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Transport Layer Security (TLS) Cached Information Extension
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Abstract

Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshakes often include fairly static information, such as the server certificate and a list of trusted certification authorities (CAs). This information can be of considerable size, particularly if the server certificate is bundled with a complete certificate chain (i.e., the certificates of intermediate CAs up to the root CA).

This document defines an extension that allows a TLS client to inform a server of cached information, allowing the server to omit already available information.

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[1.](#) Introduction

Reducing the amount of information exchanged during a Transport Layer Security handshake to a minimum helps to improve performance in environments where devices are connected to a network with a low bandwidth, and lossy radio technology. With Internet of Things such environments exist, for example, when devices use IEEE 802.15.4 or Bluetooth Smart. For more information about the challenges with smart object deployments please see [[RFC6574](#)].

This specification defines a TLS extension that allows a client and a server to exclude transmission information cached in an earlier TLS handshake.

A typical example exchange may therefore look as follows. First, the

client and the server executes the full TLS handshake. The client then caches the certificate provided by the server. When the TLS client connects to the TLS server some time in the future, without using session resumption, it then attaches the `cached_info` extension defined in this document to the client hello message to indicate that

it had cached the certificate, and it provides the fingerprint of it. If the server's certificate has not changed then the TLS server does not need to send its certificate and the corresponding certificate chain again. In case information has changed, which can be seen from the fingerprint provided by the client, the certificate payload is transmitted to the client to allow the client to update the cache.

[2.](#) Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

This document refers to the TLS protocol but the description is equally applicable to DTLS as well.

[3.](#) Cached Information Extension

This document defines a new extension type (`cached_info(TBD)`), which is used in client hello and server hello messages. The extension type is specified as follows.

```
enum {  
    cached_info(TBD), (65535)  
} ExtensionType;
```

The `extension_data` field of this extension, when included in the client hello, MUST contain the `CachedInformation` structure. The client MAY send multiple `CachedObjects` of the same `CachedInformationType`. This may, for example, be the case when the client has cached multiple certificates from a server.

```
enum {
    cert(1), cert_req(2) (255)
} CachedInformationType;

struct {
    select (type) {
        case client:
            CachedInformationType type;
            opaque hash_value<1..255>;
        case server:
            CachedInformationType type;
    } body;
} CachedObject;

struct {
    CachedObject cached_info<1..2^16-1>;
} CachedInformation;
```

This document defines the following two types:

'cert' Type for not sending the complete Server Certificate Message:

With the type field set to 'cert', the client MUST include the fingerprint of the Certificate message in the hash_value field. For this type the fingerprint MUST be calculated using the procedure described in [Section 5](#) with the Certificate message as input data.

'cert_req' Type for not sending the complete CertificateRequest Message:

With the type set to 'cert_req', the client MUST include the fingerprint of the CertificateRequest message in the hash_value field. For this type the fingerprint MUST be calculated using the procedure described in [Section 5](#) with the CertificateRequest message as input data.

New cached info types can be added following the policy described in the IANA considerations section, see [Section 8](#). New message digest algorithms for use with these types can also be added by registering a new type that makes use of the updated message digest algorithm. For practical reasons we recommend to re-use hash algorithms already available with TLS ciphersuites to avoid additional code and to keep the collision probably low new hash algorithms MUST NOT have a collision resistance worse than SHA-256.

[4.](#) Exchange Specification

Clients supporting this extension MAY include the "cached_info" extension in the (extended) client hello. If the client includes the extension then it MUST contain one or more CachedObject attributes.

A server supporting this extension MAY include the "cached_info" extension in the (extended) server hello. By returning the "cached_info" extension the server indicates that it supports the cached info types. For each indicated cached info type the server MUST alter the transmission of respective payloads, according to the rules outlined with each type. If the server includes the extension it MUST only include CachedObjects of a type also supported by the client (as expressed in the client hello). For example, if a client indicates support for 'cert' and 'cert_req' then the server cannot respond with a "cached_info" attribute containing support for ('foobar').

Since the client includes a fingerprint of information it cached (for each indicated type) the server is able to determine whether cached information is stale. If the server supports this specification and notices a mismatch between the data cached by the client and its own

information then the server MUST include the information in full and MUST NOT list the respective type in the "cached_info" extension.

