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Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions

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Abstract

This document provides documentation for existing specific TLS extensions. It is a companion document for the TLS 1.2 specification, [draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-07.txt](#).

Acknowledgements

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1. Introduction

The TLS (Transport Layer Security) Protocol Version 1.2 is specified in [RFC7925]. That specification includes the framework for extensions to TLS, considerations in designing such extensions (see [Section 7.4.1.4](#) of [RFC7925]), and IANA Considerations for the allocation of new extension code points; however, it does not specify any particular extensions other than CertHashTypes (see [Section 7.4.1.4.1](#) of [RFC7925]).

This document provides the specifications for existing TLS extensions. It is, for the most part, the mere adaptation and editing of material from [RFC4366], which covered all aspects of TLS extensions for TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and TLS 1.1 [RFC4346].

1.1 Specific Extensions Covered

The extensions described here focus on extending the functionality provided by the TLS protocol message formats. Other issues, such as the addition of new cipher suites, are deferred.

Specifically, the extensions described in this document:

- Allow TLS clients to provide to the TLS server the name of the server they are contacting. This functionality is desirable in order to facilitate secure connections to servers that host multiple 'virtual' servers at a single underlying network address.
- Allow TLS clients and servers to negotiate the maximum fragment length to be sent. This functionality is desirable as a result of memory constraints among some clients, and bandwidth constraints among some access networks.
- Allow TLS clients and servers to negotiate the use of client certificate URLs. This functionality is desirable in order to conserve memory on constrained clients.
- Allow TLS clients to indicate to TLS servers which CA root keys they possess. This functionality is desirable in order to prevent multiple handshake failures involving TLS clients that are only able to store a small number of CA root keys due to memory limitations.
- Allow TLS clients and servers to negotiate the use of truncated MACs. This functionality is desirable in order to conserve bandwidth in constrained access networks.

- Allow TLS clients and servers to negotiate that the server sends

the client certificate status information (e.g., an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [[RFC2560](#)] response) during a TLS handshake. This functionality is desirable in order to avoid sending a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) over a constrained access network and therefore save bandwidth.

The extensions described in this document may be used by TLS clients and servers. The extensions are designed to be backwards compatible, meaning that TLS clients that support the extensions can talk to TLS servers that do not support the extensions, and vice versa. The document therefore updates TLS 1.0 [[RFC2246](#)] and TLS 1.1 [[RFC4346](#)].

[1.2](#) Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

3. Server Name Indication

TLS does not provide a mechanism for a client to tell a server the name of the server it is contacting. It may be desirable for clients to provide this information to facilitate secure connections to servers that host multiple 'virtual' servers at a single underlying network address.

In order to provide the server name, clients MAY include an extension of type "server_name" in the (extended) client hello. The "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain "ServerNameList" where:

```
struct {
    NameType name_type;
    select (name_type) {
        case host_name: HostName;
    } name;
} ServerName;

enum {
    host_name(0), (255)
} NameType;

opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>;

struct {
    ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1>
} ServerNameList;
```

Currently, the only server names supported are DNS hostnames; however, this does not imply any dependency of TLS on DNS, and other name types may be added in the future (by an RFC that updates this document). TLS MAY treat provided server names as opaque data and pass the names and types to the application.

"HostName" contains the fully qualified DNS hostname of the server, as understood by the client. The hostname is represented as a byte string using UTF-8 encoding [[RFC3629](#)], without a trailing dot.

If the hostname labels contain only US-ASCII characters, then the client MUST ensure that labels are separated only by the byte 0x2E, representing the dot character U+002E (requirement 1 in [Section 3.1 of \[RFC3490\]](#) notwithstanding). If the server needs to match the HostName against names that contain non-US-ASCII characters, it MUST perform the conversion operation described in [Section 4 of \[RFC3490\]](#), treating the HostName as a "query string" (i.e., the AllowUnassigned flag MUST be set). Note that IDNA allows labels to be separated by any of the Unicode characters U+002E, U+3002, U+FF0E, and U+FF61;

therefore, servers MUST accept any of these characters as a label

separator. If the server only needs to match the HostName against names containing exclusively ASCII characters, it MUST compare ASCII names case-insensitively.

Literal IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are not permitted in "HostName".

