)</code>
Invoke with Arguments	<code>invoke(current, arg)</code>

Table 2

### 6.5. Special Cases of Component Index

Component Index can take on one of three types:

1. Integer
2. Array of integers
3. True

Integers **MUST** always be supported by Set Component Index. Arrays of integers **MUST** be supported by Set Component Index if the Recipient supports 3 or more components. True **MUST** be supported by Set Component Index if the Recipient supports 2 or more components. Each of these operates on the list of components declared in the manifest.

Integer indices are the default case as described in the previous section. An array of integers represents a list of the components (Set Component Index) to which each subsequent command applies. The value True replaces the list of component indices with the full list of components, as defined in the manifest.

When a command is executed, it

1. operates on the component identified by the component index if that index is an integer, or
2. it operates on each component identified by an array of indices, or

3. it operates on every component if the index is the boolean True.

This is described by the following pseudocode:

```
if component-index is True:
    current-list = components
else if component-index is array:
    current-list = [ components[idx] for idx in component-index ]
else:
    current-list = [ components[component-index] ]
for current in current-list:
    cmd(current)
```

Try Each and Run Sequence are affected in the same way as other commands: they are invoked once for each possible Component. This means that the sequences that are arguments to Try Each and Run Sequence are not invoked with Component Index = True, nor are they invoked with array indices. They are only invoked with integer indices. The interpreter loops over the whole sequence, setting the Component Index to each index in turn.

## 6.6. Serialized Processing Interpreter

In highly constrained devices, where storage for parameters is limited, the manifest processor **MAY** handle one component at a time, traversing the manifest tree once for each listed component. In this mode, the interpreter ignores any commands executed while the component index is not the current component. This reduces the overall volatile storage required to process the update so that the only limit on number of components is the size of the manifest. However, this approach requires additional processing power.

In order to operate in this mode, the manifest processor loops on each section for every supported component, simply ignoring commands when the current component is not selected.

When a serialized Manifest Processor encounters a component index of True, it does not ignore any commands. It applies them to the current component on each iteration.

## 6.7. Parallel Processing Interpreter

To enable parallel or out-of-order processing of Command Sequences, Recipients **MAY** make use of the Strict Order parameter. The Strict Order parameter indicates to the Manifest Processor that Commands **MUST** be executed strictly in order. When the Strict Order parameter is False, this indicates to the Manifest Processor that Commands **MAY** be executed in parallel or out of order. To perform parallel processing, once the Strict Order parameter is set to False, the

Recipient may issue each or every command concurrently until the Strict Order parameter is returned to True or the Command Sequence ends. Then, it waits for all issued commands to complete before continuing processing of commands. To perform out-of-order processing, a similar approach is used, except the Recipient consumes all commands after the Strict Order parameter is set to False, then it sorts these commands into its preferred order, invokes them all, then continues processing.

When the manifest processor encounters any of the following scenarios the parallel processing **MUST** pause until all issued commands have completed, after which it may resume parallel processing if Strict Order is still False.

- \*Override Parameters.

- \*Set Strict Order = True.

- \*Set Component Index.

Extensions **MAY** alter this list. A Component **MUST NOT** be both a target of an operation and a source of data (for example, in Copy or Swap) in a Command Sequence where Strict Order is False.

To perform more useful parallel operations, a manifest author may collect sequences of commands in a Run Sequence command. Then, each of these sequences **MAY** be run in parallel. There are several invocation options for Run Sequence:

- \*Component Index is a positive integer, Strict Order is False: Strict Order is set to True before the sequence argument is run. The sequence argument **MUST** begin with set-component-index.

- \*Component Index is true or an array of positive integers, Strict Order is False: The sequence argument is run once for each component (or each component in the array); the manifest processor presets the component index and Strict Order = True before each iteration of the sequence argument.

- \*Component Index is a positive integer, Strict Order is True: No special considerations

- \*Component Index is True or an array of positive integers, Strict Order is True: The sequence argument is run once for each component (or each component in the array); the manifest processor presets the component index before each iteration of the sequence argument.

These rules isolate each sequence from each other sequence, ensuring that they operate as expected. When Strict Order = False, any

further Set Component Index directives in the Run Sequence command sequence argument **MUST** cause an Abort. This allows the interpreter that issues Run Sequence commands to check that the first element is correct, then issue the sequence to a parallel execution context to handle the remainder of the sequence.

## 7. Creating Manifests

Manifests are created using tools for constructing COSE structures, calculating cryptographic values and compiling desired system state into a sequence of operations required to achieve that state. The process of constructing COSE structures and the calculation of cryptographic values is covered in [[RFC9052](#)].

Compiling desired system state into a sequence of operations can be accomplished in many ways. Several templates are provided below to cover common use-cases. These templates can be combined to produce more complex behavior.

The author **MUST** ensure that all parameters consumed by a command are set prior to invoking that command. Where Component Index = True, this means that the parameters consumed by each command **MUST** have been set for each Component.

This section details a set of templates for creating manifests. These templates explain which parameters, commands, and orders of commands are necessary to achieve a stated goal.

NOTE: On systems that support only a single component, Set Component Index has no effect and can be omitted.

NOTE: A digest **MUST** always be set using Override Parameters.

### 7.1. Compatibility Check Template

The goal of the compatibility check template ensure that Recipients only install compatible images.

In this template all information is contained in the shared sequence and the following sequence of commands is used:

\*Set Component Index directive (see [Section 8.4.10.1](#))

\*Override Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#)) for Vendor ID and Class ID (see [Section 8.4.8](#))

\*Check Vendor Identifier condition (see [Section 8.4.8.2](#))

\*Check Class Identifier condition (see [Section 8.4.8.2](#))

## 7.2. Trusted Invocation Template

The goal of the Trusted Invocation template is to ensure that only authorized code is invoked; such as in Secure Boot or when a Trusted Application is loaded into a TEE.

The following commands are placed into the shared sequence:

- \*Set Component Index directive (see [Section 8.4.10.1](#))
- \*Override Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#)) for Image Digest and Image Size (see [Section 8.4.8](#))

The system validation sequence contains the following commands:

- \*Set Component Index directive (see [Section 8.4.10.1](#))
- \*Check Image Match condition (see [Section 8.4.9.2](#))

Then, the run sequence contains the following commands:

- \*Set Component Index directive (see [Section 8.4.10.1](#))
- \*Invoke directive (see [Section 8.4.10.7](#))

## 7.3. Component Download Template

The goal of the Component Download template is to acquire and store an image.

The following commands are placed into the shared sequence:

- \*Set Component Index directive (see [Section 8.4.10.1](#))
- \*Override Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#)) for Image Digest and Image Size (see [Section 8.4.8](#))

Then, the install sequence contains the following commands:

- \*Set Component Index directive (see [Section 8.4.10.1](#))
- \*Override Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#)) for URI (see [Section 8.4.8.10](#))
- \*Fetch directive (see [Section 8.4.10.4](#))
- \*Check Image Match condition (see [Section 8.4.9.2](#))

The Fetch directive needs the URI parameter to be set to determine where the image is retrieved from. Additionally, the destination of where the component shall be stored has to be configured. The URI is



configured via the Set Parameters directive while the destination is configured via the Set Component Index directive.

#### 7.4. Install Template

The goal of the Install template is to use an image already stored in an identified component to copy into a second component.

This template is typically used with the Component Download template, however a modification to that template is required: the Component Download operations are moved from the Payload Install sequence to the Payload Fetch sequence.

Then, the install sequence contains the following commands:

- \*Set Component Index directive (see [Section 8.4.10.1](#))
- \*Override Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#)) for Source Component (see [Section 8.4.8.11](#))
- \*Copy directive (see [Section 8.4.10.5](#))
- \*Check Image Match condition (see [Section 8.4.9.2](#))

#### 7.5. Integrated Payload Template

The goal of the Integrated Payload template is to install a payload that is included in the manifest envelope. It is identical to the Component Download template ([Section 7.3](#)).

An Author **MAY** choose to place a payload in the envelope of a manifest. The payload envelope key **MUST** be a string. The payload **MUST** be serialized in a bstr element.

The URI for a payload enclosed in this way **MAY** be expressed as a fragment-only reference, as defined in [[RFC3986](#)], [Section 4.4](#), for example: "#device-model-v1.2.3.bin".

An intermediary, such as a Network Operator, **MAY** choose to pre-fetch a payload and add it to the manifest envelope, using the URI as the key.

#### 7.6. Load from Nonvolatile Storage Template

The goal of the Load from Nonvolatile Storage template is to load an image from a non-volatile component into a volatile component, for example loading a firmware image from external Flash into RAM.

The following commands are placed into the load sequence:

- \*Set Component Index directive (see [Section 8.4.10.1](#))
- \*Override Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#)) for Source Component (see [Section 8.4.8](#))
- \*Copy directive (see [Section 8.4.10.5](#))

As outlined in [Section 6.4](#), the Copy directive needs a source and a destination to be configured. The source is configured via Component Index (with the Set Parameters directive) and the destination is configured via the Set Component Index directive.

### 7.7. A/B Image Template

The goal of the A/B Image Template is to acquire, validate, and invoke one of two images, based on a test.

The following commands are placed in the common block:

- \*Set Component Index directive (see [Section 8.4.10.1](#))
- \*Try Each
  - First Sequence:
    - oOverride Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#), [Section 8.4.8](#)) for Slot A
    - oCheck Slot Condition (see [Section 8.4.9.4](#))
    - oOverride Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#)) for Image Digest A and Image Size A (see [Section 8.4.8](#))
  - Second Sequence:
    - oOverride Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#), [Section 8.4.8](#)) for Slot B
    - oCheck Slot Condition (see [Section 8.4.9.4](#))
    - oOverride Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#)) for Image Digest B and Image Size B (see [Section 8.4.8](#))

The following commands are placed in the fetch block or install block

- \*Set Component Index directive (see [Section 8.4.10.1](#))

\*Try Each

-First Sequence:

oOverride Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#),  
[Section 8.4.8](#)) for Slot A

oCheck Slot Condition (see [Section 8.4.9.4](#))

oSet Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#)) for URI A  
(see [Section 8.4.8](#))

-Second Sequence:

oOverride Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#),  
[Section 8.4.8](#)) for Slot B

oCheck Slot Condition (see [Section 8.4.9.4](#))

oSet Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#)) for URI B  
(see [Section 8.4.8](#))

\*Fetch

If Trusted Invocation ([Section 7.2](#)) is used, only the run sequence is added to this template, since the shared sequence is populated by this template:

\*Set Component Index directive (see [Section 8.4.10.1](#))

\*Try Each

-First Sequence:

oOverride Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#),  
[Section 8.4.8](#)) for Slot A

oCheck Slot Condition (see [Section 8.4.9.4](#))

-Second Sequence:

oOverride Parameters directive (see [Section 8.4.10.3](#),  
[Section 8.4.8](#)) for Slot B

oCheck Slot Condition (see [Section 8.4.9.4](#))

\*Invoke

NOTE: Any test can be used to select between images, Check Slot Condition is used in this template because it is a typical test for execute-in-place devices.

## 8. Metadata Structure

The metadata for SUIT updates is composed of several primary constituent parts: Authentication Information, Manifest, Severable Elements and Integrated Payloads.

For a diagram of the metadata structure, see [Section 5](#).

### 8.1. Encoding Considerations

The map indices in the envelope encoding are reset to 1 for each map within the structure. This is to keep the indices as small as possible. The goal is to keep the index objects to single bytes (CBOR positive integers 1-23).

Wherever enumerations are used, they are started at 1. This allows detection of several common software errors that are caused by uninitialized variables. Positive numbers in enumerations are reserved for IANA registration. Negative numbers are used to identify application-specific values, as described in [Section 11](#).

All elements of the envelope must be wrapped in a bstr to minimize the complexity of the code that evaluates the cryptographic integrity of the element and to ensure correct serialization for integrity and authenticity checks.

All CBOR maps in the Manifest and manifest envelope **MUST** be encoded with the canonical CBOR ordering as defined in [[RFC8949](#)].

### 8.2. Envelope

The Envelope contains each of the other primary constituent parts of the SUIT metadata. It allows for modular processing of the manifest by ordering components in the expected order of processing.

The Envelope is encoded as a CBOR Map. Each element of the Envelope is enclosed in a bstr, which allows computation of a message digest against known bounds.

### 8.3. Authenticated Manifests

SUIT\_Authentication contains a list of elements, which consist of a SUIT\_Digest calculated over the manifest, and zero or more SUIT\_Authentication\_Block's calculated over the SUIT\_Digest.

```
SUIT_Authentication = [  
  bstr .cbor SUIT_Digest,  
  * bstr .cbor SUIT_Authentication_Block  
]  
SUIT_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Mac_Tagged  
SUIT_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Sign_Tagged  
SUIT_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Mac0_Tagged  
SUIT_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Sign1_Tagged
```

The `SUIT_Digest` is computed over the bstr-wrapped `SUIT_Manifest` that is present in the `SUIT_Envelope` at the `suit-manifest` key. The `SUIT_Digest` **MUST** always be present. The Manifest Processor requires a `SUIT_Authentication_Block` to be present. The manifest **MUST** be protected from tampering between the time of creation and the time of signing/MACing.

