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A Discard Prefix for IPv6  
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## Abstract

Remote triggered black hole filtering describes a method of mitigating the effects of denial-of-service attacks by selectively discarding traffic based on source or destination address. Remote triggered black hole routing describes a method of selectively re-routing traffic into a sinkhole router (for further analysis) based on destination address. This document updates the IPv6 Special Purpose Address Registry by explaining why a unique IPv6 prefix should be formally assigned by IANA for the purpose of facilitating IPv6 remote triggered black hole filtering and routing.

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## 1. Introduction

Remote triggered black hole (RTBH) filtering describes a class of methods of blocking IP traffic either from a specific source ([RFC5635]) or to a specific destination ([RFC3882]) on a network. RTBH routing describes a class of methods of re-routing IP traffic destined to the attacked/targeted host to a special path (tunnel) where a sniffer could capture the traffic for analysis. Both these methods operate by setting the next-hop address of an IP packet with a specified source or destination address to be a unicast prefix which is connected locally or remotely to a router's discard, null or tunnel interface. Typically, reachability information for this prefix is propagated throughout an autonomous system using a dynamic routing protocol such as BGP ([RFC3882]). By deploying RTBH systems across a network, traffic to or from specific destinations may be selectively black-holed or re-routed to a sinkhole device in a manner which is efficient, scalable and straightforward to implement.

On some networks, operators configure RTBH installations using [RFC1918] address space or the address blocks reserved for documentation in [RFC5737]. This approach is inadequate because RTBH configurations are not documentation, but rather operationally important features of many public-facing production networks. Furthermore, [RFC3849] specifies that the IPv6 documentation prefix should be filtered in both local and public contexts. On this basis, it is suggested that both private network address blocks and the documentation prefixes described in [RFC5737] are inappropriate for RTBH configurations, and that a dedicated IPv6 prefix should be assigned instead.

This document updates the IPv6 Special Purpose Address Registry [IANA-IPV6REG].

### 1.1. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",

"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

## 2. A Discard Prefix for IPv6

For the purposes of implementing an IPv6 remote triggered black hole configuration, a unicast address block is required. There are currently no IPv6 unicast address blocks which are specifically nominated for the purposes of implementing such RTBH systems.

While it could be argued that there are other addresses and address

prefixes which could be used for this purpose (e.g. documentation prefixes, private address space), or that an operator could assign an address block from their own address space for this purposes, there is currently no operational clarity on what address block would be appropriate or inappropriate to use for this purpose. By assigning a globally unique discard prefix for IPv6, the IETF will introduce good practice for the implementation of IPv6 RTBH configurations and will facilitate operational clarity by allowing operators to implement consistent and deterministic inter-domain prefix and traffic filtering policies for black-holed traffic.

As [[RFC3882](#)] and [[RFC5635](#)] describe situations where more than one discard address may be used for implementing multiple remote triggered black hole scenarios, a single address is not sufficient to cover all likely RTBH situations. Consequently, an address block is required.

## 3. Operational Implications

This assignment MAY be carried in a dynamic routing protocol within an autonomous system. The assignment SHOULD NOT be announced to or accepted from third party autonomous systems and IPv6 traffic with a destination address within this prefix SHOULD NOT be forwarded to or accepted from third party autonomous systems. If the prefix or a subnet of the prefix is inadvertently announced to or accepted from a third party autonomous system, this may cause excessive volumes of traffic to pass unintentionally between the the two networks, which would aggravate the effect of a denial-of-service attack.

On networks which implement IPv6 remote triggered black holes, some or all of this network block MAY be configured with a next-hop destination of a discard or null interface on any or all IPv6 routers within the autonomous system.

#### 4. IANA Considerations

This document directs IANA to record the allocation of the IPv6 address prefix xxxx/64 as a discard-only prefix in the IPv6 Address Space registry and to add the prefix to the IPv6 Special Purpose Address Registry [[IANA-IPV6REG](#)]. No end party is to be assigned this prefix. The prefix should be allocated from ::/3.

#### 5. Security Considerations

As the prefix specified in this document ought not normally be

transmitted or accepted over inter-domain BGP sessions for the reasons described in [Section 3](#), it is usually appropriate to include this prefix in inter-domain BGP prefix filters [[RFC3704](#)] or otherwise ensure the prefix is neither transmitted to or accepted from a third party autonomous system.

#### 6. References

##### 6.1. Normative References

[IANA-IPV6REG]

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- [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", [BCP 26](#), [RFC 5226](#), May 2008.
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