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**AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption**  
**draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-08**

**Abstract**

This memo specifies two authenticated encryption algorithms that are nonce misuse-resistant - that is that they do not fail catastrophically if a nonce is repeated.

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## [1.](#) Introduction

The concept of "Authenticated encryption with additional data" (AEAD [[RFC5116](#)]) couples confidentiality and integrity in a single operation that is easier to use correctly. The most popular AEAD, AES-GCM [[GCM](#)], is seeing widespread use due to its attractive performance.

However, most AEADs suffer catastrophic failures of confidentiality and/or integrity when two distinct messages are encrypted with the same nonce. While the requirements for AEADs specify that the pair of (key, nonce) shall only ever be used once, and thus prohibit this, in practice this is a worry.

Nonce misuse-resistant AEADs do not suffer from this problem. For this class of AEADs, encrypting two messages with the same nonce only discloses whether the messages were equal or not. This is the minimum amount of information that a deterministic algorithm can leak in this situation.



This memo specifies two nonce misuse-resistant AEADs:

"AEAD\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SIV" and "AEAD\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SIV". These AEADs are designed to be able to take advantage of existing hardware support for AES-GCM and can decrypt within 5% of the speed of AES-GCM (for multi-kilobyte messages). Encryption is, perforce, slower than AES-GCM because two passes are required. However, measurements suggest that it can still run at 2/3rds of the speed of AES-GCM.

We suggest that these AEADs be considered in any situation where nonce uniqueness cannot be guaranteed. This includes situations where there is no stateful counter or where such state cannot be guaranteed, as when multiple encryptors use the same key. As discussed in [Section 9](#), it is RECOMMENDED to use this scheme with randomly chosen nonces.

## **2. Requirements Language**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

## **3. POLYVAL**

The GCM-SIV construction is similar to GCM: the block cipher is used in counter mode to encrypt the plaintext and a polynomial authenticator is used to provide integrity. The authenticator in GCM-SIV is called POLYVAL.

POLYVAL, like GHASH, operates in a binary field of size  $2^{128}$ . The field is defined by the irreducible polynomial  $x^{128} + x^{127} + x^{126} + x^{121} + 1$ . The sum of any two elements in the field is the result of XORing them. The product of any two elements is calculated using standard (binary) polynomial multiplication followed by reduction modulo the irreducible polynomial.

We define another binary operation on elements of the field:  $\text{dot}(a, b)$ , where  $\text{dot}(a, b) = a * b * x^{-128}$ . The value of the field element  $x^{-128}$  is equal to  $x^{127} + x^{124} + x^{121} + x^{114} + 1$ . The result,  $\text{dot}(a, b)$ , of this multiplication is another field element.

Polynomials in this field are converted to and from 128-bit strings by taking the least-significant bit of the first byte to be the coefficient of  $x^0$ , the most-significant bit of the first byte to the coefficient of  $x^7$  and so on, until the most-significant bit of the last byte is the coefficient of  $x^{127}$ .



POLYVAL takes a field element,  $H$ , and a series of field elements  $X_1, \dots, X_s$ . Its result is  $S_s$ , where  $S$  is defined by the iteration  $S_0 = 0$ ;  $S_j = \text{dot}(S_{j-1} + X_j, H)$ , for  $j = 0..s$

We note that  $\text{POLYVAL}(H, X_1, X_2, \dots)$  is equal to  $\text{ByteReverse}(\text{GHASH}(\text{ByteReverse}(H) * x, \text{ByteReverse}(X_1), \text{ByteReverse}(X_2), \dots))$ , where  $\text{ByteReverse}$  is a function that reverses the order of 16 bytes. See [Appendix A](#) for a more detailed explanation.

#### 4. Encryption

AES-GCM-SIV encryption takes a 16- or 32-byte key-generating key, a 96-bit nonce, and variable-length plaintext & additional data byte-strings. It outputs an authenticated ciphertext that will be 16 bytes longer than the plaintext. Both encryption and decryption are only defined on inputs that are a whole number of bytes.

If the key-generating key is 16 bytes long then AES-128 is used throughout. Otherwise AES-256 is used throughout.

The first step of encryption is to generate per-nonce, record-authentication and record-encryption keys. The record-authentication key is 128-bit and the record-encryption key is either 128- (for AES-128) or 256-bit (for AES-256).

