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AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption
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Abstract

This memo specifies two authenticated encryption algorithms that are nonce misuse-resistant - that is that they do not fail catastrophically if a nonce is repeated.

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[1.](#) Introduction

The concept of "Authenticated encryption with additional data" (AEAD [[RFC5116](#)]) couples confidentiality and integrity in a single operation that is easier for practitioners to use correctly. The most popular AEAD, AES-GCM [[GCM](#)], is seeing widespread use due to its attractive performance.

However, most AEADs suffer catastrophic failures of confidentiality and/or integrity when two distinct messages are encrypted with the same nonce. While the requirements for AEADs specify that the pair of (key, nonce) shall only ever be used once, and thus prohibit this, in practice this is a worry.

Nonce misuse-resistant AEADs do not suffer from this problem. For this class of AEADs, encrypting two messages with the same nonce only discloses whether the messages were equal or not. This is the minimum amount of information that a deterministic algorithm can leak in this situation.

This memo specifies two nonce misuse-resistant AEADs:

"AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV" and "AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV". These AEADs are designed to be able to take advantage of existing hardware support for AES-GCM and can decrypt within 5% of the speed of AES-GCM (for multi-kilobyte messages). Encryption is, perforce, slower than AES-GCM because two passes are required. However, measurements suggest that it can still run at 2/3rds of the speed of AES-GCM.

We suggest that these AEADs be considered in any situation where there is the slightest doubt about nonce uniqueness.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

3. POLYVAL

The GCM-SIV construction is similar to GCM: the block cipher is used in counter mode to encrypt the plaintext and a polynomial authenticator is used to provide integrity. The authenticator in GCM-SIV is called POLYVAL.

POLYVAL, like GHASH, operates in a binary field of size 2^{128} . The field is defined by the irreducible polynomial $x^{128} + x^{127} + x^{126} + x^{121} + 1$. The sum of any two elements in the field is the result of XORing them. The product of any two elements is calculated using standard (binary) polynomial multiplication followed by reduction modulo the irreducible polynomial.

We define another binary operation on elements of the field: $\text{dot}(a, b)$, where $\text{dot}(a, b) = a * b * x^{-128}$. The value of the field element x^{-128} is equal to $x^{127} + x^{124} + x^{121} + x^{114} + 1$. The result, $\text{dot}(a, b)$, of this multiplication is another field element.

Polynomials in this field are converted to and from 128-bit strings by taking the least-significant bit of the first byte to be the coefficient of x^0 , the most-significant bit of the first byte to the coefficient of x^7 and so on, until the most-significant bit of the last byte is the coefficient of x^{127} .

POLYVAL takes a field element, H , and a series of field elements $X_1, \dots, X_s$. Its result is S_s , where S is defined by the iteration $S_0 = 0$; $S_j = \text{dot}(S_{j-1} + X_j, H)$, for $j = 0..s$

We note that $\text{POLYVAL}(H, X_1, X_2, \dots)$ is equal to $\text{ByteReverse}(\text{GHASH}(\text{ByteReverse}(H) * x, \text{ByteReverse}(X_1),$

ByteReverse(X₂), ...)), where ByteReverse is a function that reverses the order of 16 bytes. See [Appendix A](#) for a more detailed explanation.

4. Encryption

AES-GCM-SIV encryption takes a 16- or 32-byte key-generating key, a 96-bit nonce, and arbitrary-length plaintext & additional data byte-strings. It outputs an authenticated ciphertext that will be 16 bytes longer than the plaintext.

If the key-generating key is 16 bytes long then AES-128 is used throughout. Otherwise AES-256 is used throughout.

The first step of encryption is to generate per-nonce, record-authentication and record-encryption keys. The record-authentication key is 128-bit and the record-encryption key is either 128- (for AES-128) or 256-bit (for AES-256).

These keys are generated by encrypting a series of plaintext blocks that contain a 32-bit, little-endian counter followed by the nonce, and then discarding the second half of the resulting ciphertext. In the AES-128 case, $128 + 128 = 256$ bits of key material need to be generated and, since encrypting each block yields 64 bits after discarding half, four blocks need to be encrypted. The counter values for these blocks are 0, 1, 2 and 3. For AES-256, six blocks are needed in total, with counter values 0 through 5 (inclusive).