It is RECOMMENDED that clients include an extension of type "server_name" in the client hello whenever they locate a server by a supported name type.

A server that receives a client hello containing the "server_name" extension MAY use the information contained in the extension to guide its selection of an appropriate certificate to return to the client, and/or other aspects of security policy. In this event, the server SHALL include an extension of type "server_name" in the (extended) server hello. The "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL be empty.

If the server understood the client hello extension but does not recognize the server name, it SHOULD send an "unrecognized_name" alert (which MAY be fatal).

If an application negotiates a server name using an application protocol and then upgrades to TLS, and if a server_name extension is sent, then the extension SHOULD contain the same name that was negotiated in the application protocol. If the server_name is established in the TLS session handshake, the client SHOULD NOT attempt to request a different server name at the application layer.

4. Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation

Without this extension, TLS specifies a fixed maximum plaintext fragment length of 2^{14} bytes. It may be desirable for constrained clients to negotiate a smaller maximum fragment length due to memory limitations or bandwidth limitations.

In order to negotiate smaller maximum fragment lengths, clients MAY include an extension of type "max_fragment_length" in the (extended) client hello. The "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain:

```
enum{
    2^9(1), 2^10(2), 2^11(3), 2^12(4), (255)
} MaxFragmentLength;
```

whose value is the desired maximum fragment length. The allowed values for this field are: 2^9 , 2^{10} , 2^{11} , and 2^{12} .

Servers that receive an extended client hello containing a "max_fragment_length" extension MAY accept the requested maximum fragment length by including an extension of type "max_fragment_length" in the (extended) server hello. The "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain a "MaxFragmentLength" whose value is the same as the requested maximum fragment length.

If a server receives a maximum fragment length negotiation request for a value other than the allowed values, it MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. Similarly, if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation response that differs from the length it requested, it MUST also abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.

Once a maximum fragment length other than 2^{14} has been successfully negotiated, the client and server MUST immediately begin fragmenting messages (including handshake messages), to ensure that no fragment larger than the negotiated length is sent. Note that TLS already requires clients and servers to support fragmentation of handshake messages.

The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session including session resumptions.

The negotiated length limits the input that the record layer may process without fragmentation (that is, the maximum value of `TLSPlaintext.length`; see [\[RFC7914\]](#), Section 6.2.1). Note that the output of the record layer may be larger. For example, if the negotiated length is $2^9=512$, then for currently defined cipher suites (those defined in [\[RFC7914\]](#), [\[RFC2712\]](#), and [\[RFC3268\]](#)), and when null compression is used, the record layer output can be at most 793 bytes: 5 bytes of headers, 512 bytes of application data, 256 bytes of padding, and 20 bytes of MAC. This means that in this event a TLS record layer peer receiving a TLS record layer message larger than 793 bytes may discard the message and send a "record_overflow" alert, without decrypting the message.

5. Client Certificate URLs

Without this extension, TLS specifies that when client authentication is performed, client certificates are sent by clients to servers during the TLS handshake. It may be desirable for constrained clients to send certificate URLs in place of certificates, so that they do not need to store their certificates and can therefore save memory.

In order to negotiate sending certificate URLs to a server, clients

MAY include an extension of type "client_certificate_url" in the

(extended) client hello. The "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL be empty.

(Note that it is necessary to negotiate use of client certificate URLs in order to avoid "breaking" existing TLS servers.)

Servers that receive an extended client hello containing a "client_certificate_url" extension MAY indicate that they are willing to accept certificate URLs by including an extension of type "client_certificate_url" in the (extended) server hello. The "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL be empty.

After negotiation of the use of client certificate URLs has been successfully completed (by exchanging hellos including "client_certificate_url" extensions), clients MAY send a "CertificateURL" message in place of a "Certificate" message:

```
enum {
    individual_certs(0), pkipath(1), (255)
} CertChainType;

enum {
    false(0), true(1)
} Boolean;

struct {
    CertChainType type;
    URLAndOptionalHash url_and_hash_list<1..2^16-1>;
} CertificateURL;

struct {
    opaque url<1..2^16-1>;
    Boolean hash_present;
    select (hash_present) {
        case false: struct {};
        case true: SHA1Hash;
    } hash;
} URLAndOptionalHash;

opaque SHA1Hash[20];
```

Here "url_and_hash_list" contains a sequence of URLs and optional hashes.

