

Using OpenPGP keys for TLS authentication

<[draft-ietf-tls-openpgp-keys-02.txt](#)>

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Abstract

This document proposes extensions to the TLS protocol to support the OpenPGP trust model and keys. The extensions discussed here include a certificate type negotiation mechanism, and the required modifications to the TLS Handshake Protocol.

This document uses the same notation used in the TLS Protocol draft.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#).

1. Introduction

At the time of writing, TLS [[TLS](#)] uses the PKIX [[PKIX](#)] infrastructure, to provide certificate services. Currently the PKIX protocols are limited to a hierarchical key management. As a result, applications which follow different - non hierarchical - trust models, like the "web of trust" model, could not be benefited by TLS.

OpenPGP keys (sometimes called OpenPGP certificates), provide security services for electronic communications. They are widely deployed, especially in electronic mail applications, provide public key authentication services, and allow distributed key management. This document will update the TLS protocol to support OpenPGP trust model and keys using the existing TLS cipher suites.

2. OpenPGP keys for TLS authentication

The X.509 [[X509](#)] certificates recommended for use with TLS will not be used in conjunction with OpenPGP keys. An implementation SHOULD be able to support both TLS with X.509 certificates and TLS with OpenPGP keys. Implementations are not required to support both. The "peer certificate" in the session state of TLS MAY refer to either X.509 or OpenPGP.

2.1 Changes to the Handshake Message Contents

This section describes the changes to the TLS handshake message contents when OpenPGP keys are to be used for authentication.

2.1.1 Hello Messages

2.1.1.1 Extension Type

A new value, "cert_type(7)", is added to the enumerated ExtensionType, defined in [[TLSEXT](#)]. This value is used as the extension number for the extensions in both the client hello message and the server hello message. The new extension type will be used for certificate type negotiation.

2.1.1.2 Client Hello

In order to indicate the support of multiple certificate types clients will include an extension of type "cert_type" to the extended client hello message. The the hello extension mechanism is described in [[TLSEXT](#)].

This extension carries a list of supported certificate types the client can use, sorted by client preference. This extension SHOULD be omitted if the client supports only X.509 certificates.

The "extension_data" field of this extension will contain a CertificateTypeExtension structure.

```
enum { client, server } ClientOrServerExtension;

enum { X.509(0), OpenPGP(1), (255) } CertificateType;

struct {
    select(ClientOrServerExtension) {
        case client:
            CertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
        case server:
            CertificateType certificate_type;
    }
} CertificateTypeExtension;
```

[2.1.1.3](#) Server Hello

Servers that receive an extended client hello containing the "cert_type" extension MUST select a certificate type from the certificate_types field in the extended client hello, or terminate the connection with a fatal alert of type "unsupported_certificate".

The certificate type selected by the server, is encoded in a CertificateTypeExtension structure, which is included in the extended server hello message, using an extension of type "cert_type".

Servers that only support X.509 certificates MAY omit including the "cert_type" extension in the extended server hello.

[2.1.2](#) Server certificate

The contents of the certificate message sent from server to client and vice versa are determined by the negotiated certificate type and the selected cipher suite's key exchange algorithm.

If the OpenPGP certificate type is negotiated then it is required to present an OpenPGP key in the Certificate message. The OpenPGP key must contain a public key that matches the selected key exchange algorithm, as shown below.

Key Exchange Algorithm	OpenPGP Key Type
------------------------	------------------

RSA	RSA public key which can be used for encryption.
-----	--

DHE_DSS	DSS public key.
---------	-----------------

DHE_RSA

RSA public key which can be used for
signing.

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An OpenPGP key appearing in the Certificate message will be sent in binary OpenPGP format. The option is also available to send an OpenPGP fingerprint, instead of sending the entire key. The process of fingerprint generation is described in [\[OpenPGP\]](#). The peer shall respond with a "certificate_unobtainable" fatal alert if the key with the given key fingerprint cannot be found. The "certificate_unobtainable" fatal alert is defined in section 4 of [\[TLSEXT\]](#).

If the key is not valid, expired, revoked, corrupt, the appropriate fatal alert message is sent from section A.3 of the TLS specification. If a key is valid and neither expired nor revoked, it is accepted by the protocol. The key validation procedure is a local matter outside the scope of this document.

```
enum {
    key_fingerprint (0), key (1), (255)
} PGPKKeyDescriptorType;

opaque PGPKKeyFingerprint<16..20>;

opaque PGPKKey<0..2^24-1>;

struct {
    PGPKKeyDescriptorType descriptorType;
    select (descriptorType) {
        case key_fingerprint: PGPKKeyFingerprint;
        case key: PGPKKey;
    }
} Certificate;
```

[2.1.3](#) Certificate request

The semantics of this message remain the same as in the TLS specification. However the structure of this message has been modified for OpenPGP keys. the PGPCertificateRequest structure will only be used if the negotiated certificate type is OpenPGP.

```
enum {
    rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), (255)
} ClientCertificateParamsType;

struct {
    ClientCertificateParamsType certificate_params_types<1..2^8-1>;
} PGPCertificateRequest;
```

certificate_params_types is a list of accepted client certificate parameter types, sorted in order of the server's preference.

[2.1.4](#) Client certificate

The client certificate message is sent using the same formatting as the server certificate message. This message is only sent in response to the certificate request message. If no OpenPGP key is available from the client, then a certificate that contains an empty PGPKey is sent. The server may respond with a "handshake_failure" fatal alert if client authentication is required. This transaction follows the TLS specification.

[2.1.5](#) Server key exchange

The server key exchange message for OpenPGP keys is identical to the TLS specification.

[2.1.6](#) Certificate verify

The certificate verify message for OpenPGP keys is identical to the TLS specification.

[2.1.7](#) Finished

The finished message for OpenPGP keys is identical to the description in the specification.

[3.](#) Cipher suites

No new cipher suites are required to use OpenPGP keys. OpenPGP keys can be combined with existing cipher suites defined in [\[TLS\]](#), except the ones marked as "Exportable". Exportable cipher suites SHOULD NOT be used with OpenPGP keys.

[3.1](#) New cipher suites

Some additional cipher suites are defined here in order to support algorithms which are defined in [\[OpenPGP\]](#) but are not present in [\[TLS\]](#).

CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAST_128_CBC_SHA	= { 0x00, 0x70 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAST_128_CBC_RMD	= { 0x00, 0x71 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_RMD	= { 0x00, 0x72 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_RMD	= { 0x00, 0x73 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_RMD	= { 0x00, 0x74 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAST_128_CBC_SHA	= { 0x00, 0x75 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAST_128_CBC_RMD	= { 0x00, 0x76 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_RMD	= { 0x00, 0x77 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_RMD	= { 0x00, 0x78 };
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_RMD	= { 0x00, 0x79 };


```
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAST_128_CBC_SHA      = { 0x00, 0x7A };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAST_128_CBC_RMD       = { 0x00, 0x7B };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_RMD       = { 0x00, 0x7C };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_RMD        = { 0x00, 0x7D };
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_RMD        = { 0x00, 0x7E };
```

All of the above cipher suites use either the CAST [[CAST](#)], AES [[AES](#)], or 3DES block ciphers in CBC mode. The choice of hash is either SHA-1 or RIPEMD-160. Implementations are not required to support the above cipher suites.

[4. Acknowledgments](#)

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[5. References](#)

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