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AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption
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Abstract

This memo specifies two authenticated encryption algorithms that are nonce misuse-resistant - that is that they do not fail catastrophically if a nonce is repeated.

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[1. Introduction](#)

The concept of "Authenticated encryption with additional data" (AEAD [[RFC5116](#)]) couples confidentiality and integrity in a single operation that is easier for practitioners to use correctly. The most popular AEAD, AES-GCM [[GCM](#)], is seeing widespread use due to its attractive performance.

However, most AEADs suffer catastrophic failures of confidentiality and/or integrity when two distinct messages are encrypted with the same nonce. While the requirements for AEADs specify that the pair of (key, nonce) shall only ever be used once, and thus prohibit this, in practice this is a worry.

Nonce misuse-resistant AEADs do not suffer from this problem. For this class of AEADs, encrypting two messages with the same nonce only discloses whether the messages were equal or not. This is the minimum amount of information that a deterministic algorithm can leak in this situation.

This memo specifies two nonce misuse-resistant AEADs: "AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV" and "AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV". These AEADs are designed to be able to take advantage of existing hardware support for AES-GCM and can decrypt within 5% of the speed of AES-GCM.

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Encryption is, perforce, slower than AES-GCM because two passes are required. However, measurements suggest that it can still run at 2/3rds of the speed of AES-GCM.

We suggest that these AEADs be considered in any situation where there is the slightest doubt about nonce uniqueness.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

3. POLYVAL

The GCM-SIV construction is similar to GCM: the block cipher is used in counter mode to encrypt the plaintext and a polynomial authenticator is used to provide integrity. The authenticator in GCM-SIV is called POLYVAL.

POLYVAL, like GHASH, operates in a binary field of size 2^{128} . The field is defined by the irreducible polynomial $x^{128} + x^{127} + x^{126} + x^{121} + 1$. The sum of any two elements in the field is the result of XORing them. The product of any two elements is calculated using standard (binary) polynomial multiplication followed by reduction modulo the irreducible polynomial.

We define another binary operation on elements of the field: $\text{dot}(a, b)$, where $\text{dot}(a, b) = a * b * x^{-128}$. The value of the field element x^{-128} is equal to $x^{127} + x^{124} + x^{121} + x^{114} + 1$. The result, $\text{dot}(a, b)$, of this multiplication is another field element.

Polynomials in this field are converted to and from 128-bit strings by taking the least-significant bit of the first byte to be the coefficient of x^0 , the most-significant bit of the first byte to be the coefficient of x^7 and so on, until the most-significant bit of the last byte is the coefficient of x^{127} .

POLYVAL takes a field element, H , and a series of field elements X_1, \dots, X_s . Its result is S_s , where S is defined by the iteration $S_0 = 0; S_j = \text{dot}(S_{\{j-1\}} + X_j, H)$, for $j = 0..s$

We note that $\text{POLYVAL}(H, X_1, X_2, \dots)$ is equal to $\text{ByteReverse}(\text{GHASH}(\text{ByteReverse}(H)*x, \text{ByteReverse}(X_1), \text{ByteReverse}(X_2), \dots))$, where ByteReverse is a function that reverses the order of 16 bytes. See [Appendix A](#) for a more detailed explanation.

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4. Encryption

AES-GCM-SIV encryption takes a 16- or 32-byte key-generating key, a 96-bit nonce, and arbitrary-length plaintext & additional data byte-strings. It outputs an authenticated ciphertext that will be 16 bytes longer than the plaintext.

If the key-generating key is 16 bytes long then AES-128 is used throughout. Otherwise AES-256 is used throughout.

The first step of encryption is to generate per-nonce, record-authentication and record-encryption keys. The record-authentication key is 128-bit and the record-authentication key is either 128- (for AES-128) or 256-bit (for AES-256).

These keys are generated by encrypting a series of plaintext blocks that contain a 32-bit, little-endian counter followed by the nonce, and then discarding the second half of the resulting ciphertext. In the AES-128 case, $128 + 128 = 256$ bits of key material need to be generated and, since encrypting each block yields 64 bits after discarding half, four blocks need to be encrypted. The counter values for these blocks are 0, 1, 2 and 3. For AES-256, six blocks are needed in total, with counter values 0 through 5 (inclusive).

In pseudocode form:


```

U32LE(x) =
[x & 0xff, (x >> 8) & 0xff, (x >> 16) & 0xff, (x >> 24) & 0xff]

record-authentication-key = AES128(key = key-generating-key,
                                     input = U32LE(0) ++ nonce)[:8] ++
                                     AES128(key = key-generating-key,
                                             input = U32LE(1) ++ nonce)[:8]

if bytelen(key-generating-key) == 16 {
    record-encryption-key = AES128(key = key-generating-key,
                                    input = U32LE(2) ++ nonce)[:8] ++
                                    AES128(key = key-generating-key,
                                            input = U32LE(3) ++ nonce)[:8]
} else if bytelen(key-generating-key) == 32 {
    record-encryption-key = AES128(key = key-generating-key,
                                    input = U32LE(2) ++ nonce)[:8] ++
                                    AES128(key = key-generating-key,
                                            input = U32LE(3) ++ nonce)[:8] ++
                                    AES128(key = key-generating-key,
                                            input = U32LE(4) ++ nonce)[:8] ++
                                    AES128(key = key-generating-key,
                                            input = U32LE(5) ++ nonce)[:8]
}

```

Define the `_length block_` as a 16-byte value that is the concatenation of the 64-bit, little-endian encodings of `bytelen(additional_length)*8` and `bytelen(plaintext)*8`. Pad the plaintext and additional data with zeros until they are each a multiple of 16 bytes, the AES block size. Then `X_1`, `X_2`, ... (the series of field elements that are inputs to `POLYVAL`) are the concatenation of the padded additional data, the padded plaintext and the length block.

