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AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption
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Abstract

This memo specifies two authenticated encryption algorithms that are nonce misuse-resistant - that is that they do not fail catastrophically if a nonce is repeated.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	2
2. Requirements Language	3
3. POLYVAL	3
4. Encryption	4
5. Decryption	7
6. AEADs	9
7. Field operation examples	9
8. Worked example	9
9. Security Considerations	10
10. IANA Considerations	12
11. Acknowledgements	12
12. References	12
12.1. Normative References	12
12.2. Informative References	13
Appendix A. The relationship between POLYVAL and GHASH	13
Appendix B. Additional comparisons with AES-GCM	15
Appendix C. Test vectors	15
C.1. AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV	15
C.2. AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV	25
C.3. Counter wrap tests	36
Authors' Addresses	37

[1. Introduction](#)

The concept of "Authenticated encryption with additional data" (AEAD [[RFC5116](#)]) couples confidentiality and integrity in a single operation that is easier to use correctly. The most popular AEAD, AES-GCM [[GCM](#)], is seeing widespread use due to its attractive performance.

However, most AEADs suffer catastrophic failures of confidentiality and/or integrity when two distinct messages are encrypted with the same nonce. While the requirements for AEADs specify that the pair of (key, nonce) shall only ever be used once, and thus prohibit this, in practice this is a worry.

Nonce misuse-resistant AEADs do not suffer from this problem. For this class of AEADs, encrypting two messages with the same nonce only discloses whether the messages were equal or not. This is the minimum amount of information that a deterministic algorithm can leak in this situation.

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 2]

This memo specifies two nonce misuse-resistant AEADs: "AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV" and "AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV". These AEADs are designed to be able to take advantage of existing hardware support for AES-GCM and can decrypt within 5% of the speed of AES-GCM (for multi-kilobyte messages). Encryption is, perforce, slower than AES-GCM because two passes are required. However, measurements suggest that it can still run at 2/3rds of the speed of AES-GCM.

We suggest that these AEADs be considered in any situation where there is the slightest doubt about nonce uniqueness.

[2. Requirements Language](#)

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

[3. POLYVAL](#)

The GCM-SIV construction is similar to GCM: the block cipher is used in counter mode to encrypt the plaintext and a polynomial authenticator is used to provide integrity. The authenticator in GCM-SIV is called POLYVAL.

POLYVAL, like GHASH, operates in a binary field of size 2^{128} . The field is defined by the irreducible polynomial $x^{128} + x^{127} + x^{126} + x^{121} + 1$. The sum of any two elements in the field is the result of XORing them. The product of any two elements is calculated using standard (binary) polynomial multiplication followed by reduction modulo the irreducible polynomial.

We define another binary operation on elements of the field: $\text{dot}(a, b)$, where $\text{dot}(a, b) = a * b * x^{-128}$. The value of the field element x^{-128} is equal to $x^{127} + x^{124} + x^{121} + x^{114} + 1$. The result, $\text{dot}(a, b)$, of this multiplication is another field element.

Polynomials in this field are converted to and from 128-bit strings by taking the least-significant bit of the first byte to be the coefficient of x^0 , the most-significant bit of the first byte to the coefficient of x^7 and so on, until the most-significant bit of the last byte is the coefficient of x^{127} .

POLYVAL takes a field element, H , and a series of field elements X_1, \dots, X_s . Its result is S_s , where S is defined by the iteration $S_0 = 0; S_j = \text{dot}(S_{\{j-1\}} + X_j, H)$, for $j = 0..s$

We note that $\text{POLYVAL}(H, X_1, X_2, \dots)$ is equal to $\text{ByteReverse}(\text{GHASH}(\text{ByteReverse}(H) * x, \text{ByteReverse}(X_1),$

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 3]

`ByteReverse(X_2), ...)`), where `ByteReverse` is a function that reverses the order of 16 bytes. See [Appendix A](#) for a more detailed explanation.

4. Encryption

AES-GCM-SIV encryption takes a 16- or 32-byte key-generating key, a 96-bit nonce, and variable-length plaintext & additional data byte-strings. It outputs an authenticated ciphertext that will be 16 bytes longer than the plaintext. Both encryption and decryption are only defined on inputs that are a whole number of bytes.

If the key-generating key is 16 bytes long then AES-128 is used throughout. Otherwise AES-256 is used throughout.

The first step of encryption is to generate per-nonce, record-authentication and record-encryption keys. The record-authentication key is 128-bit and the record-encryption key is either 128- (for AES-128) or 256-bit (for AES-256).

These keys are generated by encrypting a series of plaintext blocks that contain a 32-bit, little-endian counter followed by the nonce, and then discarding the second half of the resulting ciphertext. In the AES-128 case, $128 + 128 = 256$ bits of key material need to be generated and, since encrypting each block yields 64 bits after discarding half, four blocks need to be encrypted. The counter values for these blocks are 0, 1, 2 and 3. For AES-256, six blocks are needed in total, with counter values 0 through 5 (inclusive).

In pseudocode form, where `++` indicates concatenation and `x[:8]` indicates taking only the first eight bytes from `x`:


```

if bytelen(key_generating_key) == 16 {
    record_authentication_key =
        AES128(key = key_generating_key,
                input = "00000000" ++ nonce)[:8] ++
        AES128(key = key_generating_key,
                input = "01000000" ++ nonce)[:8]
    record_encryption_key =
        AES128(key = key_generating_key,
                input = "02000000" ++ nonce)[:8] ++
        AES128(key = key_generating_key,
                input = "03000000" ++ nonce)[:8]
} else if bytelen(key_generating_key) == 32 {
    record_authentication_key =
        AES256(key = key_generating_key,
                input = "00000000" ++ nonce)[:8] ++
        AES256(key = key_generating_key,
                input = "01000000" ++ nonce)[:8]
    record_encryption_key =
        AES256(key = key_generating_key,
                input = "02000000" ++ nonce)[:8] ++
        AES256(key = key_generating_key,
                input = "03000000" ++ nonce)[:8] ++
        AES256(key = key_generating_key,
                input = "04000000" ++ nonce)[:8] ++
        AES256(key = key_generating_key,
                input = "05000000" ++ nonce)[:8]
}

```

Define the "length block" as a 16-byte value that is the concatenation of the 64-bit, little-endian encodings of `bytelen(additional_data) * 8` and `bytelen(plaintext) * 8`. Pad the plaintext and additional data with zeros until they are each a multiple of 16 bytes, the AES block size. Then X_1, X_2, \dots (the series of field elements that are inputs to POLYVAL) are the concatenation of the padded additional data, the padded plaintext and the length block.

Calculate $S_s = \text{POLYVAL}(\text{record-authentication-key}, X_1, X_2, \dots)$. XOR the first twelve bytes of S_s with the nonce and clear the most-significant bit of the last byte. Encrypt the result with AES using the record-encryption key to produce the tag.

The encrypted plaintext is produced by using AES, with the record-encryption key, in counter mode on the unpadded plaintext. The initial counter block is the tag with the most-significant bit of the last byte set to one. The counter advances by incrementing the first 32 bits interpreted as an unsigned, little-endian integer, with

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 5]

overflow. The result of the encryption is the encrypted plaintext (truncated to the length of the plaintext) followed by the tag.