Note: If a server is part of a hosting environment then the client may have cached multiple data items for a single server. To allow the client to select the appropriate information from the cache it is RECOMMENDED that the client utilizes the Server Name Indication extension [[RFC6066](#)].

Following a successful exchange of the "cached_info" extension in the client and server hello, the server alters sending the corresponding handshake message. How information is altered from the handshake messages is defined in [Section 4.1](#), and in [Section 4.2](#) for the types defined in this specification.

[Appendix A](#) shows an example hash calculation and [Section 6](#) shows an example protocol exchange.

[4.1](#). Server Certificate Message

When a ClientHello message contains the "cached_info" extension with a type set to 'cert' then the server MAY send the Certificate message shown in Figure 1 under the following conditions:

- o The server software implements the "cached_info" extension defined in this specification.

- o The 'cert' cached info extension is enabled (for example, a policy allows the use of this extension).
- o The server compared the value in the hash_value field of the client-provided "cached_info" extension with the fingerprint of the Certificate message it normally sends to clients. This check ensures that the information cached by the client is current. The procedure for calculating the fingerprint is described in [Section 5](#).

The original Certificate handshake message syntax is defined in [[RFC5246](#)] and has been extended with [[RFC7250](#)]. [RFC 7250](#) allows the certificate payload to contain only the SubjectPublicKeyInfo instead of the full information typically found in a certificate. Hence, when this specification is used in combination with [[RFC7250](#)] and the

negotiated certificate type is a raw public key then the TLS server omits sending a Certificate payload that contains an ASN.1 Certificate structure with the included SubjectPublicKeyInfo rather than the full certificate chain. As such, this extension is compatible with the raw public key extension defined in [RFC 7250](#). Note: We assume that the server implementation is able to select the appropriate certificate or SubjectPublicKeyInfo from the received hash value. If the SNI extension is used by the client then the server has additional information to guide the selection of the appropriate cached info.

When the cached info specification is used then a modified version of the Certificate message is exchanged. The modified structure is shown in Figure 1.

```
struct {  
    opaque hash_value<1..255>;  
} Certificate;
```

Figure 1: Cached Info Certificate Message.

[4.2.](#) CertificateRequest Message

When a fingerprint for an object of type 'cert_req' is provided in the client hello, the server MAY send the CertificateRequest message shown in Figure 2 message under the following conditions:

- o The server software implements the "cached_info" extension defined in this specification.
- o The 'cert_req' cached info extension is enabled (for example, a policy allows the use of this extension).

- o The server compared the value in the hash_value field of the client-provided "cached_info" extension with the fingerprint of the CertificateRequest message it normally sends to clients. This check ensures that the information cached by the client is current. The procedure for calculating the fingerprint is described in [Section 5](#).
- o The server wants to request a certificate from the client.

The original CertificateRequest handshake message syntax is defined in [\[RFC5246\]](#). The modified structure of the CertificateRequest message is shown in Figure 2.

```
struct {  
    opaque hash_value<1..255>;  
} CertificateRequest;
```

Figure 2: Cached Info CertificateRequest Message.

The CertificateRequest payload is the input parameter to the fingerprint calculation described in [Section 5](#).

[5](#). Fingerprint Calculation

The fingerprint for the two cached info objects defined in this document MUST be computed as follows:

1. Compute the SHA-256 [\[RFC6234\]](#) hash of the input data. The input data depends on the cached info type. This document defines two cached info types, described in [Section 4.1](#) and in [Section 4.2](#). Note that the computed hash only covers the input data structure (and not any type and length information of the record layer). [Appendix A](#) shows an example.
2. Use the output of the SHA-256 hash.

The purpose of the fingerprint provided by the client is to help the server select the correct information. For example, in case of the certificate message the fingerprint identifies the server certificate (and the corresponding private key) for use for with the rest of the handshake. Servers may have more than one certificate and therefore a hash needs to be long enough to keep the probably of hash collisions low. On the other hand, the cached info design aims to reduce the amount of data being exchanged. The security of the handshake depends on the private key and not on the size of the fingerprint. Hence, the fingerprint is a way to prevent the server from accidentally selecting the wrong information. If an attacker

injects an incorrect fingerprint then two outcomes are possible: (1)

The fingerprint does not relate to any cached state and the server has to fall back to a full exchange. (2) If the attacker manages to inject a fingerprint that refers to data the client has not cached then the exchange will fail later when the client continues with the handshake and aims to verify the digital signature. The signature verification will fail since the public key cached by the client will not correspond to the private key that was used by server to sign the message.