In pseudocode form, where ++ indicates concatenation and x[:8] indicates taking only the first eight bytes from x:


```

if bytelen(key-generating-key) == 16 {
    record-authentication-key =
        AES128(key = key-generating-key,
            input = "00000000" ++ nonce)[:8] ++
        AES128(key = key-generating-key,
            input = "01000000" ++ nonce)[:8]
    record-encryption-key =
        AES128(key = key-generating-key,
            input = "02000000" ++ nonce)[:8] ++
        AES128(key = key-generating-key,
            input = "03000000" ++ nonce)[:8]
} else if bytelen(key-generating-key) == 32 {
    record-authentication-key =
        AES256(key = key-generating-key,
            input = "00000000" ++ nonce)[:8] ++
        AES256(key = key-generating-key,
            input = "01000000" ++ nonce)[:8]
    record-encryption-key =
        AES256(key = key-generating-key,
            input = "02000000" ++ nonce)[:8] ++
        AES256(key = key-generating-key,
            input = "03000000" ++ nonce)[:8] ++
        AES256(key = key-generating-key,
            input = "04000000" ++ nonce)[:8] ++
        AES256(key = key-generating-key,
            input = "05000000" ++ nonce)[:8]
}

```

Define the `_length block_` as a 16-byte value that is the concatenation of the 64-bit, little-endian encodings of `bytelen(additional_length) * 8` and `bytelen(plaintext) * 8`. Pad the plaintext and additional data with zeros until they are each a multiple of 16 bytes, the AES block size. Then `X_1`, `X_2`, ... (the series of field elements that are inputs to `POLYVAL`) are the concatenation of the padded additional data, the padded plaintext and the length block.

Calculate `S_s = POLYVAL(record-authentication-key, X_1, X_2, ...)`. XOR the first twelve bytes of `S_s` with the nonce and clear the most-significant bit of the last byte. Encrypt the result with AES using the record-encryption key to produce the tag.

The ciphertext is produced by using AES, with the record-encryption key, in counter mode on the unpadded plaintext. The initial counter block is the tag with the most-significant bit of the last byte set to one. The counter advances by incrementing the first 32 bits interpreted as an unsigned, little-endian integer. The result of the

encryption is the resulting ciphertext (truncated to the length of the plaintext) followed by the tag.

5. Decryption

Decryption takes a 16- or 32-byte key-generating key, a 96-bit nonce, and arbitrary-length ciphertext & additional data byte-strings. It either fails, or outputs a plaintext that is 16 bytes shorter than the ciphertext.

Firstly, the record-encryption and record-authentication keys are derived in the same manner as when encrypting.

If the ciphertext is less than 16 bytes or more than $2^{36} + 16$ bytes, then fail. Otherwise split the input into the encrypted plaintext and a 16-byte tag. Decrypt the encrypted plaintext with the record-encryption key in counter mode, where the initial counter block is the tag with the most-significant bit of the last byte set to one. The counter advances in the same way as for encryption.

Pad the additional data and plaintext with zeros until they are each a multiple of 16 bytes, the AES block size. Calculate the length block and $X_1, X_2, \dots$ as above and compute $S_s = \text{POLYVAL}(\text{record-authentication-key}, X_1, X_2, \dots)$. Compute the expected tag by XORing S_s and the nonce, clearing the most-significant bit of the last byte and encrypting with the record-encryption key. Compare the provided and expected tag values in constant time. If they do not match, fail. Otherwise return the plaintext.

6. AEADs

We define two AEADs, in the format of [RFC 5116](#), that use AES-GCM-SIV: AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV and AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV. They differ only in the size of the AES key used.

The key input to these AEADs becomes the key-generating key. Thus AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV takes a 16-byte key and AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV takes a 32-byte key.

The parameters for AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV are then: K_LEN is 16, P_MAX is 2^{36} , A_MAX is $2^{61} - 1$, N_MIN and N_MAX are 12 and C_MAX is $2^{36} + 16$.

The parameters for AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV differ only in the key size: K_LEN is 32, P_MAX is 2^{36} , A_MAX is $2^{61} - 1$, N_MIN and N_MAX are 12 and C_MAX is $2^{36} + 16$.

7. Field operation examples

Polynomials in this document will be written as 16-byte values. For example, the sixteen bytes 0100000000000000000000000000492 would represent the polynomial $x^{127} + x^{124} + x^{121} + x^{114} + 1$, which is also the value of x^{-128} in this field.

If $a = 66e94bd4ef8a2c3b884cfa59ca342b2e$ and $b = ff0000000000000000000000000000$ then $a + b = 99e94bd4ef8a2c3b884cfa59ca342b2e$, $a * b = 37856175e9dc9df26ebc6d6171aa0ae9$ and $\text{dot}(a, b) = ebe563401e7e91ea3ad6426b8140c394$.

8. Worked example

Consider the encryption of the plaintext "Hello world" with the additional data "example" under key `ee8e1ed9ff2540ae8f2ba9f50bc2f27c` using `AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV`. The random nonce that we'll use for this example is `752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310`.