In pseudo-code form, the encryption process can be expressed as:

```
func right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(input) {
    while (bytelen(input) % 16 != 0) {
        input = input ++ "\x00"
    }
    return input
}

func AES_CTR(key, initial_counter_block, in) {
    block = initial_counter_block

    output = ""
    while bytelen(in) > 0 {
        block[0:4] = little_endian_uint32(
            read_little_endian_uint32(block[0:4]) + 1)
        keystream_block = AES(key = key, block = block)

        todo = min(bytelen(in), bytelen(keystream_block))
        for j = 0; j < todo; j++ {
            result = result + (keystream_block[j] ^ in[j])
        }

        in = in[todo:]
    }

    return output
}

func encrypt(key_generating_key,
            nonce,
            plaintext,
            additional_data) {
    if bytelen(plaintext) > 2**36 {
        fail()
    }
    if bytelen(additional_data) > 2**36 {
        fail()
    }

    record_encryption_key, record_authentication_key =
        derive_keys(key_generating_key)

    length_block =
        little_endian_uint64(bytelen(additional_data) * 8) ++
```

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 6]

```

    little_endian_uint64(bytelen(plaintext) * 8)
padded_plaintext = right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(plaintext)
padded_ad = right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(additional_data)
S_s = POLYVAL(key = record_authentication_key,
               input = padded_ad ++ padded_plaintext ++
                      length_block)
for i = 0; i < 12; i++ {
    S_s[i] ^= nonce[i]
}
S_s[15] &= 0x7f
tag = AES(key = record_encryption_key, block = S_s)

counter_block = S_s
counter_block[15] |= 0x80
return AES_CTR(key = record_encryption_key,
               initial_counter_block = counter_block,
               in = plaintext) ++
tag
}

```

5. Decryption

Decryption takes a 16- or 32-byte key-generating key, a 96-bit nonce, and variable-length ciphertext & additional data byte-strings. It either fails, or outputs a plaintext that is 16 bytes shorter than the ciphertext.

Firstly, the record-encryption and record-authentication keys are derived in the same manner as when encrypting.

If the ciphertext is less than 16 bytes or more than $2^{36} + 16$ bytes, then fail. Otherwise split the input into the encrypted plaintext and a 16-byte tag. Decrypt the encrypted plaintext with the record-encryption key in counter mode, where the initial counter block is the tag with the most-significant bit of the last byte set to one. The counter advances in the same way as for encryption.

Pad the additional data and plaintext with zeros until they are each a multiple of 16 bytes, the AES block size. Calculate the length block and X_1, X_2, ... as above and compute S_s = POLYVAL(record-authentication-key, X_1, X_2, ...). Compute the expected tag by XORing S_s and the nonce, clearing the most-significant bit of the last byte and encrypting with the record-encryption key. Compare the provided and expected tag values in constant time. If they do not match, fail. Otherwise return the plaintext.

In pseudo-code form, the encryption process can be expressed as:

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 7]

```
func decrypt(key_generating_key,
             nonce,
             ciphertext,
             additional_data) {
    if bytelen(ciphertext) < 16 || bytelen(ciphertext) > 2**36 + 16 {
        fail()
    }
    if bytelen(additional_data) > 2**36 {
        fail()
    }

    record_encryption_key, record_authentication_key =
        derive_keys(key_generating_key)

    tag = ciphertext[bytelen(ciphertext)-16:]

    counter_block = tag
    counter_block[15] |= 0x80
    plaintext = AES_CTR(key = record_encryption_key,
                         initial_counter_block = counter_block,
                         in = ciphertext[:bytelen(ciphertext)-16])

    length_block =
        little_endian_uint64(bytelen(additional_data) * 8) ++
        little_endian_uint64(bytelen(plaintext) * 8)
    padded_plaintext = right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(plaintext)
    padded_ad = right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(additional_data)
    S_s = POLYVAL(key = record_authentication_key,
                  input = padded_ad ++ padded_plaintext ++
                  length_block)
    for i = 0; i < 12; i++ {
        S_s[i] ^= nonce[i]
    }
    S_s[15] &= 0x7f
    expected_tag = AES(key = record_encryption_key, block = S_s)

    xor_sum = 0
    for i := 0; i < bytelen(expected_tag); i++ {
        xor_sum |= expected_tag[i] ^ tag[i]
    }

    if xor_sum != 0 {
        fail()
    }

    return plaintext
}
```

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 8]

6. AEADs

We define two AEADs, in the format of [RFC 5116](#), that use AES-GCM-SIV: AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV and AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV. They differ only in the size of the AES key used.

The key input to these AEADs becomes the key-generating key. Thus AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV takes a 16-byte key and AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV takes a 32-byte key.

The parameters for AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV are then: K_LEN is 16, P_MAX is 2^{36} , A_MAX is 2^{36} , N_MIN and N_MAX are 12 and C_MAX is $2^{36} + 16$.

The parameters for AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV differ only in the key size: K_LEN is 32, P_MAX is 2^{36} , A_MAX is $2^{32} - 1$, N_MIN and N_MAX are 12 and C_MAX is $2^{36} + 16$.

7. Field operation examples

Polynomials in this document will be written as 16-byte values. For example, the sixteen bytes 010000000000000000000000000492 would represent the polynomial $x^{127} + x^{124} + x^{121} + x^{114} + 1$, which is also the value of x^{-128} in this field.

```
If a = 66e94bd4ef8a2c3b884cfaf59ca342b2e and b =
ff000000000000000000000000000000 then a + b =
99e94bd4ef8a2c3b884cfaf59ca342b2e, a * b =
37856175e9dc9df26ebc6d6171aa0ae9 and dot(a, b) =
ebe563401e7e91ea3ad6426b8140c394.
```

8. Worked example

Consider the encryption of the plaintext "Hello world" with the additional data "example" under key ee8e1ed9ff2540ae8f2ba9f50bc2f27c using AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV. The random nonce that we'll use for this example is 752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310.

In order to generate the record-authentication and record-encryption keys, a counter is combined with the nonce to form four blocks. These blocks are encrypted with key given above:

Counter		Nonce	Ciphertext
00000000	752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310	->	310728d9911f1f38c40e952ca83d093e
01000000	752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310	->	37b24316c3fab9a046ae90952daa0450
02000000	752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310	->	a4c5ae624996327947920b2d2412474b
03000000	752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310	->	c100be4d7e2c6edd1fefef004305ab1e7

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 9]

The latter halves of the ciphertext blocks are discarded and the remaining bytes are concatenated to form the per-record keys. Thus the record-authentication key is 310728d9911f1f3837b24316c3fab9a0 and the record-encryption key is a4c5ae6249963279c100be4d7e2c6edd.

The length block contains the encoding of the bit-lengths of the additional data and plaintext, respectively. The string "example" is seven characters, thus 56 bits (or 0x38 in hex). The string "Hello world" is 11 characters, or 88 = 0x58 bits. Thus the length block is 38000000000000005800000000000000.

The input to POLYVAL is the padded additional data, padded plaintext and then the length block. This is 6578616d706c6500000000000000000048656c6c6f20776f726c64000000000038000000000000005800000000000000, based on the ASCII encoding of "example" (6578616d706c65) and of "Hello world" (48656c6c6f20776f726c64).

