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**Exported Authenticators in TLS**  
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Abstract

This document describes a mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS) to provide an exportable proof of ownership of a certificate that can be transmitted out of band and verified by the other party.

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## [1.](#) Introduction

This document provides a way to authenticate one party of a Transport Layer Security (TLS) communication to another using a certificate after the session has been established. This allows both the client and server to prove ownership of additional identities at any time after the handshake has completed. This proof of authentication can be exported and transmitted out of band from one party to be validated by the other party.

This mechanism provides two advantages over the authentication that TLS natively provides:

multiple identities - Endpoints that are authoritative for multiple identities - but do not have a single certificate that includes all of the identities - can authenticate with those identities over a single connection.

spontaneous authentication - Endpoints can authenticate after a connection is established, in response to events in a higher-layer protocol, as well as integrating more context.

This document intends to replace much of the functionality of renegotiation in previous versions of TLS. It has the advantages over renegotiation of not requiring additional on-the-wire changes during a connection. For simplicity, only TLS 1.2 and later are supported.

Post-handshake authentication is defined in TLS 1.3, but it has the disadvantage of requiring additional state to be stored in the TLS state machine and it composes poorly with multiplexed connection protocols like HTTP/2. It is also only available for client authentication. This mechanism is intended to be used as part of a replacement for post-handshake authentication in applications.



## 2. Authenticator

The authenticator is a structured message that can be exported from either party of a TLS connection. It can be transmitted to the other party of the TLS connection at the application layer. The application layer protocol used to send the authenticator SHOULD use TLS as its underlying transport.

An authenticator message can be constructed by either the client or the server given an established TLS connection, a certificate, and a corresponding private key. This authenticator uses the message structures from section 4.4. of [\[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13\]](#), but different parameters. Also, unlike the Certificate and CertificateRequest messages in TLS 1.3, the messages described in this draft are not encrypted with a handshake key.

Each authenticator is computed using a Handshake Context and Finished MAC Key derived from the TLS session. The Handshake Context is and Finished MAC Key are dependent on whether the authenticator is created by the client or the server.

- o The Handshake Context is an [\[RFC5705\]](#) (for TLS 1.2) or [\[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13\]](#) (for TLS 1.3) exporter value derived using the label "EXPORTER-client authenticator handshake context" or "EXPORTER-server authenticator handshake context", depending on the sender, and length 64 bytes. The context\_value is absent (length zero).
- o The Finished MAC Key is an exporter value derived using the label "EXPORTER-server authenticator finished key" or "EXPORTER-client authenticator finished key", depending on the sender. The length of this key is equal to the length of the output of the hash function selected in TLS for the pseudorandom function (PRF); cipher suites that do not use the TLS PRF MUST define a hash function that can be used for this purpose or they cannot be used.

If the connection is TLS 1.2, the master secret MUST have been computed with the extended master secret [\[RFC7627\]](#) to avoid key synchronization attacks.

**Certificate** The certificate to be used for authentication and any supporting certificates in the chain. This structure is defined in [\[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13\]](#) [section 4.4.2](#).

The certificate message contains an opaque string called `certificate_request_context` which SHOULD be unique for a given connection. Its format is be defined by the application layer protocol and SHOULD be non-zero length. For example, it may be a



sequence number used by the higher-level protocol during the transport of the authenticator to the other party. Using a unique and unpredictable value ties the authenticator to a given context, allowing the application to prevent authenticators from being replayed or precomputed by an attacker with temporary access to a private key.

**CertificateVerify** A signature over the value Hash(Handshake Context || Certificate)

This is described in section 4.2.3. of [[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13](#)]. The signature scheme MUST be a valid signature scheme for TLS 1.3. This excludes all RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 algorithms and ECDSA algorithms that are not supported in TLS 1.3. For servers, this signature scheme must match one of the signature and hash algorithms advertised in the signature\_algorithms extension of the ClientHello.

**Finished** A HMAC over the value Hash(Handshake Context || Certificate || CertificateVerify) using the hash function from the handshake and the Finished MAC Key as a key.

The certificates used in the Certificate message MUST conform to the requirements of a Certificate message in the version of TLS negotiated. This is described in section 4.2.3. of [[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13](#)] and sections 7.4.2. and 7.4.6. of [[RFC5246](#)]. Alternative certificate formats such as [[RFC7250](#)] Raw Public Keys are not supported.

The exported authenticator message is the concatenation of messages: Certificate || CertificateVerify || Finished

A given exported authenticator can be validated by checking the validity of the CertificateVerify message and recomputing the Finished message to see if it matches. If the underlying connection is TLS 1.3, CertificateVerify messages with an RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 algorithm as its SignatureScheme MUST be rejected.

### **3. API considerations**

The creation and validation of exported authenticators SHOULD be implemented inside TLS library even if it is possible to implement it at the application layer. TLS implementations supporting the use of exported authenticators MUST provide application programming interfaces by which clients and servers may request and verify exported authenticator messages.

Given an established connection, the application SHOULD be able to call an "authenticate" API which takes as input:



- o `certificate_request_context` (from 1 to 255 bytes)
- o valid certificate chain for the connection and associated extensions (OCSP, SCT, etc.)
- o signer (either the private key associated with the certificate, or interface to perform private key operation)
- o signature scheme

The API returns the exported authenticator as output.

Given an established connection and an exported authenticator message, the application **SHOULD** be able to call a "validate" API that takes an exported authenticator as an input. If the Finished and CertificateVerify messages verify correctly, the API returns the following as output:

- o certificate chain and extensions
- o `certificate_request_context`

In order for the application layer to be able to choose the certificates and signature schemes to use when constructing an authenticator, a TLS server **SHOULD** expose an API that returns the content of the `signature_algorithms` extension of client's ClientHello message.

#### **4. Security Considerations**

The Certificate/Verify/Finished pattern intentionally looks like the TLS 1.3 pattern which now has been analyzed several times. In the case where the client presents an authenticator to a server, [[SIGMAC](#)] presents a relevant framework for analysis.

Authenticators are independent and unidirectional. There is no explicit state change inside TLS when an authenticator is either created or validated.

- o This property makes it difficult to formally prove that a server is jointly authoritative over multiple certificates, rather than individually authoritative over each.
- o There is no indication in the TLS layer about which point in time an authenticator was computed. Any feedback about the time of creation or validation of the authenticator should be tracked as part of the application layer semantics if required.





## 5. Acknowledgements

Comments on this proposal were provided by Martin Thomson.  
Suggestions for the security considerations section were provided by Karthikeyan Bhargavan.

## 6. Normative References

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