These keys are generated by encrypting a series of plaintext blocks that contain a 32-bit, little-endian counter followed by the nonce, and then discarding the second half of the resulting ciphertext. In the AES-128 case,  $128 + 128 = 256$  bits of key material need to be generated and, since encrypting each block yields 64 bits after discarding half, four blocks need to be encrypted. The counter values for these blocks are 0, 1, 2 and 3. For AES-256, six blocks are needed in total, with counter values 0 through 5 (inclusive).

In pseudocode form, where  $++$  indicates concatenation and  $x[:8]$  indicates taking only the first eight bytes from  $x$ :



```

func derive_keys(key_generating_key, nonce) {
    record_authentication_key =
        AES(key = key_generating_key,
            block = little_endian_uint32(0) ++ nonce)[:8] ++
        AES(key = key_generating_key,
            block = little_endian_uint32(1) ++ nonce)[:8]
    record_encryption_key =
        AES(key = key_generating_key,
            block = little_endian_uint32(2) ++ nonce)[:8] ++
        AES(key = key_generating_key,
            block = little_endian_uint32(3) ++ nonce)[:8]

    if bytelen(key_generating_key) == 32 {
        record_encryption_key +=
            AES(key = key_generating_key,
                block = little_endian_uint32(4) ++ nonce)[:8] ++
            AES(key = key_generating_key,
                block = little_endian_uint32(5) ++ nonce)[:8]
    }

    return record_authentication_key, record_encryption_key
}

```

Define the "length block" as a 16-byte value that is the concatenation of the 64-bit, little-endian encodings of  $\text{bytelen}(\text{additional\_data}) * 8$  and  $\text{bytelen}(\text{plaintext}) * 8$ . Pad the plaintext and additional data with zeros until they are each a multiple of 16 bytes, the AES block size. Then  $X_1, X_2, \dots$  (the series of field elements that are inputs to POLYVAL) are the concatenation of the padded additional data, the padded plaintext and the length block.

Calculate  $S_s = \text{POLYVAL}(\text{record-authentication-key}, X_1, X_2, \dots)$ . XOR the first twelve bytes of  $S_s$  with the nonce and clear the most-significant bit of the last byte. Encrypt the result with AES using the record-encryption key to produce the tag.

The encrypted plaintext is produced by using AES, with the record-encryption key, in counter mode on the unpadded plaintext. The initial counter block is the tag with the most-significant bit of the last byte set to one. The counter advances by incrementing the first 32 bits interpreted as an unsigned, little-endian integer, with overflow. The result of the encryption is the encrypted plaintext (truncated to the length of the plaintext) followed by the tag.

In pseudo-code form, the encryption process can be expressed as:

```

func right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(input) {

```



```
while (bytelen(input) % 16 != 0) {
    input = input ++ "\x00"
}
return input
}

func AES_CTR(key, initial_counter_block, in) {
    block = initial_counter_block

    output = ""
    while bytelen(in) > 0 {
        keystream_block = AES(key = key, block = block)
        block[0:4] = little_endian_uint32(
            read_little_endian_uint32(block[0:4]) + 1)

        todo = min(bytelen(in), bytelen(keystream_block))
        for j = 0; j < todo; j++ {
            output = output ++ (keystream_block[j] ^ in[j])
        }

        in = in[todo:]
    }

    return output
}

func encrypt(key_generating_key,
             nonce,
             plaintext,
             additional_data) {
    if bytelen(plaintext) > 2**36 {
        fail()
    }
    if bytelen(additional_data) > 2**36 {
        fail()
    }

    record_encryption_key, record_authentication_key =
        derive_keys(key_generating_key, nonce)

    length_block =
        little_endian_uint64(bytelen(additional_data) * 8) ++
        little_endian_uint64(bytelen(plaintext) * 8)
    padded_plaintext = right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(plaintext)
    padded_ad = right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(additional_data)
    S_s = POLYVAL(key = record_authentication_key,
                  input = padded_ad ++ padded_plaintext ++
                      length_block)
```



```
    for i = 0; i < 12; i++ {
        S_s[i] ^= nonce[i]
    }
    S_s[15] &= 0x7f
    tag = AES(key = record_encryption_key, block = S_s)

    counter_block = tag
    counter_block[15] |= 0x80
    return AES_CTR(key = record_encryption_key,
                  initial_counter_block = counter_block,
                  in = plaintext) ++
    tag
}
```

## 5. Decryption

Decryption takes a 16- or 32-byte key-generating key, a 96-bit nonce, and variable-length ciphertext & additional data byte-strings. It either fails, or outputs a plaintext that is 16 bytes shorter than the ciphertext.