Calling POLYVAL with the record-authentication key and the input above results in S_s = ad7fcf0b5169851662672f3c5f95138f.

Before encrypting, the nonce is XORed in and the most-significant bit of the last byte is cleared. This gives d85575d8b1c630e256bb6c2c5f95130f because that bit happened to be one previously. Encrypting with the record-encryption key gives the tag, which is 4fbcdedb7e4793f4a1d7e4faa70100af1.

In order to form the initial counter block, the most-significant bit of the last byte of the tag is set to one. That doesn't result in a change in this example. Encrypting this with the record key gives the first block of the keystream: 1551f2c1787e81deac9a99f139540ab5.

The final ciphertext is the result of XORing the plaintext with the keystream and appending the tag. That gives 5d349ead175ef6b1def6fd4fbcdedb7e4793f4a1d7e4faa70100af1.

[9. Security Considerations](#)

A detailed analysis of these schemes appears in [[AES-GCM-SIV](#)] and the remainder of this section is a summary of that paper.

The AEADs defined in this document calculate fresh AES keys for each nonce. This allows a larger number of plaintexts to be encrypted under a given key. Without this step, each SIV encryption would be like a standard GCM encryption with a random nonce. Since the nonce size for GCM is only 12 bytes, NIST set a limit [[GCM](#)] of 2^{32} encryptions before the probability of duplicate nonces becomes too high.

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 10]

The authors felt that, while large, 2^{32} wasn't so large that this limit could be safely ignored. For example, consider encrypting the contents of a hard disk where the AEAD record size is 512 bytes, to match the traditional size of a disk sector. This process would have encrypted 2^{32} records after processing 2TB, yet hard drives of multiple terabytes are now common.

Deriving fresh AES keys for each nonce alleviates this problem.

If the nonce is fixed then AES-GCM-SIV acts like AES-GCM with a random nonce, with the caveat that identical plaintexts will produce identical ciphertexts. However, we feel that the 2^{32} limit for AES-GCM is too risky in a multi-key setting. Thus with AES-GCM-SIV we recommend that, for a specific key, a nonce not be repeated more than 2^8 times. (And, ideally, not be repeated at all.) For up to 256 repeats of a nonce, the following message limits should be respected (this assumes a short AAD):

2^{29} messages, where each plaintext is at most 1GiB

2^{35} messages, where each plaintext is at most 128MiB

2^{49} messages, where each plaintext is at most 1MiB

2^{61} messages, where each plaintext is at most 16KiB

Suzuki et al [[multibirthday](#)] show that even if nonces are selected uniformly at random, the probability that one or more values would be repeated 256 or more times is negligible until the number of nonces reaches 2^{102} . (Specifically the probability is $1/((2^{96})^{(255)}) * \text{Binomial}(q, 256)$, where q is the number of nonces.) Since 2^{102} is vastly greater than the limit on the number of plaintexts per key given above, we don't feel that this limit on the number of repeated nonces will be a problem. This also means that selecting nonces at random is a safe practice with AES-GCM-SIV.

For situations where, for some reason, an even higher number of nonce repeats is possible (e.g. in devices with very poor randomness), the message limits need to be reconsidered. Theorem seven in the paper contains more details but, for up to 1,024 repeats of each nonce, the limits would be (again assuming a short AAD):

2^{25} messages, where each plaintext is at most 1GiB

2^{31} messages, where each plaintext is at most 128MiB

2^{45} messages, where each plaintext is at most 1MiB

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 11]

2^{57} messages, where each plaintext is at most 16KiB

In addition to calculating fresh AES keys for each nonce, these AEADs also calculate fresh POLYVAL keys. Previous versions of GCM-SIV did not do this and, instead, used part of the AEAD's key as the POLYVAL key. Bleichenbacher pointed out that this allowed an attacker who controlled the AEAD key to force the POLYVAL key to be zero. If a user of this AEAD authenticated messages with a secret additional-data value then this would be insecure as the attacker could calculate a valid authenticator without knowing the input. This does not violate the standard properties of an AEAD as the additional data is not assumed to be confidential. However, we want these AEADs to be robust to plausible misuse and also to be drop-in replacements for AES-GCM and so derive nonce-specific POLYVAL keys to avoid this issue.

We also wish to note that the probability of successful forgery increases with the number of attempts that an attacker is permitted. If an attacker is permitted extremely large numbers of attempts then the tiny probability that any given attempt succeeds may sum to a non-trivial chance.

A security analysis of a similar scheme appears in [[GCM-SIV](#)].

10. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to add two entries to the registry of AEAD algorithms: AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV and AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV, both referencing this document as their specification.

11. Acknowledgements

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Appendix A. The relationship between POLYVAL and GHASH

GHASH and POLYVAL both operate in GF(2¹²⁸), although with different irreducible polynomials: POLYVAL works modulo $x^{128} + x^{127} + x^{126} + x^{121} + 1$ and GHASH works modulo $x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1$. Note that these irreducible polynomials are the "reverse" of each other.

GHASH also has a different mapping between 128-bit strings and field elements. Where as POLYVAL takes the least-significant to most-significant bits of the first byte to be the coefficients of x^0 to x^7 , GHASH takes them to be the coefficients of x^7 to x^0 . This continues until, for the last byte, POLYVAL takes the least-significant to most-significant bits to be the coefficients of x^{120} to x^{127} while GHASH takes them to be the coefficients of x^{127} to x^{120} .

The combination of these facts means that it's possible to "convert" values between the two by reversing the order of the bytes in a

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 13]

16-byte string. The differing interpretations of bit order takes care of reversing the bits within each byte and then reversing the bytes does the rest. This may have a practical benefit for implementations that wish to implement both GHASH and POLYVAL.

In order to be clear which field a given operation is performed in, let mulX_GHASH be a function that takes a 16-byte string, converts it to an element of GHASH's field using GHASH's convention, multiplies it by x and converts back to a string. Likewise, let mulX_POLYVAL be a function that converts a 16-byte string to an element of POLYVAL's field using POLYVAL's convention, multiplies it by x and converts back.

Given the 16-byte string 01000000000000000000000000000000, mulX_GHASH of that string is 00800000000000000000000000000000 and mulX_POLYVAL of that string is 02000000000000000000000000000000. As a more general example, given 9c98c04df9387ded828175a92ba652d8, mulX_GHASH of that string is 4e4c6026fc9c3ef6c140bad495d3296c and mulX_POLYVAL of it is 3931819bf271fada0503eb52574ca5f2.

Lastly, let ByteReverse be the function that takes a 16-byte string and returns a copy where the order of the bytes has been reversed.