Calculate `S_s = POLYVAL(record-authentication-key, X_1, X_2, ...)`. XOR the first twelve bytes of `S_s` with the nonce and clear the most-significant bit of the last byte. Encrypt the result with AES using the record-encryption key to produce the tag.

The ciphertext is produced by using AES, with the record-encryption key, in counter mode on the unpadded plaintext. The initial counter block is the tag with the most-significant bit of the last byte set to one. The counter advances by incrementing the first 32 bits interpreted as an unsigned, little-endian integer. The result of the encryption is the resulting ciphertext (truncated to the length of the plaintext) followed by the tag.

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5. Decryption

Decryption takes a 16- or 32-byte key-generating key, a 96-bit nonce, and arbitrary-length ciphertext & additional data byte-strings. It either fails, or outputs a plaintext that is 16 bytes shorter than the ciphertext.

Firstly, the record-encryption and record-authentication keys are derived in the same manner as when encrypting.

If the ciphertext is less than 16 bytes or more than $2^{36} + 16$ bytes, then fail. Otherwise split the input into the encrypted plaintext and a 16-byte tag. Decrypt the encrypted plaintext with the record-encryption key in counter mode, where the initial counter block is the tag with the most-significant bit of the last byte set to one. The counter advances in the same way as for encryption.

Pad the additional data and plaintext with zeros until they are each a multiple of 16 bytes, the AES block size. Calculate the length block and X_1, X_2, \dots as above and compute $S_s = \text{POLYVAL}(\text{record-authentication-key}, X_1, X_2, \dots)$. Compute the expected tag by XORing S_s and the nonce, clearing the most-significant bit of the last byte and encrypting with the record-encryption key. Compare the provided and expected tag values in constant time. If they do not match, fail. Otherwise return the plaintext.

6. AEADs

We define two AEADs, in the format of [RFC 5116](#), that use AES-GCM-SIV: AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV and AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV. They differ only in the size of the AES key used.

The key input to these AEADs becomes the key-generating key. Thus AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV takes a 16-byte key and AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV takes a 32-byte key.

The parameters for AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV are then: K_LEN is 16, P_MAX is 2^{36} , A_MAX is $2^{61} - 1$, N_MIN and N_MAX are 12 and C_MAX is $2^{36} + 16$.

The parameters for AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV differ only in the key size: K_LEN is 32, P_MAX is 2^{36} , A_MAX is $2^{61} - 1$, N_MIN and N_MAX are 12 and C_MAX is $2^{36} + 16$.

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7. Field operation examples

Polynomials in this document will be written as 16-byte values. For example, the sixteen bytes 01000000000000000000000000492 would represent the polynomial $x^{127} + x^{124} + x^{121} + x^{114} + 1$, which is also the value of x^{-128} in this field.

```
If a = 66e94bd4ef8a2c3b884cfa59ca342b2e and b =
ff000000000000000000000000000000 then a+b =
99e94bd4ef8a2c3b884cfa59ca342b2e, a*b =
37856175e9dc9df26ebc6d6171aa0ae9 and dot(a, b) =
ebe563401e7e91ea3ad6426b8140c394.
```

8. Worked example

Consider the encryption of the plaintext "Hello world" with the additional data "example" under key ee8e1ed9ff2540ae8f2ba9f50bc2f27c using AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV. The random nonce that we'll use for this example is 752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310.

In order to generate the record-authentication and record-encryption keys, a counter is combined with the nonce to form four blocks. These blocks are encrypted with key given above:

Counter	Nonce	Ciphertext
00000000	752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310	-> 310728d9911f1f38c40e952ca83d093e
01000000	752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310	-> 37b24316c3fab9a046ae90952daa0450
02000000	752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310	-> a4c5ae624996327947920b2d2412474b
03000000	752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310	-> c100be4d7e2c6edd1fefef004305ab1e7

The latter halves of the ciphertext blocks are discarded and the remaining bytes are concatenated to form the per-record keys. Thus the record-authentication key is 310728d9911f1f3837b24316c3fab9a0 and the record-encryption key is a4c5ae6249963279c100be4d7e2c6edd.

The length block contains the encoding of the bit-lengths of the additional data and plaintext, respectively, which are and 56 and 88. Thus the length block is 38000000000000005800000000000000.

The input to POLYVAL is the padded additional data, padded plaintext and then the length block. This is 6578616d706c650000000000000000048656c6c6f20776f726c64000000000038000000000000005800000000000000.

Calling POLYVAL with the record-authentication key and the input above results in S_s = ad7fcf0b5169851662672f3c5f95138f.