The `SUIT_Authentication_Block` is computed using detached payloads, as described in RFC 9052 [[RFC9052](#)]. The detached payload in each case is the bstr-wrapped `SUIT_Digest` at the beginning of the list. Signers (or MAC calculators) **MUST** verify the `SUIT_Digest` prior to performing the cryptographic computation to avoid "Time-of-check to time-of-use" type of attack. When multiple `SUIT_Authentication_Blocks` are present, then each `SUIT_Authentication_Block` **MUST** be computed over the same `SUIT_Digest` but using a different algorithm or signing/MAC authority. This feature also allows to transition to new algorithms, such as post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms.

The `SUIT_Authentication` structure **MUST** come before the `suit-manifest` element, regardless of canonical encoding of CBOR. The algorithms used in `SUIT_Authentication` are defined by the profiles declared in [[I-D.ietf-suit-mti](#)].

#### 8.4. Manifest

The manifest contains:

- \*a version number (see [Section 8.4.1](#))
- \*a sequence number (see [Section 8.4.2](#))
- \*a reference URI (see [Section 8.4.3](#))
- \*a common structure with information that is shared between command sequences (see [Section 8.4.5](#))
- \*one or more lists of commands that the Recipient should perform (see [Section 8.4.6](#))
- \*a reference to the full manifest (see [Section 8.4.3](#))

\*human-readable text describing the manifest found in the SUIT\_Envelope (see [Section 8.4.4](#))

The Text section, or any Command Sequence of the Update Procedure (Image Fetch, Image Installation and, System Validation) can be either a CBOR structure or a SUIT\_Digest. In each of these cases, the SUIT\_Digest provides for a severable element. Severable elements are **RECOMMENDED** to implement. In particular, the human-readable text **SHOULD** be severable, since most useful text elements occupy more space than a SUIT\_Digest, but are not needed by the Recipient. Because SUIT\_Digest is a CBOR Array and each severable element is a CBOR bstr, it is straight-forward for a Recipient to determine whether an element has been severed. The key used for a severable element is the same in the SUIT\_Manifest and in the SUIT\_Envelope so that a Recipient can easily identify the correct data in the envelope. See [Section 8.4.12](#) for more detail.

#### 8.4.1. suit-manifest-version

The suit-manifest-version indicates the version of serialization used to encode the manifest. Version 1 is the version described in this document. suit-manifest-version is **REQUIRED** to implement.

#### 8.4.2. suit-manifest-sequence-number

The suit-manifest-sequence-number is a monotonically increasing anti-rollback counter. Each Recipient **MUST** reject any manifest that has a sequence number lower than its current sequence number. For convenience, an implementer **MAY** use a UTC timestamp in seconds as the sequence number. suit-manifest-sequence-number is **REQUIRED** to implement.

#### 8.4.3. suit-reference-uri

suit-reference-uri is a text string that encodes a URI where a full version of this manifest can be found. This is convenient for allowing management systems to show the severed elements of a manifest when this URI is reported by a Recipient after installation.

#### 8.4.4. suit-text

suit-text **SHOULD** be a severable element. suit-text is a map of language identifiers (identical to Tag38 of RFC9290, Appendix A) to language-specific text maps. Each language-specific text map is a map containing two different types of pair:

\*integer => text

\*SUIT\_Component\_Identifier => map

The SUIT\_Text\_Map is defined in the following CDDL.

```
tag38-ltag = text .regexp "[a-zA-Z]{1,8}(-[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,8})"
```

```
SUIT_Text_Map = {  
  + tag38-ltag => SUIT_Text_LMap  
}  
SUIT_Text_LMap = {  
  SUIT_Text_Keys,  
  * SUIT_Component_Identifier => {  
    SUIT_Text_Component_Keys  
  }  
}
```

Each SUIT\_Component\_Identifier => map entry contains a map of integer => text values. All SUIT\_Component\_Identifier present in suit-text **MUST** also be present in suit-common ([Section 8.4.5](#)).

suit-text contains all the human-readable information that describes any and all parts of the manifest, its payload(s) and its resource(s). The text section is typically severable, allowing manifests to be distributed without the text, since end-nodes do not require text. The meaning of each field is described below.

Each section **MAY** be present. If present, each section **MUST** be as described. Negative integer IDs are reserved for application-specific text values.

The following table describes the text fields available in suit-text:

CDDL Structure	Description
suit-text-manifest-description	Free text description of the manifest
suit-text-update-description	Free text description of the update
suit-text-manifest-json-source	The JSON-formatted document that was used to create the manifest
suit-text-manifest-yaml-source	The YAML [ <a href="#">YAML</a> ]-formatted document that was used to create the manifest

Table 3

The following table describes the text fields available in each map identified by a SUIT\_Component\_Identifier.

CDDL Structure	Description
suit-text-vendor-name	Free text vendor name
suit-text-model-name	Free text model name

<b>CDDL Structure</b>	<b>Description</b>
suit-text-vendor-domain	The domain used to create the vendor-id condition (see <a href="#">Section 8.4.8.2</a> )
suit-text-model-info	The information used to create the class-id condition (see <a href="#">{{uuid-identifiers}}</a> )
suit-text-component-description	Free text description of each component in the manifest
suit-text-component-version	A free text representation of the component version

Table 4

suit-text is **OPTIONAL** to implement.

#### 8.4.5. suit-common

suit-common encodes all the information that is shared between each of the command sequences, including: suit-components, and suit-shared-sequence. suit-common is **REQUIRED** to implement.

suit-components is a list of [SUIT Component Identifier](#) ([Section 8.4.5.1](#)) blocks that specify the component identifiers that will be affected by the content of the current manifest. suit-components is **REQUIRED** to implement.

suit-shared-sequence is a `SUIT_Command_Sequence` to execute prior to executing any other command sequence. Typical actions in suit-shared-sequence include setting expected Recipient identity and image digests when they are conditional (see [Section 8.4.10.2](#) and [Section 7.7](#) for more information on conditional sequences). suit-shared-sequence is **RECOMMENDED** to implement. Whenever a parameter or Try Each command is required by more than one Command Sequence, placing that parameter or command in suit-shared-sequence results in a smaller encoding.

##### 8.4.5.1. SUIT\_Component\_Identifier

A component is a unit of code or data that can be targeted by an update. To facilitate composite devices, components are identified by a list of CBOR byte strings, which allows construction of hierarchical component structures. Components are identified by Component Identifiers, but referenced in commands by Component Index; Component Identifiers are arrays of binary strings and a Component Index is an index into the array of Component Identifiers.

A Component Identifier can be trivial, such as the simple array `[h'00']`. It can also represent a filesystem path by encoding each segment of the path as an element in the list. For example, the path `"/usr/bin/env"` would encode to `['usr','bin','env']`.



This hierarchical construction allows a component identifier to identify any part of a complex, multi-component system.

#### 8.4.6. SUIT\_Command\_Sequence

A SUIT\_Command\_Sequence defines a series of actions that the Recipient **MUST** take to accomplish a particular goal. These goals are defined in the manifest and include:

1. Payload Fetch: suit-payload-fetch is a SUIT\_Command\_Sequence to execute in order to obtain a payload. Some manifests may include these actions in the suit-install section instead if they operate in a streaming installation mode. This is particularly relevant for constrained devices without any temporary storage for staging the update. suit-payload-fetch is **OPTIONAL** to implement because it is not relevant in all bootloaders.
2. Payload Installation: suit-install is a SUIT\_Command\_Sequence to execute in order to install a payload. Typical actions include verifying a payload stored in temporary storage, copying a staged payload from temporary storage, and unpacking a payload. suit-install is **OPTIONAL** to implement.
3. Image Validation: suit-validate is a SUIT\_Command\_Sequence to execute in order to validate that the result of applying the update is correct. Typical actions involve image validation. suit-validate is **REQUIRED** to implement.
4. Image Loading: suit-load is a SUIT\_Command\_Sequence to execute in order to prepare a payload for execution. Typical actions include copying an image from permanent storage into RAM, optionally including actions such as decryption or decompression. suit-load is **OPTIONAL** to implement.
5. Invoke or Boot: suit-invoke is a SUIT\_Command\_Sequence to execute in order to invoke an image. suit-invoke typically contains a single instruction: the "invoke" directive, but may also contain an image condition. suit-invoke is **OPTIONAL** to implement because it not needed for restart-based invocation.

Goals 1,2,3 form the Update Procedure. Goals 3,4,5 form the Invocation Procedure.

Each Command Sequence follows exactly the same structure to ensure that the parser is as simple as possible.

Lists of commands are constructed from two kinds of element:

1. Conditions that **MUST** be true and any failure is treated as a failure of the update/load/invocation
2. Directives that **MUST** be executed.

Each condition is composed of:

1. A command code identifier
2. A [SUIT Reporting Policy](#) ([Section 8.4.7](#))

Each directive is composed of:

1. A command code identifier
2. An argument block or a [SUIT Reporting Policy](#) ([Section 8.4.7](#))

Argument blocks are consumed only by flow-control directives:

\*Set Component Index

\*Set/Override Parameters

\*Try Each

\*Run Sequence

Reporting policies provide a hint to the manifest processor of whether to add the success or failure of a command to any report that it generates.

Many conditions and directives apply to a given component, and these generally grouped together. Therefore, a special command to set the current component index is provided. This index is a numeric index into the Component Identifier table defined at the beginning of the manifest.

To facilitate optional conditions, a special directive, `suit-directive-try-each` ([Section 8.4.10.2](#)), is provided. It runs several new lists of conditions/directives, one after another, that are contained as an argument to the directive. By default, it assumes that a failure of a condition should not indicate a failure of the update/invocation, but a parameter is provided to override this behavior. See `suit-parameter-soft-failure` ([Section 8.4.8.15](#)).

#### 8.4.7. Reporting Policy

To facilitate construction of Reports that describe the success or failure of a given Procedure, each command is given a Reporting Policy. This is an integer bitfield that follows the command and indicates what the Recipient should do with the Record of executing the command. The options are summarized in the table below.

Policy	Description
suit-send-record-on-success	Record when the command succeeds
suit-send-record-on-failure	Record when the command fails
suit-send-sysinfo-success	Add system information when the command succeeds
suit-send-sysinfo-failure	Add system information when the command fails

Table 5

Any or all of these policies may be enabled at once.

At the completion of each command, a Manifest Processor **MAY** forward information about the command to a Reporting Engine, which is responsible for reporting boot or update status to a third party. The Reporting Engine is entirely implementation-defined, the reporting policy simply facilitates the Reporting Engine's interface to the SUIT Manifest Processor.

The information elements provided to the Reporting Engine are:

- \*The reporting policy
- \*The result of the command
- \*The values of parameters consumed by the command
- \*The system information consumed by the command

The Reporting Engine consumes these information elements and decides whether to generate an entry in its report output and which information elements to include based on its internal policy decisions. The Reporting Engine uses the reporting policy provided to it by the SUIT Manifest Processor as a set of hints but **MAY** choose to ignore these hints and apply its own policy instead.

If the component index is set to True or an array when a command is executed with a non-zero reporting policy, then the Reporting Engine **MUST** receive one set of information elements for each Component, in

the order expressed in the Components list or the Component Index array.

This specification does not define a particular format of Records or Reports. This specification only defines hints to the Reporting Engine for which information elements it should aggregate into the Report.

When used in a Invocation Procedure, the output of the Reporting Engine **MAY** form the basis of an attestation report. When used in an Update Process, the report **MAY** form the basis for one or more log entries.

#### 8.4.8. SUIT\_Parameters

Many conditions and directives require additional information. That information is contained within parameters that can be set in a consistent way. This allows reuse of parameters between commands, thus reducing manifest size.

Most parameters are scoped to a specific component. This means that setting a parameter for one component has no effect on the parameters of any other component. The only exceptions to this are two Manifest Processor parameters: Strict Order and Soft Failure.

The defined manifest parameters are described below.

Name	CDDL Structure	Reference
Vendor ID	suit-parameter-vendor-identifier	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.3</a>
Class ID	suit-parameter-class-identifier	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.4</a>
Device ID	suit-parameter-device-identifier	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.5</a>
Image Digest	suit-parameter-image-digest	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.6</a>
Image Size	suit-parameter-image-size	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.7</a>
Content	suit-parameter-content	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.9</a>
Component Slot	suit-parameter-component-slot	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.8</a>
URI	suit-parameter-uri	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.10</a>
Source Component	suit-parameter-source-component	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.11</a>
Invoke Args	suit-parameter-invoke-args	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.12</a>
Fetch Arguments	suit-parameter-fetch-arguments	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.13</a>
Strict Order	suit-parameter-strict-order	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.14</a>
Soft Failure	suit-parameter-soft-failure	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.15</a>
Custom	suit-parameter-custom	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.16</a>

Table 6

CBOR-encoded object parameters are still wrapped in a bstr. This is because it allows a parser that is aggregating parameters to reference the object with a single pointer and traverse it without understanding the contents. This is important for modularization and division of responsibility within a pull parser. The same

consideration does not apply to Directives because those elements are invoked with their arguments immediately.