Now GHASH and POLYVAL can be defined in terms of one another:

```
POLYVAL(H, X_1, ..., X_n) =
ByteReverse(GHASH(mulX_GHASH(ByteReverse(H)), ByteReverse(X_1), ...,
ByteReverse(X_n)))
```

```
GHASH(H, X_1, ..., X_n) =
ByteReverse(POLYVAL(mulX_POLYVAL(ByteReverse(H)), ByteReverse(X_1),
..., ByteReverse(X_n)))
```

As a worked example, let $H = 25629347589242761d31f826ba4b757b$, $X_1 = 4f4f95668c83dfb6401762bb2d01a262$ and $X_2 = d1a24ddd2721d006bbe45f20d3c9f362$. $\text{POLYVAL}(H, X_1, X_2) = f7a3b47b846119fae5b7866cf5e5b77e$. If we wished to calculate this given only an implementation of GHASH then the key for GHASH would be $\text{mulX_GHASH}(\text{ByteReverse}(H)) = dcbaa5dd137c188ebb21492c23c9b112$. Then $\text{ByteReverse}(\text{GHASH}(dcba..., \text{ByteReverse}(X_1), \text{ByteReverse}(X_2))) = f7a3b47b846119fae5b7866cf5e5b77e$, as required.

In the other direction, $\text{GHASH}(H, X_1, X_2) = bd9b3997046731fb96251b91f9c99d7a$. If we wished to calculate this given only an implementation of POLYVAL then we would first calculate the key for POLYVAL, $\text{mulX_POLYVAL}(\text{ByteReverse}(H))$, which is $f6ea96744df0633aec8424b18e26c54a$. Then $\text{ByteReverse}(\text{POLYVAL}(f6ea...,$

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 14]

```
ByteReverse(X_1), ByteReverse(X_2))) =
bd9b3997046731fb96251b91f9c99d7a.
```

[Appendix B.](#) Additional comparisons with AES-GCM

Some, non-security, properties also differ between AES-GCM and AES-GCM-SIV that are worth noting:

AES-GCM allows plaintexts to be encrypted in a streaming fashion, i.e. the beginning of the plaintext can be encrypted and transmitted before the entire message has been processed. AES-GCM-SIV requires two passes for encryption and so cannot do this.

AES-GCM allows a constant additional-data input to be precomputed in order to save per-record computation. AES-GCM-SIV varies the authenticator key based on the nonce and so does not permit this.

The performance for AES-GCM vs AES-GCM-SIV on small machines can be roughly characterised by the number of AES operations and the number of GF(2^{128}) multiplications needed to process a message. Let $a = (\text{bytelen}(\text{additional-data}) + 15) / 16$ and $p = (\text{bytelen}(\text{plaintext}) + 15) / 16$. Then AES-GCM requires $p + 1$ AES operations and $p + a + 1$ field multiplications.

Defined similarly, AES-GCM-SIV with AES-128 requires $p + 5$ AES operations and $p + a + 1$ field multiplications. With AES-256 that becomes $p + 7$ AES operations.

With large machines, the available parallelism becomes far more important and such simple performance analysis is no longer representative. For such machines, we find that decryption of AES-GCM-SIV is only about 5% slower than AES-GCM, as long as the message is at least a couple of kilobytes. Encryption tends to be about 2/3's the speed because of the additional pass required.

[Appendix C.](#) Test vectors

[C.1.](#) AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV

```
Plaintext (0 bytes) =
AAD (0 bytes) =
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input = 00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
```

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 15]

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 16]

```
Plaintext (32 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
                      02000000000000000000000000000000
```

```
AAD (0 bytes) =  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377  
Record encryption key = 4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
```

```
POLYVAL result = ce6edc9a50b36d9a98986bbf6a261c3b  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = cd6edc9a50b36d9a98986bbf6a261c3b  
... and masked = cd6edc9a50b36d9a98986bbf6a261c3b  
Tag = 1a8e45dc4578c667cd86847bf6155ff  
Initial counter = 1a8e45dc4578c667cd86847bf6155ff  
Result (48 bytes) = 84e07e62ba83a6585417245d7ec413a9  
fe427d6315c09b57ce45f2e3936a9445  
1a8e45dc4578c667cd86847bf6155ff
```

```
AAD (0 bytes) =  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377  
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcfd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
```

```
POLYVAL result = 81388746bc22d26b2abc3dc15754222  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 82388746bc22d26b2abc3dc15754222  
... and masked = 82388746bc22d26b2abc3dc15754222  
Tag = 5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8  
Initial counter = 5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8  
Result (64 bytes) = 3fd24ce1f5a67b75bf2351f181a475c7  
b800a5b4d3dcf70106b1eea82fa1d64d
```

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 17]

f42bf7226122fa92e17a40eeaac1201b
 5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8

Plaintext (64 bytes) =	01000000000000000000000000000000 02000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 04000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (0 bytes) =	
Key =	01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =	03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key =	d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key =	4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input =	01000000000000000000000000000000 02000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 04000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000002000000000000
POLYVAL result =	1e39b6d3344d348f6044f89935d1cf78
POLYVAL result XOR nonce =	1d39b6d3344d348f6044f89935d1cf78
... and masked =	1d39b6d3344d348f6044f89935d1cf78
Tag =	8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8
Initial counter =	8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8
Result (80 bytes) =	2433668f1058190f6d43e360f4f35cd8 e475127cfca7028ea8ab5c20f7ab2af0 2516a2bdcbc08d521be37ff28c152bba 36697f25b4cd169c6590d1dd39566d3f 8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8
Plaintext (8 bytes) =	0200000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) =	01
Key =	01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =	03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key =	d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key =	4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input =	01000000000000000000000000000000 02000000000000000000000000000000 080000000000004000000000000000
POLYVAL result =	b26781e7e2c1376f96bec195f3709b2a
POLYVAL result XOR nonce =	b16781e7e2c1376f96bec195f3709b2a
... and masked =	b16781e7e2c1376f96bec195f3709b2a
Tag =	3b0a1a2560969cdf790d99759abd1508
Initial counter =	3b0a1a2560969cdf790d99759abd1588
Result (24 bytes) =	1e6daba35669f4273b0a1a2560969cdf 790d99759abd1508

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 18]

```
Plaintext (12 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input =
01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
08000000000000006000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 111f5affb18e4cc1164a01bdc12a4145
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 121f5affb18e4cc1164a01bdc12a4145
... and masked = 121f5affb18e4cc1164a01bdc12a4145
Tag = 08299c5102745aaa3a0c469fad9e075a
Initial counter = 08299c5102745aaa3a0c469fad9e07da
Result (28 bytes) = 296c7889fd99f41917f4462008299c51
02745aaa3a0c469fad9e075a
```

```
Plaintext (16 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input =
01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
08000000000000008000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 79745ab508622c8a958543675fac4688
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 7a745ab508622c8a958543675fac4688
... and masked = 7a745ab508622c8a958543675fac4608
Tag = 8f8936ec039e4e4bb97ebd8c4457441f
Initial counter = 8f8936ec039e4e4bb97ebd8c4457449f
Result (32 bytes) = e2b0c5da79a901c1745f700525cb335b
8f8936ec039e4e4bb97ebd8c4457441f
```

```
Plaintext (32 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input =
01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
08000000000000001000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 2ce7daaf7c89490822051255b12eca6b
```