In order to generate the record-authentication and record-encryption keys, a counter is combined with the nonce to form four blocks. These blocks are encrypted with key given above:

Counter	Nonce	Ciphertext
00000000	752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310	-> 310728d9911f1f38c40e952ca83d093e
01000000	752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310	-> 37b24316c3fab9a046ae90952daa0450
02000000	752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310	-> a4c5ae624996327947920b2d2412474b
03000000	752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310	-> c100be4d7e2c6edd1efef004305ab1e7

The latter halves of the ciphertext blocks are discarded and the remaining bytes are concatenated to form the per-record keys. Thus the record-authentication key is `310728d9911f1f3837b24316c3fab9a0` and the record-encryption key is `a4c5ae6249963279c100be4d7e2c6edd`.

The length block contains the encoding of the bit-lengths of the additional data and plaintext, respectively, which are 56 and 88. Thus the length block is `38000000000000000580000000000000`.

The input to `POLYVAL` is the padded additional data, padded plaintext and then the length block. This is `6578616d706c650000000000000000048656c6c6f20776f726c640000000000380000000000000580000000000000`.

Calling `POLYVAL` with the record-authentication key and the input above results in `S_s = ad7fcf0b5169851662672f3c5f95138f`.

Before encrypting, the nonce is XORed in and the most-significant bit of the last byte is cleared. This gives

d85575d8b1c630e256bb6c2c5f95130f because that bit happened to be one previously. Encrypting with the record-encryption key gives the tag, which is 4fbcdeb7e4793f4a1d7e4faa70100af1.

In order to form the initial counter block, the most-significant bit of the last byte of the tag is set to one. That doesn't result in a change in this example. Encrypting this with the record key gives the first block of the keystream: 1551f2c1787e81deac9a99f139540ab5.

The final ciphertext is the result of XORing the plaintext with the keystream and appending the tag. That gives 5d349ead175ef6b1def6fd4fbcdeb7e4793f4a1d7e4faa70100af1.

9. Security Considerations

A detailed analysis of these schemes appears in [\[AES-GCM-SIV\]](#) and the remainder of this section is a summary of that paper.

We recommend a limit of 2^{50} plaintexts encrypted with a given key. Past this point, AES-GCM-SIV may be distinguishable from an ideal AEAD. (This is based on standard assumptions about AES.)

The AEADs defined in this document calculate fresh AES keys for each nonce. This allows a larger number of plaintexts to be encrypted under a given key. Without this step, each SIV encryption would be like a standard GCM encryption with a random nonce. Since the nonce size for GCM is only 12 bytes, NIST set a limit [\[GCM\]](#) of 2^{32} encryptions before the probability of duplicate nonces becomes too high.

The authors felt that, while large, 2^{32} wasn't so large that this limit could be safely ignored. For example, consider encrypting the contents of a hard disk where the AEAD record size is 512 bytes, to match the traditional size of a disk sector. This process would have encrypted 2^{32} records after processing 2TB, yet hard drives of multiple terabytes are now common.

Deriving fresh AES keys for each nonce alleviates this problem.

If the nonce is fixed then AES-GCM-SIV acts like AES-GCM with a random nonce, with the caveat that identical plaintexts will produce identical ciphertexts. However, we feel that the 2^{32} limit for AES-GCM is too risky in a multi-key setting. Thus with AES-GCM-SIV we recommend that, for a specific key, a nonce not be repeated more than 2^8 times. (And, ideally, not be repeated at all.) See theorem six and figure four from the paper for detailed bounds.

Suzuki et al [[multibirthday](#)] show that even if nonces are selected uniformly at random, the probability that one or more values would be repeated 256 or more times is negligible until the number of nonces reaches 2^{102} . (Specifically the probability is $1/((2^{96})^{(255)}) * \text{Binomial}(q, 256)$, where q is the number of nonces.) Since 2^{102} is vastly greater than the limit on the number of plaintexts per key given above, we don't feel that this limit on the number of repeated nonces will be a problem. This also means that selecting nonces at random is a safe practice with AES-GCM-SIV.

In addition to calculating fresh AES keys for each nonce, these AEADs also calculate fresh POLYVAL keys. Previous versions of GCM-SIV did not do this and, instead, used part of the AEAD's key as the POLYVAL key. Bleichenbacher pointed out that this allowed an attacker who controlled the AEAD key to force the POLYVAL key to be zero. If a user of this AEAD authenticated messages with a secret additional-data value then this would be insecure as the attacker could calculate a valid authenticator without knowing the input. This does not violate the standard properties of an AEAD as the additional data is not assumed to be confidential. However, we want these AEADs to be robust to plausible misuse and also to be drop-in replacements for AES-GCM and so derive nonce-specific POLYVAL keys to avoid this issue.

A security analysis of a similar scheme appears in [[GCM-SIV](#)].

[10.](#) IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to add two entries to the registry of AEAD algorithms: AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV and AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV, both referencing this document as their specification.

[11.](#) Acknowledgements

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[12.](#) References

[12.1.](#) Normative References

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- [RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption", [RFC 5116](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>>.