#### 8.4.8.1. CBOR PEN UUID Namespace Identifier

The CBOR PEN UUID Namespace Identifier is constructed as follows:

It uses the OID Namespace as a starting point, then uses the CBOR absolute OID encoding for the IANA PEN OID (1.3.6.1.4.1):

```
D8 6F          # tag(111)
 45           # bytes(5)
# Absolute OID encoding of IANA Private Enterprise Number:
#   1.3. 6. 1. 4. 1
      2B 06 01 04 01 # X.690 Clause 8.19
```

Computing a version 5 UUID from these produces:

```
NAMESPACE_CBOR_PEN = UUID5(NAMESPACE_OID, h'D86F452B06010401')
NAMESPACE_CBOR_PEN = 47fbdabb-f2e4-55f0-bb39-3620c2f6df4e
```

#### 8.4.8.2. Constructing UUIDs

Several conditions use identifiers to determine whether a manifest matches a given Recipient or not. These identifiers are defined to be RFC 4122 [[RFC4122](#)] UUIDs. These UUIDs are not human-readable and are therefore used for machine-based processing only.

A Recipient **MAY** match any number of UUIDs for vendor or class identifier. This may be relevant to physical or software modules. For example, a Recipient that has an OS and one or more applications might list one Vendor ID for the OS and one or more additional Vendor IDs for the applications. This Recipient might also have a Class ID that must be matched for the OS and one or more Class IDs for the applications.

Identifiers are used for compatibility checks. They **MUST NOT** be used as assertions of identity. They are evaluated by identifier conditions ([Section 8.4.9.1](#)).

A more complete example: Imagine a device has the following physical components: 1. A host MCU 2. A WiFi module

This same device has three software modules: 1. An operating system 2. A WiFi module interface driver 3. An application

Suppose that the WiFi module's firmware has a proprietary update mechanism and doesn't support manifest processing. This device can report four class IDs:

1. Hardware model/revision
2. OS
3. WiFi module model/revision
4. Application

This allows the OS, WiFi module, and application to be updated independently. To combat possible incompatibilities, the OS class ID can be changed each time the OS has a change to its API.

This approach allows a vendor to target, for example, all devices with a particular WiFi module with an update, which is a very powerful mechanism, particularly when used for security updates.

UUIDs **MUST** be created according to versions 3, 4, or 5 of RFC 4122 [[RFC4122](#)]. Versions 1 and 2 do not provide a tangible benefit over version 4 for this application.

The **RECOMMENDED** method to create a vendor ID is:

```
Vendor ID = UUID5(DNS_PREFIX, vendor domain name)
```

If the Vendor ID is a UUID, the **RECOMMENDED** method to create a Class ID is:

```
Class ID = UUID5(Vendor ID, Class-Specific-Information)
```

If the Vendor ID is a CBOR PEN (see [Section 8.4.8.3](#)), the **RECOMMENDED** method to create a Class ID is:

```
Class ID = UUID5(  
  UUID5(NAMESPACE_CBOR_PEN, CBOR_PEN),  
  Class-Specific-Information)
```

Class-specific-information is composed of a variety of data, for example:

- \*Model number.
- \*Hardware revision.
- \*Bootloader version (for immutable bootloaders).

#### **8.4.8.3. suit-parameter-vendor-identifier**

suit-parameter-vendor-identifier may be presented in one of two ways:

\*A Private Enterprise Number

\*A byte string containing a UUID [[RFC4122](#)]

Private Enterprise Numbers are encoded as a relative OID, according to the definition in [[RFC9090](#)]. All PENs are relative to the IANA PEN: 1.3.6.1.4.1.

#### **8.4.8.4. suit-parameter-class-identifier**

A RFC 4122 UUID representing the class of the device or component. The UUID is encoded as a 16 byte bstr, containing the raw bytes of the UUID. It **MUST** be constructed as described in [Section 8.4.8.2](#)

#### **8.4.8.5. suit-parameter-device-identifier**

A RFC 4122 UUID representing the specific device or component. The UUID is encoded as a 16 byte bstr, containing the raw bytes of the UUID. It **MUST** be constructed as described in [Section 8.4.8.2](#)

#### **8.4.8.6. suit-parameter-image-digest**

A fingerprint computed over the component itself, encoded in the SUIT\_Digest [Section 10](#) structure. The SUIT\_Digest is wrapped in a bstr, as required in [Section 8.4.8](#).

#### **8.4.8.7. suit-parameter-image-size**

The size of the firmware image in bytes. This size is encoded as a positive integer.

#### **8.4.8.8. suit-parameter-component-slot**

This parameter sets the slot index of a component. Some components support multiple possible Slots (offsets into a storage area). This parameter describes the intended Slot to use, identified by its index into the component's storage area. This slot **MUST** be encoded as a positive integer.

#### **8.4.8.9. suit-parameter-content**

A block of raw data for use with [Section 8.4.10.6](#). It contains a byte string of data to be written to a specified component ID in the same way as a fetch or a copy.

If data is encoded this way, it should be small, e.g. 10's of bytes. Large payloads, e.g. 1000's of bytes, written via this method might prevent the manifest from being held in memory during validation. Typical applications include small configuration parameters.

The size of payload embedded in `suit-parameter-content` impacts the security requirement defined in [RFC9124], Section 4.3.21 `REQ.SEC.MFST.CONST`: Manifest Kept Immutable between Check and Use. Actual limitations on payload size for `suit-parameter-content` depend on the application, in particular the available memory that satisfies `REQ.SEC.MFST.CONST`. If the availability of tamper resistant memory is less than the manifest size, then `REQ.SEC.MFST.CONST` cannot be satisfied.

If `suit-parameter-content` is instantiated in a severable command sequence, then this becomes functionally very similar to an integrated payload, which may be a better choice.

#### **8.4.8.10. `suit-parameter-uri`**

A URI Reference [RFC3986] from which to fetch a resource, encoded as a text string. CBOR Tag 32 is not used because the meaning of the text string is unambiguous in this context.

#### **8.4.8.11. `suit-parameter-source-component`**

This parameter sets the source component to be used with either `suit-directive-copy` (Section 8.4.10.5) or with `suit-directive-swap` (Section 8.4.10.9). The current Component, as set by `suit-directive-set-component-index` defines the destination, and `suit-parameter-source-component` defines the source.

#### **8.4.8.12. `suit-parameter-invoke-args`**

This parameter contains an encoded set of arguments for `suit-directive-invoke` (Section 8.4.10.7). The arguments **MUST** be provided as an implementation-defined bstr.

#### **8.4.8.13. `suit-parameter-fetch-arguments`**

An implementation-defined set of arguments to `suit-directive-fetch` (Section 8.4.10.4). Arguments are encoded in a bstr.

#### **8.4.8.14. `suit-parameter-strict-order`**

The Strict Order Parameter allows a manifest to govern when directives can be executed out-of-order. This allows for systems that have a sensitivity to order of updates to choose the order in which they are executed. It also allows for more advanced systems to parallelize their handling of updates. Strict Order defaults to



True. It **MAY** be set to False when the order of operations does not matter. When arriving at the end of a command sequence, ALL commands **MUST** have completed, regardless of the state of `SUIT_Parameter_Strict_Order`. If `SUIT_Parameter_Strict_Order` is returned to True, ALL preceding commands **MUST** complete before the next command is executed.

See [Section 6.7](#) for behavioral description of Strict Order.

#### 8.4.8.15. `suit-parameter-soft-failure`

When executing a command sequence inside `suit-directive-try-each` ([Section 8.4.10.2](#)) or `suit-directive-run-sequence` ([Section 8.4.10.8](#)) and a condition failure occurs, the manifest processor aborts the sequence. For `suit-directive-try-each`, if Soft Failure is True, the next sequence in Try Each is invoked, otherwise `suit-directive-try-each` fails with the condition failure code. In `suit-directive-run-sequence`, if Soft Failure is True the `suit-directive-run-sequence` simply halts with no side-effects and the Manifest Processor continues with the following command, otherwise, the `suit-directive-run-sequence` fails with the condition failure code.

`suit-parameter-soft-failure` is scoped to the enclosing `SUIT_Command_Sequence`. Its value is discarded when the enclosing `SUIT_Command_Sequence` terminates and `suit-parameter-soft-failure` reverts to the value it had prior to the invocation of the `SUIT_Command_Sequence`. Nested `SUIT_Command_Sequences` do not inherit the enclosing sequence's `suit-parameter-soft-failure`. It **MUST NOT** be set outside of `suit-directive-try-each` or `suit-directive-run-sequence`, modifying `suit-parameter-soft-failure` outside of these circumstances causes an Abort.

When `suit-directive-try-each` is invoked, Soft Failure defaults to True in every `SUIT_Command_Sequence` in the `suit-directive-try-each` argument. An Update Author may choose to set Soft Failure to False if they require a failed condition in a sequence to force an Abort. When the enclosing `SUIT_Command_Sequence` terminates, `suit-parameter-soft-failure` reverts to the value it held before the `SUIT_Command_Sequence` was invoked.

When `suit-directive-run-sequence` is invoked, Soft Failure defaults to False. An Update Author may choose to make failures soft within a `suit-directive-run-sequence`.

#### 8.4.8.16. `suit-parameter-custom`

This parameter is an extension point for any proprietary, application specific conditions and directives. It **MUST NOT** be used in the shared sequence. This effectively scopes each custom command to a particular Vendor Identifier/Class Identifier pair.

suit-parameter-custom **MAY** be consumed by any command, in an application-specific way, however if a suit-parameter-custom is absent, then all standardised suit-commands **MUST** execute correctly. In this respect, suit-parameter-custom **MUST** be treated as a hint by any standardised suit-command that consumes it.

#### 8.4.9. SUIT\_Condition

Conditions are used to define mandatory properties of a system in order for an update to be applied. They can be pre-conditions or post-conditions of any directive or series of directives, depending on where they are placed in the list. All Conditions specify a Reporting Policy as described [Section 8.4.7](#). Conditions include:

Name	CDDL Structure	Reference
Vendor Identifier	suit-condition-vendor-identifier	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.1</a>
Class Identifier	suit-condition-class-identifier	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.1</a>
Device Identifier	suit-condition-device-identifier	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.1</a>
Image Match	suit-condition-image-match	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.2</a>
Check Content	suit-condition-check-content	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.3</a>
Component Slot	suit-condition-component-slot	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.4</a>
Abort	suit-condition-abort	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.5</a>
Custom Condition	suit-command-custom	<a href="#">Section 8.4.11</a>

Table 7

The abstract description of these conditions is defined in [Section 6.4](#).

Conditions compare parameters against properties of the system. These properties may be asserted in many different ways, including: calculation on-demand, volatile definition in memory, static definition within the manifest processor, storage in known location within an image, storage within a key storage system, storage in One-Time-Programmable memory, inclusion in mask ROM, or inclusion as a register in hardware. Some of these assertion methods are global in scope, such as a hardware register, some are scoped to an individual component, such as storage at a known location in an image, and some assertion methods can be either global or component-scope, based on implementation.

Each condition **MUST** report a result code on completion. If a condition reports failure, then the current sequence of commands **MUST** terminate. A subsequent command or command sequence **MAY** continue executing if suit-parameter-soft-failure ([Section 8.4.8.15](#)) is set. If a condition requires additional information, this **MUST** be specified in one or more parameters before the condition is executed. If a Recipient attempts to process a condition that expects additional information and that information has not been

set, it **MUST** report a failure. If a Recipient encounters an unknown condition, it **MUST** report a failure.

Condition labels in the positive number range are reserved for IANA registration while those in the negative range are custom conditions reserved for proprietary definition by the author of a manifest processor. See [Section 11](#) for more details.

#### **8.4.9.1. suit-condition-vendor-identifier, suit-condition-class-identifier, and suit-condition-device-identifier**

There are three identifier-based conditions: suit-condition-vendor-identifier, suit-condition-class-identifier, and suit-condition-device-identifier. Each of these conditions match a RFC 4122 [[RFC4122](#)] UUID that **MUST** have already been set as a parameter. The installing Recipient **MUST** match the specified UUID in order to consider the manifest valid. These identifiers are scoped by component in the manifest. Each component **MAY** match more than one identifier. Care is needed to ensure that manifests correctly identify their targets using these conditions. Using only a generic class ID for a device-specific firmware could result in matching devices that are not compatible.