When X.509 certificates are used, there are two possibilities:

- If CertificateURL.type is "individual_certs", each URL refers to a single DER-encoded X.509v3 certificate, with the URL for the client's certificate first.

- If CertificateURL.type is "pkipath", the list contains a single URL referring to a DER-encoded certificate chain, using the type PkiPath described in Section 8 of [[RFCTL](#)].

When any other certificate format is used, the specification that describes use of that format in TLS should define the encoding format of certificates or certificate chains, and any constraint on their ordering.

The hash corresponding to each URL at the client's discretion either is not present or is the SHA-1 hash of the certificate or certificate chain (in the case of X.509 certificates, the DER-encoded certificate or the DER-encoded PkiPath).

Note that when a list of URLs for X.509 certificates is used, the ordering of URLs is the same as that used in the TLS Certificate message (see [[RFCTL](#)], Section 7.4.2), but opposite to the order in which certificates are encoded in PkiPath. In either case, the self-signed root certificate MAY be omitted from the chain, under the assumption that the server must already possess it in order to validate it.

Servers receiving "CertificateURL" SHALL attempt to retrieve the client's certificate chain from the URLs and then process the certificate chain as usual. A cached copy of the content of any URL in the chain MAY be used, provided that a SHA-1 hash is present for that URL and it matches the hash of the cached copy.

Servers that support this extension MUST support the http: URL scheme for certificate URLs, and MAY support other schemes. Use of other schemes than "http", "https", or "ftp" may create unexpected problems.

If the protocol used is HTTP, then the HTTP server can be configured to use the Cache-Control and Expires directives described in [[RFC2616](#)] to specify whether and for how long certificates or certificate chains should be cached.

The TLS server is not required to follow HTTP redirects when retrieving the certificates or certificate chain. The URLs used in this extension SHOULD therefore be chosen not to depend on such redirects.

If the protocol used to retrieve certificates or certificate chains returns a MIME-formatted response (as HTTP does), then the following MIME Content-Types SHALL be used: when a single X.509v3 certificate is returned, the Content-Type is "application/pkix-cert" [[RFC2585](#)], and when a chain of X.509v3 certificates is returned, the Content-Type is "application/pkix-pkipath" (see Section 8 of [[RFCTL](#)]).

If a SHA-1 hash is present for an URL, then the server MUST check that the SHA-1 hash of the contents of the object retrieved from that URL (after decoding any MIME Content-Transfer-Encoding) matches the given hash. If any retrieved object does not have the correct SHA-1 hash, the server MUST abort the handshake with a "bad_certificate_hash_value" alert.

Note that clients may choose to send either "Certificate" or "CertificateURL" after successfully negotiating the option to send certificate URLs. The option to send a certificate is included to provide flexibility to clients possessing multiple certificates.

If a server encounters an unreasonable delay in obtaining certificates in a given CertificateURL, it SHOULD time out and signal a "certificate_unobtainable" error alert.

6. Trusted CA Indication

Constrained clients that, due to memory limitations, possess only a small number of CA root keys may wish to indicate to servers which root keys they possess, in order to avoid repeated handshake failures.

In order to indicate which CA root keys they possess, clients MAY include an extension of type "trusted_ca_keys" in the (extended) client hello. The "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain "TrustedAuthorities" where:

```
struct {
    TrustedAuthority trusted_authorities_list<0..2^16-1>;
} TrustedAuthorities;

struct {
    IdentifierType identifier_type;
    select (identifier_type) {
        case pre_agreed: struct {};
        case key_sha1_hash: SHA1Hash;
        case x509_name: DistinguishedName;
        case cert_sha1_hash: SHA1Hash;
    } identifier;
} TrustedAuthority;

enum {
    pre_agreed(0), key_sha1_hash(1), x509_name(2),
    cert_sha1_hash(3), (255)
} IdentifierType;
```

opaque DistinguishedName<1..2¹⁶-1>;

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Here "TrustedAuthorities" provides a list of CA root key identifiers that the client possesses. Each CA root key is identified via either:

- "pre_agreed": no CA root key identity supplied.
- "key_sha1_hash": contains the SHA-1 hash of the CA root key. For Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) keys, this is the hash of the "subjectPublicKey" value. For RSA keys, the hash is of the big-endian byte string representation of the modulus without any initial 0-valued bytes. (This copies the key hash formats deployed in other environments.)
- "x509_name": contains the DER-encoded X.509 DistinguishedName of the CA.
- "cert_sha1_hash": contains the SHA-1 hash of a DER-encoded Certificate containing the CA root key.