Appendix A. The relationship between POLYVAL and GHASH

GHASH and POLYVAL both operate in $GF(2^{128})$, although with different irreducible polynomials: POLYVAL works modulo $x^{128} + x^{127} + x^{126} + x^{121} + 1$ and GHASH works modulo $x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1$. Note that these irreducible polynomials are the "reverse" of each other.

GHASH also has a different mapping between 128-bit strings and field elements. Where as POLYVAL takes the least-significant to most-significant bits of the first byte to be the coefficients of x^0 to x^7 , GHASH takes them to be the coefficients of x^7 to x^0 . This continues until, for the last byte, POLYVAL takes the least-significant to most-significant bits to be the coefficients of x^{120} to x^{127} while GHASH takes them to be the coefficients of x^{127} to x^{120} .

The combination of these facts means that it's possible to "convert" values between the two by reversing the order of the bytes in a

16-byte string. The differing interpretations of bit order takes care of reversing the bits within each byte and then reversing the bytes does the rest. This may have a practical benefit for implementations that wish to implement both GHASH and POLYVAL.

In order to be clear which field a given operation is performed in, let `mulX_GHASH` be a function that takes a 16-byte string, converts it to an element of GHASH's field using GHASH's convention, multiplies it by `x` and converts back to a string. Likewise, let `mulX_POLYVAL` be a function that converts a 16-byte string to an element of POLYVAL's field using POLYVAL's convention, multiplies it by `x` and converts back.

Given the 16-byte string `01000000000000000000000000000000`, `mulX_GHASH` of that string is `00800000000000000000000000000000` and `mulX_POLYVAL` of that string is `02000000000000000000000000000000`. As a more general example, given `9c98c04df9387ded828175a92ba652d8`, `mulX_GHASH` of that string is `4e4c6026fc9c3ef6c140bad495d3296c` and `mulX_POLYVAL` of it is `3931819bf271fada0503eb52574ca5f2`.

Lastly, let `ByteReverse` be the function that takes a 16-byte string and returns a copy where the order of the bytes has been reversed.

Now GHASH and POLYVAL can be defined in terms of one another:

```
POLYVAL(H, X_1, ..., X_n) =
ByteReverse(GHASH(mulX_GHASH(ByteReverse(H)), ByteReverse(X_1), ...,
ByteReverse(X_n)))
```

```
GHASH(H, X_1, ..., X_n) =
ByteReverse(POLYVAL(mulX_POLYVAL(ByteReverse(H)), ByteReverse(X_1),
..., ByteReverse(X_n)))
```

As a worked example, let `H = 25629347589242761d31f826ba4b757b`, `X_1 = 4f4f95668c83dfb6401762bb2d01a262` and `X_2 = d1a24ddd2721d006bbe45f20d3c9f362`. `POLYVAL(H, X_1, X_2) = f7a3b47b846119fae5b7866cf5e5b77e`. If we wished to calculate this given only an implementation of GHASH then the key for GHASH would be `mulX_GHASH(ByteReverse(H)) = dcbaa5dd137c188ebb21492c23c9b112`. Then `ByteReverse(GHASH(dcba..., ByteReverse(X_1), ByteReverse(X_2))) = f7a3b47b846119fae5b7866cf5e5b77e`, as required.

In the other direction, `GHASH(H, X_1, X_2) = bd9b3997046731fb96251b91f9c99d7a`. If we wished to calculate this given only an implementation of POLYVAL then we would first calculate the key for POLYVAL, `mulX_POLYVAL(ByteReverse(H))`, which is `f6ea96744df0633aec8424b18e26c54a`. Then `ByteReverse(POLYVAL(f6ea...,`


```
ByteReverse(X_1), ByteReverse(X_2))) =
bd9b3997046731fb96251b91f9c99d7a.
```

[Appendix B.](#) Additional comparisons with AES-GCM

Some, non-security, properties also differ between AES-GCM and AES-GCM-SIV that are worth noting:

AES-GCM allows plaintexts to be encrypted in a streaming fashion, i.e. the beginning of the plaintext can be encrypted and transmitted before the entire message has been processed. AES-GCM-SIV requires two passes for encryption and so cannot do this.

AES-GCM allows a constant additional-data input to be precomputed in order to save per-record computation. AES-GCM-SIV varies the authenticator key based on the nonce and so does not permit this.

The performance for AES-GCM vs AES-GCM-SIV on small machines can be roughly characterised by the number of AES operations and the number of $GF(2^{128})$ multiplications needed to process a message. Let $a = (\text{bytelen}(\text{additional-data}) + 15) / 16$ and $p = (\text{bytelen}(\text{plaintext}) + 15) / 16$. Then AES-GCM requires $p + 1$ AES operations and $p + a + 1$ field multiplications.

