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Donald Eastlake  
Yizhou Li  
Huawei  
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TRILL: RBridge Channel Tunnel Protocol  
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## Abstract

The IETF TRILL (Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links) protocol includes an optional mechanism, called RBridge Channel, for the transmission of typed messages between TRILL switches in the same campus and between TRILL switches and end stations on the same link. This document specifies optional extensions to RBridge Channel that provides three facilities: (1) A mechanism to send such messages between a TRILL switch and an end station in either direction, or between two end stations, when the two devices are in the same campus but not on the same link; (2) A method to support security facilities for RBridge Channel messages; and (3) A method to tunnel a variety of payload types by encapsulating them in an RBridge Channel message.

## Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of [BCP 78](#) and [BCP 79](#).

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TRILL: RBridge Channel Tunnel

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TRILL: RBridge Channel Tunnel

## 1. Introduction

The IETF TRILL protocol [[RFC6325](#)] includes an optional RBridge Channel [[RFCchannel](#)] facility to support transmission of typed messages (for example BFD [[RFCbfd](#)]) between two RBridges in the same campus and between RBridges and end stations on the same link. This document specifies optional extensions to RBridge Channel that provides three facilities:

- (1) A mechanism to send RBridge Channel messages between a TRILL switch (RBridge) and an end station in either direction, or between two end stations, when the two devices are in the same campus but not on the same link. This mechanism requires the cooperation of a TRILL switch that is on the same link as the end station or stations involved.
- (2) A method to support security facilities for RBridge Channel messages.
- (3) A method to tunnel a variety of payload types by encapsulating them in an RBridge Channel message.

Any one, two, or all three of these facilities can be use in the same message.

There is no mechanism to stop end stations on the same link, from sending native RBridge Channel messages to each other; however, such use is outside the scope of this document.

## [1.2.](#) Terminology and Acronyms

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

This document uses the acronyms defined in [[RFC6325](#)] and [[RFCchannel](#)] supplemented by the following additional acronym:

Data Label - VLAN or FGL.

FGL - Fine Grained Label [[RFCfgl](#)].

Primary Nickname - If a TRILL switch holds two or more nicknames, the one it holds with the highest priority is the primary nickname. If two or more are held with the same priority, the one with the lowest value, considered as a 16-bit unsigned integer in network byte order, is the primary nickname.

RBridge - An alternative term for a TRILL switch.


TRILL switch - A device that implements the TRILL protocol [[RFC6325](#)], sometimes referred to as an RBridge.

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TRILL: RBridge Channel Tunnel

## 2. Channel Tunnel Packet Format

The general structure of an RBridge Channel message on a link between TRILL switches (RBridges) is shown in Figure 1 below. When a native RBridge Channel message is sent between an RBridge and an end station on the same link, in either direction, the TRILL Header (including the inner Ethernet addresses and Data Label) is omitted as shown in Figure 2. The type of RBridge Channel message is given by a Protocol field in the RBridge Channel Header that indicates how to interpret the Channel Protocol Specific Payload [[RFCchannel](#)].






Figure 1. RBridge Channel Packet Structure





Figure 2. Native RBridge Channel Frame

The RBridge Channel Header looks like this:





Scope: This field describes the transport scope of the instance of Channel Tunnel. See [Section 4](#).

SType: This field describes the type of security information and features, including keying material, being provided. See [Section 5](#).

PType: Payload type. The describes the tunneled data. See [Section 3](#) below.

The Channel Tunnel protocol is integrated with the RBridge Channel facility. Channel Tunnel errors are reported as if they were RBridge Channel errors, using newly allocated code points in the ERR field of the RBridge Channel Header supplemented by the SubERR field. Additional RBridge Channel Header flags are specified and used by Channel Tunnel.



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### 3. Tunnel Payload Types

The RBridge Channel Tunnel Protocol can carry a variety of payloads as indicated by the PType field. Values are shown in the table below with further explanation after the table.

PType	Section	Description
0		Reserved
1	3.1	Null
2	3.2	RBridge Channel message
3	3.3	TRILL Data packet
4	3.4	TRILL IS-IS packet
5	3.5	Ethernet Frame
6-14		(Available for assignment by IETF Review)
15		Reserved

Table 1. Payload Type Values

While implementation of the Channel Tunnel protocol is optional, if it is implemented PTypes 1 (Null) and 2 (RBridge Channel message) MUST be implemented. PTypes 3, 4, and 5 MAY be implemented. The processing of any particular Channel Protocol message and its payload depends on meeting local security and other policy at the destination TRILL switch or end station.