The Recipient uses the ID parameter that has already been set using the Set Parameters directive. If no ID has been set, this condition fails. suit-condition-class-identifier and suit-condition-vendor-identifier are **REQUIRED** to implement. suit-condition-device-identifier is **OPTIONAL** to implement.

Each identifier condition compares the corresponding identifier parameter to a parameter asserted to the Manifest Processor by the Recipient. Identifiers **MUST** be known to the Manifest Processor in order to evaluate compatibility.

#### **8.4.9.2. suit-condition-image-match**

Verify that the current component matches the suit-parameter-image-digest ([Section 8.4.8.6](#)) for the current component. The digest is verified against the digest specified in the Component's parameters list. If no digest is specified, the condition fails. suit-condition-image-match is **REQUIRED** to implement.

#### **8.4.9.3. suit-condition-check-content**

This directive compares the specified component identifier to the data indicated by suit-parameter-content. This functions similarly to suit-condition-image-match, however it does a direct, byte-by-byte comparison rather than a digest-based comparison. Because it is possible that an early stop to check-content could reveal

information through timing, `suit-condition-check-content` **MUST** be constant time: no early exits.

The following pseudo-code described an example content checking algorithm:

```
// content & component must be same length
// returns 0 for match
int check_content(content, component, length) {
    int residual = 0;
    for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
        residual |= content[i] ^ component[i];
    }
    return residual;
}
```

#### 8.4.9.4. `suit-condition-component-slot`

Verify that the slot index of the current component matches the slot index set in `suit-parameter-component-slot` ([Section 8.4.8.8](#)). This condition allows a manifest to select between several images to match a target slot.

#### 8.4.9.5. `suit-condition-abort`

Unconditionally fail. This operation is typically used in conjunction with `suit-directive-try-each` ([Section 8.4.10.2](#)).

#### 8.4.10. `SUIT_Directive`

Directives are used to define the behavior of the recipient. Directives include:

Name	CDDL Structure	Reference
Set Component Index	<code>suit-directive-set-component-index</code>	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.1</a>
Try Each	<code>suit-directive-try-each</code>	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.2</a>
Override Parameters	<code>suit-directive-override-parameters</code>	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.3</a>
Fetch	<code>suit-directive-fetch</code>	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.4</a>
Copy	<code>suit-directive-copy</code>	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.5</a>
Write	<code>suit-directive-write</code>	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.6</a>
Invoke	<code>suit-directive-invoke</code>	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.7</a>
Run Sequence	<code>suit-directive-run-sequence</code>	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.8</a>
Swap	<code>suit-directive-swap</code>	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.9</a>
Custom Directive	<code>suit-command-custom</code>	<a href="#">Section 8.4.11</a>

Table 8

The abstract description of these commands is defined in [Section 6.4](#).

When a Recipient executes a Directive, it **MUST** report a result code. If the Directive reports failure, then the current Command Sequence **MUST** be terminated.

#### **8.4.10.1. suit-directive-set-component-index**

Set Component Index defines the component to which successive directives and conditions will apply. The Set Component Index arguments are described in [Section 6.5](#).

If the following commands apply to ONE component, an unsigned integer index into the component list is used. If the following commands apply to ALL components, then the boolean value "True" is used instead of an index. If the following commands apply to more than one, but not all components, then an array of unsigned integer indices into the component list is used.

If component index is set to True when a command is invoked, then the command applies to all components, in the order they appear in suit-common-components. When the Manifest Processor invokes a command while the component index is set to True, it must execute the command once for each possible component index, ensuring that the command receives the parameters corresponding to that component index.

#### **8.4.10.2. suit-directive-try-each**

This command runs several SUI\_T\_Command\_Sequence instances, one after another, in a strict order, until one succeeds or the list is exhausted. Use this command to implement a "try/catch-try/catch" sequence. Manifest processors **MAY** implement this command.

suit-parameter-soft-failure ([Section 8.4.8.15](#)) is initialized to True at the beginning of each sequence. If one sequence aborts due to a condition failure, the next is started. If no sequence completes without condition failure, then suit-directive-try-each returns an error. If a particular application calls for all sequences to fail and still continue, then an empty sequence (nil) can be added to the Try Each Argument.

The argument to suit-directive-try-each is a list of SUI\_T\_Command\_Sequence. suit-directive-try-each does not specify a reporting policy.

#### **8.4.10.3. suit-directive-override-parameters**

suit-directive-override-parameters replaces any listed parameters that are already set with the values that are provided in its argument. This allows a manifest to prevent replacement of critical parameters.

Available parameters are defined in [Section 8.4.8](#).

suit-directive-override-parameters does not specify a reporting policy.

#### **8.4.10.4. suit-directive-fetch**

suit-directive-fetch instructs the manifest processor to obtain one or more manifests or payloads, as specified by the manifest index and component index, respectively.

suit-directive-fetch can target one or more payloads. suit-directive-fetch retrieves each component listed in component-index. If component-index is True, instead of an integer, then all current manifest components are fetched. If component-index is an array, then all listed components are fetched.

suit-directive-fetch typically takes no arguments unless one is needed to modify fetch behavior. If an argument is needed, it must be wrapped in a bstr and set in suit-parameter-fetch-arguments.

suit-directive-fetch reads the URI parameter to find the source of the fetch it performs.

#### **8.4.10.5. suit-directive-copy**

suit-directive-copy instructs the manifest processor to obtain one or more payloads, as specified by the component index. As described in [Section 6.5](#) component index may be a single integer, a list of integers, or True. suit-directive-copy retrieves each component specified by the current component-index, respectively.

suit-directive-copy reads its source from suit-parameter-source-component ([Section 8.4.8.11](#)).

If either the source component parameter or the source component itself is absent, this command fails.

#### **8.4.10.6. suit-directive-write**

This directive writes a small block of data, specified in [Section 8.4.8.9](#), to a component.

Encoding Considerations: Careful consideration must be taken to determine whether it is more appropriate to use an integrated payload or to use [Section 8.4.8.9](#) for a particular application. While the encoding of `suit-directive-write` is smaller than an integrated payload, a large `suit-parameter-content` payload may prevent the manifest processor from holding the command sequence in memory while executing it.

#### **8.4.10.7. `suit-directive-invoke`**

`suit-directive-invoke` directs the manifest processor to transfer execution to the current Component Index. When this is invoked, the manifest processor **MAY** be unloaded and execution continues in the Component Index. Arguments are provided to `suit-directive-invoke` through `suit-parameter-invoke-arguments` ([Section 8.4.8.12](#)) and are forwarded to the executable code located in Component Index in an application-specific way. For example, this could form the Linux Kernel Command Line if booting a Linux device.

If the executable code at Component Index is constructed in such a way that it does not unload the manifest processor, then the manifest processor **MAY** resume execution after the executable completes. This allows the manifest processor to invoke suitable helpers and to verify them with image conditions.

#### **8.4.10.8. `suit-directive-run-sequence`**

To enable conditional commands, and to allow several strictly ordered sequences to be executed out-of-order, `suit-directive-run-sequence` allows the manifest processor to execute its argument as a `SUIT_Command_Sequence`. The argument must be wrapped in a `bstr`. This also allows a sequence of instructions to be iterated over, once for each current component index, when `component-index = true` or `component-index = list`. See [Section 6.5](#).

When a sequence is executed, any failure of a condition causes immediate termination of the sequence.

When `suit-directive-run-sequence` completes, it forwards the last status code that occurred in the sequence. If the `Soft Failure` parameter is true, then `suit-directive-run-sequence` only fails when a directive in the argument sequence fails.

`suit-parameter-soft-failure` ([Section 8.4.8.15](#)) defaults to False when `suit-directive-run-sequence` begins. Its value is discarded when `suit-directive-run-sequence` terminates.

#### 8.4.10.9. **suit-directive-swap**

suit-directive-swap instructs the manifest processor to move the source to the destination and the destination to the source simultaneously. Swap has nearly identical semantics to suit-directive-copy except that suit-directive-swap replaces the source with the current contents of the destination in an application-defined way. As with suit-directive-copy, if the source component is missing, this command fails.

#### 8.4.11. **suit-command-custom**

suit-command-custom describes any proprietary, application specific condition or directive. This is encoded as a negative integer, chosen by the firmware developer. If additional information must be provided, it should be encoded in a custom parameter (a nint) (as described in [Section 8.4.8](#)). SUIT\_Command\_Custom is **OPTIONAL** to implement.

#### 8.4.12. **Integrity Check Values**

When the Text section or any Command Sequence of the Update Procedure is made severable, it is moved to the Envelope and replaced with a SUIT\_Digest. The SUIT\_Digest is computed over the entire bstr enclosing the Manifest element that has been moved to the Envelope. Each element that is made severable from the Manifest is placed in the Envelope. The keys for the envelope elements have the same values as the keys for the manifest elements.

Each Integrity Check Value covers the corresponding Envelope Element as described in [Section 8.5](#).

### 8.5. **Severable Elements**

Because the manifest can be used by different actors at different times, some parts of the manifest can be removed or "Severed" without affecting later stages of the lifecycle. Severing of information is achieved by separating that information from the signed container so that removing it does not affect the signature. This means that ensuring integrity of severable parts of the manifest is a requirement for the signed portion of the manifest. Severing some parts makes it possible to discard parts of the manifest that are no longer necessary. This is important because it allows the storage used by the manifest to be greatly reduced. For example, no text size limits are needed if text is removed from the manifest prior to delivery to a constrained device.

At time of manifest creation, the Author **MAY** chose to make a manifest element severable by removing it from the manifest, encoding it in a bstr, and placing a SUIT\_Digest of the bstr in the



manifest so that it can still be authenticated. Making an element severable changes the digest of the manifest, so the signature **MUST** be computed after manifest elements are made severable. Only Manifest Elements with corresponding elements in the SUIT\_Envelope can be made severable (see [Section 11.1](#) for SUIT\_Envelope elements). The SUIT\_Digest typically consumes 4 bytes more than the size of the raw digest, therefore elements smaller than  $(\text{Digest Bits})/8 + 4$  **SHOULD NOT** be severable. Elements larger than  $(\text{Digest Bits})/8 + 4$  **MAY** be severable, while elements that are much larger than  $(\text{Digest Bits})/8 + 4$  **SHOULD** be severable.

Because of this, all command sequences in the manifest are encoded in a bstr so that there is a single code path needed for all command sequences.

## 9. Access Control Lists

SUIT Manifest Processors are **RECOMMENDED** to use one of the following models for managing permissions in the manifest.

First, the simplest model requires that all manifests are authenticated by a single trusted key. This mode has the advantage that only a root manifest needs to be authenticated, since all of its dependencies have digests included in the root manifest.

This simplest model can be extended by adding key delegation without much increase in complexity.

A second model requires an ACL to be presented to the Recipient, authenticated by a trusted party or stored on the Recipient. This ACL grants access rights for specific component IDs or Component Identifier prefixes to the listed identities or identity groups. Any identity can verify an image digest, but fetching into or fetching from a Component Identifier requires approval from the ACL.

A third model allows a Recipient to provide even more fine-grained controls: The ACL lists the Component Identifier or Component Identifier prefix that an identity can use, and also lists the commands and parameters that the identity can use in combination with that Component Identifier.

## 10. SUIT Digest Container

The SUIT digest is a CBOR array containing two elements: an algorithm identifier and a bstr containing the bytes of the digest. Some forms of digest may require additional parameters. These can be added following the digest.

The values of the algorithm identifier are found in the IANA "COSE Algorithms" registry [[COSE Alg](#)], which was created by [[RFC9054](#)]. SHA-256 (-16) **MUST** be implemented by all Manifest Processors.

Any other algorithm defined in the IANA "COSE Algorithms" registry, such as SHA-512 (-44), **MAY** be implemented in a Manifest Processor.

## 11. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to:

- \*allocate CBOR tag 107 (suggested) in the "CBOR Tags" registry for the SUIT Envelope.
- \*allocate CBOR tag 1070 (suggested) in the "CBOR Tags" registry for the SUIT Manifest.
- \*allocate media type application/suit-envelope in the "Media Types" registry, see below.
- \*setup several registries as described below.

IANA is requested to create a new category for Software Update for the Internet of Things (SUIT) and a page within this category for SUIT manifests.

IANA is also requested to create several registries defined in the subsections below.

For each registry, values 0-255 are Standards Action and 256 or greater are Expert Review. Negative values -255 to 0 are Standards Action, and -256 and lower are Private Use.

New entries to those registries need to provide a label, a name and a reference to a specification that describes the functionality. More guidance on the expert review can be found below.

### 11.1. SUIT Envelope Elements

IANA is requested to create a new registry for SUIT envelope elements.

Label	Name	Reference
2	Authentication Wrapper	<a href="#">Section 8.3</a> of [TBD: this document]
3	Manifest	<a href="#">Section 8.4</a> of [TBD: this document]
16	Payload Fetch	<a href="#">Section 8.4.6</a> of [TBD: this document]
17	Payload Installation	<a href="#">Section 8.4.6</a> of [TBD: this document]
23	Text Description	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]

Table 9

## 11.2. SUIT Manifest Elements

IANA is requested to create a new registry for SUIT manifest elements.