Firstly, the record-encryption and record-authentication keys are derived in the same manner as when encrypting.

If the ciphertext is less than 16 bytes or more than  $2^{36} + 16$  bytes, then fail. Otherwise split the input into the encrypted plaintext and a 16-byte tag. Decrypt the encrypted plaintext with the record-encryption key in counter mode, where the initial counter block is the tag with the most-significant bit of the last byte set to one. The counter advances in the same way as for encryption.

Pad the additional data and plaintext with zeros until they are each a multiple of 16 bytes, the AES block size. Calculate the length block and  $X_1$ ,  $X_2$ , ... as above and compute  $S_s = \text{POLYVAL}(\text{record-authentication-key}, X_1, X_2, \dots)$ . Compute the expected tag by XORing  $S_s$  and the nonce, clearing the most-significant bit of the last byte and encrypting with the record-encryption key. Compare the provided and expected tag values in constant time. If they do not match, fail. Otherwise return the plaintext.

In pseudo-code form, the decryption process can be expressed as:



```
func decrypt(key_generating_key,
             nonce,
             ciphertext,
             additional_data) {
  if bytelen(ciphertext) < 16 || bytelen(ciphertext) > 2**36 + 16 {
    fail()
  }
  if bytelen(additional_data) > 2**36 {
    fail()
  }

  record_encryption_key, record_authentication_key =
    derive_keys(key_generating_key, nonce)

  tag = ciphertext[bytelen(ciphertext)-16:]

  counter_block = tag
  counter_block[15] |= 0x80
  plaintext = AES_CTR(key = record_encryption_key,
                     initial_counter_block = counter_block,
                     in = ciphertext[:bytelen(ciphertext)-16])

  length_block =
    little_endian_uint64(bytelen(additional_data) * 8) ++
    little_endian_uint64(bytelen(plaintext) * 8)
  padded_plaintext = right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(plaintext)
  padded_ad = right_pad_to_multiple_of_16_bytes(additional_data)
  S_s = POLYVAL(key = record_authentication_key,
               input = padded_ad ++ padded_plaintext ++
               length_block)
  for i = 0; i < 12; i++ {
    S_s[i] ^= nonce[i]
  }
  S_s[15] &= 0x7f
  expected_tag = AES(key = record_encryption_key, block = S_s)

  xor_sum = 0
  for i := 0; i < bytelen(expected_tag); i++ {
    xor_sum |= expected_tag[i] ^ tag[i]
  }

  if xor_sum != 0 {
    fail()
  }

  return plaintext
}
```



## 6. AEADs

We define two AEADs, in the format of [RFC 5116](#), that use AES-GCM-SIV: AEAD\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SIV and AEAD\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SIV. They differ only in the size of the AES key used.

The key input to these AEADs becomes the key-generating key. Thus AEAD\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SIV takes a 16-byte key and AEAD\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SIV takes a 32-byte key.

The parameters for AEAD\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SIV are then: K\_LEN is 16, P\_MAX is  $2^{36}$ , A\_MAX is  $2^{36}$ , N\_MIN and N\_MAX are 12 and C\_MAX is  $2^{36} + 16$ .

The parameters for AEAD\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SIV differ only in the key size: K\_LEN is 32, P\_MAX is  $2^{36}$ , A\_MAX is  $2^{36}$ , N\_MIN and N\_MAX are 12 and C\_MAX is  $2^{36} + 16$ .

## 7. Field operation examples

Polynomials in this document will be written as 16-byte values. For example, the sixteen bytes 010000000000000000000000000000492 would represent the polynomial  $x^{127} + x^{124} + x^{121} + x^{114} + 1$ , which is also the value of  $x^{-128}$  in this field.

