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Encrypt-then-MAC for TLS and DTLS  
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## Abstract

This document describes a means of negotiating the use of the encrypt-then-MAC security mechanism in place of TLS'/DTLS' existing MAC-then-encrypt one, which has been the subject of a number of security vulnerabilities over a period of many years.

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[1.](#) Introduction

TLS [\[2\]](#) and DTLS [\[4\]](#) use a MAC-then-encrypt construction that was regarded as secure at the time the original SSL protocol was specified in the mid-1990s, but that is no longer regarded as secure [\[5\]](#) [\[6\]](#). This construction, as used in TLS and later DTLS, has been the subject of numerous security vulnerabilities and attacks stretching over a period of many years. This document specifies a means of switching to the more secure encrypt-then-MAC construction as part of the TLS/DTLS handshake, replacing the current MAC-then-encrypt construction.

[1.1.](#) Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [\[1\]](#).

[2.](#) Negotiating Encrypt-then-MAC

The use of encrypt-then-MAC is negotiated via TLS/DTLS extensions as defined in TLS [\[2\]](#). On connecting, the client includes the `encrypt_then_mac` extension in its `client_hello` if it wishes to use encrypt-then-MAC rather than the default MAC-then-encrypt. If the server is capable of meeting this requirement, it responds with an `encrypt_then_mac` in its `server_hello`. The "extension\_type" value for this extension SHALL be 22 (0x16) and the "extension\_data" field of

this extension SHALL be empty. The client and server MUST NOT use encrypt-then-MAC unless both sides have successfully exchanged encrypt\_then\_mac extensions.

### [2.1.](#) Rationale

The use of TLS/DTLS extensions to negotiate an overall switch is preferable to defining new ciphersuites because the latter would result in a Cartesian explosion of suites, potentially requiring duplicating every single existing suite with a new one that uses encrypt-then-MAC. In contrast the approach presented here requires just a single new extension type with a corresponding minimal-length extension sent by client and server.

Another possibility for introducing encrypt-then-MAC would be to make it part of TLS 1.3, however this would require the implementation and deployment of all of TLS 1.2 just to support a trivial code change in the order of encryption and MAC'ing. In contrast deploying encrypt-then-MAC via the TLS/DTLS extension mechanism required changing less than a dozen lines of code in one implementation (not including the handling for the new extension type, which was a further 50 or so lines of code).

The use of extensions precludes use with SSL 3.0, but then it's likely that anything still using this nearly two decades-old protocol will be vulnerable to any number of other attacks anyway, so there seems little point in bending over backwards to accomodate SSL 3.0.

### [3.](#) Applying Encrypt-then-MAC

Once the use of encrypt-then-MAC has been negotiated, processing of TLS/DTLS packets switches from the standard:

```
encrypt( data || MAC || pad )
```

to the new:

```
encrypt( data || pad ) || MAC
```

with the MAC covering the entire packet up to the start of the MAC

value. In TLS [2] notation the MAC calculation is:

```
MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num +
    TLSCipherText.type +
    TLSCipherText.version +
    TLSCipherText.length +
    ENC(content + padding + padding_length));
```

for TLS 1.0 without the explicit IV and:

```
MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num +
    TLSCipherText.type +
    TLSCipherText.version +
    TLSCipherText.length +
    IV +
    ENC(content + padding + padding_length));
```

for TLS 1.1 and greater with explicit IV (for DTLS the sequence number is replaced by the combined epoch and sequence number as per DTLS [4]). The final MAC value is then appended to the encrypted data and padding. This calculation is identical to the existing one with the exception that the MAC calculation is run over the payload ciphertext (the TLSCipherText PDU) rather than the plaintext (the TLSCompressed PDU).

