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**Reaction of Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) to Flash-  
Renumbering Events  
draft-ietf-v6ops-slaac-renum-00**

**Abstract**

In scenarios where network configuration information related to IPv6 prefixes becomes invalid without any explicit signaling of that condition (such as when a CPE crashes and reboots without knowledge of the previously-employed prefixes), nodes on the local network will continue using stale prefixes for an unacceptably long period of time, thus resulting in connectivity problems. This document documents this problem, and discusses operational workarounds that may help to improve network robustness. Additionally, it highlights areas where further work may be needed.

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## [1.](#) Introduction

IPv6 largely assumes prefix stability, with network renumbering only taking place in a planned manner, with old/stale prefixes being phased-out via reduced prefix lifetimes, and new prefixes (with longer lifetimes) being introduced at the same time. However, there are a number of scenarios that may lead to the so-called "flash-renumbering" events, where the prefix employed by a network suddenly becomes invalid and replaced by a new prefix. In some of these scenarios, the local router producing the network renumbering event may try to deprecate the currently-employed prefixes (by explicitly signaling the network about the renumbering event), whereas in other scenarios it may be unable to do so.

In scenarios where network configuration information related to IPv6 prefixes becomes invalid without any explicit signaling of that



condition, nodes on the local network will continue using stale prefixes for an unacceptably long period of time, thus resulting in connectivity problems.

Scenarios where this problem may arise include, but are not limited to, the following:

- o The most common IPv6 deployment scenario for residential or small office networks is that in which a CPE router employs DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation (DHCPv6-PD) [[RFC8415](#)] to request a prefix from an Internet Service Provider (ISP), and a sub-prefix of the leased prefix is advertised on the LAN-side of the CPE router via Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) [[RFC4862](#)]. In scenarios where the CPE router crashes and reboots, the CPE may be leased (via DHCPv6-PD) a different prefix from the one previously leased, and therefore advertise (via SLAAC) the new prefix on the LAN side. Hosts will normally configure addresses for the new prefix, but will normally retain and actively employ the addresses configured for the previously-advertised prefix, since their associated Preferred Lifetime and Valid Lifetime allow them to do so.
- o A switch-port the host is connected to may be moved to another subnet (VLAN) as a result of manual switch-port reconfiguration or 802.1x re-authentication. In particular there has been evidence that some 802.1x supplicants do not reset network settings after successful 802.1x authentication. So if a host had failed 802.1x authentication for some reason, was placed in a "quarantine" VLAN and then got successfully authenticated later on, it might end up having IPv6 addresses from both old ("quarantine") and new VLANs.
- o During the planned network renumbering, a router may be configured to send an RA with the Preferred Lifetime for the "old" Prefix Information Option (PIO) set to zero and the new PIO having non-zero preferred lifetime. However, due to unsolicited RAs being sent as all-hosts multicast and multicast being rather unreliable on busy wifi networks, the RA may not be received by a host (or set of hosts).
- o Automated device config management system performs periodical config push to network devices. If such a push results in changing the /64 subnet configured on a particular network, hosts attached to that network would not get notified about the subnet change and their addresses from the "old" prefix will not be deprecated. A related scenario is the incorrect network renumbering where a network administrator renumbers a network by simply removing the "old" prefix from the configuration and configuring a new prefix instead.



Lacking any explicit signaling to "deprecate" the previously-advertised prefixes, hosts may continue to employ the previously-configured addresses which will typically result in packets being blackholed -- whether because of egress-filtering by the CPE or ISP, or because responses to such packets be discarded or routed elsewhere.

We note that the default values for the "Valid Lifetime" and "Preferred Lifetime" of PIOs, as specified in [[RFC4861](#)], are:

- o Valid Lifetime (AdvValidLifetime): 2592000 seconds (30 days)
- o Preferred Lifetime (AdvPreferredLifetime): 604800 seconds (7 days)

This means that in the aforementioned scenarios, the stale addresses would be retained and also actively employed for new communications instances for unacceptably long period of time (one month, and one week, respectively), leading to interoperability problems, instead of hosts transitioning to the newly-advertised prefix(es) in a timelier manner.

Some devices have implemented ad-hoc mechanisms to address this problem, such as sending RAs to invalidate apparently-stale prefixes when the device receives any packets employing a source address from a prefix not currently advertised for address configuration on the local network [[FRITZ](#)]. However, this may introduce other interoperability problems, particularly in multihomed/multiprefix scenarios. This is clear indication that advice in this area is warranted.