If  $a = 66e94bd4ef8a2c3b884cfa59ca342b2e$  and  $b = ff000000000000000000000000000000$  then  $a + b = 99e94bd4ef8a2c3b884cfa59ca342b2e$ ,  $a * b = 37856175e9dc9df26ebc6d6171aa0ae9$  and  $\text{dot}(a, b) = ebe563401e7e91ea3ad6426b8140c394$ .

## 8. Worked example

Consider the encryption of the plaintext "Hello world" with the additional data "example" under key ee8e1ed9ff2540ae8f2ba9f50bc2f27c using AEAD\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SIV. The random nonce that we'll use for this example is 752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310.

In order to generate the record-authentication and record-encryption keys, a counter is combined with the nonce to form four blocks. These blocks are encrypted with key given above:

| Counter  | Nonce                    | Ciphertext                          |
|----------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 00000000 | 752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310 | -> 310728d9911f1f38c40e952ca83d093e |
| 01000000 | 752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310 | -> 37b24316c3fab9a046ae90952daa0450 |
| 02000000 | 752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310 | -> a4c5ae624996327947920b2d2412474b |
| 03000000 | 752abad3e0afb5f434dc4310 | -> c100be4d7e2c6edd1efef004305ab1e7 |



The latter halves of the ciphertext blocks are discarded and the remaining bytes are concatenated to form the per-record keys. Thus the record-authentication key is 310728d9911f1f3837b24316c3fab9a0 and the record-encryption key is a4c5ae6249963279c100be4d7e2c6edd.

The length block contains the encoding of the bit-lengths of the additional data and plaintext, respectively. The string "example" is seven characters, thus 56 bits (or 0x38 in hex). The string "Hello world" is 11 characters, or 88 = 0x58 bits. Thus the length block is 38000000000000000580000000000000.

The input to POLYVAL is the padded additional data, padded plaintext and then the length block. This is 6578616d706c65000000000000000000048656c6c6f20776f726c64000000000038000000000000000580000000000000, based on the ASCII encoding of "example" (6578616d706c65) and of "Hello world" (48656c6c6f20776f726c64).

Calling POLYVAL with the record-authentication key and the input above results in `S_s` = ad7fcf0b5169851662672f3c5f95138f.

Before encrypting, the nonce is XORed in and the most-significant bit of the last byte is cleared. This gives d85575d8b1c630e256bb6c2c5f95130f because that bit happened to be one previously. Encrypting with the record-encryption key gives the tag, which is 4fbcdeb7e4793f4a1d7e4faa70100af1.

In order to form the initial counter block, the most-significant bit of the last byte of the tag is set to one. That doesn't result in a change in this example. Encrypting this with the record key gives the first block of the keystream: 1551f2c1787e81deac9a99f139540ab5.

The final ciphertext is the result of XORing the plaintext with the keystream and appending the tag. That gives 5d349ead175ef6b1def6fd4fbcdeb7e4793f4a1d7e4faa70100af1.

## 9. Security Considerations

A detailed analysis of these schemes appears in [\[AES-GCM-SIV\]](#) and the remainder of this section is a summary of that paper.

The AEADs defined in this document calculate fresh AES keys for each nonce. This allows a larger number of plaintexts to be encrypted under a given key. Without this step, AES-GCM-SIV encryption would be limited by the birthday bound like other standard modes (e.g., AES-GCM, AES-CCM, AES-SIV). This means that when  $2^{64}$  blocks have been encrypted overall, the adversary has an advantage of  $1/2$ . Thus, in order to limit the adversary's advantage to  $2^{-32}$ , at most  $2^{48}$  blocks can be encrypted overall. In contrast, by deriving fresh keys



from each nonce, it is possible to encrypt a far larger number of messages and blocks with AES-GCM-SIV.

We stress that nonce-misuse resistant schemes guarantee that if a nonce repeats then the only security loss is that identical plaintexts will produce identical ciphertexts. Since this can also be a concern (as the fact that the same plaintext has been encrypted twice is revealed), we do not recommend using a fixed nonce as a policy. In addition, as we show below, better-than-birthday bounds are achieved by AES-GCM-SIV when nonces repetition is low. Finally, as shown in [BHT18], there is a great security benefit in the multi-user/multi-key setting when each particular nonce is re-used by a small number of users only. We stress that nonce-misuse resistance was never intended to be used with intentional nonce-reuse; rather, such schemes provide the best possible security in the event of nonce reuse. Due to all of the above, it is RECOMMENDED that nonces be randomly generated.