#### 3.1 Null Payload

The Null payload type is intended to be used for messages such as key negotiation or the like. It indicates that there is no payload. Any data after the possible Scope Information and Security Information fields is ignored.

#### 3.2 RBridge Channel Message Payload

A PType of 2 indicates that the payload of the Channel Tunnel message is an encapsulated RBridge Channel message without the initial RBridge Channel Ethertype. Typical reasons for sending an RBridge

Channel message inside a Channel Tunnel message are to provide security services, such as authentication or encryption, or to forward it through a cooperating border TRILL switch in either direction between an end station and a TRILL switch not on the same link.

This looks like the following:




Figure 5. Tunneled Channel Message Channel Tunnel Structure

### 3.3 TRILL Data Packet

A PType of 3 indicates that the payload of the Tunnel protocol message is an encapsulated TRILL Data packet without the initial TRILL Ethertype as shown in the figure below. If this PType is implemented, the tunneled TRILL Data packet is handled as if it had been received by the destination TRILL switch on the port where the Channel Tunnel message was received.

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


Figure 6. Nested TRILL Data Packet Channel Tunnel Structure

### 3.4 TRILL IS-IS Packet

A PType of 4 indicates that the payload of the Tunnel protocol message is an encapsulated TRILL IS-IS packet without the initial L2-IS-IS Ethertype as shown in the figure below. If this PType is implemented, the tunneled TRILL IS-IS packet is processed by the destination RBridge if it meets local policy. The intended use is to expedite the receipt of a link state PDU by some TRILL switch with an immediate requirement for the enclosed link state data. It is RECOMMENDED that any link local IS-IS PDU (Hello, xSNP, MTU-x) received via this channel tunnel payload type be discarded.




Figure 7. Tunneled TRILL IS-IS Packet Structure

### 3.5 Ethernet Frame

If PType is 5, the Tunnel Protocol payload is an Ethernet frame as might be received from or sent to an end station except that the tunneled Ethernet frame's FCS is omitted, as shown in Figure 8. (There is still an overall FCS if the RBridge Channel message is being sent on an Ethernet link.) If this PType is implemented, the tunneled frame is handled as if it had been received on the port on which the Tunnel Protocol message was received.

In the case of a non-Ethernet link, such as a PPP link [RFC6361], the ports on the link are considered to have link local synthetic 48-bit MAC addresses constructed by concatenating three 16-bit quantities: 0xFEFF, the primary nickname of the TRILL switch (see [Section 1.2](#)), and the Port ID that the TRILL switch has assigned to that port, as shown in Figure 9. The resulting MAC address has the Local bit on and the Group bit off [RFC7042]. Since end stations are connected to TRILL switches over Ethernet, there will be no end stations on a non-Ethernet link in a TRILL campus. Thus such synthetic MAC addresses cannot conflict on the link with an end station address.

[illegible]




Figure 8. Ethernet Frame Channel Tunnel Structure




Figure 9. Synthetic MAC Address

The Channel Tunnel protocol extends the RBridge Channel facility to optionally support typed messages between an end station and a TRILL switch, in either direction, or between two end stations, when these devices are part of the same TRILL campus but not on the same link. The scopes specified in this document are as follows:

Scope	Symbol	Section	From-To
0	NORM		Normal
1	ESRB	4.1	End Station to RBridge
2	RBES	4.2	RBridge to End Station
3	ESES	4.3	End Station to End Station
4-14		Available for assignment by IETF Review	
15		Reserved	

Table 2. Scope Values

If the Channel Tunnel protocol is supported, then the NORM scope MUST be supported. Other scopes MAY be supported. In cases where a sequence of steps is given below, other processing sequences producing the same result are allowed.

**NORM:** This is the normal scope of an RBridge Channel message; thus it is either between two TRILL switches in the same campus or between a TRILL switch and an end station on the same link in either direction. The base RBridge Channel mechanisms apply [[RFCchannel](#)]. The scope dependent addressing information is of zero length. This scope is typically used when just the security and/or payload type features of the Tunnel Protocol are desired. If a TRILL switch supports the Channel Tunnel facility, it MUST support NORM scope.

