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### Abstract

This document specifies use profiles for the application of the simple group keying protocol (SGKP) to multi-destination TRILL Extended RBridge Channel message security (<u>RFC 7978</u>) and TRILL over IP packet security (<u>draft-ietf-trill-over-ip</u>).

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### **1**. Introduction

This document specifies use profiles for the application of the simple group keying protocol (SGKP) [SGKPrfc] to the use of DTLS [RFC6347] formatted TRILL [RFC6325] [RFC7780] Extended RBridge Channel message security [RFC7178] [RFC7978] and to the use of IPsec formatted TRILL over IP [TRILLoverIP]. It is anticipated that there will be other uses for this group keying protocol.

### **<u>1.1</u>** Terminology and Acronyms

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This document uses terminology and acronyms defined in [RFC6325] and [RFC7178]. Some of these are repeated below for convenience along with additional new terms and acronyms.

Data Label - VLAN or FGL.

- DTLS Datagram Transport Level Security [RFC6347].
- FGL Fine Grained Label [RFC7172].
- GKd A distinguished station in a group that is in charge of which group keying (Section 2) is in use.
- GKs Stations in a group other than GKd (Section 2).
- HKDF Hash based Key Derivation Function [RFC5869].
- IS-IS Intermediate System to Intermediate System [RFC7176].
- keying material The set of a Key ID, a secret key, and a cypher suite.
- PDU Protocol Data Unit.
- QoS Quality of Service.
- RBridge An alternative term for a TRILL switch.

SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm [RFC6234].

TRILL - Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links or Tunneled Routing in the Link Layer.

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TRILL switch - A device that implements the TRILL protocol
[RFC6325] [RFC7780], sometimes referred to as an RBridge.

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### **2**. DTLS: Extended RBridge Channel Group Keyed Security

This section specifies a profile of the simple group keying protocol (SGKP) defined in [SGKPrfc]. This profile provides shared secret keying to secure multi-destination Extended RBridge Channel messages [RFC7978] as described in Setction 2.2.

For this SKGP use profile, a group is identified by TRILL Data Label (VLAN or FGL [RFC7172]) and consists of the data reachable [RFC7780] RBridges with interest in that Data Label. GKd is the RBridge in the group that, of those group members supporting the Group Keying Protocol, is the highest priority to be a TRILL distribution tree root as specified in Section 4.5 of [RFC6325]. If not all members of the group support the Group Keying Protocol, then there are two cases of destinations for multi-destination Channel Tunnel RBridge Channel messages:

- (1) If the sender and at least two other group members support the Group Keying Protocol, it SHOULD, for efficiency, send a secured multi-destination RBridge Channel message to cover the group and serially unicast to the group members not supporting the Group Keying Protocol.
- (2) In other cases the sender serially transmits the data to the group members using pairwise security.

### **<u>2.1</u>** Transmission of Group Keying Messages

Keying messages themselves are sent as unicast Extended RBridge Channel messages carrying a Group Keying protocol (see <u>Section 5.1</u>) RBridge Channel message. Such messages MUST use DTLS Pairwise or Composite (STypes 2 or 3) security [<u>RFC7978</u>].

The Group Keying profile for this Group Keying Use Type is as follows:

Priority of Group Keying messages for this SHOULD be 6 unless the network manager chooses to use a lower priority after determining that such lower priority group keying messages will yield acceptable performance. Priority 7 SHOULD NOT be used as it may cause interference with the establishment and maintenance of adjacency.

Use Type = 1

KeyID1 Length = 2, KeyID1 is an [<u>RFC5310</u>] key ID.

CypherSuiteLng = 2, CypherSuite is the cypher suite used in

groupcast extended RBridge Channel data messages for the

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corresponding KeyID2. This is a DTLS [<u>RFC6347</u>] cypher suite.

KeyID2 Length = 1, KeyID2 is the index under which a group key is set. Group keys are, in effect, indexed by this KeyID2 and the nickname of the GKd as used in the Ingress Nickname field of the TRILL Header of Group Keying messages.