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 19]

```
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 2fe7daaf7c89490822051255b12eca6b
... and masked = 2fe7daaf7c89490822051255b12eca6b
Tag = e6af6a7f87287da059a71684ed3498e1
Initial counter = e6af6a7f87287da059a71684ed3498e1
Result (48 bytes) = 620048ef3c1e73e57e02bb8562c416a3
19e73e4caac8e96a1ecb2933145a1d71
e6af6a7f87287da059a71684ed3498e1

Plaintext (48 bytes) = 0200000000000000000000000000000000000000
0300000000000000000000000000000000000000
0400000000000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 0300000000000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input = 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000
0200000000000000000000000000000000000000
0300000000000000000000000000000000000000
0400000000000000000000000000000000000000
0800000000000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 9ca987715d69c1786711dfcd22f830fc
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 9fa987715d69c1786711dfcd22f830fc
... and masked = 9fa987715d69c1786711dfcd22f8307c
Tag = 6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2
Initial counter = 6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2
Result (64 bytes) = 50c8303ea93925d64090d07bd109dfd9
515a5a33431019c17d93465999a8b005
3201d723120a8562b838cdff25bf9d1e
6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2

Plaintext (64 bytes) = 0200000000000000000000000000000000000000
0300000000000000000000000000000000000000
0400000000000000000000000000000000000000
0500000000000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 0300000000000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input = 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000
0200000000000000000000000000000000000000
0300000000000000000000000000000000000000
0400000000000000000000000000000000000000
0500000000000000000000000000000000000000
0800000000000000000000000000000000000000
```

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 20]

```

POLYVAL result =          ffcd05d5770f34ad9267f0a59994b15a
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = fcc05d5770f34ad9267f0a59994b15a
... and masked =          fcc05d5770f34ad9267f0a59994b15a
Tag =                    cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae21744
Initial counter =         cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae217c4
Result (80 bytes) =      2f5c64059db55ee0fb847ed513003746
                          aca4e61c711b5de2e7a77ffd02da42fe
                          ec601910d3467bb8b36ebbaebce5fba3
                          0d36c95f48a3e7980f0e7ac299332a80
                          cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae21744

```

```

Plaintext (4 bytes) =    02000000
AAD (12 bytes) =        01000000000000000000000000000000
Key =                   01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =                 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key =   4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input =          01000000000000000000000000000000
                          02000000000000000000000000000000
                          60000000000000002000000000000000
POLYVAL result =          f6ce9d3dcd68a2fd603c7ecc18fb9918
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = f5ce9d3dcd68a2fd603c7ecc18fb9918
... and masked =          f5ce9d3dcd68a2fd603c7ecc18fb9918
Tag =                    07eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99e2f48a14
Initial counter =         07eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99e2f48a94
Result (20 bytes) =       a8fe3e8707eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99
                          e2f48a14

```

```

Plaintext (20 bytes) =   03000000000000000000000000000000
                          04000000
AAD (18 bytes) =        01000000000000000000000000000000
                          0200
Key =                   01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =                 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key =   4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input =          01000000000000000000000000000000
                          02000000000000000000000000000000
                          03000000000000000000000000000000
                          04000000000000000000000000000000
                          9000000000000000a00000000000000
POLYVAL result =          4781d492cb8f926c504caa36f61008fe
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 4481d492cb8f926c504caa36f61008fe
... and masked =          4481d492cb8f926c504caa36f610087e
Tag =                    24afc9805e976f451e6d87f6fe106514
Initial counter =         24afc9805e976f451e6d87f6fe106594

```

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 21]

Result (36 bytes) = 6bb0fecf5ded9b77f902c7d5da236a43
 91dd029724afc9805e976f451e6d87f6
 fe106514

Plaintext (18 bytes) = 03000000000000000000000000000000
 0400
 AAD (20 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000
 02000000
 Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
 Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
 Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
 Record encryption key = 4004a0dc862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
 POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
 02000000000000000000000000000000
 03000000000000000000000000000000
 04000000000000000000000000000000
 a000000000000000000000000000000
 POLYVAL result = 75cbc23a1a10e348aeb8e384b5cc79fd
 POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 76cbc23a1a10e348aeb8e384b5cc79fd
 ... and masked = 76cbc23a1a10e348aeb8e384b5cc797d
 Tag = bff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13b9fd
 Initial counter = bff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13b9fd
 Result (34 bytes) = 44d0aa6fb2f1f34add5e8064e83e12a
 2adabff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13
 b9fd

Plaintext (0 bytes) =
 AAD (0 bytes) =
 Key = e66021d5eb8e4f4066d4adb9c33560e4
 Nonce = f46e44bb3da0015c94f70887
 Record authentication key = 036ee1fe2d7926af68898095e54e7b3c
 Record encryption key = 5e46482396008223b5c1d25173d87539
 POLYVAL input = 00000000000000000000000000000000
 POLYVAL result = 00000000000000000000000000000000
 POLYVAL result XOR nonce = f46e44bb3da0015c94f7088700000000
 ... and masked = f46e44bb3da0015c94f7088700000000
 Tag = a4194b79071b01a87d65f706e3949578
 Initial counter = a4194b79071b01a87d65f706e39495f8
 Result (16 bytes) = a4194b79071b01a87d65f706e3949578

Plaintext (3 bytes) = 7a806c
 AAD (5 bytes) = 46bb91c3c5
 Key = 36864200e0eaf5284d884a0e77d31646
 Nonce = bae8e37fc83441b16034566b
 Record authentication key = 3e28de1120b2981a0155795ca2812af6
 Record encryption key = 6d4b78b31a4c9c03d8db0f42f7507fae

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 22]

```
POLYVAL input = 46bb91c3c50000000000000000000000000000000  
7a806c0000000000000000000000000000000000000000  
280000000000000018000000000000000000000000000000  
  
POLYVAL result = 43d9a745511dcfa21b96dd606f1d5720  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = f931443a99298e137ba28b0b6f1d5720  
... and masked = f931443a99298e137ba28b0b6f1d5720  
Tag = 711bd85bc1e4d3e0a462e074eea428a8  
Initial counter = 711bd85bc1e4d3e0a462e074eea428a8  
Result (19 bytes) = af60eb711bd85bc1e4d3e0a462e074ee  
a428a8
```

```
Plaintext (6 bytes) =      bdc66f146545
AAD (10 bytes) =         fc880c94a95198874296
Key =                   aedb64a6c590bc84d1a5e269e4b47801
Nonce =                 afc0577e34699b9e671fdd4f
Record authentication key = 43b8de9cea62330d15ccfc84a33e8c8
Record encryption key =   8e54631607e431e095b54852868e3a27
POLYVAL input =          fc880c94a9519887429600000000000000000000
                           bdc66f146545000000000000000000000000000000
                           500000000000000030000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result =         26498e0d2b1ef004e808c458e8f2f515
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 8989d9731f776b9a8f171917e8f2f515
... and masked =         8989d9731f776b9a8f171917e8f2f515
Tag =                   d6a9c45545cf11f03ad743dba20f966
Initial counter =        d6a9c45545cf11f03ad743dba20f9e6
Result (22 bytes) =      bb93a3e34d3cd6a9c45545cf11f03ad
                           743dba20f966
```

```
Payload (9 bytes) = 1177441f195495860f
AAD (15 bytes) = 046787f3ea22c127aa195d1894728
Key = d5cc1fd161320b6920ce07787f86743b
Nonce = 275d1ab32f6d1f0434d8848c
Record authentication key = 8a51df64d93eaf667c2c09bd454ce5c5
Record encryption key = 43ab276c2b4a473918ca73f2dd85109c
POLYVAL input = 046787f3ea22c127aa195d189472800
                  1177441f195495860f0000000000000000
                  780000000000000048000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 63a3451c0b23345ad02bba59956517cf
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 44fe5faf244e2b5ee4f33ed5956517cf
... and masked = 44fe5faf244e2b5ee4f33ed59565174f
Tag = 1d02fd0cd174c84fc5dae2f60f52fd2b
Initial counter = 1d02fd0cd174c84fc5dae2f60f52fdab
Result (25 bytes) = 4f37281f7ad12949d01d02fd0cd174c8
                   4fc5dae2f60f52fd2b
```