**ESRB:** From end station to RBridge(s) not on the same link. The scope dependent address information is eight bytes long. See [Section 4.1](#) for further details. This scope MAY be supported.

**RBES:** From RBridge to end station(s) not on the same link. The scope dependent address information is eight bytes long. See [Section 4.2](#) for further details. This scope MAY be supported.

**ESES:** From end station to end station(s) not on the same link. The scope information is twelve bytes long. See [Section 4.3](#) for further details. This scope MAY be supported.

It is an implementation option and may depend on local policy whether or not an edge TRILL switch that has been requested to forward a Channel Tunnel protocol message due to a non-NORM Scope examines the SType and, if it does examine the SType, whether it verifies any authentication.

#### 4.1 End Station to RBridge(s)

The ESRB scope additional information is as follows:




Figure 10. ESRB Scope Information

To support the case where an end station originates a multi-destination RBridge Channel message to all the TRILL switches advertising interest in a Data Label, the BR (Broadcast) bit in the RBridge Channel Header Flags field is used (see [Section 7](#)).

Steps by the source end station:

If the RBridge Channel message is intended to a single destination RBridge, the source end station sets the Scope Destination Nickname to a nickname of that RBridge and ensures that the BR bit is zero. If the message is intended to be broadcast to the RBridges indicating interest in a Data Label, the end station sets the BR bit, uses that Data Label as part of the TRILL Header information, and the contents of the Scope Destination Nickname field is ignored.

Steps by the ingress TRILL switch on receiving the native RBridge Channel message from the end station:

0. As with any RBridge Channel message, determine, as a matter of local policy, whether the native RBridge Channel message is acceptable and discard it if it is not. This test might take into account, for example, whether the message is authenticated (see [Section 5](#)), whether or not the BR flag is set, and whether or not the original native destination MAC address is All-Edge-RBridges.
1. Store the native RBridge Channel message's source MAC address into the Scope Source MAC Address field.
2. Clear the NA bit and set the MH bit in the RBridge Channel Header flags.
3. Set the native RBridge Channel message's MAC destination address to All-Egress-RBridges.
4. Set the native RBridge Channel message's MAC source address to the MAC address that the ingress RBridge normally uses as the





Scope Destination MAC Address is broadcast, multicast, or unknown unicast. The source TRILL switch sets the Inner.MacSA to the MAC address it usually uses for RBridge Channel messages and also selects the Inner Data Label.

Steps by the egress RBridge(s):

An egress RBridge stores the ingress nickname into the Scope Source Nickname and sets the NA bit in the RBridge Channel Header flags. It then egresses the frame as a native RBridge Channel message, setting the native frame's outer destination and source MAC addresses to the Scope Destination MAC Address and the egress

RBridge port's MAC address, respectively.

If the original RBridge Channel message was multi-destination it might be egressed by more than one RBridge, each of which would perform the above transform. Whether such a multi-destination RBridge Channel Tunnel Protocol message would be accepted by any particular egress TRILL switch is a matter of local policy.

### [4.3](#) End Station to End Station

The ESES scope additional addressing information is as follows:




Figure 12. ESES Scope Information

Steps by the source end stations:

If the RBridge Channel message is intended for a single destination end station, the source end station sets the Scope Destination MAC address to the MAC address of that end station and ensures that the BR bit is zero. If the message is intended to be broadcast to a set of end stations via a multicast MAC address or the broadcast MAC address, the end station sets the Scope

Destination MAC address to that multicast or broadcast address and sets the BR bit. All of this is within the VLAN of the native RBridge Channel message or its Fine Grained Label (FGL) if the ingress port is configured to map to an FGL.

Steps by the ingress RBridge:

0. As with any RBridge Channel message, determine, as a matter of local policy, whether the native RBridge Channel message is acceptable and discard it if it is not. This test might take into account, for example, whether the message is authenticated (see [Section 5](#)), whether or not the BR flag is set, and whether or not the original Outer.MacDA is All-Edge-RBridges.
1. Store the native RBridge Channel message's source MAC address into the Scope Source MAC Address.
2. Clear the NA bit and set the MH bit in the RBridge Channel Header flags.
3. Set the native RBridge Channel message's MAC destination address to All-Egress-RBridges.
4. Set the native RBridge Channel message's MAC source address to