Before encrypting, the nonce is XORed in and the most-significant bit of the last byte is cleared. This gives

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d85575d8b1c630e256bb6c2c5f95130f because that bit happened to be one previously. Encrypting with the record-encryption key gives the tag, which is 4fbcdedb7e4793f4a1d7e4faa70100af1.

In order to form the initial counter block, the most-significant bit of the last byte of the tag is set to one. That doesn't result in a change in this example. Encrypting this with the record key gives the first block of the keystream: 1551f2c1787e81deac9a99f139540ab5.

The final ciphertext is the result of XORing the plaintext with the keystream and appending the tag. That gives 5d349ead175ef6b1def6fd4fbcdedb7e4793f4a1d7e4faa70100af1.

9. Security Considerations

We recommend a limit of 2^{50} plaintexts encrypted with a given key. Past this point, AES-GCM-SIV may be distinguishable from an ideal AEAD. (This is based on standard assumptions about AES.)

The AEADs defined in this document calculate fresh AES keys for each nonce. This allows a larger number of plaintexts to be encrypted under a given key. Without this step, each SIV encryption would be like a standard GCM encryption with a random nonce. Since the nonce size for GCM is only 12 bytes, NIST set a limit [[GCM](#)] of 2^{32} encryptions before the probability of duplicate nonces becomes too high.

The authors felt that, while large, 2^{32} wasn't so large that this limit could be safely ignored. For example, consider encrypting the contents of a hard disk where the AEAD record size is 512 bytes, to match the traditional size of a disk sector. This process would have encrypted 2^{32} records after processing 2TB, yet hard drives of multiple terabytes are now common.

Deriving fresh AES keys for each nonce alleviates this problem.

If the nonce is fixed then AES-GCM-SIV acts like AES-GCM with a random nonce, with the caveat that identical plaintexts will produce identical ciphertexts. However, we feel that the 2^{32} limit for AES-GCM is too risky in a multi-key setting. Thus with AES-GCM-SIV we recommend that, for a specific key, a nonce not be repeated more than 2^8 times. (And, ideally, not be repeated at all.)

Suzuki et al [[multibirthday](#)] show that even if nonces are selected uniformly at random, the probability that one or more values would be repeated 256 or more times is negligible until the number of nonces reaches 2^{102} . (Specifically the probability is $1/((2^{96})^{(255)}) * \text{Binomial}(q, 256)$, where q is the number of nonces.) Since 2^{102} is

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vastly greater than the limit on the number of plaintexts per key given above, we don't feel that this limit on the number of repeated nonces will be a problem. This also means that selecting nonces at random is a safe practice with AES-GCM-SIV.

In addition to calculating fresh AES keys for each nonce, these AEADs also calculate fresh POLYVAL keys. Previous versions of GCM-SIV did not do this and, instead, used part of the AEAD's key as the POLYVAL key. Bleichenbacher pointed out that this allowed an attacker who controlled the AEAD key to force the POLYVAL key to be zero. If a user of this AEAD authenticated messages with a secret additional-data value then this would be insecure as the attacker could calculate a valid authenticator without knowing the input. This does not violate the standard properties of an AEAD as the additional data is not assumed to be confidential. However, we want these AEADs to be robust to plausible misuse and also to be drop-in replacements for AES-GCM and so derive nonce-specific POLYVAL keys to avoid this issue.

A security analysis of a similar scheme appears in [[GCM-SIV](#)].

10. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

11. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Uri Blumenthal, Ondrej Mosnaček, Daniel Bleichenbacher, Kenny Paterson, Bart Preneel and Deb Cooley's team at IAD for their helpful suggestions.

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12.1. Normative References

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[multibirthday]

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[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption", [RFC 5116](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008, [<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>](http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116).

Appendix A. The relationship between POLYVAL and GHASH

GHASH and POLYVAL both operate in GF(2¹²⁸), although with different irreducible polynomials: POLYVAL works modulo $x^{128} + x^{127} + x^{126} + x^{121} + 1$ and GHASH works modulo $x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1$. Note that these irreducible polynomials are the "reverse" of each other.

GHASH also has a different mapping between 128-bit strings and field elements. Where as POLYVAL takes the least-significant to most-significant bits of the first byte to be the coefficients of x^0 to x^7 , GHASH takes them to be the coefficients of x^7 to x^0 . This continues until, for the last byte, POLYVAL takes the least-significant to most-significant bits to be the coefficients of x^{120} to x^{127} while GHASH takes them to be the coefficients of x^{127} to x^{120} .

The combination of these facts means that it's possible to "convert" values between the two by reversing the order of the bytes in a 16-byte string. The differing interpretations of bit order takes care of reversing the bits within each byte and then reversing the bytes does the rest. This may have a practical benefit for implementations that wish to implement both GHASH and POLYVAL.

In order to be clear which field a given operation is performed in, let `mulX_GHASH` be a function that takes a 16-byte string, converts it to an element of GHASH's field using GHASH's convention, multiplies it by x and converts back to a string. Likewise, let `mulX_POLYVAL` be a function that converts a 16-byte string to an element of POLYVAL's field using POLYVAL's convention, multiplies it by x and converts back.