Label	Name	Reference
1	Encoding Version	<a href="#">Section 8.4.1</a> of [TBD: this document]
2	Sequence Number	<a href="#">Section 8.4.2</a> of [TBD: this document]
3	Common Data	<a href="#">Section 8.4.5</a> of [TBD: this document]
4	Reference URI	<a href="#">Section 8.4.3</a> of [TBD: this document]
7	Image Validation	<a href="#">Section 8.4.6</a> of [TBD: this document]
8	Image Loading	<a href="#">Section 8.4.6</a> of [TBD: this document]
9	Image Invocation	<a href="#">Section 8.4.6</a> of [TBD: this document]
16	Payload Fetch	<a href="#">Section 8.4.6</a> of [TBD: this document]
17	Payload Installation	<a href="#">Section 8.4.6</a> of [TBD: this document]
23	Text Description	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]

Table 10

## 11.3. SUIT Common Elements

IANA is requested to create a new registry for SUIT common elements.

Label	Name	Reference
2	Component Identifiers	<a href="#">Section 8.4.5</a> of [TBD: this document]
4	Common Command Sequence	<a href="#">Section 8.4.5</a> of [TBD: this document]

Table 11

## 11.4. SUIT Commands

IANA is requested to create a new registry for SUIT commands.

Label	Name	Reference
1	Vendor Identifier	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.1</a> of [TBD: this document]
2	Class Identifier	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.1</a> of [TBD: this document]
3	Image Match	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.2</a> of [TBD: this document]
4	Reserved	
5	Component Slot	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.4</a> of [TBD: this document]
6	Check Content	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.3</a> of [TBD: this document]
12	Set Component Index	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.1</a> of [TBD: this document]
13	Reserved	
14	Abort	
15	Try Each	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.2</a> of [TBD: this document]
16	Reserved	
17	Reserved	
18	Write Content	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.6</a> of [TBD: this document]
19	Reserved	
20	Override Parameters	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.3</a> of [TBD: this document]
21	Fetch	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.4</a> of [TBD: this document]

Label	Name	Reference
22	Copy	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.5</a> of [TBD: this document]
23	Invoke	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.7</a> of [TBD: this document]
24	Device Identifier	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.1</a> of [TBD: this document]
25	Reserved	
26	Reserved	
27	Reserved	
28	Reserved	
29	Reserved	
30	Reserved	
31	Swap	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.9</a> of [TBD: this document]
32	Run Sequence	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.8</a> of [TBD: this document]
33	Reserved	
nint	Custom Command	<a href="#">Section 8.4.11</a> of [TBD: this document]

Table 12

### 11.5. SUIT Parameters

IANA is requested to create a new registry for SUIT parameters.

Label	Name	Reference
1	Vendor ID	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.3</a> of [TBD: this document]
2	Class ID	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.4</a> of [TBD: this document]
3	Image Digest	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.6</a> of [TBD: this document]
4	Reserved	
5	Component Slot	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.8</a> of [TBD: this document]
12	Strict Order	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.14</a> of [TBD: this document]
13	Soft Failure	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.15</a> of [TBD: this document]
14	Image Size	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.7</a> of [TBD: this document]
18	Content	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.9</a> of [TBD: this document]
19	Reserved	
20	Reserved	
21	URI	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.10</a> of [TBD: this document]
22	Source Component	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.11</a> of [TBD: this document]
23	Invoke Args	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.12</a> of [TBD: this document]
24	Device ID	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.5</a> of [TBD: this document]
26	Reserved	
27	Reserved	
28	Reserved	
29	Reserved	
30	Reserved	
nint	Custom	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.16</a> of [TBD: this document]

Table 13

### 11.6. SUIT Text Values

IANA is requested to create a new registry for SUIT text values.

Label	Name	Reference
1	Manifest Description	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]
2	Update Description	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]
3	Manifest JSON Source	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]
4	Manifest YAML Source	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]
nint	Custom	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]

Table 14

### 11.7. SUIT Component Text Values

IANA is requested to create a new registry for SUIT component text values.

Label	Name	Reference
1	Vendor Name	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]
2	Model Name	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]
3	Vendor Domain	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]
4	Model Info	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]
5	Component Description	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]
6	Component Version	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]
7	Component Version Required	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]
nint	Custom	<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a> of [TBD: this document]

Table 15

### 11.8. Expert Review Instructions

The IANA registries established in this document allow values to be added based on expert review. This section gives some general guidelines for what the experts should be looking for, but they are being designated as experts for a reason, so they should be given substantial latitude.

Expert reviewers should take into consideration the following points:

- \*Point squatting should be discouraged. Reviewers are encouraged to get sufficient information for registration requests to ensure that the usage is not going to duplicate one that is already registered, and that the point is likely to be used in deployments. The zones tagged as private use are intended for

testing purposes and closed environments; code points in other ranges should not be assigned for testing.

\*Specifications are required for the standards track range of point assignment. Specifications should exist for all other ranges, but early assignment before a specification is available is considered to be permissible. When specifications are not provided, the description provided needs to have sufficient information to identify what the point is being used for.

\*Experts should take into account the expected usage of fields when approving point assignment. The fact that there is a range for standards track documents does not mean that a standards track document cannot have points assigned outside of that range. The length of the encoded value should be weighed against how many code points of that length are left, the size of device it will be used on, and the number of code points left that encode to that size.

#### **11.9. Media Type Registration**

This section registers the 'application/suit-envelope' media type in the "Media Types" registry. This media type are used to indicate that the content is a SUIT envelope.

Type name: application

Subtype name: suit-envelope

Required parameters: N/A

Optional parameters: N/A

Encoding considerations: binary

Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[This RFC]].

Interoperability considerations: N/A

Published specification: [[This RFC]]

Applications that use this media type: Primarily used for Firmware and software updates although the content may also contain configuration data and other information related to software and firmware.

Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

Additional information:

\* Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

\* Magic number(s): N/A

\* File extension(s): cbor

\* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

Person & email address to contact for further information:  
iesg@ietf.org

Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: N/A

Author: Brendan Moran, <brendan.moran.ietf@gmail.com>

Change Controller: IESG

Provisional registration? No

## 12. Security Considerations

This document is about a manifest format protecting and describing how to retrieve, install, and invoke firmware images and as such it

is part of a larger solution for delivering firmware updates to IoT devices. A detailed security treatment can be found in the architecture [[RFC9019](#)] and in the information model [[RFC9124](#)] documents.

The security requirements outlined in [[RFC9124](#)] are addressed by this draft and its extensions. The specific mapping of requirements and information elements in [[RFC9124](#)] to manifest data structures is outlined in the table below:

Security Requirement	Information Element	Implementation
REQ.SEC.SEQUENCE	Monotonic Sequence Number	<a href="#">Section 8.4.2</a>
REQ.SEC.COMPATIBLE	Vendor ID Condition, Class ID Condition	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.1</a>
REQ.SEC.EXP	Expiration Time	[ <a href="#">I-D.ietf-suit-update-management</a> ]
REQ.SEC.AUTHENTIC	Signature, Payload Digests	<a href="#">Section 8.3</a> , <a href="#">Section 8.4.9.2</a>
REQ.SEC.AUTH.IMG_TYPE	Payload Format	[ <a href="#">I-D.ietf-suit-update-management</a> ]
REQ.SEC.AUTH.IMG_LOC	Storage Location	<a href="#">Section 8.4.5.1</a>
REQ.SEC.AUTH.REMOTE_LOC	Payload Indicator	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.10</a>
REQ.SEC.AUTH.EXEC	Payload Digests, Size	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.6</a> , <a href="#">Section 8.4.8.7</a>
REQ.SEC.AUTH.PRECURSOR	Precursor Image Digest	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.6</a>
REQ.SEC.AUTH.COMPATIBILITY	Authenticated Vendor and Class IDs	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.3</a> , <a href="#">Section 8.4.8.4</a>
REQ.SEC.RIGHTS	Signature	<a href="#">Section 8.3</a> , <a href="#">Section 9</a>
REQ.SEC.IMG.CONFIDENTIALITY	Encryption Wrapper	[ <a href="#">I-D.ietf-suit-firmware-encryption</a> ]
REQ.SEC.ACCESS_CONTROL: Access Control	None	<a href="#">Section 9</a>
REQ.SEC.MFST.CONFIDENTIALITY	Manifest Encryption Wrapper / Transport Security	[ <a href="#">I-D.ietf-suit-firmware-encryption</a> ]
REQ.SEC.IMG.COMPLETE_DIGEST	Payload Digests	Implementation Consideration
REQ.SEC.REPORTING	None	[ <a href="#">I-D.ietf-suit-report</a> ], [ <a href="#">RFC9334</a> ]
REQ.SEC.KEY.PROTECTION	None	Implementation Consideration
REQ.SEC.KEY.ROTATION	None	[ <a href="#">I-D.tschofenig-cose-cwt-chain</a> ], Implementation Consideration
REQ.SEC.MFST.CHECK	None	Deployment Consideration
REQ.SEC.MFST.TRUSTED	None	Deployment Consideration
REQ.SEC.MFST.CONST	None	Implementation Consideration
REQ.USE.MFST.PRE_CHECK	Additional Installation Instructions	[ <a href="#">I-D.ietf-suit-update-management</a> ]
REQ.USE.MFST.TEXT		<a href="#">Section 8.4.4</a>



Security Requirement	Information Element	Implementation
	Manifest Text Information	
REQ.USE.MFST.OVERRIDE_REMOTE	Aliases	[RFC3986] Relative URIs, [I-D.ietf-suit-trust-domains]
REQ.USE.MFST.COMPONENT	Dependencies, StorageIdentifier, ComponentIdentifier	<a href="#">SUIT Component Identifier</a> (Section 8.4.5 [I-D.ietf-suit-trust-domains])
REQ.USE.MFST.MULTI_AUTH	Signature	<a href="#">Section 8.3</a>
REQ.USE.IMG.FORMAT	Payload Format	[I-D.ietf-suit-update-management]
REQ.USE.IMG.NESTED	Processing Steps	[I-D.ietf-suit-firmware-encryption] (Enc Wrapper), [I-D.ietf-suit-update-management] (Payload Format)
REQ.USE.IMG.VERSIONS	Required Image Version List	[I-D.ietf-suit-update-management]
REQ.USE.IMG.SELECT	XIP Address	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.4</a>
REQ.USE.EXEC	Runtime Metadata	<a href="#">Section 8.4.6</a> (suit-invoke)
REQ.USE.LOAD	Load-Time Metadata	<a href="#">Section 8.4.6</a> (suit-load)
REQ.USE.PAYLOAD	Payload	<a href="#">Section 7.5</a>
REQ.USE.PARSE	Simple Parsing	<a href="#">Section 6.4</a>
REQ.USE.DELEGATION	Delegation Chain	[I-D.tschofenig-cose-cwt-chain]

Table 16

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- \*

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## Appendix A. A. Full CDDL

In order to create a valid SUIF Manifest document the structure of the corresponding CBOR message **MUST** adhere to the following CDDL data definition.