Defined similarly, AES-GCM-SIV with AES-128 requires $p + 5$ AES operations and $p + a + 1$ field multiplications. With AES-256 that becomes $p + 7$ AES operations.

With large machines, the available parallelism becomes far more important and such simple performance analysis is no longer representative. For such machines, we find that decryption of AES-GCM-SIV is only about 5% slower than AES-GCM, as long as the message is at least a couple of kilobytes. Encryption tends to be about 2/3's the speed because of the additional pass required.

[Appendix C.](#) Test vectors

[C.1.](#) AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV

```
Plaintext (0 bytes) =
AAD (0 bytes) =
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input = 00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
```



```
POLYVAL result = 20806c26e3c1de019e111255708031d6
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 23806c26e3c1de019e111255708031d6
... and masked = 23806c26e3c1de019e11125570803156
Tag = 303aaf90f6fe21199c6068577437a0c4
Initial counter = 303aaf90f6fe21199c6068577437a0c4
Result (32 bytes) = 743f7c8077ab25f8624e2e948579cf77
303aaf90f6fe21199c6068577437a0c4
```

```
Plaintext (32 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
```

```
AAD (0 bytes) =
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000010000000000000
```

```
POLYVAL result = ce6edc9a50b36d9a98986bbf6a261c3b
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = cd6edc9a50b36d9a98986bbf6a261c3b
... and masked = cd6edc9a50b36d9a98986bbf6a261c3b
Tag = 1a8e45dcd4578c667cd86847bf6155ff
Initial counter = 1a8e45dcd4578c667cd86847bf6155ff
Result (48 bytes) = 84e07e62ba83a6585417245d7ec413a9
fe427d6315c09b57ce45f2e3936a9445
1a8e45dcd4578c667cd86847bf6155ff
```

```
Plaintext (48 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
```

```
AAD (0 bytes) =
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000008001000000000000
```

```
POLYVAL result = 81388746bc22d26b2abc3dcb15754222
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 82388746bc22d26b2abc3dcb15754222
... and masked = 82388746bc22d26b2abc3dcb15754222
Tag = 5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8
Initial counter = 5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8
Result (64 bytes) = 3fd24ce1f5a67b75bf2351f181a475c7
b800a5b4d3dcf70106b1eea82fa1d64d
```


f42bf7226122fa92e17a40eeaac1201b
5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8

Plaintext (64 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (0 bytes) =

Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000

Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000

Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377

Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c

POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000

02000000000000000000000000000000

03000000000000000000000000000000

04000000000000000000000000000000

000000000000000000000000200000000000

POLYVAL result = 1e39b6d3344d348f6044f89935d1cf78

POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 1d39b6d3344d348f6044f89935d1cf78

... and masked = 1d39b6d3344d348f6044f89935d1cf78

Tag = 8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8

Initial counter = 8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8

Result (80 bytes) = 2433668f1058190f6d43e360f4f35cd8

e475127cfca7028ea8ab5c20f7ab2af0

2516a2bdcabc08d521be37ff28c152bba

36697f25b4cd169c6590d1dd39566d3f

8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8

Plaintext (8 bytes) = 0200000000000000

AAD (1 bytes) = 01

Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000

Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000

Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377

Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c

POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000

02000000000000000000000000000000

0800000000000000004000000000000000

POLYVAL result = b26781e7e2c1376f96bec195f3709b2a

POLYVAL result XOR nonce = b16781e7e2c1376f96bec195f3709b2a

... and masked = b16781e7e2c1376f96bec195f3709b2a

Tag = 3b0a1a2560969cdf790d99759abd1508

Initial counter = 3b0a1a2560969cdf790d99759abd1588

Result (24 bytes) = 1e6daba35669f4273b0a1a2560969cdf

790d99759abd1508

Plaintext (12 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
08000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 111f5affb18e4cc1164a01bdc12a4145
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 121f5affb18e4cc1164a01bdc12a4145
... and masked = 121f5affb18e4cc1164a01bdc12a4145
Tag = 08299c5102745aaa3a0c469fad9e075a
Initial counter = 08299c5102745aaa3a0c469fad9e07da
Result (28 bytes) = 296c7889fd99f41917f4462008299c51
02745aaa3a0c469fad9e075a

Plaintext (16 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
08000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 79745ab508622c8a958543675fac4688
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 7a745ab508622c8a958543675fac4688
... and masked = 7a745ab508622c8a958543675fac4608
Tag = 8f8936ec039e4e4bb97ebd8c4457441f
Initial counter = 8f8936ec039e4e4bb97ebd8c4457449f
Result (32 bytes) = e2b0c5da79a901c1745f700525cb335b
8f8936ec039e4e4bb97ebd8c4457441f

