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UDP Encapsulation of SCTP Packets for End-Host to End-Host Communication
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Abstract

This document describes a simple method of encapsulating SCTP Packets into UDP packets and its limitations. This allows the usage of SCTP in networks with legacy NAT not supporting SCTP. It can also be used to implement SCTP on hosts without directly accessing the IP-layer, for example implementing it as part of the application without requiring special privileges.

Please note that this document only describes the functionality required within an SCTP stack to add on UDP encapsulation, providing only those mechanisms for two end-hosts to communicate with each other over UDP ports. In particular, it does not provide mechanisms to determine whether UDP encapsulation is being used by the peer, nor the mechanisms for determining which remote UDP port number can be used. These functions are out of scope for this document.

This document covers only end-hosts and not tunneling (egress or ingress) end-points.

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Table of Contents

1.	Introduction	3
2.	Conventions	3
3.	Use Cases	3
3.1.	Portable SCTP Implementations	3
3.2.	Legacy NAT Traversal	4
4.	Unilateral Self-Address Fixing (UNSAF) Considerations	4
5.	SCTP over UDP	4
5.1.	Architectural Considerations	4
5.2.	Packet Format	5
5.3.	Encapsulation Procedure	6
5.4.	Decapsulation Procedure	6
5.5.	ICMP Considerations	7
5.6.	Path MTU Considerations	7
5.7.	Handling of Embedded IP-addresses	7
5.8.	ECN Considerations	8
6.	Socket API Considerations	8
6.1.	Get or Set the Remote UDP Encapsulation Port Number (SCTP_REMOTE_UDP_ENCAPS_PORT)	8
7.	IANA Considerations	9
8.	Security Considerations	9
9.	Acknowledgments	9
10.	References	9
10.1.	Normative References	9
10.2.	Informative References	10
	Authors' Addresses	11

1. Introduction

This document describes a simple method of encapsulating SCTP packets into UDP packets. SCTP as defined in [[RFC4960](#)] runs directly over IPv4 or IPv6. There are two main reasons for encapsulating SCTP packets:

- o Allow SCTP traffic to pass through legacy NATs, which do not provide native SCTP support as specified in [[I-D.ietf-behave-sctpnat](#)] and [[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-natsupp](#)].
- o Allow SCTP to be implemented on hosts which do not provide direct access to the IP-layer. In particular, applications can use their own SCTP implementation if the operating system does not provide one.

SCTP provides the necessary congestion control and reliability service that UDP does not perform.

2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

3. Use Cases

This section discusses two important use cases for encapsulating SCTP into UDP.

3.1. Portable SCTP Implementations

Some operating systems support SCTP natively. For other operating systems implementations are available, but require special privileges to install and/or use them. In some cases no kernel implementation might be available at all. When providing an SCTP implementation as part of a user process, most operating systems require special privileges to access the IP layer directly.

Using UDP encapsulation makes it possible to provide an SCTP implementation as part of a user process which does not require any special privileges.

A crucial point for implementing SCTP in user space is that the source address of outgoing packets needs to be controlled. This is not an issue if the SCTP stack can use all addresses configured at the IP-layer as source addresses. However, it is an issue when also using the address management required for NAT traversal, described in [Section 5.7](#).

[3.2.](#) Legacy NAT Traversal

Using UDP encapsulation allows SCTP communication when traversing legacy NATs (i.e those NATs not supporting SCTP as described in [[I-D.ietf-behave-sctpnat](#)] and [[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-natsupp](#)]). For single-homed associations IP addresses MUST NOT be listed in the INIT and INIT-ACK chunks. To use multiple addresses, the dynamic address reconfiguration extension described in [[RFC5061](#)] MUST be used only with wildcard addresses in the ASCONF chunks in combination with [[RFC4895](#)].

For multi-homed SCTP association the address management as described in [Section 5.7](#) MUST be performed.

SCTP sends periodic HEARTBEAT chunks on all idle paths. These can keep the NAT state alive.