Some example usage bounds for AES-GCM-SIV are given below (for these bounds, the adversary's advantage is always below  $2^{-32}$ ). For up to 256 repeats of a nonce (i.e., where one can assume that nonce misuse is no more than this bound), the following message limits should be respected (this assumes a short AAD):

$2^{29}$  messages, where each plaintext is at most 1GiB

$2^{35}$  messages, where each plaintext is at most 128MiB

$2^{49}$  messages, where each plaintext is at most 1MiB

$2^{61}$  messages, where each plaintext is at most 16KiB

Suzuki et al [multibirthday] show that even if nonces are selected uniformly at random, the probability that one or more values would be repeated 256 or more times is negligible until the number of nonces reaches  $2^{102}$ . (Specifically the probability is  $1/((2^{96})^{(255)}) * \text{Binomial}(q, 256)$ , where  $q$  is the number of nonces.) Since  $2^{102}$  is vastly greater than the limit on the number of plaintexts per key given above, we don't feel that this limit on the number of repeated nonces will be a problem. This also means that selecting nonces at random is a safe practice with AES-GCM-SIV. In fact, nonces repeat far less than 256 times when randomly chosen. Thus, the bounds obtained for random nonces are as follows (as above, for these bounds the adversary's advantage is at most  $2^{-32}$ ):

$2^{32}$  messages, where each plaintext is at most 8GiB

$2^{48}$  messages, where each plaintext is at most 32MiB



$2^{64}$  messages, where each plaintext is at most 128KiB

For situations where, for some reason, an even higher number of nonce repeats is possible (e.g. in devices with very poor randomness), the message limits need to be reconsidered. Theorem Seven in the paper contains more details but, for up to 1,024 repeats of each nonce, the limits would be (again assuming a short AAD):

$2^{25}$  messages, where each plaintext is at most 1GiB

$2^{31}$  messages, where each plaintext is at most 128MiB

$2^{45}$  messages, where each plaintext is at most 1MiB

$2^{57}$  messages, where each plaintext is at most 16KiB

In addition to calculating fresh AES keys for each nonce, these AEADs also calculate fresh POLYVAL keys. Previous versions of GCM-SIV did not do this and, instead, used part of the AEAD's key as the POLYVAL key. Bleichenbacher pointed out that this allowed an attacker who controlled the AEAD key to force the POLYVAL key to be zero. If a user of this AEAD authenticated messages with a secret additional-data value then this would be insecure as the attacker could calculate a valid authenticator without knowing the input. This does not violate the standard properties of an AEAD as the additional data is not assumed to be confidential. However, we want these AEADs to be robust to plausible misuse and also to be drop-in replacements for AES-GCM and so derive nonce-specific POLYVAL keys to avoid this issue.

We also wish to note that the probability of successful forgery increases with the number of attempts that an attacker is permitted. If an attacker is permitted extremely large numbers of attempts then the tiny probability that any given attempt succeeds may sum to a non-trivial chance.

A security analysis of a similar scheme without nonce-based key derivation appears in [[GCM-SIV](#)] and a full analysis of the bounds when applying nonce-based key derivation appears in [[key-derive](#)]. A larger table of bounds and other information appears at [[aes-gcm-siv-homepage](#)].

The multi-user/multi-key security of AES-GCM-SIV was studied by [[BHT18](#)] who showed that security is almost like in the single user setting, as long as nonces do not repeat many times across many users. This is the case when nonces are chosen randomly.



## **10. IANA Considerations**

IANA is requested to add two entries to the registry of AEAD algorithms: AEAD\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SIV and AEAD\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SIV, both referencing this document as their specification.

## **11. Acknowledgements**

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## **12. References**

### **12.1. Normative References**

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.

### **12.2. Informative References**

[AES-GCM-SIV]

Gueron, S., Langley, A., and Y. Lindell, "AES-GCM-SIV: specification and analysis", July 2017, <<https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/168>>.

