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ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Protocol version 1.2
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Abstract

This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol version 1.2. The cipher suites are all based on the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM. PSK provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and integrity protection.

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ECDHE_PSK_AEAD

May 2017

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[1.](#) Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

[2.](#) Introduction

This document defines new cipher suites that provide Pre-Shared Key (PSK) authentication, Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), and Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). The cipher suites are defined for version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [[RFC5246](#)] protocol and version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol [[RFC6347](#)].

Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Authentication is widely used in many scenarios. One deployment is 3GPP networks where pre-shared keys are used to authenticate both subscriber and network. Another deployment is Internet of Things where PSK authentication is often preferred for performance and energy efficiency reasons. In both scenarios the endpoints are owned/controlled by a party that provisions the pre-shared keys and makes sure that they provide a high level of entropy.

Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is a strongly recommended feature in security protocol design and can be accomplished by using an

ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange method. Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) provides PFS with excellent performance and small key sizes. ECDHE is mandatory to implement in both HTTP/2 [[RFC7540](#)] and CoAP [[RFC7252](#)].

AEAD algorithms that combine encryption and integrity protection are strongly recommended for (D)TLS [[RFC7525](#)] and non-AEAD algorithms are forbidden to use in TLS 1.3 [[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13](#)]. The AEAD algorithms considered in this document are AES-GCM and AES-CCM. The use of AES-GCM in TLS is defined in [[RFC5288](#)] and the use of AES-CCM is defined in [[RFC6655](#)].

[[RFC4279](#)] defines Pre-Shared Key (PSK) cipher suites for TLS but does not consider Elliptic Curve Cryptography. [[RFC4492](#)] introduces Elliptic Curve Cryptography for TLS but does not consider PSK authentication. [[RFC5487](#)] describes the use of AES-GCM in combination with PSK authentication, but does not consider ECDHE. [[RFC5489](#)] describes the use of PSK in combination with ECDHE but does not consider AES-GCM or AES-CCM.

3. ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites

The cipher suites defined in this document are based on the AES-GCM and AES-CCM Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM, AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 defined in [[RFC6655](#)] and AEAD_AES_128_CCM defined in [[RFC5116](#)].

Messages and premaster secret construction in this document are defined in [[RFC5489](#)]. The ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange messages are used and the premaster secret is computed as for the ECDHE_PSK key exchange. The elliptic curve parameters used in the Diffie-Hellman parameters are negotiated using extensions defined in [[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis](#)].

For TLS 1.2, the following cipher suites are defined:

```
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD,0xTBD};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0xTBD,0xTBD};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0xTBD,0xTBD};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256  = {0xTBD,0xTBD};
```

The assigned code points can only be used for TLS 1.2.

The cipher suites defined in this document MUST NOT be negotiated for any version of (D)TLS other than TLS 1.2. Servers MUST NOT select one of these cipher suites when selecting TLS version other than TLS 1.2. A client MUST treat the selection of these cipher suites in combination with a different version of TLS as an error and generate a fatal 'illegal_parameter' TLS alert.

Cipher suites TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 and TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 are used to support equivalent functionality in TLS 1.3 [[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13](#)].

[4.](#) IANA Considerations

This document defines the following new cipher suites, whose values have been assigned in the TLS Cipher Suite Registry defined by [[RFC5246](#)].

TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	=	{0xTBD; 0xTBD}	{0xD0,0x01};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	=	{0xTBD; 0xTBD}	{0xD0,0x02};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256	=	{0xTBD; 0xTBD}	{0xD0,0x03};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256	=	{0xTBD; 0xTBD}	{0xD0,0x05};

NOTE TO THE RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS PARAGRAPH. The cipher suite numbers listed in the last column are numbers used for cipher suite interoperability testing and it's suggested that IANA use these values for assignment.

[5.](#) Security Considerations

The security considerations in TLS 1.2 [[RFC5246](#)], DTLS 1.2 [[RFC6347](#)], PSK Ciphersuites for TLS [[RFC4279](#)], ECDHE_PSK [[RFC5489](#)], AES-GCM [[RFC5288](#)], and AES-CCM [[RFC6655](#)] apply to this document as well.

All the cipher suites defined in this document provide confidentiality, mutual authentication, and forward secrecy. The AES-128 cipher suites provide 128-bit security and the AES-256 cipher suites provide at least 192-bit security. However, AES_128_CCM_8 only provides 64-bit security against message forgery.

The Pre-Shared Keys used for authentication MUST have a security

level equal or higher than the cipher suite used, i.e., at least 128-bit for the AES-128 cipher suites and at least 192-bit for the AES-256 cipher suites.

GCM or CCM encryption – even of different clear text – re-using a nonce with a same key undermines the security of GCM and CCM. As a result, GCM and CCM MUST only be used with a system guaranteeing nonce uniqueness [[RFC5116](#)].

[6.](#) Acknowledgements

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