Note that clients may include none, some, or all of the CA root keys they possess in this extension.

Note also that it is possible that a key hash or a Distinguished Name alone may not uniquely identify a certificate issuer (for example, if a particular CA has multiple key pairs). However, here we assume this is the case following the use of Distinguished Names to identify certificate issuers in TLS.

The option to include no CA root keys is included to allow the client to indicate possession of some pre-defined set of CA root keys.

Servers that receive a client hello containing the "trusted_ca_keys" extension MAY use the information contained in the extension to guide their selection of an appropriate certificate chain to return to the client. In this event, the server SHALL include an extension of type "trusted_ca_keys" in the (extended) server hello. The "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL be empty.

7. Truncated HMAC

Currently defined TLS cipher suites use the MAC construction HMAC with either MD5 or SHA-1 [[RFC2104](#)] to authenticate record layer communications. In TLS, the entire output of the hash function is used as the MAC tag. However, it may be desirable in constrained environments to save bandwidth by truncating the output of the hash function to 80 bits when forming MAC tags.

In order to negotiate the use of 80-bit truncated HMAC, clients MAY

include an extension of type "truncated_hmac" in the extended client hello. The "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL be empty.

Servers that receive an extended hello containing a "truncated_hmac" extension MAY agree to use a truncated HMAC by including an extension of type "truncated_hmac", with empty "extension_data", in the extended server hello.

Note that if new cipher suites are added that do not use HMAC, and the session negotiates one of these cipher suites, this extension will have no effect. It is strongly recommended that any new cipher suites using other MACs consider the MAC size an integral part of the cipher suite definition, taking into account both security and bandwidth considerations.

If HMAC truncation has been successfully negotiated during a TLS handshake, and the negotiated cipher suite uses HMAC, both the client and the server pass this fact to the TLS record layer along with the other negotiated security parameters. Subsequently during the session, clients and servers MUST use truncated HMACs, calculated as specified in [\[RFC2104\]](#). That is, CipherSpec.hash_size is 10 bytes, and only the first 10 bytes of the HMAC output are transmitted and checked. Note that this extension does not affect the calculation of the pseudo-random function (PRF) as part of handshaking or key derivation.

The negotiated HMAC truncation size applies for the duration of the session including session resumptions.

8. Certificate Status Request

Constrained clients may wish to use a certificate-status protocol such as OCSP [\[RFC2560\]](#) to check the validity of server certificates, in order to avoid transmission of CRLs and therefore save bandwidth on constrained networks. This extension allows for such information to be sent in the TLS handshake, saving roundtrips and resources.

In order to indicate their desire to receive certificate status information, clients MAY include an extension of type "status_request" in the (extended) client hello. The "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain "CertificateStatusRequest" where:

```
struct {  
    CertificateStatusType status_type;  
    select (status_type) {  
        case ocsp: OCSPStatusRequest;
```

```
} request;
```



```
    } CertificateStatusRequest;

enum { ocspl(1), (255) } CertificateStatusType;

struct {
    ResponderID responder_id_list<0..2^16-1>;
    Extensions request_extensions;
} OCSPStatusRequest;

opaque ResponderID<1..2^16-1>;
opaque Extensions<0..2^16-1>;
```

In the OCSPStatusRequest, the "ResponderIDs" provides a list of OCSP responders that the client trusts. A zero-length "responder_id_list" sequence has the special meaning that the responders are implicitly known to the server, e.g., by prior arrangement. "Extensions" is a DER encoding of OCSP request extensions.

Both "ResponderID" and "Extensions" are DER-encoded ASN.1 types as defined in [\[RFC2560\]](#). "Extensions" is imported from [\[RFC3280\]](#). A zero-length "request_extensions" value means that there are no extensions (as opposed to a zero-length ASN.1 SEQUENCE, which is not valid for the "Extensions" type).