The overall TLS packet [2] is then:

```
struct {
    ContentType type;
    ProtocolVersion version;
    uint16 length;
    GenericBlockCipher fragment;
    opaque MAC;
} TLSCiphertext;
```

The equivalent DTLS packet [4] is then:

```
struct {
    ContentType type;
```

```
ProtocolVersion version;
uint16 epoch;
uint48 sequence_number;
uint16 length;
GenericBlockCipher fragment;
opaque MAC;
} TLSCiphertext;
```

This is identical to the existing TLS/DTLS layout with the only difference being that the MAC value is moved outside the encrypted data.

Note from the GenericBlockCipher annotation that this only applies to standard block ciphers that have distinct encrypt and MAC operations. It does not apply to GenericStreamCiphers, or to GenericAEADCiphers that already include integrity protection with the cipher. If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension from a client and then selects a stream or AEAD cipher suite, it MUST NOT send an encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client.

Decryption reverses this processing. The MAC SHALL be evaluated before any further processing such as decryption is performed, and if the MAC verification fails then processing SHALL terminate immediately. For TLS, a fatal bad\_record\_mac MUST be generated [2]. For DTLS, the record MUST be discarded and a fatal bad\_record\_mac MAY be generated [2]. This immediate response to a bad MAC eliminates any timing channels that may be available through the use of manipulated packet data.

Some implementations may prefer to use a truncated MAC rather than a full-length one. In this case they MAY negotiate the use of a truncated MAC through the TLS truncated\_hmac extension as defined in TLS-Ext [3].

### [3.1.](#) Rehandshake Issues

The status of encrypt-then-MAC vs. MAC-then-encrypt can potentially change during a rehandshake. Implementations SHOULD retain the current session state for the renegotiated session (in other words if the mechanism for the current session is X then the renegotiated session should also use X). While implementations SHOULD NOT change the state during a rehandshake, if they wish to be more flexible then

the following rules apply:

Current Session	Renegotiated Session	Action to take
MAC-then-encrypt	MAC-then-encrypt	No change
MAC-then-encrypt	Encrypt-then-MAC	Upgrade to Encrypt-then-MAC
Encrypt-then-MAC	MAC-then-encrypt	Error
Encrypt-then-MAC	Encrypt-then-MAC	No change

Table 1: Encrypt-then-MAC with Renegotiation

As the above table points out, implementations MUST NOT renegotiate a downgrade from Encrypt-then-MAC to MAC-then-encrypt. Note that a client or server that doesn't wish to implement the mechanism-change-during-rehandshake ability can (as a client) not request a mechanism change and (as a server) deny the mechanism change.

If an upgrade from MAC-then-encrypt to Encrypt-then-MAC is negotiated as per the second line in the table above then the change will take

place in the first message that follows the Change Cipher Spec (CCS). In other words all messages up to and including the CCS will use MAC-then-encrypt, and then the message that follows will continue with Encrypt-then-MAC.

#### 4. Security Considerations

This document defines an improved security mechanism encrypt-then-MAC to replace the current MAC-then-encrypt one. This is regarded as more secure than the current mechanism [5] [6], and should mitigate or eliminate a number of attacks on the current mechanism, provided that the instructions on MAC processing given in [Section 3](#) are applied.

An active attacker who can emulate a client or server with extension

intolerance may cause some implementations to fall back to older protocol versions that don't support extensions, which will in turn force a fallback to non-Encrypt-then-MAC behaviour. A straightforward solution to this problem is to avoid fallback to older, less secure protocol versions. If fallback behaviour is unavoidable then mechanisms to address this issue, which affects all capabilities that are negotiated via TLS extensions, are being developed by the TLS working group [7]. Anyone concerned about this type of attack should consult the TLS working group documents for guidance on appropriate defence mechanisms.

## [5.](#) IANA Considerations

IANA has added the extension code point 22 (0x16) for the `encrypt_then_mac` extension to the TLS ExtensionType values registry as specified in TLS [2].

## [6.](#) Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Martin Rex, Dan Shumow, and the members of the TLS mailing list for their feedback on this document.

## [7.](#) References

### [7.1.](#) Normative References

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### [7.2.](#) Informative References

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