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## **Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in (D)TLS 1.2**

### **Abstract**

The MD5 and SHA-1 hashing algorithms are increasingly vulnerable to attack and this document deprecates their use in TLS 1.2 digital signatures. However, this document does not deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection. This document updates RFC 5246.

### **Status of This Memo**

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## Table of Contents

- [1. Introduction](#)
  - [1.1. Requirements Language](#)
- [2. Signature Algorithms](#)
- [3. Certificate Request](#)
- [4. Server Key Exchange](#)
- [5. Certificate Verify](#)
- [6. IANA Considerations](#)
- [7. Security Considerations](#)
- [8. Acknowledgement](#)
- [9. References](#)
  - [9.1. Normative References](#)
  - [9.2. Informative References](#)
- [Authors' Addresses](#)

## 1. Introduction

The usage of MD5 and SHA-1 for signature hashing in TLS 1.2 is specified in [\[RFC5246\]](#). MD5 and SHA-1 have been proven to be insecure, subject to collision attacks [\[Wang\]](#). In 2011, [\[RFC6151\]](#) detailed the security considerations, including collision attacks for MD5. NIST formally deprecated use of SHA-1 in 2011 [\[NISTSP800-131A-R2\]](#) and disallowed its use for digital signatures at the end of 2013, based on both the Wang et al. attack and the potential for brute-force attack. In 2016, researchers from INRIA identified a new class of transcript collision attacks on TLS (and other protocols) that rely on efficient collision-finding algorithms on the underlying hash constructions [\[Transcript-Collision\]](#). Further, in 2017, researchers from Google and CWI Amsterdam [\[SHA-1-Collision\]](#) proved SHA-1 collision attacks were practical. This document updates [\[RFC5246\]](#) in such a way that MD5 and SHA-1 MUST NOT be used for digital signatures. However, this document does not deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection. Note that the CABF has also deprecated use of SHA-1 for use in certificate signatures [\[CABF\]](#).

### 1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [\[RFC2119\]](#) [\[RFC8174\]](#) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## 2. Signature Algorithms

Clients MUST include the `signature_algorithms` extension. Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in this extension.

### 3. Certificate Request

Servers SHOULD NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateRequest messages.

### 4. Server Key Exchange

Servers MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in ServerKeyExchange messages. If the client receives a ServerKeyExchange message indicating MD5 or SHA-1, then it MUST abort the connection with an `illegal_parameter` alert.

### 5. Certificate Verify

Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateVerify messages. If a server receives a CertificateVerify message with MD5 or SHA-1 it MUST abort the connection with an `illegal_parameter` alert.

### 6. IANA Considerations

The document updates the "TLS SignatureScheme" registry to change the recommended status of SHA-1 based signature schemes to N (not recommended) as defined by [\[RFC8447\]](#). The following entries are to be updated:

Value	Description	Recommended	Reference
0x0201	rsa_pkcs1_sha1	N	<a href="#">[RFC8446]</a> [RFCTBD]
0x0203	ecdsa_sha1	N	<a href="#">[RFC8446]</a> [RFCTBD]

Table 1

Other entries of the registry remain the same.

IANA is also requested to update the Reference for the TLS SignatureAlgorithm and TLS HashAlgorithm registries to refer to this RFC:

OLD:

Reference

[RFC5246][RFC8447]

NEW:

Reference

[RFC5246][RFC8447][RFC-to-be]

## 7. Security Considerations

Concerns with TLS 1.2 implementations falling back to SHA-1 is an issue. This document updates the TLS 1.2 specification to deprecate support for MD5 and SHA-1 for digital signatures. However, this document does not deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection.

## 8. Acknowledgement

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## 9. References

### 9.1. Normative References

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