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 23]

```

Plaintext (12 bytes) = 9f572c614b4745914474e7c7
AAD (20 bytes) = c9882e5386fd9f92ec489c8fde2be2cf
Key = 97e74e93
Nonce = b3fed1473c528b8426a582995929a149
Record authentication key = 22f50707a95dd416df069d670cb775e8
Record encryption key = f674a5584ee21fe97b4cebc468ab61e4
POLYVAL input = c9882e5386fd9f92ec489c8fde2be2cf
97e74e9300000000000000000000000000000000
9f572c614b4745914474e7c700000000
a00000000000000006000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 0cca0423fba9d77fe7e2e6963b08cdd0
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 9250dc5bf724b4af4ca3af563b08cdd0
... and masked = 9250dc5bf724b4af4ca3af563b08cd50
Tag = c1dc2f871fb7561da1286e655e24b7b0
Initial counter = c1dc2f871fb7561da1286e655e24b7b0
Result (28 bytes) = f54673c5ddf710c745641c8bc1dc2f87
1fb7561da1286e655e24b7b0

```

```

Plaintext (15 bytes) = 0d8c8451178082355c9e940fea2f58
AAD (25 bytes) = 2950a70d5a1db2316fd568378da107b5
Key = 2b0da55210cc1c1b0a
Nonce = 2d4ed87da44102952ef94b02b805249b
Record authentication key = ac80e6f61455bfac8308a2d4
Record encryption key = 0b00a29a83e7e95b92e3a0783b29f140
POLYVAL input = a430c27f285aed913005975c42eed5f3
2950a70d5a1db2316fd568378da107b5
2b0da55210cc1c1b0a0000000000000000
0d8c8451178082355c9e940fea2f5800
c8000000000000007800000000000000
POLYVAL result = 1086ef25247aa41009bbc40871d9b350
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = bc0609d3302f1bbc8ab366dc71d9b350
... and masked = bc0609d3302f1bbc8ab366dc71d9b350
Tag = 83b3449b9f39552de99dc214a1190b0b
Initial counter = 83b3449b9f39552de99dc214a1190b8b
Result (31 bytes) = c9ff545e07b88a015f05b274540aa183
b3449b9f39552de99dc214a1190b0b

```

```

Plaintext (18 bytes) = 6b3db4da3d57aa94842b9803a96e07fb
6de7
AAD (30 bytes) = 1860f762ebfb08284e421702de0de18
baa9c9596291b08466f37de21c7f
Key = bde3b2f204d1e9f8b06bc47f9745b3d1
Nonce = ae06556fb6aa7890bebc18fe
Record authentication key = 21c874a8bad3603d1c3e8784df5b3f9f
Record encryption key = d1c16d72651c3df504eae27129d818e8

```

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 24]

```

POLYVAL input =          1860f762ebfb08284e421702de0de18
                         baa9c9596291b08466f37de21c7f0000
                         6b3db4da3d57aa94842b9803a96e07fb
                         6de7000000000000000000000000000000000000
                         f0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result =          55462a5afa0da8d646481e049ef9c764
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = fb407f354ca7d046f8f406fa9ef9c764
... and masked =          fb407f354ca7d046f8f406fa9ef9c764
Tag =                    3e377094f04709f64d7b985310a4db84
Initial counter =         3e377094f04709f64d7b985310a4db84
Result (34 bytes) =       6298b296e24e8cc35dce0bed484b7f30
                           d5803e377094f04709f64d7b985310a4
                           db84

Plaintext (21 bytes) =    e42a3c02c25b64869e146d7b233987bd
                           dfc240871d
AAD (35 bytes) =          7576f7028ec6eb5ea7e298342a94d4b2
                           02b370ef9768ec6561c4fe6b7e7296fa
                           859c21
Key =                    f901cfe8a69615a93fdf7a98cad48179
Nonce =                  6245709fb18853f68d833640
Record authentication key = 3724f55f1d22ac0ab830da0b6a995d74
Record encryption key =   75ac87b70c05db287de779006105a344
POLYVAL input =           7576f7028ec6eb5ea7e298342a94d4b2
                           02b370ef9768ec6561c4fe6b7e7296fa
                           859c2100000000000000000000000000000000
                           e42a3c02c25b64869e146d7b233987bd
                           dfc240871d000000000000000000000000000000
                           1801000000000000a80000000000000000
                           4cbba090f03f7d1188ea55749fa6c7bd
POLYVAL result =          2efed00f41b72ee7056963349fa6c7bd
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 2efed00f41b72ee7056963349fa6c73d
... and masked =          2d15506c84a9edd65e13e9d24a2a6e70
Tag =                    2d15506c84a9edd65e13e9d24a2a6ef0
Initial counter =         391cc328d484a4f46406181bcd62efd9
Result (37 bytes) =       b3ee197d052d15506c84a9edd65e13e9
                           d24a2a6e70

```

[C.2. AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV](#)

```

Plaintext (0 bytes) =
AAD (0 bytes) =
Key =                  01000000000000000000000000000000
                           00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =                 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key =   b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3

```

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 25]

POLYVAL input =	456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL result =	00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result XOR nonce =	00000000000000000000000000000000
... and masked =	03000000000000000000000000000000
Tag =	07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd400f
Initial counter =	07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd408f
Result (16 bytes) =	07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd400f
Plaintext (8 bytes) =	0100000000000000
AAD (0 bytes) =	
Key =	01000000000000000000000000000000
	00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =	03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key =	b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key =	b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
	456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input =	01000000000000000000000000000000
	00000000000000004000000000000000
POLYVAL result =	05230f62f0eac8aa14fe4d646b59cd41
POLYVAL result XOR nonce =	06230f62f0eac8aa14fe4d646b59cd41
... and masked =	06230f62f0eac8aa14fe4d646b59cd41
Tag =	843122130f7364b761e0b97427e3df28
Initial counter =	843122130f7364b761e0b97427e3dfa8
Result (24 bytes) =	c2ef328e5c71c83b843122130f7364b7 61e0b97427e3df28
Plaintext (12 bytes) =	01000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (0 bytes) =	
Key =	01000000000000000000000000000000
	00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =	03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key =	b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key =	b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
	456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input =	01000000000000000000000000000000
	00000000000000006000000000000000
POLYVAL result =	6d81a24732fd6d03ae5af544720a1c13
POLYVAL result XOR nonce =	6e81a24732fd6d03ae5af544720a1c13
... and masked =	6e81a24732fd6d03ae5af544720a1c13
Tag =	8ca50da9ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca17e
Initial counter =	8ca50da9ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca1fe
Result (28 bytes) =	9aab2aeb3faa0a34aea8e2b18ca50da9 ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca17e

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 26]

