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**Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol
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Abstract

The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and regional internet registries. This document describes information security services, specific requirements for RDAP, and approaches to provide RDAP security services.

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1. Introduction

The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) core is specified in two documents: "Unified Registration Data Access Protocol Query Format" [[I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query](#)] and "JSON Responses for the Registry Data Access Protocol" [[I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response](#)]. One goal of RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in the WHOIS [[RFC3912](#)] protocol, including authentication, authorization, availability, and data confidentiality.

This document describes each of these security services from the perspective of RDAP requirements and applicability. Where applicable, informational references to requirements for a WHOIS replacement service [[RFC3707](#)] are noted.

2. Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations

DNR: Domain Name Registry

RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol

RIR: Regional Internet Registry

3. Information Security Services and RDAP

RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to provide needed security services including authentication, authorization, availability, and data confidentiality. A description of each of these security services can be found in [RFC 4949](#) [[RFC4949](#)]. No requirements have been identified for other security services.

3.1. Authentication

WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients. As noted in [section 3.1.4.2 of RFC 3707](#) [[RFC3707](#)], there is utility in allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on policy and need". Clients have to be identified and authenticated to provide that utility.

REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST include an authentication framework that can accommodate anonymous access as well as verification of identities using a range of authentication methods and credential services.

REQUIREMENT: The RDAP authentication framework MUST use authentication methods that are fully specified and available to existing HTTP clients and servers.

REQUIREMENT: The RDAP authentication framework MUST be capable of supporting future authentication methods defined for use with HTTP.

APPROACH: RDAP clients and servers MUST implement the authentication framework specified in [RFC 2617](#) [[RFC2617](#)]. The "basic" scheme can be used to send a client's user name and password to a server in plaintext, based64-encoded form. The "digest" scheme can be used to authenticate a client without exposing the client's plaintext password. If the "basic" scheme is used another protocol (such as HTTP Over TLS [[RFC2818](#)]) MUST be used to protect the client's credentials from disclosure while in transit (see [Section 3.4](#)).

The Transport Layer Security Protocol [[RFC5246](#)] includes an optional feature to identify and authenticate clients who possess and present a valid X.509 digital certificate [[RFC5280](#)]. Support for this feature is OPTIONAL.

3.1.1. Federated Authentication

The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client credential management complexity. RDAP MAY include a federated authentication mechanism that permits a client to access multiple RDAP servers in the same federation with one credential.

REQUIREMENT: Federated authentication mechanisms used by RDAP MUST be fully supported by HTTP.

POSSIBLE APPROACH: The OAuth authorization framework [[RFC6749](#)] describes a method for users to access protected web resources without having to hand out their credentials. Instead, clients supply access tokens issued by an authorization server with the permission of the resource owner. Using OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a federation and the clients can access any server in the same federation by providing one credential registered in any server in that federation. The OAuth authorization framework is designed for use with HTTP and thus can be used with RDAP.

POSSIBLE APPROACH: OpenID [[OpenID](#)] is a decentralized single sign-on authentication system that allows users to log in at web sites with one ID instead of having to create multiple unique accounts. OpenID is decentralized. An end user can freely choose which OpenID provider to use, and can preserve their Identifier if they switch OpenID providers. [To be discussed: Is it possible to introduce OpenID into RDAP?]

POSSIBLE APPROACH: [Section 7.4.6](#) of the Transport Layer Security Protocol [[RFC5246](#)] describes the specification of a client certificate. Clients who possess and present a valid X.509 digital certificate, issued by an entity called "Certification Authority" (CA), could be identified and authenticated by a server who trusts the corresponding CA. A certificate authentication method can be used to achieve federated authentication in which multiple RDAP servers all trust the same CAs and then any client with a certificate issued by a trusted CA can access any RDAP server in the federation. This certificate-based mechanism is supported by HTTPS and can be introduced into RDAP.

[3.2.](#) Authorization

WHOIS does not provide services to grant different levels of access to clients based on a client's authenticated identity. As noted in [section 3.1.4.2 of RFC 3707](#) [[RFC3707](#)], there is utility in allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on policy and need". Access control decisions can be made once a client's identity has been authenticated (see [Section 3.1](#)).

REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST include an authorization framework that is capable of providing granular (per registration data object) access controls according to the policies of the operator.

APPROACH: Server operators will offer varying degrees of access depending on policy and need in conjunction with the authentication methods described in [Section 3.1](#). Some examples:

- Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a relationship.
- Unauthenticated or anonymous access status may not yield any contact information.
- Full access may be granted to a special group of authenticated clients.

The type of access allowed by a server will most likely vary from one operator to the next.

3.3. Availability

An RDAP service has to be available to be useful. There are no RDAP-unique requirements to provide availability, but as a general security consideration a service operator needs to be aware of the issues associated with denial of service. A thorough reading of [RFC 4732](#) [[RFC4732](#)] is RECOMMENDED.

3.4. Data Confidentiality

WHOIS does not provide the ability to encrypt data while in transit to protect it from inadvertent disclosure. Web services commonly use HTTP Over TLS [[RFC2818](#)] to provide that protection.

REQUIREMENT: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MUST include features to protect plaintext client credentials used for client authentication.

REQUIREMENT: The data confidentiality methods used by RDAP MUST be fully specified and available to existing HTTP clients and servers.

REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST be capable of supporting future data confidentiality methods defined for use with HTTP.

OPTION: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MAY include features to encrypt client-server data exchanges.

APPROACH: As noted in [Section 3.1](#), the HTTP "basic" authentication scheme can be used to authenticate a client. When this scheme is used HTTP Over TLS [[RFC2818](#)] MUST be used to protect the client's credentials from disclosure while in transit. HTTP Over TLS MAY also be used to protect client-server data exchanges if the policy of the server operator requires encryption. There are no current requirements for object-level encryption, but RDAP MUST NOT preclude support for this feature in the future.

4. IANA Considerations

This document does not specify any IANA actions. This section can be removed if this document is published as an RFC.

5. Security Considerations

One of the goals of RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in the WHOIS protocol. This document describes the security services provided by RDAP and associated protocol layers, including

authentication, authorization, availability, and data confidentiality. Data integrity and non-repudiation services were also considered and ultimately rejected.

Data integrity: No requirements for data integrity have been identified. This security service is often mistakenly associated with policy requirements focused on data accuracy, but those requirements are out of scope for this protocol. Data integrity could be provided by signing JSON-encoded objects. RDAP MUST NOT preclude support for this feature in the future.

Non-repudiation: No requirements for non-repudiation with proof of origin or proof of delivery have been identified. There are, however, currently-deployed WHOIS servers that can return signed responses that provide non-repudiation with proof of origin. RDAP MUST NOT preclude support for this feature in the future.

6. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for their contributions to this document: Andrew Newton.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

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Appendix A. Change Log

Initial -00: Adopted as working group document.

-01: Extensive text additions and revisions based on in-room discussion at IETF-85. Sections for data integrity and non-repudiation have been removed due to a lack of requirements, but both topics are now addressed in the Security Considerations section.

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