- the MAC address that the ingress RBridge normally uses as the Inner.MacSA for RBridge Channel messages it originates.
- 5.a. If the BR flag is zero, lookup the Scope Destination MAC Address and ingress the modified native frame as if it were a unicast native frame with that destination MAC address. This will result in either a unicast TRILL Data packet to the Scope Destination MAC Address or in unknown MAC flooding.
  - 5.b. If the BR flag is one, select a distribution tree and ingress the modified native frame as a multi-destination TRILL RBridge Channel message.
  - 5.c. Regardless of the BR flag value, the Inner.VLAN is the VLAN ID reported by the ingress port or, if that port is configured for FGL, the Inner.Lable is the FGL that VLAN maps to.
  6. Process the resulting RBridge Channel message. Note that if it is unicast to the ingress TRILL switch as egress, it is then immediately egressed. And if it is multi-destination and the ingress TRILL switch qualifies, a copy is egressed as well as a copy being sent on the selected distribution tree. It is possible that the Scope Destination MAC is actually out a different or even the same port of the ingress TRILL switch as the port on which the native RBridge Channel message was received.

Steps by the egress RBridge(s):

The egress RBridge sets the NA bit in the RBridge Channel Header flags. It then egresses the frame as a native RBridge Channel message, setting the native frame's outer destination and source MAC addresses to the Scope Destination MAC Address and the egress RBridge port's MAC address, respectively.

If the original RBridge Channel message was multi-destination it might be egressed by more than one TRILL switch, each of which would perform the above transform. Whether such a multi-destination RBridge Channel Tunnel Protocol message would be accepted by egress TRILL switches is a matter of local policy.


## [5](#). Security, Keying, and Algorithms

The following table gives the assigned values of the SType field and their meaning.

SType	Section	Meaning
-----	-----	-----
0	5.2	None
1	5.3	<a href="#">[RFC5310]</a> Based Authentication
2	5.4	DTLS Based Security
3-14		Available for assignment on IETF Review
15		Reserved

Table 3. SType Values

For all SType values except zero, the Security Information starts with a byte of flag bits and a byte of remaining length as follows:



### Figure 12. Security Information Format

The fields are as follows:

A: Zero if authentication is not being provided. One if it is.

E: Zero if encryption is not being provided. One if it is.

RESV: Six reserved bits that MUST be sent as zero and ignored on receipt.

Size: The number of bytes, as an unsigned integer, of Info in the Security Information after the Size byte itself.

Info: Variable length Security Information.

### 5.1 Authentication Coverage

Authentication is computed across relevant Channel Tunnel header information and payload with the area when their authentication value is to be stored set to zero. To be more precise, the covered area starts just after the first byte of the RBridge Channel header flags and extends to just before the link trailer. Thus RBridge Channel header flags bits 8 through 11 are protected by authentication while flag bits 0 through 7 are not.

Any Scope Information (see Figure 6) MUST be correctly filled in when the authentication value is computed or verified even when this is not required on the wire for correct routing, as follows:

ESRB: ([Section 3.1](#)) Authentication value computation at the origin end stations MUST be done with the Source Scope MAC Address filled

in (as well as the Scope Destination Nickname which is required for correct routing). Similarly, a TRILL switch ingressing an ESRB packet, which is required to set the Source Scope MAC Address in any case, will not be able to correctly validate the authentication value unless it is correctly set. There should be no problem at the egress TRILL switch as by the time the packet gets there, the Source Scope MAC Address should be correctly set.

RBES: ([Section 3.2](#)) Authentication value computation at the origin TRILL switch MUST be done with the Source Scope Nickname filled in (as well as the Scope Destination MAC Address which is required for correct routing). Similarly, a TRILL switch egressing an RBES packet, which is required to update the Source Scope Nickname in any case, will not be able to correctly validate the authentication value unless that nickname is correctly set.

ESES: ([Section 3.3](#)) Authentication value computation at the origin end stations MUST be done with the Source Scope MAC Address filled in (as well as the Scope Destination MAC Address which is required for correct routing). Similarly, a TRILL switch ingressing an ESES packet, which is required to update the Source Scope MAC Address in any case, will not be able to correctly validate the authentication value unless it is correctly set. There should be no problem at the egress TRILL switch as by time the packet gets there, the Source Scope MAC Address should be correctly set.

## [5.2](#) SType None

No security services are being invoked. The length of the Security Information field (see Figure 6) is zero.

## [5.3](#) [RFC 5310](#) Based Authentication

The Security Information (see Figure 6) is the flags and Size bytes specified above together with the value of the [[RFC5310](#)] Key ID and Authentication Data as shown in Figure 13.