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Given the 16-byte string 01000000000000000000000000000000, `mulX_GHASH` of that string is 00800000000000000000000000000000 and `mulX_POLYVAL` of that string is 02000000000000000000000000000000. As a more general example, given 9c98c04df9387ded828175a92ba652d8, `mulX_GHASH` of that string is 4e4c6026fc9c3ef6c140bad495d3296c and `mulX_POLYVAL` of it is 3931819bf271fada0503eb52574ca5f2.

Lastly, let `ByteReverse` be the function that takes a 16-byte string and returns a copy where the order of the bytes has been reversed.

Now GHASH and POLYVAL can be defined in terms of one another:

```
POLYVAL(H, X_1, ..., X_n) =
ByteReverse(GHASH(mulX_GHASH(ByteReverse(H)), ByteReverse(X_1), ...,
ByteReverse(X_n)))
```

```
GHASH(H, X_1, ..., X_n) =
ByteReverse(POLYVAL(mulX_POLYVAL(ByteReverse(H)), ByteReverse(X_1),
..., ByteReverse(X_n)))
```

As a worked example, let $H = 25629347589242761d31f826ba4b757b$, $X_1 = 4f4f95668c83dfb6401762bb2d01a262$ and $X_2 = d1a24ddd2721d006bbe45f20d3c9f362$. $\text{POLYVAL}(H, X_1, X_2) = f7a3b47b846119fae5b7866cf5e5b77e$. If we wished to calculate this given only an implementation of GHASH then the key for GHASH would be $\text{mulX_GHASH}(\text{ByteReverse}(H)) = \text{dcbaa5dd137c188ebb21492c23c9b112}$. Then $\text{ByteReverse}(\text{GHASH}(\text{dcba...}, \text{ByteReverse}(X_1), \text{ByteReverse}(X_2))) = f7a3b47b846119fae5b7866cf5e5b77e$, as required.

In the other direction, $\text{GHASH}(H, X_1, X_2) = bd9b3997046731fb96251b91f9c99d7a$. If we wished to calculate this given only an implementation of POLYVAL then we would first calculate the key for POLYVAL, $\text{mulX_POLYVAL}(\text{ByteReverse}(H))$, which is $f6ea96744df0633aec8424b18e26c54a$. Then $\text{ByteReverse}(\text{POLYVAL}(f6ea..., \text{ByteReverse}(X_1), \text{ByteReverse}(X_2))) = bd9b3997046731fb96251b91f9c99d7a$.

[Appendix B. Test vectors](#)

[B.1. AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV](#)

AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV:

```
AAD_len = 0 bytes
MSG_len = 0 bytes
```

BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB

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K1 = K =	01000
NONCE =	03000
AAD =	
MSG =	01000
PADDED_AAD =	
PADDED_MSG =	01000
Record_Hash_Key =	d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record_Enc_Key =	4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
LENBLK =	0000000000000000400
POLYVAL xor N =	d9b360279694941a2010be790ff81954
TAG =	578782fff6013b815b287c22493a364c
CTRBLK =	578782fff6013b815b287c22493a36cc
Encryption_Key =	4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
TAG' =	578782fff6013b815b287c22493a364c
AAD =	
CIPHERTEXT =	b5d839330ac7b786
Decrypted MSG =	01000
SIV GCM 2 KEYS Passed	

***** Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys: *****

AAD_len = 0 bytes
MSG_len = 12 bytes

BYTES ORDER

LSB - - - - - MSB

00010203040506070809101112131415

PADDED_AAD =
PADDED_MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Record_Hash_Key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record_Enc_Key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
LENBLK = 00000000000000008000000000000000
POLYVAL xor N = d9b360279694941a2010be790ff81954
TAG = 303aaaf90f6fe21199c6068577437a0c4
CTRBLK = 303aaaf90f6fe21199c6068577437a0c4
Encryption_Key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
TAG' = 303aaaf90f6fe21199c6068577437a0c4
AAD =
CIPHERTEXT = 743f7c8077ab25f8624e2e948579cf77
Decrypted_MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 0 bytes
MSG_len = 32 bytes

	BYTES ORDER
LSB	----- MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415	-----

K1 = K = 01000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD =
MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_AAD =

PADDED_MSG =	01000000000000000000000000000000 02000000000000000000000000000000
Record_Hash_Key =	d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record_Enc_Key =	4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
LENBLK =	0000000000000000000000001000000000000
POLYVAL xor N =	d9b360279694941a2010be790ff81954
TAG =	1a8e45dc4578c667cd86847bf6155ff
CTRBLK =	1a8e45dc4578c667cd86847bf6155ff
Encryption_Key =	4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
TAG' =	1a8e45dc4578c667cd86847bf6155ff
AAD =	
CIPHERTEXT =	84e07e62ba83a6585417245d7ec413a9 fe427d6315c09b57ce45f2e3936a9445
Decrypted MSG =	01000000000000000000000000000000 02000000000000000000000000000000
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed	