Plaintext (32 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
08000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 2ce7daaf7c89490822051255b12eca6b


```
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 2fe7daaf7c89490822051255b12eca6b
... and masked = 2fe7daaf7c89490822051255b12eca6b
Tag = e6af6a7f87287da059a71684ed3498e1
Initial counter = e6af6a7f87287da059a71684ed3498e1
Result (48 bytes) = 620048ef3c1e73e57e02bb8562c416a3
19e73e4caac8e96a1ecb2933145a1d71
e6af6a7f87287da059a71684ed3498e1
```

```
Plaintext (48 bytes) = 0200000000000000000000000000000000
                        0300000000000000000000000000000000
                        0400000000000000000000000000000000
```

```
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
```

```
POLYVAL result = 9ca987715d69c1786711dfcd22f830fc
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 9fa987715d69c1786711dfcd22f830fc
... and masked = 9fa987715d69c1786711dfcd22f8307c
Tag = 6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2
Initial counter = 6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2
Result (64 bytes) = 50c8303ea93925d64090d07bd109dfd9
                    515a5a33431019c17d93465999a8b005
                    3201d723120a8562b838cdff25bf9d1e
                    6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2
```

[illegible]

```
AAD (1 bytes) =                                01  
Key =                                             01000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce =                                           03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada737f  
Record encryption key =      4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c  
POLYVAL input =    01000000000000000000000000000000  
                    02000000000000000000000000000000  
                    03000000000000000000000000000000  
                    04000000000000000000000000000000  
                    05000000000000000000000000000000  
                    08000000000000000000000000000000
```



```
POLYVAL result =          fffd05d5770f34ad9267f0a59994b15a
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = fccd05d5770f34ad9267f0a59994b15a
... and masked =          fccd05d5770f34ad9267f0a59994b15a
Tag =                     cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae21744
Initial counter =         cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae217c4
Result (80 bytes) =       2f5c64059db55ee0fb847ed513003746
                           aca4e61c711b5de2e7a77ffd02da42fe
                           ec601910d3467bb8b36ebbaebce5fba3
                           0d36c95f48a3e7980f0e7ac299332a80
                           cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae21744
```

```
Plaintext (4 bytes) =      02000000
AAD (12 bytes) =          01000000000000000000000000000000
Key =                     01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =                   03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key =    4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input =           01000000000000000000000000000000
                           02000000000000000000000000000000
                           6000000000000000002000000000000000
POLYVAL result =          f6ce9d3dcd68a2fd603c7ecc18fb9918
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = f5ce9d3dcd68a2fd603c7ecc18fb9918
... and masked =          f5ce9d3dcd68a2fd603c7ecc18fb9918
Tag =                     07eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99e2f48a14
Initial counter =         07eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99e2f48a94
Result (20 bytes) =       a8fe3e8707eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99
                           e2f48a14
```

```
Plaintext (20 bytes) =    0300000000000000000000000000000000
                           04000000
AAD (18 bytes) =          0100000000000000000000000000000000
                           0200
Key =                     01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =                   03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key =    4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input =           01000000000000000000000000000000
                           02000000000000000000000000000000
                           03000000000000000000000000000000
                           04000000000000000000000000000000
                           9000000000000000a000000000000000
POLYVAL result =          4781d492cb8f926c504caa36f61008fe
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 4481d492cb8f926c504caa36f61008fe
... and masked =          4481d492cb8f926c504caa36f610087e
Tag =                     24afc9805e976f451e6d87f6fe106514
Initial counter =         24afc9805e976f451e6d87f6fe106594
```



```

Result (36 bytes) =      6bb0fecf5ded9b77f902c7d5da236a43
                        91dd029724afc9805e976f451e6d87f6
                        fe106514

Plaintext (18 bytes) =   03000000000000000000000000000000
                        0400

AAD (20 bytes) =         01000000000000000000000000000000
                        02000000

Key =                     01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =                   03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key =   4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input =           01000000000000000000000000000000
                        02000000000000000000000000000000
                        03000000000000000000000000000000
                        04000000000000000000000000000000
                        a000000000000000090000000000000000
POLYVAL result =          75cbc23a1a10e348aeb8e384b5cc79fd
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 76cbc23a1a10e348aeb8e384b5cc79fd
... and masked =          76cbc23a1a10e348aeb8e384b5cc797d
Tag =                     bff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13b9fd
Initial counter =         bff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13b9fd
Result (34 bytes) =       44d0aaf6fb2f1f34add5e8064e83e12a
                        2adabff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13
                        b9fd

```

C.2. AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV

```

Plaintext (0 bytes) =
AAD (0 bytes) =
Key =                     01000000000000000000000000000000
                        00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =                   03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key =   b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
                        456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input =           00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result =          00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
... and masked =          03000000000000000000000000000000
Tag =                     07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd400f
Initial counter =         07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd408f
Result (16 bytes) =       07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd400f

Plaintext (8 bytes) =     0100000000000000
AAD (0 bytes) =