6. Example

In the regular, full TLS handshake exchange, shown in Figure 3, the TLS server provides its certificate in the Certificate payload to the client, see step (1). This allows the client to store the certificate for future use. After some time the TLS client again interacts with the same TLS server and makes use of the TLS cached info extension, as shown in Figure 4. The TLS client indicates support for this specification via the "cached_info" extension, see step (2), and indicates that it has stored the certificate from the earlier exchange (by indicating the 'cert' type). With step (3) the TLS server acknowledges the supports of the 'cert' type and by including the value in the server hello informs the client that the content of the certificate payload contains the fingerprint of the certificate instead of the [RFC 5246](#)-defined payload of the certificate message in step (4).

```
ClientHello          ->
                    <- ServerHello
                       Certificate* // (1)
                       ServerKeyExchange*
                       CertificateRequest*
                       ServerHelloDone

Certificate*
ClientKeyExchange
CertificateVerify*
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished            ->

                    <- [ChangeCipherSpec]
                       Finished

Application Data <-----> Application Data
```

Figure 3: Example Message Exchange: Initial (full) Exchange.

```

ClientHello
cached_info=(cert)    -> // (2)
                       <-  ServerHello
                           cached_info=(cert) (3)
                           Certificate (4)
                           ServerKeyExchange*
                           ServerHelloDone

ClientKeyExchange
CertificateVerify*
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished              ->

                       <- [ChangeCipherSpec]
                           Finished

Application Data <-----> Application Data

```

Figure 4: Example Message Exchange: TLS Cached Extension Usage.

7. Security Considerations

This specification defines a mechanism to reference stored state using a fingerprint. Sending a fingerprint of cached information in an unencrypted handshake, as the client and server hello is, may allow an attacker or observer to correlate independent TLS exchanges. While some information elements used in this specification, such as server certificates, are public objects and usually do not contain sensitive information, other not yet defined types may. Those who implement and deploy this specification should therefore make an informed decision whether the cached information is inline with their security and privacy goals. In case of concerns, it is advised to avoid sending the fingerprint of the data objects in clear.

The use of the cached info extension allows the server to send significantly smaller TLS messages. Consequently, these omitted parts of the messages are not included in the transcript of the handshake in the TLS Finish message. However, since the client and the server communicate the hash values of the cached data in the initial handshake messages the fingerprints are included in the TLS Finish message.

Clients MUST ensure that they only cache information from legitimate sources. For example, when the client populates the cache from a TLS exchange then it must only cache information after the successful completion of a TLS exchange to ensure that an attacker does not

inject incorrect information into the cache. Failure to do so allows for man-in-the-middle attacks.

Security considerations for the fingerprint calculation are discussed in [Section 5](#).

[8](#). IANA Considerations

[8.1](#). New Entry to the TLS ExtensionType Registry

IANA is requested to add an entry to the existing TLS ExtensionType registry, defined in [[RFC5246](#)], for cached_info(TBD) defined in this document.

[8.2](#). New Registry for CachedInformationType

IANA is requested to establish a registry for TLS CachedInformationType values. The first entries in the registry are

- o cert(1)
- o cert_req(2)

The policy for adding new values to this registry, following the terminology defined in [[RFC5226](#)], is as follows:

- o 0-63 (decimal): Standards Action
- o 64-223 (decimal): Specification Required
- o 224-255 (decimal): reserved for Private Use

[9](#). Acknowledgments

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10. References

10.1. Normative References

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10.2. Informative References

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[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J., Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", [RFC 7250](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC7250, June 2014, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>>.