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 0 bytes
MSG_len = 48 bytes

BYTES ORDER

LSB-----MSB

00010203040506070809101112131415

AAD =

MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000
 02000000000000000000000000000000
 03000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_AAD =	
PADDED_MSG =	01000000000000000000000000000000 02000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record_Hash_Key =	d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record_Enc_Key =	4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
LENBLK =	00000000000000008001000000000000
POLYVAL xor N =	d9b360279694941a2010be790ff81954
TAG =	5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8
CTRBLK =	5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8
Encryption_Key =	4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
TAG' =	5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8
AAD =	
CIPHERTEXT =	3fd24ce1f5a67b75bf2351f181a475c7 b800a5b4d3dcf70106b1eea82fa1d64d f42bf7226122fa92e17a40eeaac1201b
Decrypted MSG =	01000000000000000000000000000000 02000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000

SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

***** Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 0 bytes
MSG_len = 64 bytes

BYTES ORDER

LSB ----- MSB

00010203040506070809101112131415

AAD =


```

MSG =          01000000000000000000000000000000
               02000000000000000000000000000000
               03000000000000000000000000000000
               04000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_AAD =

PADDED_MSG =   01000000000000000000000000000000
               02000000000000000000000000000000
               03000000000000000000000000000000
               04000000000000000000000000000000

Record_Hash_Key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377

Record_Enc_Key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c

LENBLK =        000000000000000020000000000000

POLYVAL xor N = d9b360279694941a2010be790ff81954

TAG =           8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8

CTRBLK =        8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8

Encryption_Key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c

TAG' =          8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8

AAD =

CIPHERTEXT =    2433668f1058190f6d43e360f4f35cd8
               e475127cfca7028ea8ab5c20f7ab2af0
               2516a2bdcbc08d521be37ff28c152bba
               36697f25b4cd169c6590d1dd39566d3f

Decrypted MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000
               02000000000000000000000000000000
               03000000000000000000000000000000
               04000000000000000000000000000000

```

SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

```
*****
Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:
*****
```

AAD_len = 1 bytes
MSG_len = 8 bytes

BYTES ORDER

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	BYTES ORDER
K1 = K =	01000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE =	03000000000000000000000000000000
AAD =	01
MSG =	0200000000000000
PADDED_AAD =	01000000000000000000000000000000
PADDED_MSG =	02000000000000000000000000000000
Record_Hash_Key =	d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record_Enc_Key =	4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
LENBLK =	08000000000000004000000000000000
POLYVAL xor N =	d9b360279694941a2010be790ff81954
TAG =	3b0a1a2560969cdf790d99759abd1508
CTRBLK =	3b0a1a2560969cdf790d99759abd1588
Encryption_Key =	4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
TAG' =	3b0a1a2560969cdf790d99759abd1508
AAD =	01
CIPHERTEXT =	1e6daba35669f427
Decrypted MSG =	0200000000000000
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed	

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 1 bytes
 MSG_len = 12 bytes

BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

K1 = K =	01000
NONCE =	03000
AAD =	01
MSG =	02000
PADDED_AAD =	01000
PADDED_MSG =	02000
Record_Hash_Key =	d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record_Enc_Key =	4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
LENBLK =	08000000000000006000000000000000
POLYVAL xor N =	d9b360279694941a2010be790ff81954
TAG =	08299c5102745aaa3a0c469fad9e075a
CTRBLK =	08299c5102745aaa3a0c469fad9e07da
Encryption_Key =	4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
TAG' =	08299c5102745aaa3a0c469fad9e075a
AAD =	01
CIPHERTEXT =	296c7889fd99f41917f44620
Decrypted MSG =	02000000000000000000000000000000
SIV GCM 2 KEYS Passed	

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 1 bytes
MSG_len = 16 bytes

BYTES ORDER

LSB-----MSB

00010203040506070809101112131415

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 1 bytes
MSG_len = 32 bytes

BYTES ORDER

LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

***** Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 1 bytes
MSG_len = 48 bytes

	BYTES ORDER
LSB	- - - - - MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415	

K1 = K =	0100
NONCE =	0300
AAD =	01


```

MSG =          020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
              030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
              040000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

PADDDED_AAD = 010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

PADDDED_MSG = 020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
              030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
              040000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Record_Hash_Key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377

Record_Enc_Key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c

LENBLK =        08000000000000008001000000000000

POLYVAL xor N = d9b360279694941a2010be790ff81954

TAG =           6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2

CTRBLK =        6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2

Encryption_Key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c

TAG' =          6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2

AAD =           01

CIPHERTEXT =    50c8303ea93925d64090d07bd109dfd9
                515a5a33431019c17d93465999a8b005
                3201d723120a8562b838cdff25bf9d1e

Decrypted MSG = 020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
                030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
                040000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

```

SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 1 bytes
 MSG_len = 64 bytes

BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

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[Page 23]

K1 = K = 01000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD = 01

MSG = 02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000
05000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_MSG = 02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000
05000000000000000000000000000000

Record_Hash_Key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377

Record_Enc_Key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c

LENBLK = 08000000000000000000000000000000

POLYVAL xor N = d9b360279694941a2010be790ff81954

TAG = cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae21744

CTRBLK = cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae217c4

Encryption_Key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c

TAG' = cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae21744

AAD = 01

CIPHERTEXT = 2f5c64059db55ee0fb847ed513003746
aca4e61c711b5de2e7a77ffd02da42fe
ec601910d3467bb8b36ebbaebce5fba3
0d36c95f48a3e7980f0e7ac299332a80