To be valid, the following CDDL **MUST** have the COSE CDDL appended to it. The COSE CDDL can be obtained by following the directions in [RFC9052], [Section 1.4](#).

```

SUITE_Envelope_Tagged = #6.107(SUIT_Envelope)
SUITE_Envelope = {
  suit-authentication-wrapper => bstr .cbor SUITE_Authentication,
  suit-manifest => bstr .cbor SUITE_Manifest,
  SUITE_Severable_Manifest_Members,
  * SUITE_Integrated_Payload,
  * $$$SUITE_Envelope_Extensions,
}

SUITE_Authentication = [
  bstr .cbor SUITE_Digest,
  * bstr .cbor SUITE_Authentication_Block
]

SUITE_Digest = [
  suit-digest-algorithm-id : suit-cose-hash-algs,
  suit-digest-bytes : bstr,
  * $$$SUITE_Digest-extensions
]

SUITE_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Mac_Tagged
SUITE_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Sign_Tagged
SUITE_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Mac0_Tagged
SUITE_Authentication_Block /= COSE_Sign1_Tagged

SUITE_Severable_Manifest_Members = (
  ? suit-payload-fetch => bstr .cbor SUITE_Command_Sequence,
  ? suit-install => bstr .cbor SUITE_Command_Sequence,
  ? suit-text => bstr .cbor SUITE_Text_Map,
  * $$$SUITE_severable-members-extensions,
)

SUITE_Integrated_Payload = (suit-integrated-payload-key => bstr)
suit-integrated-payload-key = tstr

SUITE_Manifest_Tagged = #6.1070(SUIT_Manifest)

SUITE_Manifest = {
  suit-manifest-version => 1,
  suit-manifest-sequence-number => uint,
  suit-common => bstr .cbor SUITE_Common,
  ? suit-reference-uri => tstr,
  SUITE_Unseverable_Members,
  SUITE_Severable_Members_Choice,
  * $$$SUITE_Manifest_Extensions,
}

SUITE_Unseverable_Members = (
  ? suit-validate => bstr .cbor SUITE_Command_Sequence,
  ? suit-load => bstr .cbor SUITE_Command_Sequence,

```

```

? suit-invoke => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
* $$unseverable-manifest-member-extensions,
)

SUIT_Severable_Members_Choice = (
? suit-payload-fetch => SUIT_Digest /
  bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
? suit-install => SUIT_Digest / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
? suit-text => SUIT_Digest / bstr .cbor SUIT_Text_Map,
* $$severable-manifest-members-choice-extensions
)

SUIT_Common = {
? suit-components          => SUIT_Components,
? suit-shared-sequence     => bstr .cbor SUIT_Shared_Sequence,
* $$SUIT_Common-extensions,
}

SUIT_Components           = [ + SUIT_Component_Identifier ]

;REQUIRED to implement:
suit-cose-hash-algs /= cose-alg-sha-256

;OPTIONAL to implement:
suit-cose-hash-algs /= cose-alg-shake128
suit-cose-hash-algs /= cose-alg-sha-384
suit-cose-hash-algs /= cose-alg-sha-512
suit-cose-hash-algs /= cose-alg-shake256

SUIT_Component_Identifier = [* bstr]

SUIT_Shared_Sequence = [
+ ( SUIT_Condition // SUIT_Shared_Commands )
]

SUIT_Shared_Commands // = (suit-directive-set-component-index,  IndexArg)
SUIT_Shared_Commands // = (suit-directive-run-sequence,
  bstr .cbor SUIT_Shared_Sequence)
SUIT_Shared_Commands // = (suit-directive-try-each,
  SUIT_Directive_Try_Each_Argument_Shared)
SUIT_Shared_Commands // = (suit-directive-override-parameters,
  {+ $$SUIT_Parameters})

IndexArg /= uint
IndexArg /= true
IndexArg /= [+uint]

SUIT_Directive_Try_Each_Argument_Shared = [
2* bstr .cbor SUIT_Shared_Sequence,

```

```

    ?nil
]

SUIT_Command_Sequence = [ + (
    SUIT_Condition // SUIT_Directive // SUIT_Command_Custom
) ]

SUIT_Command_Custom = (suit-command-custom, bstr/tstr/int/nil)
SUIT_Condition // = (suit-condition-vendor-identifier, SUIT_Rep_Policy)
SUIT_Condition // = (suit-condition-class-identifier, SUIT_Rep_Policy)
SUIT_Condition // = (suit-condition-device-identifier, SUIT_Rep_Policy)
SUIT_Condition // = (suit-condition-image-match, SUIT_Rep_Policy)
SUIT_Condition // = (suit-condition-component-slot, SUIT_Rep_Policy)
SUIT_Condition // = (suit-condition-check-content, SUIT_Rep_Policy)
SUIT_Condition // = (suit-condition-abort, SUIT_Rep_Policy)

SUIT_Directive // = (suit-directive-write, SUIT_Rep_Policy)
SUIT_Directive // = (suit-directive-set-component-index, IndexArg)
SUIT_Directive // = (suit-directive-run-sequence,
    bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence)
SUIT_Directive // = (suit-directive-try-each,
    SUIT_Directive_Try_Each_Argument)
SUIT_Directive // = (suit-directive-override-parameters,
    {+ $$SUIT_Parameters})
SUIT_Directive // = (suit-directive-fetch, SUIT_Rep_Policy)
SUIT_Directive // = (suit-directive-copy, SUIT_Rep_Policy)
SUIT_Directive // = (suit-directive-swap, SUIT_Rep_Policy)
SUIT_Directive // = (suit-directive-invoke, SUIT_Rep_Policy)

SUIT_Directive_Try_Each_Argument = [
    2* bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ?nil
]

SUIT_Rep_Policy = uint .bits suit-reporting-bits

suit-reporting-bits = &(
    suit-send-record-success : 0,
    suit-send-record-failure : 1,
    suit-send-sysinfo-success : 2,
    suit-send-sysinfo-failure : 3
)

$$SUIT_Parameters // = (suit-parameter-vendor-identifier =>
    (RFC4122_UUID / cbor-pen))

cbor-pen = #6.112(bstr)

$$SUIT_Parameters // = (suit-parameter-class-identifier => RFC4122_UUID)
$$SUIT_Parameters // = (suit-parameter-image-digest

```

```

=> bstr .cbor SUIT_Digest)
$$SUIT_Parameters //=(suit-parameter-image-size => uint)
$$SUIT_Parameters //=(suit-parameter-component-slot => uint)

$$SUIT_Parameters //=(suit-parameter-uri => tstr)
$$SUIT_Parameters //=(suit-parameter-source-component => uint)
$$SUIT_Parameters //=(suit-parameter-invoke-args => bstr)

$$SUIT_Parameters //=(suit-parameter-device-identifier => RFC4122_UUID)

$$SUIT_Parameters //=(suit-parameter-custom => int/bool/tstr/bstr)

$$SUIT_Parameters //=(suit-parameter-content => bstr)
$$SUIT_Parameters //=(suit-parameter-strict-order => bool)
$$SUIT_Parameters //=(suit-parameter-soft-failure => bool)

RFC4122_UUID = bstr .size 16

tag38-ltag = text .regex "[a-zA-Z]{1,8}(-[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,8})*"
SUIT_Text_Map = {
  + tag38-ltag => SUIT_Text_LMap
}
SUIT_Text_LMap = {
  SUIT_Text_Keys,
  * SUIT_Component_Identifier => {
    SUIT_Text_Component_Keys
  }
}

SUIT_Text_Component_Keys = (
  ? suit-text-vendor-name           => tstr,
  ? suit-text-model-name           => tstr,
  ? suit-text-vendor-domain        => tstr,
  ? suit-text-model-info           => tstr,
  ? suit-text-component-description => tstr,
  ? suit-text-component-version    => tstr,
  * $$suit-text-component-key-extensions
)

SUIT_Text_Keys = (
  ? suit-text-manifest-description => tstr,
  ? suit-text-update-description  => tstr,
  ? suit-text-manifest-json-source => tstr,
  ? suit-text-manifest-yaml-source => tstr,
  * $$suit-text-key-extensions
)

suit-authentication-wrapper = 2
suit-manifest = 3

```



```
;REQUIRED to implement:
cose-alg-sha-256 = -16

;OPTIONAL to implement:
cose-alg-shake128 = -18
cose-alg-sha-384 = -43
cose-alg-sha-512 = -44
cose-alg-shake256 = -45

;Unseverable, recipient-necessary
suit-manifest-version = 1
suit-manifest-sequence-number = 2
suit-common = 3
suit-reference-uri = 4
suit-validate = 7
suit-load = 8
suit-invoke = 9
;Severable, recipient-necessary
suit-payload-fetch = 16
suit-install = 17
;Severable, recipient-unnecessary
suit-text = 23

suit-components = 2
suit-shared-sequence = 4

suit-command-custom = nint

suit-condition-vendor-identifier = 1
suit-condition-class-identifier = 2
suit-condition-image-match = 3
suit-condition-component-slot = 5
suit-condition-check-content = 6

suit-condition-abort = 14
suit-condition-device-identifier = 24

suit-directive-set-component-index = 12
suit-directive-try-each = 15
suit-directive-write = 18
suit-directive-override-parameters = 20
suit-directive-fetch = 21
suit-directive-copy = 22
suit-directive-invoke = 23

suit-directive-swap = 31
suit-directive-run-sequence = 32

suit-parameter-vendor-identifier = 1
suit-parameter-class-identifier = 2
```

```

suit-parameter-image-digest      = 3
suit-parameter-component-slot    = 5

suit-parameter-strict-order      = 12
suit-parameter-soft-failure      = 13
suit-parameter-image-size        = 14
suit-parameter-content           = 18

suit-parameter-uri               = 21
suit-parameter-source-component  = 22
suit-parameter-invoke-args      = 23

suit-parameter-device-identifier = 24

suit-parameter-custom = nint

suit-text-manifest-description   = 1
suit-text-update-description     = 2
suit-text-manifest-json-source   = 3
suit-text-manifest-yaml-source  = 4

suit-text-vendor-name           = 1
suit-text-model-name            = 2
suit-text-vendor-domain         = 3
suit-text-model-info            = 4
suit-text-component-description  = 5
suit-text-component-version      = 6

```

## Appendix B. B. Examples

The following examples demonstrate a small subset of the functionality of the manifest. Even a simple manifest processor can execute most of these manifests.

The examples are signed using the following ECDSA secp256r1 key:

```

-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGHAgEAMBMGBYqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgApZYjZCUGLM50VBC
CjYStX+09jGmnyJPrpDLTz/hiX0hRANCAASEloEarguqq9JhVxie7NomvqqL8Rtv
P+bitWwchdvArTsfKktsCYExwKNtrNHXi90B3N+wnAUtszmr23M4tKiW
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----

```

The corresponding public key can be used to verify these examples:

```

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEhJaBGq4LqqvSYVcYnuzaJr6qi/Eb
bz/m4rVlnIXbwK07HypLbAmBMcCjbazR14vTgdzfsJwFLbM5kdtzOLSoIlg==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

```

Each example uses SHA256 as the digest function.

Note that reporting policies are declared for each non-flow-control command in these examples. The reporting policies used in the examples are described in the following tables.

Policy	Label
suit-send-record-on-success	Rec-Pass
suit-send-record-on-failure	Rec-Fail
suit-send-sysinfo-success	Sys-Pass
suit-send-sysinfo-failure	Sys-Fail

Table 17

Command	Sys-Fail	Sys-Pass	Rec-Fail	Rec-Pass
suit-condition-vendor-identifier	1	1	1	1
suit-condition-class-identifier	1	1	1	1
suit-condition-image-match	1	1	1	1
suit-condition-component-slot	0	1	0	1
suit-directive-fetch	0	0	1	0
suit-directive-copy	0	0	1	0
suit-directive-invoke	0	0	1	0

Table 18

### B.1. Example 0: Secure Boot

This example covers the following templates:

- \*Compatibility Check ([Section 7.1](#))

- \*Secure Boot ([Section 7.2](#))

It also serves as the minimum example.

```

107({
  / authentication-wrapper / 2:<< [
    / digest: / << [
      / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
      / digest-bytes /
h'6658ea560262696dd1f13b782239a064da7c6c5cbaf52fded428a6fc83c7e5af'
    ] >>,
    / signature: / << 18([
      / protected / << {
        / alg / 1:-7 / "ES256" /,
      } >>,
      / unprotected / {
      },
      / payload / F6 / nil /,
      / signature / h'56acf3c133338f558bbbac1e73a62bfffac
2a0067d0f7a2e860e20b9119a61d964af04fb56c2c7618d3d74558c14f5daf7cafa877
1b34ec42160f5c94250a57eb'
    ]) >>
  ]
] >>,
/ manifest / 3:<< {
  / manifest-version / 1:1,
  / manifest-sequence-number / 2:0,
  / common / 3:<< {
    / components / 2:[
      [h'00']
    ],
    / shared-sequence / 4:<< [
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / vendor-id /
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /,
        / class-id /
2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45' /
1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /,
        / image-digest / 3:<< [
          / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
          / digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
        ] >>,
        / image-size / 14:34768,
      } ,
      / condition-vendor-identifier / 1,15 ,
      / condition-class-identifier / 2,15
    ] >>,
  } >>,
/ validate / 7:<< [
  / condition-image-match / 3,15
] >>,

```

```
    / run / 9:<< [  
      / directive-run / 23,2  
    ] >>,  
  } >>,  
})
```

Total size of Envelope without COSE authentication object: 161

Envelope:

```
d86ba2025827815824822f58206658ea560262696dd1f13b782239a064da  
7c6c5cbaf52fded428a6fc83c7e5af035871a50101020003585fa2028181  
41000458568614a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fd5fde9de663e4d41ffe02501492  
af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45035824822f5820001122334455667788  
99aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d0010f02  
0f074382030f0943821702
```

Total size of Envelope with COSE authentication object: 237

Envelope with COSE authentication object:

```
d86ba2025873825824822f58206658ea560262696dd1f13b782239a064da  
7c6c5cbaf52fded428a6fc83c7e5af584ad28443a10126a0f6584056acf3  
c133338f558bbbac1e73a62bffac2a0067d0f7a2e860e20b9119a61d964a  
f04fb56c2c7618d3d74558c14f5daf7cafa8771b34ec42160f5c94250a57  
eb035871a50101020003585fa202818141000458568614a40150fa6b4a53  
d5ad5fd5fde9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45  
035824822f582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcd  
effedcba98765432100e1987d0010f020f074382030f0943821702
```