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 27]

```
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
                        456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input =
                        01000000000000000000000000000000
                        02000000000000000000000000000000
                        03000000000000000000000000000000
                        00000000000000008001000000000000
POLYVAL result = c1f8593d8fc29b0c290cae1992f71f51
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = c2f8593d8fc29b0c290cae1992f71f51
... and masked = c2f8593d8fc29b0c290cae1992f71f51
Tag = 790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4
Initial counter = 790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4
Result (64 bytes) = c00d121893a9fa603f48ccc1ca3c57ce
                    7499245ea0046db16c53c7c66fe717e3
                    9cf6c748837b61f6ee3adcee17534ed5
                    790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4

Plaintext (64 bytes) =
                        01000000000000000000000000000000
                        02000000000000000000000000000000
                        03000000000000000000000000000000
                        04000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (0 bytes) =
Key =
Nonce =
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3
                        456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input =
                        01000000000000000000000000000000
                        02000000000000000000000000000000
                        03000000000000000000000000000000
                        04000000000000000000000000000000
                        000000000000000020000000000000
POLYVAL result = 6ef38b06046c7c0e225efaef8e2ec4c4
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 6df38b06046c7c0e225efaef8e2ec4c4
... and masked = 6df38b06046c7c0e225efaef8e2ec444
Tag = 112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa08
Initial counter = 112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa88
Result (80 bytes) = c2d5160a1f8683834910acdafc41fbb1
                    632d4a353e8b905ec9a5499ac34f96c7
                    e1049eb080883891a4db8caa1f99dd0
                    04d80487540735234e3744512c6f90ce
                    112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa08

Plaintext (8 bytes) = 0200000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
```

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 28]

Key =	01000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =	03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key =	b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key =	b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input =	01000000000000000000000000000000 02000000000000000000000000000000 08000000000000004000000000000000
POLYVAL result =	34e57bafe011b9b36fc6821b7ffb3354
POLYVAL result XOR nonce =	37e57bafe011b9b36fc6821b7ffb3354
... and masked =	37e57bafe011b9b36fc6821b7ffb3354
Tag =	91213f267e3b452f02d01ae33e4ec854
Initial counter =	91213f267e3b452f02d01ae33e4ec8d4
Result (24 bytes) =	1de22967237a813291213f267e3b452f 02d01ae33e4ec854

Plaintext (12 bytes) =	02000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) =	01
Key =	01000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =	03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key =	b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key =	b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input =	01000000000000000000000000000000 02000000000000000000000000000000 08000000000000600000000000000000
POLYVAL result =	5c47d68a22061c1ad5623a3b66a8e206
POLYVAL result XOR nonce =	5f47d68a22061c1ad5623a3b66a8e206
... and masked =	5f47d68a22061c1ad5623a3b66a8e206 c1a4a19ae800941ccdc57cc8413c277f
Tag =	c1a4a19ae800941ccdc57cc8413c27ff
Initial counter =	c1a4a19ae800941ccdc57cc8413c27ff
Result (28 bytes) =	163d6f9cc1b346cd453a2e4cc1a4a19a e800941ccdc57cc8413c277f

Plaintext (16 bytes) =	02000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) =	01
Key =	01000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =	03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key =	b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key =	b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input =	01000000000000000000000000000000 02000000000000000000000000000000

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 29]

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 30]

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 31]

POLYVAL input =	01000000000000000000000000000000 02000000000000000000000000000000 60000000000000002000000000000000
POLYVAL result =	6dc76ae84b88916e073a303aafde05cf
POLYVAL result XOR nonce =	6ec76ae84b88916e073a303aafde05cf
... and masked =	6ec76ae84b88916e073a303aafde054f
Tag =	1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4661b74cf
Initial counter =	1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4661b74cf
Result (20 bytes) =	22b3f4cd1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4 661b74cf
Plaintext (20 bytes) =	03000000000000000000000000000000 04000000
AAD (18 bytes) =	01000000000000000000000000000000 0200
Key =	01000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =	03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key =	b5d3c529dfa ^f ac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key =	b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input =	01000000000000000000000000000000 02000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 04000000000000000000000000000000 9000000000000000a000000000000000
POLYVAL result =	973ef4fd04bd31d193816ab26f8655ca
POLYVAL result XOR nonce =	943ef4fd04bd31d193816ab26f8655ca
... and masked =	943ef4fd04bd31d193816ab26f86554a
Tag =	b879ad976d8242acc188ab59cabfe307
Initial counter =	b879ad976d8242acc188ab59cabfe387
Result (36 bytes) =	43dd0163cdb48f9fe3212bf61b201976 067f342bb879ad976d8242acc188ab59 cabfe307
Plaintext (18 bytes) =	03000000000000000000000000000000 0400
AAD (20 bytes) =	01000000000000000000000000000000 02000000
Key =	01000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =	03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key =	b5d3c529dfa ^f ac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key =	b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3 456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input =	01000000000000000000000000000000

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 32]

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 33]

```

Plaintext (6 bytes) = 195495860f04
AAD (10 bytes) = 6787f3ea22c127aaf195
Key = 6545fc880c94a95198874296d5cc1fd1
       61320b6920ce07787f86743b275d1ab3
Nonce = 2f6d1f0434d8848c1177441f
Record authentication key = e156e1f9b0b07b780cbe30f259e3c8da
Record encryption key = 6fc1c494519f944aae52fcd8b14e5b17
                        1b5a9429d3b76e430d49940c0021d612
POLYVAL input = 6787f3ea22c127aaf19500000000000000
                  195495860f0400000000000000000000
                  50000000000000003000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 2c480ed9d236b1df24c6eec109bd40c1
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 032511dde6ee355335b1aad09bd40c1
... and masked = 032511dde6ee355335b1aad09bd4041
Tag = 6b62b84dc40c84636a5ec12020ec8c2c
Initial counter = 6b62b84dc40c84636a5ec12020ec8cac
Result (22 bytes) = a254dad4f3f96b62b84dc40c84636a5e
                   c12020ec8c2c

```

```

Plaintext (9 bytes) = c9882e5386fd9f92ec
AAD (15 bytes) = 489c8fde2be2cf97e74e932d4ed87d
Key = d1894728b3fed1473c528b8426a58299
       5929a1499e9ad8780c8d63d0ab4149c0
Nonce = 9f572c614b4745914474e7c7
Record authentication key = 0533fd71f4119257361a3ff1469dd4e5
Record encryption key = 4feba89799be8ac3684fa2bb30ade0ea
                        51390e6d87dcf3627d2ee44493853abe
POLYVAL input = 489c8fde2be2cf97e74e932d4ed87d00
                  c9882e5386fd9f92ec0000000000000000
                  78000000000000004800000000000000
POLYVAL result = bf160bc9ded8c63057d2c38aae552fb4
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 204127a8959f83a113a6244dae552fb4
... and masked = 204127a8959f83a113a6244dae552f34
Tag = c0fd3dc6628dfe55ebb0b9fb2295c8c2
Initial counter = c0fd3dc6628dfe55ebb0b9fb2295c8c2
Result (25 bytes) = 0df9e308678244c44bc0fd3dc6628dfe
                   55ebb0b9fb2295c8c2