Decrypted_MSG = 02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000
05000000000000000000000000000000

SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

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AAD_len = 12 bytes
 MSG_len = 4 bytes

BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

K1 = K =	01000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE =	03000000000000000000000000000000
 AAD =	010000000000000000000000
 MSG =	02000000
 PADDED_AAD =	01000000000000000000000000000000
 PADDED_MSG =	02000000000000000000000000000000
 Record_Hash_Key =	d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
 Record_Enc_Key =	4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
 LENBLK =	60000000000000002000000000000000
 POLYVAL xor N =	d9b360279694941a2010be790ff81954
 TAG =	07eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99e2f48a14
 CTRBLK =	07eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99e2f48a94
 Encryption_Key =	4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
 TAG' =	07eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99e2f48a14
 AAD =	010000000000000000000000
 CIPHERTEXT =	a8fe3e87
 Decrypted_MSG =	02000000
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed	

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

 AAD_len = 18 bytes

MSG_len = 20 bytes

BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

K1 = K = 01000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000
0200

MSG = 03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000

PADDED_AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_MSG = 03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000

Record_Hash_Key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377

Record_Enc_Key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c

LENBLK = 9000000000000000a000000000000000

POLYVAL xor N = d9b360279694941a2010be790ff81954

TAG = 24afc9805e976f451e6d87f6fe106514

CTRBLK = 24afc9805e976f451e6d87f6fe106594

Encryption_Key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c

TAG' = 24afc9805e976f451e6d87f6fe106514

AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000
0200

CIPHERTEXT = 6bb0fecf5ded9b77f902c7d5da236a43
91dd0297

Decrypted MSG = 03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000

SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 20 bytes

MSG_len = 18 bytes

BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

K1 = K = 01000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000

MSG = 03000000000000000000000000000000
0400

PADDED_AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_MSG = 03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000

Record_Hash_Key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377

Record_Enc_Key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c

LENBLK = a00000000000000090000000000000000

POLYVAL xor N = d9b360279694941a2010be790ff81954

TAG = bff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13b9fd

CTRBLK = bff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13b9fd

Encryption_Key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c

TAG' = bff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13b9fd

AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000

CIPHERTEXT = 44d0aaaf6fb2f1f34add5e8064e83e12a
2ada

Decrypted MSG = 03000000000000000000000000000000

0400

SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV:

AAD_len = 0 bytes
MSG_len = 0 bytes

BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

K1 = K = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000

NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD =

MSG =

PADDED_AAD =

PADDED_MSG =

LENBLK = 00000000000000000000000000000000

POLYVAL xor N = 03000000000000000000000000000000

with_MSbit_cleared = 03000000000000000000000000000000

TAG = 07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd400f

CTRBLK = 07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd408f

Record_Hash_Key = b5d3c529dfaefac43136d2d11be284d7f

Encryption_Key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3

456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222

TAG' = 07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd400f

AAD =

CIPHERTEXT =

Decrypted MSG =
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 0 bytes
MSG_len = 8 bytes

BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

K1 = K = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD =

MSG = 0100000000000000

PADDED_AAD =

PADDED_MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000

LENBLK = 00000000000000004000000000000000

POLYVAL xor N = 06230f62f0eac8aa14fe4d646b59cd41

with_MSbit_cleared = 06230f62f0eac8aa14fe4d646b59cd41

TAG = 843122130f7364b761e0b97427e3df28

CTRBLK = 843122130f7364b761e0b97427e3dfa8

Record_Hash_Key = b5d3c529dfaefac43136d2d11be284d7f

Encryption_Key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3

456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222

TAG' = 843122130f7364b761e0b97427e3df28

AAD =

CIPHERTEXT = c2ef328e5c71c83b

Decrypted MSG = 0100000000000000
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 0 bytes
MSG_len = 12 bytes

BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

K1 = K = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000

NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD =

MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_AAD =

PADDED_MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000

LENBLK = 00000000000000006000000000000000

POLYVAL xor N = 6e81a24732fd6d03ae5af544720a1c13

with_MSbit_cleared = 6e81a24732fd6d03ae5af544720a1c13

TAG = 8ca50da9ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca17e

CTRBLK = 8ca50da9ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca1fe

Record_Hash_Key = b5d3c529dfaefac43136d2d11be284d7f

Encryption_Key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3

456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222

TAG' = 8ca50da9ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca17e

AAD =

CIPHERTEXT = 9aab2aeb3faa0a34aea8e2b1

Decrypted MSG = 010000000000000000000000000000
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 0 bytes
MSG_len = 16 bytes

BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

K1 = K = 010000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000

NONCE = 030000000000000000000000000000

AAD =

MSG = 010000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_AAD =

PADDED_MSG = 010000000000000000000000000000

LENBLK = 000000000000000080000000000000

POLYVAL xor N = 77eee2bf7c9a165f8b25dea73db32a6d

with_MSbit_cleared = 77eee2bf7c9a165f8b25dea73db32a6d

TAG = c9eac6fa700942702e90862383c6c366

CTRBLK = c9eac6fa700942702e90862383c6c3e6

Record_Hash_Key = b5d3c529dfaefac43136d2d11be284d7f

Encryption_Key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3

456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222

TAG' = c9eac6fa700942702e90862383c6c366

AAD =

CIPHERTEXT = 85a01b63025ba19b7fd3ddfc033b3e76

Decrypted MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 0 bytes
MSG_len = 32 bytes

BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

K1 = K = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000

NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD =

MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_AAD =

PADDED_MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000

LENBLK = 00000000000000000000000000000000

POLYVAL xor N = 8a9b6381b3d46f0def7aa0517ba188f5

with_MSbit_cleared = 8a9b6381b3d46f0def7aa0517ba18875

TAG = e819e63abcd020b006a976397632eb5d

CTRBLK = e819e63abcd020b006a976397632ebdd

Record_Hash_Key = b5d3c529dfaefac43136d2d11be284d7f

Encryption_Key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3

456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222

TAG' = e819e63abcd020b006a976397632eb5d

AAD =

CIPHERTEXT = 4a6a9db4c8c6549201b9edb53006cba8
21ec9cf850948a7c86c68ac7539d027f

Decrypted MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000

SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 0 bytes

MSG_len = 48 bytes

BYTES ORDER

LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

K1 = K = 01000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD =

MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_AAD =

PADDED_MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000

LENBLK = 00000000000000008001000000000000

POLYVAL xor N = c2f8593d8fc29b0c290cae1992f71f51

with_MSbit_cleared = c2f8593d8fc29b0c290cae1992f71f51

TAG = 790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4

CTRBLK = 790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4

Record_Hash_Key = b5d3c529dfaefac43136d2d11be284d7f

Encryption_Key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3

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456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
TAG' = 790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4
AAD =
CIPHERTEXT = c00d121893a9fa603f48ccc1ca3c57ce
7499245ea0046db16c53c7c66fe717e3
9cf6c748837b61f6ee3adcee17534ed5
Decrypted MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 0 bytes
MSG_len = 64 bytes
BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

K1 = K = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000
AAD =
MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000
PADDED_AAD =
PADDED_MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000
LENBLK = 000000000000000020000000000000
POLYVAL xor N = 6df38b06046c7c0e225efaef8e2ec4c4

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```
with_MSbit_cleared = 6df38b06046c7c0e225efaef8e2ec444  
TAG = 112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa08  
CTRBLK = 112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa88  
Record_Hash_Key = b5d3c529dfaefac43136d2d11be284d7f  
Encryption_Key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3  
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222  
TAG' = 112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa08  
AAD =  
CIPHERTEXT = c2d5160a1f8683834910acdafc41fbb1  
632d4a353e8b905ec9a5499ac34f96c7  
e1049eb080883891a4db8caaa1f99dd0  
04d80487540735234e3744512c6f90ce  
Decrypted MSG = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000  
04000000000000000000000000000000  
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed
```

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

```
AAD_len = 1 bytes  
MSG_len = 8 bytes
```

BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