[4.](#) Unilateral Self-Address Fixing (UNSAF) Considerations

As [[RFC3424](#)] requires a limited scope, this document only covers SCTP end-points dealing with legacy constraints as described in [Section 3](#). It doesn't cover generic tunneling end-points.

Obviously, the exit strategy is to use hosts supporting SCTP natively and middleboxes supporting SCTP as specified in [[I-D.ietf-behave-sctpnat](#)] and [[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-natsupp](#)]).

[5.](#) SCTP over UDP

[5.1.](#) Architectural Considerations

Each SCTP stack uses a single local UDP encapsulation port number as the destination port for all its incoming SCTP packets.

If there is only a single SCTP implementation on a host (for example, a kernel implementation being part of the operating system), using a single local UDP encapsulation port number per host can be advantageous (e.g., this reduces the number of mappings in firewalls and NATs, among other things). Using a single local UDP encapsulation port number per host is not possible if the SCTP stack is implemented as part of each application, there are multiple

applications, and some of the applications want to use the same IP-address.

An SCTP implementation supporting UDP encapsulation **MUST** store a remote UDP encapsulation port number per destination address for each SCTP association.

UDP encapsulated SCTP is communicated over the IANA-assigned UDP port number 9899 (sctp-tunneling). However, implementations **SHOULD** allow other port numbers to be specified as a local or remote UDP encapsulation port number through APIs, as applications may have the need to communicate over different port numbers.

5.2. Packet Format

To encapsulate an SCTP packet, a UDP header as defined in [RFC0768] is inserted between the IP header as defined in [RFC0791] and the SCTP common header as defined in [RFC4960].

Figure 1 shows the packet format of an encapsulated SCTP packet when IPv4 is used.





Figure 1: An SCTP/UDP/IPv4 packet

The packet format for an encapsulated SCTP packet when using IPv6 as defined in [RFC2460] is shown in Figure 2. Please note the the number *m* of IPv6 extension headers can be 0.






Figure 2: An SCTP/UDP/IPv6 packet

5.3. Encapsulation Procedure

Within the UDP header, the source port **MUST** be the local UDP encapsulation port number of the SCTP stack, the destination port **MUST** be the remote UDP encapsulation port number stored for the association and the destination address to which the packet is sent (see [Section 5.1](#)).

Because the SCTP packet is the UDP payload, the length of the UDP packet **MUST** be the length of the SCTP packet plus the size of the UDP header.

The SCTP checksum **MUST** be computed and the UDP checksum **SHOULD** be computed (see [[RFC5405](#)] and [[I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero](#)] for UDP checksum considerations).

5.4. Decapsulation Procedure

When an encapsulated packet is received, the UDP header is removed. Then the generic lookup is performed, as done by an SCTP stack whenever a packet is received, to find the association for the received SCTP packet. After finding the SCTP association (which includes checking the verification tag), the UDP source port **MUST** be stored as the encapsulation port for the destination address the SCTP packet is received from (see [Section 5.1](#)).

When a non-encapsulated SCTP packet is received by the SCTP stack, the encapsulation of outgoing packets belonging to the same

association and the corresponding destination address MUST be disabled.

5.5. ICMP Considerations

When receiving ICMP or ICMPv6 response packets, there might not be enough bytes in the payload to identify the SCTP association which the SCTP packet triggering the ICMP or ICMPv6 packet belongs to. If a received ICMP or ICMPv6 packet can not be related to a specific SCTP association or the verification tag can't be verified, it MUST be discarded silently. This means in particular that the SCTP stack MUST NOT rely on receiving ICMP or ICMPv6 messages. Implementation constraints could prevent processing received ICMP or ICMPv6 messages.

If received ICMP or ICMPv6 messages are processed, the following mapping SHOULD apply:

1. ICMP messages with type 'Destination Unreachable' and code 'Port Unreachable' SHOULD be treated as ICMP messages with type 'Protocol Unreachable' and code 'Destination Port unreachable'. See [[RFC0792](#)] for more details.
2. ICMPv6 messages with type 'Destination Unreachable' and code 'Port unreachable' SHOULD be treated as ICMPv6 messages with type 'Parameter Problem' and code 'Unrecognized Next Header type encountered'. See [[RFC4443](#)] for more details.