In the case of the "id-pkix-ocsp-nonce" OCSP extension, [\[RFC2560\]](#) is unclear about its encoding; for clarification, the nonce MUST be a DER-encoded OCTET STRING, which is encapsulated as another OCTET STRING (note that implementations based on an existing OCSP client will need to be checked for conformance to this requirement).

Servers that receive a client hello containing the "status_request" extension MAY return a suitable certificate status response to the client along with their certificate. If OCSP is requested, they SHOULD use the information contained in the extension when selecting an OCSP responder and SHOULD include request_extensions in the OCSP request.

Servers return a certificate response along with their certificate by sending a "CertificateStatus" message immediately after the "Certificate" message (and before any "ServerKeyExchange" or "CertificateRequest" messages). If a server returns a "CertificateStatus" message, then the server MUST have included an extension of type "status_request" with empty "extension_data" in the extended server hello.

```
struct {
    CertificateStatusType status_type;
    select (status_type) {
        case ocspl: OCSPResponse;
```

```
} response;
```

```
} CertificateStatus;
```

```
opaque OCSPResponse<1..2^24-1>;
```

An "ocsp_response" contains a complete, DER-encoded OCSP response (using the ASN.1 type OCSPResponse defined in [[RFC2560](#)]). Note that only one OCSP response may be sent.

The "CertificateStatus" message is conveyed using the handshake message type "certificate_status".

Note that a server MAY also choose not to send a "CertificateStatus" message, even if it receives a "status_request" extension in the client hello message.

Note in addition that servers MUST NOT send the "CertificateStatus" message unless it received a "status_request" extension in the client hello message.

Clients requesting an OCSP response and receiving an OCSP response in a "CertificateStatus" message MUST check the OCSP response and abort the handshake if the response is not satisfactory.

```
    certificate_unobtainable(111),          /* new */
    unrecognized_name(112),                /* new */
    bad_certificate_status_response(113),   /* new */
    bad_certificate_hash_value(114),       /* new */
    (255)
} AlertDescription;
```


9. IANA Considerations

IANA Considerations for TLS Extensions and the creation of a Registry therefore are all covered in Section 12 of [[RFCTLS](#)].

10. Security Considerations

General Security Considerations for TLS Extensions are covered in [[RFCTLS](#)]. Security Considerations for particular extensions specified in this document are given below.

In general, implementers should continue to monitor the state of the art and address any weaknesses identified.

Additional security considerations are described in the TLS 1.0 RFC [[RFC2246](#)] and the TLS 1.1 RFC [[RFC4346](#)].

10.1 Security Considerations for server_name

If a single server hosts several domains, then clearly it is necessary for the owners of each domain to ensure that this satisfies their security needs. Apart from this, server_name does not appear to introduce significant security issues.

Implementations MUST ensure that a buffer overflow does not occur, whatever the values of the length fields in server_name.

Although this document specifies an encoding for internationalized hostnames in the server_name extension, it does not address any security issues associated with the use of internationalized hostnames in TLS (in particular, the consequences of "spoofed" names that are indistinguishable from another name when displayed or printed). It is recommended that server certificates not be issued for internationalized hostnames unless procedures are in place to mitigate the risk of spoofed hostnames.

10.2 Security Considerations for max_fragment_length

The maximum fragment length takes effect immediately, including for handshake messages. However, that does not introduce any security complications that are not already present in TLS, since TLS requires implementations to be able to handle fragmented handshake messages.

Note that as described in [Section 4](#), once a non-null cipher suite has

been activated, the effective maximum fragment length depends on the cipher suite and compression method, as well as on the negotiated `max_fragment_length`. This must be taken into account when sizing buffers, and checking for buffer overflow.

10.3 Security Considerations for `client_certificate_url`

There are two major issues with this extension.

The first major issue is whether or not clients should include certificate hashes when they send certificate URLs.

When client authentication is used **without** the `client_certificate_url` extension, the client certificate chain is covered by the Finished message hashes. The purpose of including hashes and checking them against the retrieved certificate chain is to ensure that the same property holds when this extension is used, i.e., that all of the information in the certificate chain retrieved by the server is as the client intended.

