

HTTP Over TLS

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Abstract

This memo describes how to use TLS to secure HTTP connections over the Internet. Current practice is to layer HTTP over SSL (the predecessor to TLS), distinguishing secured traffic from insecure traffic by the use of a different server port. This document standardizes that practice using TLS. A companion document describes a method for using HTTP/TLS over the same port as normal HTTP.

1. Introduction

HTTP [[RFC2068](#)] was originally used in the clear on the Internet. However, increased use of HTTP for sensitive applications has required security measures. SSL, and its successor TLS [[TLS](#)] were designed to provide channel-oriented security. This document describes how to use HTTP over TLS.

1.1. Discussion of this Draft

This draft is being discussed on the "ietf-apps-tls" mailing list. To subscribe, send a message to:

ietf-apps-tls-request@imc.org

with the single word

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in the body of the message. There is a Web site for the mailing list at <http://www.imc.org/ietf-apps-tls/>.

1.2. Requirements Terminology

Keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT" and "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. HTTP Over TLS

Conceptually, HTTP/TLS is very simple. Simply use HTTP over TLS precisely as you would use HTTP over TCP.

2.1. Connection Initiation

The agent acting as the HTTP client should also act as the TLS client. It should initiate a connection to the server on the appropriate port and then send the TLS ClientHello to begin the TLS handshake. When the TLS handshake has finished. The client may then initiate the first HTTP request. All HTTP data MUST be sent using as TLS "application data". Normal HTTP behavior, including retained connections should be followed.

2.2. Connection Closure

TLS provides a facility for secure connection closure. When a valid closure alert is received, an implementation can be assured that no further data will be received on that connection. TLS implementations MUST initiate an exchange of closure alerts before closing a connection. A TLS implementation MAY, after sending a closure alert, close the connection without waiting for the peer to send its closure alert, generating an "incomplete close". Note that an implementation which does this MAY choose to reuse the session. This SHOULD only be done when the application knows (typically through detecting HTTP message boundaries) that it has received all the message data that it cares about.

As specified in [TLS], any implementation which receives a connection close without first receiving a valid closure alert (a "premature close") MUST NOT reuse that session. Note that a premature close does not call into question the security of the data already received, but simply indicates that subsequent data might have been truncated. Because TLS is oblivious to HTTP request/response boundaries, it is necessary to examine the HTTP data itself (specifically the Content-

Length header) to determine whether the truncation occurred inside a message or between messages.

2.2.1. Client Behavior

Because HTTP uses connection closure to signal end of server data, client implementations **MUST** treat any premature closes as errors and the data received as potentially truncated. Two cases in particular deserve special note:

in A HTTP response without a Content-Length header. Since data length
this situation is signalled by connection close a premature close generated by the server cannot be distinguished from a spurious close generated by an attacker.

oriented protection, it is
A HTTP response with a valid Content-Length header closed before all data has been read. Because TLS does not provide document impossible to determine whether the server has miscomputed the Content-Length or an attacker has truncated the connection.

When encountering a premature close, a client **SHOULD** treat as completed all requests for which it has received as much data as specified in the Content-Length header.

A client detecting an incomplete close **SHOULD** recover gracefully. It **MAY** resume a TLS session closed in this fashion.

Clients **MUST** send a closure alert before closing the connection. Clients which are unprepared to receive any more data **MAY** choose not to wait for the server's closure alert and simply close the connection, thus generating an incomplete close on the server side.

2.2.2. Server Behavior

[RFC2068](#) permits an HTTP client to close the connection at any time, and requires servers to recover gracefully. In particular, servers **SHOULD** be prepared to receive an incomplete close from the client, since the client can often determine when the end of server data is. Servers **SHOULD** be willing to resume TLS sessions closed in this fashion.

Implementation note: In HTTP implementations which do not use persistent connections, the server ordinarily expects to be able to sig-

nal end of data by closing the connection. When Content-Length is used, however, the client may have already sent the closure alert and dropped the connection.

Servers MUST attempt to initiate an exchange of closure alerts with the client before closing the connection. Servers MAY close the connection after sending the closure alert, thus generating an incomplete close on the client side.

2.3. Port Number

The first data that an HTTP server expects to receive from the client is the Request-Line production. The first data that a TLS server (and hence an HTTP/TLS server) expects to receive is the ClientHello. Consequently, common practice has been to run HTTP/TLS over a separate port in order to distinguish which protocol is being used. When HTTP/TLS is being run over a TCP/IP connection, the default port is 443. This does not preclude HTTP/TLS from being run over another transport. TLS only presumes a reliable connection-oriented data stream.

2.4. URI Format

HTTP/TLS is differentiated from HTTP URIs by using the 'https' protocol identifier in place of the 'http' protocol identifier. An example URI specifying HTTP/TLS is:

<https://abc.com:80/~smith/home.html>

3. Endpoint Identification

3.1. Server Identity

In general, HTTP/TLS requests are generated by dereferencing a URI. As a consequence, the hostname for the server is known to the client. If the hostname is available, the client MUST check it against the server's identity as presented in the server's Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.

If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead.

Matching is performed using the matching rules specified by [PKIX], including wildcard matches. E.g. *.bar.com would match a.bar.com, b.bar.com, etc. but not bar.com. If more than one identity of a given type is present in the certificate (e.g. more than one dNSName name, a match in any one of the set is considered acceptable.)

If the hostname does not match the identity in the certificate, user oriented clients **MUST** either notify the user (clients **MAY** give the user the opportunity to continue with the connection in any case) or terminate the connection with a bad certificate error. Automated clients **MUST** close the connection, returning a bad certificate error.

3.2. Client Identity

Typically, the server has no external knowledge of what the client's identity ought to be and so checks (other than that the client has a certificate chain rooted in an appropriate CA) are not possible. If a server has such knowledge (typically from some source external to HTTP or TLS) it **SHOULD** check the identity as described above.

References

- [PKIX] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, D. Solo, Internet Public Key Infrastructure: Part I: X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile, <[draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-part1-06.txt](#)>, October 1997.
- [RFC2068] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Berners-Lee, T., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1" [RFC 2068](#), January 1997.
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to indicate Requirement Levels", [RFC2119](#), March 1997.
- [TLS] Dierks, T., Allen, C., "The TLS Protocol", RFCXXXX, November 1997.

Security Considerations

This entire document is about security.

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