```


Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000004000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 05230f62f0eac8aa14fe4d646b59cd41
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 06230f62f0eac8aa14fe4d646b59cd41
... and masked = 06230f62f0eac8aa14fe4d646b59cd41
Tag = 843122130f7364b761e0b97427e3df28
Initial counter = 843122130f7364b761e0b97427e3dfa8
Result (24 bytes) = c2ef328e5c71c83b843122130f7364b7
61e0b97427e3df28

Plaintext (12 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (0 bytes) =
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000006000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 6d81a24732fd6d03ae5af544720a1c13
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 6e81a24732fd6d03ae5af544720a1c13
... and masked = 6e81a24732fd6d03ae5af544720a1c13
Tag = 8ca50da9ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca17e
Initial counter = 8ca50da9ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca1fe
Result (28 bytes) = 9aab2aeb3faa0a34aea8e2b18ca50da9
ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca17e

Plaintext (16 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (0 bytes) =
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000008000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 74eee2bf7c9a165f8b25dea73db32a6d
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 77eee2bf7c9a165f8b25dea73db32a6d


```
... and masked = 77eee2bf7c9a165f8b25dea73db32a6d
Tag = c9eac6fa700942702e90862383c6c366
Initial counter = c9eac6fa700942702e90862383c6c3e6
Result (32 bytes) = 85a01b63025ba19b7fd3ddfc033b3e76
c9eac6fa700942702e90862383c6c366

Plaintext (32 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (0 bytes) =
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 899b6381b3d46f0def7aa0517ba188f5
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 8a9b6381b3d46f0def7aa0517ba188f5
... and masked = 8a9b6381b3d46f0def7aa0517ba18875
Tag = e819e63abcd020b006a976397632eb5d
Initial counter = e819e63abcd020b006a976397632ebdd
Result (48 bytes) = 4a6a9db4c8c6549201b9edb53006cba8
21ec9cf850948a7c86c68ac7539d027f
e819e63abcd020b006a976397632eb5d

Plaintext (48 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (0 bytes) =
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = c1f8593d8fc29b0c290cae1992f71f51
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = c2f8593d8fc29b0c290cae1992f71f51
... and masked = c2f8593d8fc29b0c290cae1992f71f51
Tag = 790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4
Initial counter = 790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4
```



```
Result (64 bytes) =      c00d121893a9fa603f48ccc1ca3c57ce
                          7499245ea0046db16c53c7c66fe717e3
                          9cf6c748837b61f6ee3adcee17534ed5
                          790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4

Plaintext (64 bytes) =   01000000000000000000000000000000
                          02000000000000000000000000000000
                          03000000000000000000000000000000
                          04000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (0 bytes) =
Key =                    01000000000000000000000000000000
                          00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =                  03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key =   b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
                          456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input =          01000000000000000000000000000000
                          02000000000000000000000000000000
                          03000000000000000000000000000000
                          04000000000000000000000000000000
                          00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result =         6ef38b06046c7c0e225efaef8e2ec4c4
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 6df38b06046c7c0e225efaef8e2ec4c4
... and masked =         6df38b06046c7c0e225efaef8e2ec444
Tag =                    112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa08
Initial counter =        112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa88
Result (80 bytes) =      c2d5160a1f8683834910acdafc41fbb1
                          632d4a353e8b905ec9a5499ac34f96c7
                          e1049eb080883891a4db8caaa1f99dd0
                          04d80487540735234e3744512c6f90ce
                          112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa08


Plaintext (8 bytes) =    0200000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) =          01
Key =                    01000000000000000000000000000000
                          00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =                  03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key =   b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
                          456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input =          01000000000000000000000000000000
                          02000000000000000000000000000000
                          08000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result =         34e57bafe011b9b36fc6821b7ffb3354
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 37e57bafe011b9b36fc6821b7ffb3354
... and masked =         37e57bafe011b9b36fc6821b7ffb3354
```



```

Tag = 91213f267e3b452f02d01ae33e4ec854
Initial counter = 91213f267e3b452f02d01ae33e4ec8d4
Result (24 bytes) = 1de22967237a813291213f267e3b452f
                                02d01ae33e4ec854

```

```

Plaintext (12 bytes) = 0200000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
      00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3
                        456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
                  02000000000000000000000000000000
                  08000000000000000600000000000000
POLYVAL result = 5c47d68a22061c1ad5623a3b66a8e206
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 5f47d68a22061c1ad5623a3b66a8e206
... and masked = 5f47d68a22061c1ad5623a3b66a8e206
Tag = c1a4a19ae800941ccdc57cc8413c277f
Initial counter = c1a4a19ae800941ccdc57cc8413c27ff
Result (28 bytes) = 163d6f9cc1b346cd453a2e4cc1a4a19a
                    e800941ccdc57cc8413c277f