Unresponsiveness to these "flash-renumbering" events is caused by the inability of the network to deprecate stale information, as well as by the inability of hosts to react to network configuration changes in a timelier manner. Clearly, it would be desirable that these flash-renumbering scenarios do not occur, and that, when they do occur, that hosts are explicitly notified of their occurrence. However, for robustness reasons it is also paramount for hosts to be able to recover from stale configuration information even when these flash-renumbering events occur and the network is unable to explicitly notify hosts about such condition.

[Section 2](#) analysis this problem in more detail. [Section 3](#) describes possible operational mitigations. [Section 4](#) describes possible future work to better mitigate the aforementioned problem.



## **2. Analysis of the Problem**

As noted in [Section 1](#), the problem discussed in this document exacerbated by a number of different parameters and behaviours. Each of the following sections analyze each of them in detail.

### **2.1. Use of Dynamic Prefixes**

In the residential or small office scenario, the problem discussed in this document would be avoided if DHCPv6-PD would lease "stable" prefixes. However, a recent survey [[UK-NOF](#)] indicates that 37% of the responding ISPs employ dynamic prefixes. That is, dynamic IPv6 prefixes are an operational reality.

Deployment reality aside, there are a number of possible issues associated with stable prefixes:

- o Provisioning systems may be unable to deliver stable IPv6 prefixes.
- o While there is a range of information that may be employed to correlate network activity [[RFC7721](#)], the use of stable prefixes clearly simplifies network activity correlation, and may essentially render features such as "temporary addresses" [[RFC4941](#)] irrelevant.
- o There may be existing advice for ISPs to deliver dynamic IPv6 prefixes \*by default\* (see e.g. [[GERMAN-DP](#)]) over privacy concerns associated with stable prefixes.

The authors of this document understand that, for a number of reasons (such as the ones stated above), IPv6 deployments may employ dynamic prefixes (even at the expense of the issues discussed in this document), and that there might be scenarios in which the dynamics of a network are such that the network exhibits the behaviour of dynamic prefixes. Rather than try to preclude how operators may run their networks, this document aims at improving network robustness in the deployed Internet.

### **2.2. Default Timer Values in IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)**

Many protocols, from different layers, normally employ timers. The general logic is as follows:

- o A timer is set with a value such that, under normal conditions, the timer does \*not\* go off.





- o Whenever a fault condition arises, the timer goes off, and the protocol can perform fault recovery

One common example for the use of timers is when implementing reliability mechanisms where a packet is transmitted, and unless a response is received, a retransmission timer will go off to trigger retransmission of the original packet.

For obvious reasons, the whole point of using timers is that in problematic scenarios, they will go off, and trigger some recovery action.

However, IPv6 SLAAC employs, for PIOs, these default values:

- o Preferred Lifetime (AdvPreferredLifetime): 604800 seconds (7 days)
- o Valid Lifetime (AdvValidLifetime): 2592000 seconds (30 days)

Under normal network conditions, these timers will be reset/refreshed to the default values. However, under problematic circumstances such as where the corresponding network information has become stale without any explicit signal from the network (as described in [Section 1](#)), it will take a host 7 days (one week) to un-prefer the corresponding addresses, and 30 days (one month) to eventually invalidate and remove any addresses configured for the stale prefix.

### **2.3. Recovering from Stale Network Configuration Information**

SLAAC hosts are unable to recover from stale network configuration information for a number of reasons:

- o Item "e)" of [Section 5.5.3 of \[RFC4862\]](#) specifies that an RA may never reduce the "RemainingLifetime" more than to two hours. If the RemainingLifetime of an address is smaller than 2 hours, then a Valid Lifetime smaller than 2 hours will be ignored. The Preferred Lifetime of an address can be reduced to any value to avoid the use of a stale prefix to be employed for new communications.
- o In the absence of explicit signalling from SLAAC routers (such as sending PIOs with a "Preferred Lifetime" set to 0), SLAAC hosts fail to recover from stale configuration information in a timely manner. However, when a network element is able to explicitly signal the renumbering event, it will only be able to "un-prefer" the stale prefix, but not to invalidate the prefix in question. Therefore, communication with the new "owners" of the stale prefix will not be possible, since the stale prefix will still be considered "on-link".



#### **2.4. Lack of Explicit Signaling about Stale Information**

Whenever prefix information has changed, a SLAAC router should not only advertise the new information, but should also advertise the stale information with appropriate lifetime values (both "Preferred Lifetime" and "Valid Lifetime" set to 0), such that there is explicit signaling to SLAAC hosts to remove the stale information (including configured addresses and routes). However, in scenarios such as when a CPE router crashes and reboots, the CPE router may have no knowledge about the previously-advertised prefixes, and thus may be unable to advertise them with appropriate lifetimes (in order to deprecate them).