5.6. Path MTU Considerations

If an SCTP endpoint starts to encapsulate the packets of a path, it MUST decrease the Path MTU of that path by the size of the UDP header. If it stops encapsulating them, the Path MTU SHOULD be increased by the size of the UDP header.

When performing Path MTU discovery as described in [[RFC4820](#)] and [[RFC4821](#)] it MUST be taken into account that one cannot rely on the feedback provided by ICMP or ICMPv6 due to the limitation laid out in [Section 5.5](#).

If the implementation does not allow control of the don't fragment (DF)-bit contained in the IPv4 header, then Path MTU discovery can't be used. In this case, an implementation specific value should be used instead.

5.7. Handling of Embedded IP-addresses

When using UDP encapsulation for legacy NAT traversal, IP addresses that might require translation MUST NOT be put into any SCTP packet.

This means that a multi homed SCTP association is setup initially as a singled homed one and the protocol extension [\[RFC5061\]](#) in combination with [\[RFC4895\]](#) is used to add the other addresses. Only wildcard addresses are put into the SCTP packet.

When addresses are changed during the lifetime of an association [\[RFC5061\]](#) MUST be used with wildcard addresses only. If an SCTP endpoint receives an ABORT with the T-bit set, it MAY use this as an indication that the addresses seen by the peer might have changed.

5.8. ECN Considerations

If the implementation supports the sending and receiving of the ECN bits for the IP protocols being used by an SCTP association, the ECN bits MUST NOT be changed during sending and receiving.

6. Socket API Considerations

This section describes how the socket API defined in [\[RFC6458\]](#) needs to be extended to provide a way for the application to control the UDP encapsulation.

Please note that this section is informational only.

A socket API implementation based on [\[RFC6458\]](#) is extended by supporting one new read/write socket option.

6.1. Get or Set the Remote UDP Encapsulation Port Number (SCTP_REMOTE_UDP_ENCAPS_PORT)

This socket option can be used to set and retrieve the UDP encapsulation port number. This allows an endpoint to encapsulate initial packets.

```
struct sctp_udpencaps {
    sctp_assoc_t sue_assoc_id;
    struct sockaddr_storage sue_address;
    uint16_t sue_port;
};
```

sue_assoc_id: This parameter is ignored for one-to-one style sockets. For one-to-many style sockets the application may fill in an association identifier or SCTP_FUTURE_ASSOC for this query. It is an error to use SCTP_{CURRENT|ALL}_ASSOC in sue_assoc_id.

sue_address: This specifies which address is of interest. If a wildcard address is provided it applies only to future paths.

sue_port: The UDP port number in network byte order used as the destination port number for UDP encapsulation. Providing a value of 0 disables UDP encapsulation.

7. IANA Considerations

This document refers to the already assigned UDP port 9899 (sctp-tunneling). IANA is requested to update this assignment to refer to this document. As per [\[RFC6335\]](#) the Assignee should be [IESG] and the Contact should be [IETF_Chair].

Please note that the TCP port 9899 (sctp-tunneling) assignment is not needed anymore and IANA is asked to remove this TCP port number assignment.

8. Security Considerations

Encapsulating SCTP into UDP does not add any additional security considerations to the ones given in [\[RFC4960\]](#) and [\[RFC5061\]](#).

Firewalls inspecting SCTP packets must also be aware of the encapsulation and apply corresponding rules to the encapsulated packets.

An attacker might send a malicious UDP packet towards an SCTP endpoint to change the encapsulation port for a single remote address of a particular SCTP association. However, as specified in [Section 5.4](#), this requires the usage of one of the two negotiated verification tags. This protects against blind attackers the same way as described in [\[RFC4960\]](#) for SCTP over IPv4 or IPv6. Non-blind attackers can affect SCTP association using the UDP encapsulation described in this document in the same way as SCTP associations not using the UDP encapsulation of SCTP described here.

9. Acknowledgments

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