```

```

Plaintext (12 bytes) = 1db2316fd568378da107b52b
AAD (20 bytes) = 0da55210cc1c1b0abde3b2f204d1e9f8
Key = b06bc47f
      a44102952ef94b02b805249bac80e6f6
      1455bfac8308a2d40d8c845117808235
Nonce = 5c9e940fea2f582950a70d5a
Record authentication key = 64779ab10ee8a280272f14cc8851b727
Record encryption key = 25f40fc63f49d3b9016a8eeeb75846e0

```

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 34]

```
POLYVAL input = d72ca36ddbd312b6f5ef38ad14bd2651
0da55210cc1c1b0abde3b2f204d1e9f8
b06bc47f00000000000000000000000000
1db2316fd568378da107b52b00000000
a00000000000000006000000000000000
cc86ee22c861e1fd474c84676b42739c
90187a2d224eb9d417eb893d6b42739c
90187a2d224eb9d417eb893d6b42731c
404099c2587f64979f21826706d497d5
404099c2587f64979f21826706d497d5
8dbeb9f7255bf5769dd56692404099c2
587f64979f21826706d497d5

Plaintext (15 bytes) = 21702de0de18baa9c9596291b08466
AAD (25 bytes) = f37de21c7ff901cf8a69615a93fdf7a
98cad481796245709f
Key = 9745b3d1ae06556fb6aa7890bebc18fe
6b3db4da3d57aa94842b9803a96e07fb
Nonce = 6de71860f762ebfb08284e4
Record authentication key = 27c2959ed4daea3b1f52e849478de376
Record encryption key = 307a38a5a6cf231c0a9af3b527f23a62
e9a6ff09aff8ae669f760153e864fc93
f37de21c7ff901cf8a69615a93fdf7a
98cad481796245709f000000000000000
21702de0de18baa9c9596291b0846600
c8000000000000007800000000000000
POLYVAL input = c4fa5e5b713853703bcf8e6424505fa5
POLYVAL result = a91d463b865ab88beb4d0a8024505fa5
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = a91d463b865ab88beb4d0a8024505f25
... and masked = b3080d28f6ebb5d3648ce97bd5ba67fd
Tag = b3080d28f6ebb5d3648ce97bd5ba67fd
Initial counter = b3080d28f6ebb5d3648ce97bd5ba67fd
Result (31 bytes) = 793576dfa5c0f88729a7ed3c2f1bffb3
080d28f6ebb5d3648ce97bd5ba67fd

Plaintext (18 bytes) = b202b370ef9768ec6561c4fe6b7e7296
fa85
AAD (30 bytes) = 9c2159058b1f0fe91433a5bdc20e214e
ab7fecef4454a10ef0657df21ac7
Key = b18853f68d833640e42a3c02c25b6486
9e146d7b233987bddfc240871d7576f7
Nonce = 028ec6eb5ea7e298342a94d4
Record authentication key = 670b98154076ddb59b7a9137d0dcc0f0
Record encryption key = 78116d78507fbe69d4a820c350f55c7c
b36c3c9287df0e9614b142b76a587c3f
POLYVAL input = 9c2159058b1f0fe91433a5bdc20e214e
ab7fecef4454a10ef0657df21ac70000
```

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 35]

```

POLYVAL result = b202b370ef9768ec6561c4fe6b7e7296
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = fa850000000000000000000000000000
... and masked = f000000000000000000000000000000
Tag = 4e4108f09f41d797dc9256f8da8d58c7
Initial counter = 4ccfce1bc1e6350fe8b8c22cda8d58c7
Result (34 bytes) = 4ccfce1bc1e6350fe8b8c22cda8d5847
                    454fc2a154fea91f8363a39fec7d0a49
                    454fc2a154fea91f8363a39fec7d0ac9
                    857e16a64915a787637687db4a951963
                    5cd454fc2a154fea91f8363a39fec7d
                    0a49

Plaintext (21 bytes) = ced532ce4159b035277d4dfbb7db6296
AAD (35 bytes) = 8b13cd4eec
                  734320ccc9d9bbbb19cb81b2af4ecbc3
                  e72834321f7aa0f70b7282b4f33df23f
                  167541
Key = 3c535de192eaed3822a2fbbe2ca9dfc8
Nonce = 8255e14a661b8aa82cc54236093bbc23
Record authentication key = 688089e55540db1872504e1c
Record encryption key = cb8c3aa3f8dbaeb4b28a3e86ff6625f8
                        02426ce1aa3ab31313b0848469a1b5fc
                        6c9af9602600b195b04ad407026bc06d

POLYVAL input = 734320ccc9d9bbbb19cb81b2af4ecbc3
                  e72834321f7aa0f70b7282b4f33df23f
                  16754100000000000000000000000000000000
                  ced532ce4159b035277d4dfbb7db6296
                  8b13cd4eec0000000000000000000000000000
                  180100000000000a8000000000000000
POLYVAL result = ffd503c7dd712eb3791b7114b17bb0cf
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 97558a228831f5ab0b4b3f08b17bb0cf
... and masked = 97558a228831f5ab0b4b3f08b17bb04f
Tag = 9d6c7029675b89eaf4ba1ded1a286594
Initial counter = 9d6c7029675b89eaf4ba1ded1a286594
Result (37 bytes) = 626660c26ea6612fb17ad91e8e767639
                    edd6c9faee9d6c7029675b89eaf4ba1d
                    ed1a286594

```

[C.3. Counter wrap tests](#)

The tests in this section use AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV and are crafted to test correct wrapping of the block counter.

Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

[Page 36]

Plaintext (32 bytes) =	00000000000000000000000000000000 4db923dc793ee6497c76dcc03a98e108
AAD (0 bytes) =	
Key =	00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =	00000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key =	dc95c078a24089895275f3d86b4fb868
Record encryption key =	779b38d15bffb63d39d6e9ae76a9b2f3 75d11b0e3a68c422845c7d4690fa594f
POLYVAL input =	00000000000000000000000000000000 4db923dc793ee6497c76dcc03a98e108 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result =	7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
POLYVAL result XOR nonce =	7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
... and masked =	7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
Tag =	ffffffff00000000000000000000000000000000
Initial counter =	ffffffff00000000000000000000000000000080
Result (48 bytes) =	f3f80f2cf0cb2dd9c5984fcda908456c c537703b5ba70324a6793a7bf218d3ea ffffffff00000000000000000000000000000000
Plaintext (24 bytes) =	eb3640277c7ffd1303c7a542d02d3e4c 0000000000000000
AAD (0 bytes) =	
Key =	00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =	00000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key =	dc95c078a24089895275f3d86b4fb868
Record encryption key =	779b38d15bffb63d39d6e9ae76a9b2f3 75d11b0e3a68c422845c7d4690fa594f
POLYVAL input =	eb3640277c7ffd1303c7a542d02d3e4c 00000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000c000000000000000
POLYVAL result =	7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
POLYVAL result XOR nonce =	7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
... and masked =	7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
Tag =	ffffffff00000000000000000000000000000000
Initial counter =	ffffffff00000000000000000000000000000080
Result (40 bytes) =	18ce4f0b8cb4d0cac65fea8f79257b20 888e53e72299e56dfffffff00000000 0000000000000000

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Gueron, et al.

Expires January 27, 2018

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