However, we note that, as discussed in [Section 2.3](#), PIOs with small Valid Lifetimes will not lower the Valid Lifetime to any value shorter than two hours (as per [\[RFC4862\]](#)). Therefore, even if a SLAAC router were to explicitly signal the network about the stale configuration information via RAs, such signaling would be mostly ignored.

#### **2.5. Interaction Between DHCPv6-PD and SLAAC**

While DHCPv6-PD is normally employed along with SLAAC, the interaction between the two protocols is largely unspecified. Not unusually, the two protocols are implemented in two different software components with the interface between the two implemented by some sort of script that feeds the SLAAC implementation with values learned from DHCPv6-PD.

At times, the prefix lease time is fed as a constant value to the SLAAC router implementation, meaning that, eventually, the prefix lifetime advertised on the LAN side will span *\*past\** the DHCPv6-PD lease time. This is clearly incorrect, since the SLAAC router implementation would be allowing the use of such prefixes for a longer time than it has been granted usage of those prefixes via DHCPv6-PD.

### **3. Operational Mitigations**

The following subsections discuss possible operational workarounds for the aforementioned problem.

#### **3.1. Stable Prefixes**

As noted in [Section 2.1](#), the use of stable prefixes would eliminate the issue in *\*some\** of the scenarios discussed in [Section 1](#) of this document, such as the typical home network deployment. However, even



in such scenarios, there might be reasons for which an administrator may want or may need to employ dynamic prefixes

### 3.2. SLAAC Parameter Tweaking

An operator may wish to override some SLAAC parameters such that, under normal circumstances (including some packet loss), the timers will be refreshed/reset, but in the presence of network faults (such as network configuration information becoming stale without explicit signaling), the timers go off and trigger some fault recovering action (such as un-prefering the corresponding addresses and subsequently removing them).

The following router configuration variables (corresponding to the "lifetime" parameters in PIOs) could be overridden as follows:

```
AdvValidLifetime: 48 * AdvDefaultLifetime (86400 seconds)
```

```
AdvPreferredLifetime: AdvDefaultLifetime (1800 seconds)
```

NOTES: A CPE router advertising a sub-prefix of a prefixed leased via DHCPv6-PD will periodically refresh the Preferred Lifetime and the Valid Lifetime of an advertised prefix to AdvPreferredLifetime and AdvValidLifetime, respectively, as long as the resulting lifetime of the corresponding prefixes does not extend past the DHCPv6-PD lease time.

#### RATIONALE:

- \* In the context of [\[RFC8028\]](#), where it is clear that use of addresses configured for a given prefix is tied to using the next-hop router that advertised the prefix, it does not make sense for the "Preferred Lifetime" of a PIO to be larger than the "Router Lifetime" (AdvDefaultLifetime) of the corresponding Router Advertisement messages. The "Valid Lifetime" is set to a much larger value to cope with transient network problems.
- \* Lacking RAs that refresh information, addresses configured for advertised prefixes become un-preferred in a timelier manner, and thus Rule 3 of [\[RFC6724\]](#) causes other configured addresses (if available) to be used instead.
- \* We note that lowering the default values for the "Valid Lifetime" helps reduce the amount of time a host may maintain stale information and the amount of time an advertising router would need to advertise stale prefixes to deprecate them, while reducing the default "Preferred Lifetime" would reduce the amount of time it takes for a host to prefer other working



prefixes (see [Section 12 of \[RFC4861\]](#)). However, while the aforementioned values are an improvement over the default values specified in [\[RFC4861\]](#), they will not lead to a timely recovery from the problem discussed in this document.

#### **4. Future Work**

Improvement in Customer Edge Routers [\[RFC7084\]](#) such that they can signal the network about stale prefixes and deprecate them accordingly can help mitigate the problem discussed in this document for the "home network" scenario. Such work is currently being pursued in [\[I-D.gont-v6ops-cpe-slaac-renum\]](#).

Improvements in the SLAAC protocol [\[RFC4862\]](#) and other algorithms such as "Default Address Selection for IPv6" [\[RFC6724\]](#) would help improve network robustness. Such work is currently being pursued in [\[I-D.gont-6man-slaac-renum\]](#).

The aforementioned work is considered out of the scope of this present document, which only focuses on documenting the problem and discussing operational mitigations.

#### **5. IANA Considerations**

This document has no actions for IANA.

#### **6. Security Considerations**

This document discusses a problem that may arise in scenarios where flash-renumbering events occur, and proposes workarounds to mitigate the aforementioned problems. This document does not introduce any new security issues.

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The problem discussed in this document has been previously documented by Jen Linkova in [[I-D.linkova-6man-default-addr-selection-update](#)], and also in [[RIPE-690](#)]. [Section 1](#) borrows text from [[I-D.linkova-6man-default-addr-selection-update](#)], authored by Jen Linkova.

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