## B.2. Example 1: Simultaneous Download and Installation of Payload

This example covers the following templates:

\*Compatibility Check ([Section 7.1](#))

\*Firmware Download ([Section 7.3](#))

Simultaneous download and installation of payload. No secure boot is present in this example to demonstrate a download-only manifest.

```

107({
  / authentication-wrapper / 2:<< [
    / digest: / << [
      / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
      / digest-bytes /
h'ef14b7091e8adae8aa3bb6fca1d64fb37e19dcf8b35714cfdddc5968c80ff50e'
    ] >>,
    / signature: / << 18([
      / protected / << {
        / alg / 1:-7 / "ES256" /,
      } >>,
      / unprotected / {
      },
      / payload / F6 / nil /,
      / signature / h'9c44e07766a26fd33d41ded913363c0ec7
465c06c30be70df32a73a4dea1bbb353d880d9d1813f7b6f0c6987dc4b289838468477
9c17ca9062085487254cf203'
    ]) >>
  ]
] >>,
/ manifest / 3:<< {
  / manifest-version / 1:1,
  / manifest-sequence-number / 2:1,
  / common / 3:<< {
    / components / 2:[
      [h'00']
    ],
    / shared-sequence / 4:<< [
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / vendor-id /
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fd9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /,
        / class-id /
2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45' /
1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /,
        / image-digest / 3:<< [
          / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
          / digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
        ] >>,
        / image-size / 14:34768,
      } ,
      / condition-vendor-identifier / 1,15 ,
      / condition-class-identifier / 2,15
    ] >>,
  } >>,
/ validate / 7:<< [
  / condition-image-match / 3,15
] >>,

```

```

    / install / 17:<< [
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / uri / 21:'http://example.com/file.bin',
      } ,
      / directive-fetch / 21,2 ,
      / condition-image-match / 3,15
    ] >>,
  } >>,
})

```

Total size of Envelope without COSE authentication object: 196

Envelope:

```

d86ba2025827815824822f5820ef14b7091e8adae8aa3bb6fca1d64fb37e
19dcf8b35714cfdddc5968c80ff50e035894a50101020103585fa2028181
41000458568614a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492
af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45035824822f5820001122334455667788
99aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d0010f02
0f074382030f1158258614a115781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e
636f6d2f66696c652e62696e1502030f

```

Total size of Envelope with COSE authentication object: 272

Envelope with COSE authentication object:

```

d86ba2025873825824822f5820ef14b7091e8adae8aa3bb6fca1d64fb37e
19dcf8b35714cfdddc5968c80ff50e584ad28443a10126a0f658409c44e0
7766a26fd33d41ded913363c0ec7465c06c30be70df32a73a4dea1bbb353
d880d9d1813f7b6f0c6987dc4b2898384684779c17ca9062085487254cf2
03035894a50101020103585fa202818141000458568614a40150fa6b4a53
d5ad5fdbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45
035824822f582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcd
effedcba98765432100e1987d0010f020f074382030f1158258614a11578
1b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e1502
030f

```

### B.3. Example 2: Simultaneous Download, Installation, Secure Boot, Severed Fields

This example covers the following templates:

- \*Compatibility Check ([Section 7.1](#))

- \*Secure Boot ([Section 7.2](#))

- \*Firmware Download ([Section 7.3](#))

This example also demonstrates severable elements ([Section 5.4](#)), and text ([Section 8.4.4](#)).

```

107({
  / authentication-wrapper / 2:<< [
    / digest: / << [
      / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
      / digest-bytes /
h'56c894f743ca34ff0ae76271f964dcb8c139edb4a8dc64b01444504620be28a8'
    ] >>,
    / signature: / << 18([
      / protected / << {
        / alg / 1:-7 / "ES256" /,
      } >>,
      / unprotected / {
      },
      / payload / F6 / nil /,
      / signature / h'd6fc4cd4119a261c9e7f782226a235aa06
960781a537064131238203e9fcde17f9a04e09f6ace03ef861971ef3d4b519558cdd96
6a6303e7e82783d6b2a99cf2'
    ]) >>
  ]
] >>,
/ manifest / 3:<< {
  / manifest-version / 1:1,
  / manifest-sequence-number / 2:2,
  / common / 3:<< {
    / components / 2:[
      [h'00']
    ],
    / shared-sequence / 4:<< [
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / vendor-id /
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /,
        / class-id /
2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45' /
1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /,
        / image-digest / 3:<< [
          / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
          / digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
        ] >>,
        / image-size / 14:34768,
      } ,
      / condition-vendor-identifier / 1,15 ,
      / condition-class-identifier / 2,15
    ] >>,
  } >>,
  / reference-uri / 4:'https://git.io/JJYoj',
  / validate / 7:<< [
    / condition-image-match / 3,15
  ]
}

```



```

] >>,
/ run / 9:<< [
  / directive-run / 23,2
] >>,
/ install / 17:[
  / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
  / digest-bytes /
h'cfa90c5c58595e7f5119a72f803fd0370b3e6abbec6315cd38f63135281bc498'
],
/ text / 23:[
  / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
  / digest-bytes /
h'302196d452bce5e8bfeaf71e395645ede6d365e63507a081379721eeecf00007'
],
} >>,
})

```

Total size of the Envelope without COSE authentication object or Severable Elements: 257

Envelope:

```

d86ba2025827815824822f582056c894f743ca34ff0ae76271f964dcb8c1
39edb4a8dc64b01444504620be28a80358d1a80101020203585fa2028181
41000458568614a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492
af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45035824822f5820001122334455667788
99aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d0010f02
0f047468747470733a2f2f6769742e696f2f4a4a596f6a074382030f0943
82170211822f5820cfa90c5c58595e7f5119a72f803fd0370b3e6abbec63
15cd38f63135281bc49817822f5820302196d452bce5e8bfeaf71e395645
ede6d365e63507a081379721eeecf00007

```

Total size of the Envelope with COSE authentication object but without Severable Elements: 333

Envelope:

```
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```

Total size of Envelope with COSE authentication object and Severable Elements: 923

Envelope with COSE authentication object:

```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```

#### B.4. Example 3: A/B images

This example covers the following templates:

- \*Compatibility Check ([Section 7.1](#))
- \*Secure Boot ([Section 7.2](#))
- \*Firmware Download ([Section 7.3](#))
- \*A/B Image Template ([Section 7.7](#))

```

107({
  / authentication-wrapper / 2:<< [
    / digest: / << [
      / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
      / digest-bytes /
h'b3e6a52776bf3ed218feba031c609c98260e1a52fc1f019683edb6d1c5c4a379'
    ] >>,
    / signature: / << 18([
      / protected / << {
        / alg / 1:-7 / "ES256" /,
      } >>,
      / unprotected / {
      },
      / payload / F6 / nil /,
      / signature / h'a72d9dabc04af139a0a5b3ef775234b9ed
1c2390e03ffa1454458b2394cca16aced37039bbf84ea898a54a242d0d04883f22135a
9b98efe042015041f0142d4e'
    ]) >>
  ]
] >>,
/ manifest / 3:<< {
  / manifest-version / 1:1,
  / manifest-sequence-number / 2:3,
  / common / 3:<< {
    / components / 2:[
      [h'00']
    ],
    / shared-sequence / 4:<< [
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / vendor-id /
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /,
        / class-id /
2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45' /
1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /,
      } ,
      / directive-try-each / 15,[
        << [
          / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
            / slot / 5:0,
          } ,
          / condition-component-slot / 5,5 ,
          / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
            / image-digest / 3:<< [
              / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
              / digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
            ] >>,
            / image-size / 14:34768,

```

```

    }
  ] >> ,
  << [
    / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
      / slot / 5:1,
    } ,
    / condition-component-slot / 5,5 ,
    / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
      / image-digest / 3:<< [
        / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
        / digest-bytes /
h'0123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
      ] >>,
      / image-size / 14:76834,
    }
  ] >>
] ,
/ condition-vendor-identifier / 1,15 ,
/ condition-class-identifier / 2,15
] >>,
} >>,
/ validate / 7:<< [
  / condition-image-match / 3,15
] >>,
/ install / 17:<< [
  / directive-try-each / 15,[
    << [
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / slot / 5:0,
      } ,
      / condition-component-slot / 5,5 ,
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / uri / 21:'http://example.com/file1.bin',
      }
    ] >> ,
    << [
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / slot / 5:1,
      } ,
      / condition-component-slot / 5,5 ,
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / uri / 21:'http://example.com/file2.bin',
      }
    ] >>
  ] ,
  / directive-fetch / 21,2 ,
  / condition-image-match / 3,15
] >>,

```

```
} >>,  
})
```

Total size of Envelope without COSE authentication object: 320

Envelope:

```
d86ba2025827815824822f5820b3e6a52776bf3ed218feba031c609c9826  
0e1a52fc1f019683edb6d1c5c4a3790359010fa5010102030358a4a20281  
81410004589b8814a20150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdbe9de663e4d41ffe025014  
92af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450f8258348614a10500050514a20358  
24822f582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffe  
dcba98765432100e1987d058368614a10501050514a2035824822f582001  
23456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccdee  
ffe0e1a00012c22010f020f074382030f11585b860f8258288614a1050005  
0514a115781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c6531  
2e62696e58288614a10501050514a115781c687474703a2f2f6578616d70  
6c652e636f6d2f66696c65322e62696e1502030f
```

Total size of Envelope with COSE authentication object: 396

Envelope with COSE authentication object:

```
d86ba2025873825824822f5820b3e6a52776bf3ed218feba031c609c9826  
0e1a52fc1f019683edb6d1c5c4a379584ad28443a10126a0f65840a72d9d  
abc04af139a0a5b3ef775234b9ed1c2390e03ffa1454458b2394cca16ace  
d37039bbf84ea898a54a242d0d04883f22135a9b98efe042015041f0142d  
4e0359010fa5010102030358a4a2028181410004589b8814a20150fa6b4a  
53d5ad5fdbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab  
450f8258348614a10500050514a2035824822f5820001122334455667788  
99aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d0583686  
14a10501050514a2035824822f58200123456789abcdeffedcba98765432  
1000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0e1a00012c22010f020f074382  
030f11585b860f8258288614a10500050514a115781c687474703a2f2f65  
78616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65312e62696e58288614a10501050514  
a115781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65322e62  
696e1502030f
```

#### B.5. Example 4: Load from External Storage

This example covers the following templates:

- \*Compatibility Check ([Section 7.1](#))
- \*Secure Boot ([Section 7.2](#))
- \*Firmware Download ([Section 7.3](#))
- \*Install ([Section 7.4](#))

\*Load ([Section 7.6](#))

```

107({
  / authentication-wrapper / 2:<< [
    / digest: / << [
      / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
      / digest-bytes /
h'838eb848698c9d9dd29b5930102ea1f29743857d975f52ed4d19589b821e82cf'
    ] >>,
    / signature: / << 18([
      / protected / << {
        / alg / 1:-7 / "ES256" /,
      } >>,
      / unprotected / {
      },
      / payload / F6 / nil /,
      / signature / h'42e4185517635842a5715c63772436588c
c366d6a4c2beff3f3e0736806062c4208a756da9cfb0cc1325168eb3c743834b5f5a5d
c00b33acd2a9073c6eb09e5c'
    ]) >>
  ]
] >>,
/ manifest / 3:<< {
  / manifest-version / 1:1,
  / manifest-sequence-number / 2:4,
  / common / 3:<< {
    / components / 2:[
      [h'00'] ,
      [h'02'] ,
      [h'01']
    ],
    / shared-sequence / 4:<< [
      / directive-set-component-index / 12,0 ,
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / vendor-id /
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /,
        / class-id /
2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45' /
1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /,
        / image-digest / 3:<< [
          / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
          / digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
        ] >>,
        / image-size / 14:34768,
      } ,
      / condition-vendor-identifier / 1,15 ,
      / condition-class-identifier / 2,15
    ] >>,
  } >>,
} >>,

```

```

    / validate / 7:<< [
      / directive-set-component-index / 12,0 ,
      / condition-image-match / 3,15
    ] >>,
    / load / 8:<< [
      / directive-set-component-index / 12,2 ,
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / image-digest / 3:<< [
          / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
          / digest-bytes /
h'0123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
        ] >>,
        / image-size / 14:76834,
        / source-component / 22:0 / [h'00'] /,
      } ,
      / directive-copy / 22,2 ,
      / condition-image-match / 3,15
    ] >>,
    / run / 9:<< [
      / directive-set-component-index / 12,2 ,
      / directive-run / 23,2
    ] >>,
    / payload-fetch / 16:<< [
      / directive-set-component-index / 12,1 ,
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / image-digest / 3:<< [
          / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
          / digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
        ] >>,
        / uri / 21:'http://example.com/file.bin',
      } ,
      / directive-fetch / 21,2 ,
      / condition-image-match / 3,15
    ] >>,
    / install / 17:<< [
      / directive-set-component-index / 12,0 ,
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / source-component / 22:1 / [h'02'] /,
      } ,
      / directive-copy / 22,2 ,
      / condition-image-match / 3,15
    ] >>,
  } >>,
})