[Appendix A](#). Example

Consider a certificate containing an NIST P256 elliptic curve public key displayed using Peter Gutmann's ASN.1 decoder [[ASN.1-Dump](#)] in Figure 5.

```
0 556: SEQUENCE {
4 434:   SEQUENCE {
8   3:     [0] {
10  1:      INTEGER 2
      :      }
13  1:      INTEGER 13
16 10:      SEQUENCE {
18  8:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecDSAWithSHA256 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 2)
      :      }
28 62:      SEQUENCE {
30 11:      SET {
32  9:      SEQUENCE {
```

```

34  3:          OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
39  2:          PrintableString 'NL'
    :          }
    :          }
43 17:          SET {
45 15:          SEQUENCE {
47  3:          OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
52  8:          PrintableString 'PolarSSL'
    :          }
    :          }
62 28:          SET {
64 26:          SEQUENCE {
66  3:          OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
71 19:          PrintableString 'Polarssl Test EC CA'
    :          }
    :          }
    :          }
92 30:          SEQUENCE {
94 13:          UTCTime 24/09/2013 15:52:04 GMT
109 13:         UTCTime 22/09/2023 15:52:04 GMT
    :          }
124 65:         SEQUENCE {
126 11:         SET {

```

```

128  9:          SEQUENCE {
130  3:          OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
135  2:          PrintableString 'NL'
    :          }
    :          }
139 17:          SET {
141 15:          SEQUENCE {
143  3:          OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
148  8:          PrintableString 'PolarSSL'
    :          }
    :          }
158 31:          SET {
160 29:          SEQUENCE {
162  3:          OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
167 22:          PrintableString 'PolarSSL Test Client 2'
    :          }
    :          }
    :          }

```

```

191 89: SEQUENCE {
193 19:   SEQUENCE {
195  7:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1)
204  8:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER prime256v1 (1 2 840 10045 3 1 7)
      :     }
214 66:   BIT STRING
      :     04 57 E5 AE B1 73 DF D3 AC BB 93 B8 81 FF 12 AE
      :     EE E6 53 AC CE 55 53 F6 34 0E CC 2E E3 63 25 0B
      :     DF 98 E2 F3 5C 60 36 96 C0 D5 18 14 70 E5 7F 9F
      :     D5 4B 45 18 E5 B0 6C D5 5C F8 96 8F 87 70 A3 E4
      :     C7
      :   }
282 157: [3] {
285 154:   SEQUENCE {
288  9:     SEQUENCE {
290  3:       OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
295  2:       OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
297  0:         SEQUENCE {}
          :       }
          :     }
299 29:   SEQUENCE {
301  3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
306 22:     OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
308 20:       OCTET STRING
          :         7A 00 5F 86 64 FC E0 5D E5 11 10 3B B2 E6 3B C4
          :         26 3F CF E2
          :       }
          :     }
330 110: SEQUENCE {
332  3:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)

```

```

337 103: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
339 101:   SEQUENCE {
341  20:     [0]
          :     9D 6D 20 24 49 01 3F 2B CB 78 B5 19 BC 7E 24
          :     C9 DB FB 36 7C
363 66:     [1] {
365 64:       [4] {
367 62:         SEQUENCE {
369 11:           SET {
371  9:             SEQUENCE {
373  3:               OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)

```

```

378  2:      PrintableString 'NL'
      :      }
      :      }
382 17:      SET {
384 15:      SEQUENCE {
386  3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName
      :      (2 5 4 10)
391  8:      PrintableString 'PolarSSL'
      :      }
      :      }
401 28:      SET {
403 26:      SEQUENCE {
405  3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
410 19:      PrintableString 'Polarssl Test EC CA'
      :      }
      :      }
      :      }
      :      }
      :      }
431  9:      [2] 00 C1 43 E2 7E 62 43 CC E8
      :      }
      :      }
      :      }
      :      }
      :      }
442 10:      SEQUENCE {
444  8:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA256 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 2)
      :      }
454 104:     BIT STRING, encapsulates {
457 101:     SEQUENCE {
459  48:     INTEGER
      :     4A 65 0D 7B 20 83 A2 99 B9 A8 0F FC 8D EE 8F 3D
      :     BB 70 4C 96 03 AC 8E 78 70 DD F2 0E A0 B2 16 CB
      :     65 8E 1A C9 3F 2C 61 7E F8 3C EF AD 1C EE 36 20
509  49:     INTEGER
      :     00 9D F2 27 A6 D5 74 B8 24 AE E1 6A 3F 31 A1 CA

```

```

      :     54 2F 08 D0 8D EE 4F 0C 61 DF 77 78 7D B4 FD FC
      :     42 49 EE E5 B2 6A C2 CD 26 77 62 8E 28 7C 9E 57
      :     45
      :     }

```



```
:   }  
:   }
```

Figure 5: ASN.1-based Certificate: Example.