Figure 13. SType 1 Security Information

The Key ID specifies the same keying value and algorithm that Key ID specifies for core TRILL IS-IS LSP Authentication TLVs; however, to avoid using the same key for multiple purposes, the keying value actually used for Tunnel Channel messages with this SType is a value derived from that TRILL IS-IS value as follows:

HMAC-SHA256 ( ( "Channel Tunnel" | Data Label ), IS-IS-key )

where "|" indicates concatenation, HMAC-SHA256 is as in [FIPS-180] [RFC6234], "Channel Tunnel" is the 14 character [ASCII] string indicated, and Data Label is the Data Label in which Channel Tunnel message is being sent as either (1) a right justified 12-bit VLAN ID in two bytes with 4 zero high order bits or (2) three bytes of FGL.

#### 5.4 DTLS Based Security

TBD - permits key negotiation, provides both encryption and authentication [RFC6347]...

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## 6. Channel Tunnel Errors

RBridge Channel Tunnel Protocol errors are reported like RBridge Channel level errors. The ERR field is set to one of the following error codes:

ERR	Meaning
---	-----
6	Unknown or unsupported field value
7	Authentication failure
8	Error in nested RBridge Channel message
(more TBD?)	

Table 4. Additional ERR Values

### 6.1 SubERRs under ERR 6

If the ERR field is 6, the SubERR field indicates the problematic field or value as show in the table below.

SubERR	Meaning (for ERR = 6)
-----	-----
0	Unsupported Scope
1	Unsupported SType
2	Unsupported PType
3	Unknown or reserved Scope Egress Nickname in an ESRB scope Tunnel Channel message
4	Unsupported crypto algorithm
5	Unknown Key ID for SType 1
(more TBD)	

Table 5. SubERR values under ERR 6

### 6.2 Nested RBridge Channel Errors

If  
a Channel Tunnel message is sent with security and with a payload



type (PType) indicating a nested RBridge Channel message and  
there is an error in the processing of that nested message that results in a return RBridge Channel message with a non-zero ERR field,  
then that returned message SHOULD also be nested in an Channel Tunnel message using the same type of security. In this case, the ERR field in the Channel Tunnel envelope is set to 8 indicating that there is a nested error.

## [7.](#) IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to allocate a new RBridge Channel protocol number from the range based on Standards Action for the "Channel Tunnel" protocol.

IANA is requested to allocate a new RBridge Channel Header flag bit for the Broadcast (BR) flag with this document as reference. Bit 8 is suggest. In any case, this bit must be one of the low order 4 bit, that is, bits 8 through 11.

## [8.](#) Security Considerations

The RBridge Channel tunnel facility has potentially positive and negative effects on security.

On the positive side, it provides optional security that can be used to authenticate and/or encrypt channel messages. Some RBridge Channel message payloads provide their own security [[RFCbfd](#)] but where this is not true, careful consideration should be give to requiring use of the security features of the Tunnel Protocol.

On the negative side, the ability to tunnel various payload types and to tunnel them not just between TRILL switches but to and from end stations can increase risk unless precautions are taking. The processing of decapsulated Tunnel Protocol payloads is not a good place to be liberal in what you accept as the tunneling facility makes it easier for unexpected messages to pop up in unexpected places in a TRILL campus due to accidents or the actions of an adversary. Local policies should generally be strict and only process payload types required and then only with adequate authentication for

the particular circumstances.

See [[RFCchannel](#)] for general RBridge Channel Security Considerations.

See [[RFC6325](#)] for general TRILL Security Considerations.

#### Normative References

- [ASCII] - American National Standards Institute (formerly United States of America Standards Institute), "USA Code for Information Interchange", ANSI X3.4-1968, 1968. ANSI X3.4-1968 has been replaced by newer versions with slight modifications, but the 1968 version remains definitive for the Internet.
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TRILL: RBridge Channel Tunnel

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Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd  
Huawei Technologies  
155 Beaver Street  
Milford, MA 01757 USA

Phone: +1-508-333-2270  
Email: d3e3e3@gmail.com

Yizhou Li  
Huawei Technologies  
101 Software Avenue,  
Nanjing 210012, China

Phone: +86-25-56622310  
Email: liyizhou@huawei.com

INTERNET-DRAFT

TRILL: RBridge Channel Tunnel

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