```

Total size of Envelope without COSE authentication object: 327

Envelope:



d86ba2025827815824822f5820838eb848698c9d9dd29b5930102ea1f297  
43857d975f52ed4d19589b821e82cf03590116a801010204035867a20283  
814100814102814101045858880c0014a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de6  
63e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45035824822f5820  
00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba987654  
32100e1987d0010f020f0745840c00030f085838880c0214a3035824822f  
58200123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabb  
ccddeeff0e1a00012c2216001602030f0945840c02170210584e880c0114  
a2035824822f582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789ab  
cdeffedcba987654321015781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f  
6d2f66696c652e62696e1502030f114b880c0014a116011602030f

Total size of Envelope with COSE authentication object: 403

Envelope with COSE authentication object:

d86ba2025873825824822f5820838eb848698c9d9dd29b5930102ea1f297  
43857d975f52ed4d19589b821e82cf584ad28443a10126a0f6584042e418  
5517635842a5715c63772436588cc366d6a4c2beff3f3e0736806062c420  
8a756da9c9fb0cc1325168eb3c743834b5f5a5dc00b33acd2a9073c6eb09e  
5c03590116a801010204035867a20283814100814102814101045858880c  
0014a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e  
48bf429b2d51f2ab45035824822f582000112233445566778899aabbccdd  
eeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d0010f020f0745840c  
00030f085838880c0214a3035824822f58200123456789abcdeffedcba98  
7654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0e1a00012c2216001602  
030f0945840c02170210584e880c0114a2035824822f5820001122334455  
66778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba987654321015781b68  
7474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e1502030f  
114b880c0014a116011602030f

## B.6. Example 5: Two Images

This example covers the following templates:

\*Compatibility Check ([Section 7.1](#))

\*Secure Boot ([Section 7.2](#))

\*Firmware Download ([Section 7.3](#))

Furthermore, it shows using these templates with two images.

```

107({
  / authentication-wrapper / 2:<< [
    / digest: / << [
      / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
      / digest-bytes /
h'264dc89eb4a39ae7a8ed05e4d6232153bce4fb9a111a31310b90627d1edfc3bb'
    ] >>,
    / signature: / << 18([
      / protected / << {
        / alg / 1:-7 / "ES256" /,
      } >>,
      / unprotected / {
      },
      / payload / F6 / nil /,
      / signature / h'9350fcb80d59f9be2a923bc144c5f64022
b57d18ccddd9c0477a5be608b04200689373d42fc42fc154dce2d54255d64be9f5bd55
efddb5de22354ec0894e979a'
    ]) >>
  ]
] >>,
/ manifest / 3:<< {
  / manifest-version / 1:1,
  / manifest-sequence-number / 2:5,
  / common / 3:<< {
    / components / 2:[
      [h'00'] ,
      [h'01']
    ],
    / shared-sequence / 4:<< [
      / directive-set-component-index / 12,0 ,
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / vendor-id /
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fd9be9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /,
        / class-id /
2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45' /
1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /,
        / image-digest / 3:<< [
          / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
          / digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
        ] >>,
        / image-size / 14:34768,
      } ,
      / condition-vendor-identifier / 1,15 ,
      / condition-class-identifier / 2,15 ,
      / directive-set-component-index / 12,1 ,
      / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
        / image-digest / 3:<< [

```

```

        / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
        / digest-bytes /
h'0123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
    ] >>,
        / image-size / 14:76834,
    }
  ] >>,
} >>,
/ validate / 7:<< [
  / directive-set-component-index / 12,0 ,
  / condition-image-match / 3,15 ,
  / directive-set-component-index / 12,1 ,
  / condition-image-match / 3,15
] >>,
/ run / 9:<< [
  / directive-set-component-index / 12,0 ,
  / directive-run / 23,2
] >>,
/ install / 17:<< [
  / directive-set-component-index / 12,0 ,
  / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
    / uri / 21:'http://example.com/file1.bin',
  } ,
  / directive-fetch / 21,2 ,
  / condition-image-match / 3,15 ,
  / directive-set-component-index / 12,1 ,
  / directive-override-parameters / 20,{
    / uri / 21:'http://example.com/file2.bin',
  } ,
  / directive-fetch / 21,2 ,
  / condition-image-match / 3,15
] >>,
} >>,
})

```

Total size of Envelope without COSE authentication object: 306

Envelope:

d86ba2025827815824822f5820264dc89eb4a39ae7a8ed05e4d6232153bc  
e4fb9a111a31310b90627d1edfc3bb03590101a601010205035895a20282  
8141008141010458898c0c0014a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfe9de663e4d4  
1ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45035824822f5820001122  
33445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e  
1987d0010f020f0c0114a2035824822f58200123456789abcdeffedcba98  
7654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0e1a00012c220749880c  
00030f0c01030f0945840c00170211584f900c0014a115781c687474703a  
2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65312e62696e1502030f0c0114  
a115781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65322e62  
696e1502030f

Total size of Envelope with COSE authentication object: 382

Envelope with COSE authentication object:

d86ba2025873825824822f5820264dc89eb4a39ae7a8ed05e4d6232153bc  
e4fb9a111a31310b90627d1edfc3bb584ad28443a10126a0f658409350fc  
b80d59f9be2a923bc144c5f64022b57d18ccddd9c0477a5be608b0420068  
9373d42fc42fc154dce2d54255d64be9f5bd55efddb5de22354ec0894e97  
9a03590101a601010205035895a202828141008141010458898c0c0014a4  
0150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf42  
9b2d51f2ab45035824822f582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01  
23456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d0010f020f0c0114a2035824  
822f58200123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899  
aabbccddeeff0e1a00012c220749880c00030f0c01030f0945840c001702  
11584f900c0014a115781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f  
66696c65312e62696e1502030f0c0114a115781c687474703a2f2f657861  
6d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65322e62696e1502030f

## Appendix C. C. Design Rational

In order to provide flexible behavior to constrained devices, while still allowing more powerful devices to use their full capabilities, the SUIT manifest encodes the required behavior of a Recipient device. Behavior is encoded as a specialized byte code, contained in a CBOR list. This promotes a flat encoding, which simplifies the parser. The information encoded by this byte code closely matches the operations that a device will perform, which promotes ease of processing. The core operations used by most update and trusted invocation operations are represented in the byte code. The byte code can be extended by registering new operations.

The specialized byte code approach gives benefits equivalent to those provided by a scripting language or conventional byte code, with two substantial differences. First, the language is extremely high level, consisting of only the operations that a device may perform during update and trusted invocation of a firmware image. Second, the language specifies linear behavior, without reverse

branches. Conditional processing is supported, and parallel and out-of-order processing may be performed by sufficiently capable devices.

By structuring the data in this way, the manifest processor becomes a very simple engine that uses a pull parser to interpret the manifest. This pull parser invokes a series of command handlers that evaluate a Condition or execute a Directive. Most data is structured in a highly regular pattern, which simplifies the parser.

The results of this allow a Recipient to implement a very small parser for constrained applications. If needed, such a parser also allows the Recipient to perform complex updates with reduced overhead. Conditional execution of commands allows a simple device to perform important decisions at validation-time.

Dependency handling is vastly simplified as well. Dependencies function like subroutines of the language. When a manifest has a dependency, it can invoke that dependency's commands and modify their behavior by setting parameters. Because some parameters come with security implications, the dependencies also have a mechanism to reject modifications to parameters on a fine-grained level. Dependency handling is covered in [[I-D.ietf-suit-trust-domains](#)].

Developing a robust permissions system works in this model too. The Recipient can use a simple ACL that is a table of Identities and Component Identifier permissions to ensure that operations on components fail unless they are permitted by the ACL. This table can be further refined with individual parameters and commands.

Capability reporting is similarly simplified. A Recipient can report the Commands, Parameters, Algorithms, and Component Identifiers that it supports. This is sufficiently precise for a manifest author to create a manifest that the Recipient can accept.

The simplicity of design in the Recipient due to all of these benefits allows even a highly constrained platform to use advanced update capabilities.

### **C.1. C.1 Design Rationale: Envelope**

The Envelope is used instead of a COSE structure for several reasons:

1. This enables the use of Severable Elements ([Section 8.5](#))
2. This enables modular processing of manifests, particularly with large signatures.
3. This enables multiple authentication schemes.

4. This allows integrity verification by a dependent to be unaffected by adding or removing authentication structures.

Modular processing is important because it allows a Manifest Processor to iterate forward over an Envelope, processing Delegation Chains and Authentication Blocks, retaining only intermediate values, without any need to seek forward and backwards in a stream until it gets to the Manifest itself. This allows the use of large, Post-Quantum signatures without requiring retention of the signature itself, or seeking forward and back.

Four authentication objects are supported by the Envelope:

- \*COSE\_Sign\_Tagged
- \*COSE\_Sign1\_Tagged
- \*COSE\_Mac\_Tagged
- \*COSE\_Mac0\_Tagged

The SUIT Envelope allows an Update Authority or intermediary to mix and match any number of different authentication blocks it wants without any concern for modifying the integrity of another authentication block. This also allows the addition or removal of an authentication blocks without changing the integrity check of the Manifest, which is important for dependency handling. See [Section 6.2](#)

## **C.2. C.2 Byte String Wrappers**

Byte string wrappers are used in several places in the suit manifest. The primary reason for wrappers is to limit the parser extent when invoked at different times, with a possible loss of context.

The elements of the suit envelope are wrapped both to set the extents used by the parser and to simplify integrity checks by clearly defining the length of each element.

The common block is re-parsed in order to find components identifiers from their indices, to find dependency prefixes and digests from their identifiers, and to find the shared sequence. The shared sequence is wrapped so that it matches other sequences, simplifying the code path.

A severed SUIT command sequence will appear in the envelope, so it must be wrapped as with all envelope elements. For consistency, command sequences are also wrapped in the manifest. This also allows

the parser to discern the difference between a command sequence and a SUIT\_Digest.

Parameters that are structured types (arrays and maps) are also wrapped in a bstr. This is so that parser extents can be set correctly using only a reference to the beginning of the parameter. This enables a parser to store a simple list of references to parameters that can be retrieved when needed.

#### Appendix D. D. Implementation Conformance Matrix

This section summarizes the functionality a minimal manifest processor implementation needs to offer to claim conformance to this specification, in the absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise.

The subsequent table shows the conditions.

Name	Reference	Implementation
Vendor Identifier	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.2</a>	<b>REQUIRED</b>
Class Identifier	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.2</a>	<b>REQUIRED</b>
Device Identifier	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.2</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
Image Match	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.2</a>	<b>REQUIRED</b>
Check Content	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.3</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
Component Slot	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.4</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
Abort	<a href="#">Section 8.4.9.5</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
Custom Condition	<a href="#">Section 8.4.11</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>

Table 19

The subsequent table shows the directives.

Name	Reference	Implementation
Set Component Index	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.1</a>	<b>REQUIRED</b> if more than one component
Write Content	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.6</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
Try Each	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.2</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
Override Parameters	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.3</a>	<b>REQUIRED</b>
Fetch	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.4</a>	<b>REQUIRED</b> for Updater
Copy	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.5</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
Invoke	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.7</a>	<b>REQUIRED</b> for Bootloader
Run Sequence	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.8</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
Swap	<a href="#">Section 8.4.10.9</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>

Table 20

The subsequent table shows the parameters.

Name	Reference	Implementation
Vendor ID	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.3</a>	<b>REQUIRED</b>
Class ID	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.4</a>	<b>REQUIRED</b>
Image Digest	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.6</a>	<b>REQUIRED</b>
Image Size	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.7</a>	<b>REQUIRED</b>
Component Slot	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.8</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
Content	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.9</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
URI	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.10</a>	<b>REQUIRED</b> for Updater
Source Component	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.11</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
Invoke Args	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.12</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
Device ID	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.5</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
Strict Order	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.14</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
Soft Failure	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.15</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>
Custom	<a href="#">Section 8.4.8.16</a>	<b>OPTIONAL</b>

Table 21

### Authors' Addresses

Brendan Moran  
Arm Limited

Email: [brendan.moran.ietf@gmail.com](mailto:brendan.moran.ietf@gmail.com)

Hannes Tschofenig

Email: [hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net](mailto:hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net)

Henk Birkholz  
Fraunhofer SIT

Email: [henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de](mailto:henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de)

Koen Zandberg  
Inria

Email: [koen.zandberg@inria.fr](mailto:koen.zandberg@inria.fr)

Øyvind Rønningstad  
Nordic Semiconductor

Email: [oyvind.ronningstad@gmail.com](mailto:oyvind.ronningstad@gmail.com)