### **2.2** Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data

Protected Extended RBridge Channel [RFC7978] messages are multicast (M bit set to one in the TRILL Header) and set the SType field to a new value TBD2 for "Group Secured" (see Section 5.2). Since there could be multiple group keys distribued and enabled for use, data is formatted as two bytes of Key ID followed by data formatted as TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] application\_data using the cyphersuite and keying material stored under the Key ID. Such a message on the wire looks like the following:

+   +   +	Link Header   TRILL Header
	RBridge Channel Header
	snd Extension
+-·	PBridge Channel Bayload
	++
	2-byte Key ID
	++
	DTLS formatted
	application data
	++
 +	Link Trailer

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### 3. TRILL Over IP Group Keyed Security

This SGKP usage profile provides shared secret keying to secure TRILL over IP messages [TRILLoverIP]. The keys put in place by the group keying protocol are available for use as IPSEC keys.

For this use profile, a group is identified by an IP multicast address and consists of the RBridges adjacent [RFC7177] to the sender reachable with that multicast address over a TRILL over IP link. GKd is the RBridge in the group that, of those group members supporting the Group Keying Protocol, has the highest priority to be a TRILL distribution tree root as specified in <u>Section 4.5 of [RFC6325]</u>. If not all members of the group support the Group Keying Protocol, then there are two cases for multi-destination TRILL over IP messages:

- (1) If the sender and at least two other group members support SGKP, it SHOULD, for efficiency, send a secured IPSEC message to cover the group and serially unicast to the group members not supporting the Group Keying Protocol.
- (2) In other cases the sender serially transmits the data to the group members using pairwise security.

### 3.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages

Keying messages themselves are sent as unicast Extended RBridge Channel messages carrying a Group Keying protocol (see <u>Section 5.1</u>) RBridge Channel message. Such messages MUST use DTLS Pairwise or Composite (STypes 2 or 3) security [<u>RFC7978</u>].

The Group Keying profile for this Group Keying Use Type is as follows:

Priority of Group Keying messages for this SHOULD be 6 unless the network manager chooses to use a lower priority after determining that such lower priority group keying messages will yield acceptable performance. Priority 7 SHOULD NOT be used as it may cause interference with the establishment and maintenance of adjacency.

Use Type = 2

KeyID1 Length = 2, KeyID1 is an [RFC5310] key ID.

CypherSuiteLng = variable, CypherSuite is an IKEv2 crypto algorithm "proposal" [<u>RFC7296</u>].

KeyID2 Length = 4, KeyID2 is the IPsec multicast SA. It is the

index under which a group key is set. Group keys are indexed

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by this KeyID2 and the nickname of the GKd as used in the Ingress Nickname field of the TRILL Header of Group Keying messages.

# **<u>3.2</u>** Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data

Multi-destination TRILL over IP data packets are formatted as multicast IPsec ESP tunnel mode [<u>RFC4303</u>] packets. The key and crpto algorithms in use are indicated by the multicast SA.

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# **<u>4</u>**. Security Considerations

See [<u>SGKPrfc</u>] for Simple Group Keying Protocol security considerations.

See [<u>RFC7978</u>] for Extended RBridge Channel security considerations.

See [ $\underline{RFC7457}$ ] in connection with TLS and DTLS security considerations.

See [TRILLoverIP] for TRILL over IP secrity considerations.

See [<u>RFC4303</u>] for IPsec ESP security considerations.

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### 5. IANA Considerations

This section gives IANA Considerations.

#### **5.1** Group Keying RBridge Channel Protocol Numbers

IANA is requested to assign TBD1 as the TRILL RBridge Channel protocol number, from the range assigned by Standards Action, for use when the "Group Keying" protocol is transmitted over Extended RBridge Channel messages.

The added RBridge Channel protocols registry entry on the TRILL Parameters web page is as follows:

Protocol	Description	Reference
TBD1	Group Keying	Section 2 of [this document]

#### **5.2** Group Secured Extended RBridge Channel SType

IANA is requested to assign TBD2 as the Group Secured SType in the "Extended RBridge Channel Security Types Subregistry" on the TRILL Parameters web page as follows:

SType Description Reference TBD2 Group Secured Section 2.2 of [this document]

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