```
K1 = K = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000  
NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
AAD = 01  
MSG = 0200000000000000  
PADDED_AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000
```

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PADDED_MSG =	0200
LENBLK =	0800
POLYVAL xor N =	37e57bafe011b9b36fc6821b7ffb3354
with_MSbit_cleared =	37e57bafe011b9b36fc6821b7ffb3354
TAG =	91213f267e3b452f02d01ae33e4ec854
CTRBLK =	91213f267e3b452f02d01ae33e4ec8d4
Record_Hash_Key =	b5d3c529dfaefac43136d2d11be284d7f
Encryption_Key =	b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
	456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
TAG' =	91213f267e3b452f02d01ae33e4ec854
AAD =	01
CIPHERTEXT =	1de22967237a8132
Decrypted_MSG =	02000000000000000000000000000000
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed	

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 1 bytes
MSG_len = 12 bytes

BYTES ORDER

LSB-----MSB

00010203040506070809101112131415

PADDED_MSG =	0200
LENBLK =	0800
POLYVAL xor N =	5f47d68a22061c1ad5623a3b66a8e206
with_MSbit_cleared =	5f47d68a22061c1ad5623a3b66a8e206
TAG =	c1a4a19ae800941ccdc57cc8413c277f
CTRBLK =	c1a4a19ae800941ccdc57cc8413c27ff
Record_Hash_Key =	b5d3c529dfaefac43136d2d11be284d7f
Encryption_Key =	b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
	456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
TAG' =	c1a4a19ae800941ccdc57cc8413c277f
AAD =	01
CIPHERTEXT =	163d6f9cc1b346cd453a2e4c
Decrypted_MSG =	02000000000000000000000000000000
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed	

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 1 bytes
MSG_len = 16 bytes

BYTES ORDER

LSB-----MSB

00010203040506070809101112131415

PADDED_MSG =	0200
LENBLK =	0800
POLYVAL xor N =	462896726c616746f01d11d82911d478
with_MSbit_cleared =	462896726c616746f01d11d82911d478
TAG =	b292d28ff61189e8e49f3875ef91aff7
CTRBLK =	b292d28ff61189e8e49f3875ef91aff7
Record_Hash_Key =	b5d3c529dfa fac43136d2d11be284d7f
Encryption_Key =	b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
	456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
TAG' =	b292d28ff61189e8e49f3875ef91aff7
AAD =	01
CIPHERTEXT =	c91545823cc24f17dbb0e9e807d5ec17
Decrypted_MSG =	0200
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed	

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 1 bytes
MSG_len = 32 bytes

BYTES ORDER

LSB-----MSB

00010203040506070809101112131415

NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD = 01

MSG = 02000000000000000000000000000000
 03000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_MSG =	02000 03000
LENBLK =	08000
POLYVAL xor N =	4d58c1e341c9bb0ae34eda9509dfc90c
with_MSbit_cleared =	4d58c1e341c9bb0ae34eda9509dfc90c
TAG =	aea1bad12702e1965604374aab96dbbc
CTRBLK =	aea1bad12702e1965604374aab96dbbc
Record_Hash_Key =	b5d3c529dfaefac43136d2d11be284d7f
Encryption_Key =	b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
	456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
TAG' =	aea1bad12702e1965604374aab96dbbc
AAD =	01
CIPHERTEXT =	07dad364bfc2b9da89116d7bef6daaaaf 6f255510aa654f920ac81b94e8bad365
Decrypted MSG =	02000 03000
STV_GCM_2_KEYS_Passed	

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 1 bytes
MSG_len = 48 bytes

BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

K1 = K =	01000
NONCE =	000
AAD =	03000
MSG =	01

PADDED_AAD =	03000 04000
PADDED_MSG =	01000 02000 03000 04000
LENBLK =	08000 01000
POLYVAL xor N =	2666a4aff9a525df9772c16d4eaf8d2a
with_MSbit_cleared =	2666a4aff9a525df9772c16d4eaf8d2a
TAG =	03332742b228c647173616cf44c54eb
CTRBLK =	03332742b228c647173616cf44c54eb
Record_Hash_Key =	b5d3c529dfaefac43136d2d11be284d7f
Encryption_Key =	b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
TAG' =	03332742b228c647173616cf44c54eb
AAD =	01
CIPHERTEXT =	c67a1f0f567a5198aa1fcc8e3f213143 36f7f51ca8b1af61feac35a86416fa47 fbca3b5f749cdf564527f2314f42fe25
Decrypted_MSG =	02000 03000 04000
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed	

***** Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 1 bytes
MSG_len = 64 bytes

BYTES ORDER

LSB-----MSB

00010203040506070809101112131415

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```
*****
```

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

```
*****
```

AAD_len = 12 bytes

MSG_len = 4 bytes

BYTES ORDER
LSB-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415

K1 = K = 01000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000

MSG = 02000000

PADDED_AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_MSG = 02000000000000000000000000000000

LENBLK = 60000000000000002000000000000000

POLYVAL xor N = 6ec76ae84b88916e073a303aafe05cf

with_MSbit_cleared = 6ec76ae84b88916e073a303aafe054f

TAG = 1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4661b74cf

CTRBLK = 1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4661b74cf

Record_Hash_Key = b5d3c529dfaefac43136d2d11be284d7f

Encryption_Key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3

456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222

TAG' = 1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4661b74cf

AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000

CIPHERTEXT = 22b3f4cd

Decrypted_MSG = 02000000

SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed


```
*****
```

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

```
*****
```

AAD_len = 18 bytes
MSG_len = 20 bytes

BYTES ORDER

LSB-----MSB

00010203040506070809101112131415

K1 = K = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000
0200

MSG = 03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000

PADDED_AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_MSG = 03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000

LENBLK = 9000000000000000a00000000000000

POLYVAL xor N = 943ef4fd04bd31d193816ab26f8655ca

with_MSbit_cleared = 943ef4fd04bd31d193816ab26f86554a

TAG = b879ad976d8242acc188ab59cabfe307

CTRBLK = b879ad976d8242acc188ab59cabfe387

Record_Hash_Key = b5d3c529dfaefac43136d2d11be284d7f

Encryption_Key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222

TAG' = b879ad976d8242acc188ab59cabfe307

AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000
0200

CIPHERTEXT = 43dd0163cdb48f9fe3212bf61b201976
067f342b

Decrypted MSG = 03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000

SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

Performing SIV_GCM - Two Keys:

AAD_len = 20 bytes

MSG_len = 18 bytes

BYTES ORDER

LSB-----	-----MSB
00010203040506070809101112131415	
-----	-----

K1 = K = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000

NONCE = 03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000

MSG = 03000000000000000000000000000000
0400

PADDED_AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000

PADDED_MSG = 03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000

LENBLK = a00000000000000009000000000000000

POLYVAL xor N = 2fbb6b7ab2dbffefb797f825f826870c

with_MSbit_cleared = 2fbb6b7ab2dbffefb797f825f826870c

TAG = cfcdf5042112aa29685c912fc2056543

CTRBLK = cfcdf5042112aa29685c912fc20565c3

Record_Hash_Key = b5d3c529dfa fac43136d2d11be284d7f

Encryption_Key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3

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456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
TAG' = cfcdf5042112aa29685c912fc2056543
AAD = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000
CIPHERTEXT = 462401724b5ce6588d5a54aae5375513
a075
Decrypted MSG = 03000000000000000000000000000000
0400
SIV_GCM_2_KEYS Passed

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