To include the certificate shown in Figure 5 in a TLS/DTLS Certificate message it is prepended with a message header. This Certificate message header in our example is 0b 00 02 36 00 02 33 00 02 00 02 30, which indicates:

Message Type: 0b -- 1 byte type field indicating a Certificate message

Length: 00 02 36 -- 3 byte length field indicating a 566 bytes payload

Certificates Length: 00 02 33 -- 3 byte length field indicating 563 bytes for the entire certificates_list structure, which may contain multiple certificates. In our example only one certificate is included.

Certificate Length: 00 02 30 -- 3 byte length field indicating 560 bytes of the actual certificate following immediately afterwards. In our example, this is the certificate content with 30 82 02 9E 57 45 shown in Figure 6.

The hex encoding of the ASN.1 encoded certificate payload shown in Figure 5 leads to the following encoding.

```

30 82 02 2C 30 82 01 B2 A0 03 02 01 02 02 01 0D
30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02 30 3E 31 0B
30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 4E 4C 31 11 30 0F 06
03 55 04 0A 13 08 50 6F 6C 61 72 53 53 4C 31 1C
30 1A 06 03 55 04 03 13 13 50 6F 6C 61 72 73 73
6C 20 54 65 73 74 20 45 43 20 43 41 30 1E 17 0D
31 33 30 39 32 34 31 35 35 32 30 34 5A 17 0D 32
33 30 39 32 32 31 35 35 32 30 34 5A 30 41 31 0B
30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 4E 4C 31 11 30 0F 06
03 55 04 0A 13 08 50 6F 6C 61 72 53 53 4C 31 1F
30 1D 06 03 55 04 03 13 16 50 6F 6C 61 72 53 53
4C 20 54 65 73 74 20 43 6C 69 65 6E 74 20 32 30
59 30 13 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 08 2A 86
48 CE 3D 03 01 07 03 42 00 04 57 E5 AE B1 73 DF
D3 AC BB 93 B8 81 FF 12 AE EE E6 53 AC CE 55 53
F6 34 0E CC 2E E3 63 25 0B DF 98 E2 F3 5C 60 36
96 C0 D5 18 14 70 E5 7F 9F D5 4B 45 18 E5 B0 6C
D5 5C F8 96 8F 87 70 A3 E4 C7 A3 81 9D 30 81 9A
30 09 06 03 55 1D 13 04 02 30 00 30 1D 06 03 55
1D 0E 04 16 04 14 7A 00 5F 86 64 FC E0 5D E5 11
10 3B B2 E6 3B C4 26 3F CF E2 30 6E 06 03 55 1D
23 04 67 30 65 80 14 9D 6D 20 24 49 01 3F 2B CB
78 B5 19 BC 7E 24 C9 DB FB 36 7C A1 42 A4 40 30
3E 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 4E 4C 31 11
30 0F 06 03 55 04 0A 13 08 50 6F 6C 61 72 53 53
4C 31 1C 30 1A 06 03 55 04 03 13 13 50 6F 6C 61
72 73 73 6C 20 54 65 73 74 20 45 43 20 43 41 82
09 00 C1 43 E2 7E 62 43 CC E8 30 0A 06 08 2A 86
48 CE 3D 04 03 02 03 68 00 30 65 02 30 4A 65 0D
7B 20 83 A2 99 B9 A8 0F FC 8D EE 8F 3D BB 70 4C
96 03 AC 8E 78 70 DD F2 0E A0 B2 16 CB 65 8E 1A
C9 3F 2C 61 7E F8 3C EF AD 1C EE 36 20 02 31 00
9D F2 27 A6 D5 74 B8 24 AE E1 6A 3F 31 A1 CA 54
2F 08 D0 8D EE 4F 0C 61 DF 77 78 7D B4 FD FC 42
49 EE E5 B2 6A C2 CD 26 77 62 8E 28 7C 9E 57 45

```

Figure 6: Hex Encoding of the Example Certificate.

Applying the SHA-256 hash function to the Certificate message, which starts with 0b 00 02 and ends with 9E 57 45, produces 0x086eefb4859adfe977defac494fff6b73033b4ce1f86b8f2a9fc0c6bf98605af.

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