On the other hand, omitting certificate hashes enables functionality that is desirable in some circumstances; for example, clients can be issued daily certificates that are stored at a fixed URL and need not be provided to the client. Clients that choose to omit certificate hashes should be aware of the possibility of an attack in which the attacker obtains a valid certificate on the client's key that is different from the certificate the client intended to provide. Although TLS uses both MD5 and SHA-1 hashes in several other places, this was not believed to be necessary here. The property required of SHA-1 is second pre-image resistance.

The second major issue is that support for `client_certificate_url` involves the server's acting as a client in another URL protocol. The server therefore becomes subject to many of the same security concerns that clients of the URL scheme are subject to, with the added concern that the client can attempt to prompt the server to connect to some (possibly weird-looking) URL.

In general, this issue means that an attacker might use the server to indirectly attack another host that is vulnerable to some security flaw. It also introduces the possibility of denial of service attacks in which an attacker makes many connections to the server, each of which results in the server's attempting a connection to the target of the attack.

Note that the server may be behind a firewall or otherwise able to access hosts that would not be directly accessible from the public

Internet. This could exacerbate the potential security and denial of

service problems described above, as well as allow the existence of internal hosts to be confirmed when they would otherwise be hidden.

The detailed security concerns involved will depend on the URL schemes supported by the server. In the case of HTTP, the concerns are similar to those that apply to a publicly accessible HTTP proxy server. In the case of HTTPS, loops and deadlocks may be created, and this should be addressed. In the case of FTP, attacks arise that are similar to FTP bounce attacks.

As a result of this issue, it is RECOMMENDED that the `client_certificate_url` extension should have to be specifically enabled by a server administrator, rather than be enabled by default. It is also RECOMMENDED that URI protocols be enabled by the administrator individually, and only a minimal set of protocols be enabled. Unusual protocols that offer limited security or whose security is not well-understood SHOULD be avoided.

As discussed in [[RFC3986](#)], URLs that specify ports other than the default may cause problems, as may very long URLs (which are more likely to be useful in exploiting buffer overflow bugs).

Also note that HTTP caching proxies are common on the Internet, and some proxies do not check for the latest version of an object correctly. If a request using HTTP (or another caching protocol) goes through a misconfigured or otherwise broken proxy, the proxy may return an out-of-date response.

[10.4](#) Security Considerations for `trusted_ca_keys`

It is possible that which CA root keys a client possesses could be regarded as confidential information. As a result, the CA root key indication extension should be used with care.

The use of the SHA-1 certificate hash alternative ensures that each certificate is specified unambiguously. As for the previous extension, it was not believed necessary to use both MD5 and SHA-1 hashes.

[10.5](#) Security Considerations for `truncated_hmac`

It is possible that truncated MACs are weaker than "un-truncated" MACs. However, no significant weaknesses are currently known or expected to exist for HMAC with MD5 or SHA-1, truncated to 80 bits.

Note that the output length of a MAC need not be as long as the

length of a symmetric cipher key, since forging of MAC values cannot be done off-line: in TLS, a single failed MAC guess will cause the immediate termination of the TLS session.

Since the MAC algorithm only takes effect after all handshake messages that affect extension parameters have been authenticated by the hashes in the Finished messages, it is not possible for an active attacker to force negotiation of the truncated HMAC extension where it would not otherwise be used (to the extent that the handshake authentication is secure). Therefore, in the event that any security problem were found with truncated HMAC in the future, if either the client or the server for a given session were updated to take the problem into account, it would be able to veto use of this extension.

10.6 Security Considerations for status_request

If a client requests an OCSP response, it must take into account that an attacker's server using a compromised key could (and probably would) pretend not to support the extension. In this case, a client that requires OCSP validation of certificates SHOULD either contact the OCSP server directly or abort the handshake.

Use of the OCSP nonce request extension (id-pkix-ocsp-nonce) may improve security against attacks that attempt to replay OCSP responses; see [Section 4.4.1 of \[RFC2560\]](#) for further details.

11. Internationalization Considerations

None of the extensions defined here directly use strings subject to localization. Domain Name System (DNS) hostnames are encoded using UTF-8. If future extensions use text strings, then internationalization should be considered in their design.

12. Normative References

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