```

```

Plaintext (16 bytes) = 0200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 0300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 452896726c616746f01d11d82911d478
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 462896726c616746f01d11d82911d478
... and masked = 462896726c616746f01d11d82911d478
Tag = b292d28ff61189e8e49f3875ef91aff7
Initial counter = b292d28ff61189e8e49f3875ef91aff7
Result (32 bytes) = c91545823cc24f17dbb0e9e807d5ec17
b292d28ff61189e8e49f3875ef91aff7

```

[illegible]

AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
08000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 4e58c1e341c9bb0ae34eda9509dfc90c
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 4d58c1e341c9bb0ae34eda9509dfc90c
... and masked = 4d58c1e341c9bb0ae34eda9509dfc90c
Tag = aea1bad12702e1965604374aab96dbbc
Initial counter = aea1bad12702e1965604374aab96dbbc
Result (48 bytes) = 07dad364bfc2b9da89116d7bef6daaaf
6f255510aa654f920ac81b94e8bad365
aea1bad12702e1965604374aab96dbbc

Plaintext (48 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000
08000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 2566a4aff9a525df9772c16d4eaf8d2a
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 2666a4aff9a525df9772c16d4eaf8d2a
... and masked = 2666a4aff9a525df9772c16d4eaf8d2a
Tag = 03332742b228c647173616cfd44c54eb
Initial counter = 03332742b228c647173616cfd44c54eb
Result (64 bytes) = c67a1f0f567a5198aa1fcc8e3f213143
36f7f51ca8b1af61feac35a86416fa47
fbca3b5f749cdf564527f2314f42fe25
03332742b228c647173616cfd44c54eb

Plaintext (64 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000


```
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000
05000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000
05000000000000000000000000000000
08000000000000000000000020000000000000
POLYVAL result = da58d2f61b0a9d343b2f37fb0c519733
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = d958d2f61b0a9d343b2f37fb0c519733
... and masked = d958d2f61b0a9d343b2f37fb0c519733
Tag = 5bde0285037c5de81e5b570a049b62a0
Initial counter = 5bde0285037c5de81e5b570a049b62a0
Result (80 bytes) = 67fd45e126bfb9a79930c43aad2d3696
7d3f0e4d217c1e551f59727870beefc9
8cb933a8fce9de887b1e40799988db1f
c3f91880ed405b2dd298318858467c89
5bde0285037c5de81e5b570a049b62a0

Plaintext (4 bytes) = 02000000
AAD (12 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
6000000000000000000000002000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 6dc76ae84b88916e073a303aafde05cf
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 6ec76ae84b88916e073a303aafde05cf
... and masked = 6ec76ae84b88916e073a303aafde054f
Tag = 1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4661b74cf
Initial counter = 1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4661b74cf
Result (20 bytes) = 22b3f4cd1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4
661b74cf
```



```
Plaintext (20 bytes) = 03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000
AAD (18 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000
0200
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000
900000000000000000a000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 973ef4fd04bd31d193816ab26f8655ca
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 943ef4fd04bd31d193816ab26f8655ca
... and masked = 943ef4fd04bd31d193816ab26f86554a
Tag = b879ad976d8242acc188ab59cabfe307
Initial counter = b879ad976d8242acc188ab59cabfe387
Result (36 bytes) = 43dd0163cdb48f9fe3212bf61b201976
067f342bb879ad976d8242acc188ab59
cabfe307

Plaintext (18 bytes) = 03000000000000000000000000000000
0400
AAD (20 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000
a000000000000000009000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 2cbb6b7ab2dbffefb797f825f826870c
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 2fbb6b7ab2dbffefb797f825f826870c
... and masked = 2fbb6b7ab2dbffefb797f825f826870c
Tag = cfcdf5042112aa29685c912fc2056543
Initial counter = cfcdf5042112aa29685c912fc20565c3
Result (34 bytes) = 462401724b5ce6588d5a54aae5375513
a075cfcdf5042112aa29685c912fc205
6543
```


The tests in this section use AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV and are crafted to test correct wrapping of the block counter.

```

Plaintext (24 bytes) = eb3640277c7fffd1303c7a542d02d3e4c
                        000000000000000000
AAD (0 bytes) =
Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
      00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 00000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = dc95c078a24089895275f3d86b4fb868
Record encryption key = 779b38d15bffb63d39d6e9ae76a9b2f3
                        75d11b0e3a68c422845c7d4690fa594f
POLYVAL input = eb3640277c7fffd1303c7a542d02d3e4c
                  0000000000000000000000000000000000
                  00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
... and masked = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
Tag = ffffffff00000000000000000000000000000000
Initial counter = ffffffff0000000000000000000000000080
Result (40 bytes) = 18ce4f0b8cb4d0cac65fea8f79257b20
                    888e53e72299e56dffffffff0000000000
                    000000000000000000

```


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