[aes-gcm-siv-homepage]

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[GCM]

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## **Appendix A. The relationship between POLYVAL and GHASH**

GHASH and POLYVAL both operate in  $GF(2^{128})$ , although with different irreducible polynomials: POLYVAL works modulo  $x^{128} + x^{127} + x^{126} + x^{121} + 1$  and GHASH works modulo  $x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1$ . Note that these irreducible polynomials are the "reverse" of each other.

GHASH also has a different mapping between 128-bit strings and field elements. Where as POLYVAL takes the least-significant to most-significant bits of the first byte to be the coefficients of  $x^0$  to  $x^7$ , GHASH takes them to be the coefficients of  $x^7$  to  $x^0$ . This continues until, for the last byte, POLYVAL takes the least-significant to most-significant bits to be the coefficients of  $x^{120}$  to  $x^{127}$  while GHASH takes them to be the coefficients of  $x^{127}$  to  $x^{120}$ .

The combination of these facts means that it's possible to "convert" values between the two by reversing the order of the bytes in a 16-byte string. The differing interpretations of bit order takes care of reversing the bits within each byte and then reversing the bytes does the rest. This may have a practical benefit for implementations that wish to implement both GHASH and POLYVAL.



In order to be clear which field a given operation is performed in, let `mulX_GHASH` be a function that takes a 16-byte string, converts it to an element of GHASH's field using GHASH's convention, multiplies it by `x` and converts back to a string. Likewise, let `mulX_POLYVAL` be a function that converts a 16-byte string to an element of POLYVAL's field using POLYVAL's convention, multiplies it by `x` and converts back.

Given the 16-byte string `01000000000000000000000000000000`, `mulX_GHASH` of that string is `00800000000000000000000000000000` and `mulX_POLYVAL` of that string is `02000000000000000000000000000000`. As a more general example, given `9c98c04df9387ded828175a92ba652d8`, `mulX_GHASH` of that string is `4e4c6026fc9c3ef6c140bad495d3296c` and `mulX_POLYVAL` of it is `3931819bf271fada0503eb52574ca5f2`.

Lastly, let `ByteReverse` be the function that takes a 16-byte string and returns a copy where the order of the bytes has been reversed.

Now GHASH and POLYVAL can be defined in terms of one another:

```
POLYVAL(H, X_1, ..., X_n) =
ByteReverse(GHASH(mulX_GHASH(ByteReverse(H)), ByteReverse(X_1), ...,
ByteReverse(X_n)))
```

```
GHASH(H, X_1, ..., X_n) =
ByteReverse(POLYVAL(mulX_POLYVAL(ByteReverse(H)), ByteReverse(X_1),
..., ByteReverse(X_n)))
```

As a worked example, let `H = 25629347589242761d31f826ba4b757b`, `X_1 = 4f4f95668c83dfb6401762bb2d01a262` and `X_2 = d1a24ddd2721d006bbe45f20d3c9f362`. `POLYVAL(H, X_1, X_2) = f7a3b47b846119fae5b7866cf5e5b77e`. If we wished to calculate this given only an implementation of GHASH then the key for GHASH would be `mulX_GHASH(ByteReverse(H)) = dcbaa5dd137c188ebb21492c23c9b112`. Then `ByteReverse(GHASH(dcba..., ByteReverse(X_1), ByteReverse(X_2))) = f7a3b47b846119fae5b7866cf5e5b77e`, as required.

In the other direction, `GHASH(H, X_1, X_2) = bd9b3997046731fb96251b91f9c99d7a`. If we wished to calculate this given only an implementation of POLYVAL then we would first calculate the key for POLYVAL, `mulX_POLYVAL(ByteReverse(H))`, which is `f6ea96744df0633aec8424b18e26c54a`. Then `ByteReverse(POLYVAL(f6ea..., ByteReverse(X_1), ByteReverse(X_2))) = bd9b3997046731fb96251b91f9c99d7a`.



## [Appendix B.](#) Additional comparisons with AES-GCM

Some, non-security, properties also differ between AES-GCM and AES-GCM-SIV that are worth noting:

AES-GCM allows plaintexts to be encrypted in a streaming fashion, i.e. the beginning of the plaintext can be encrypted and transmitted before the entire message has been processed. AES-GCM-SIV requires two passes for encryption and so cannot do this.

AES-GCM allows a constant additional-data input to be precomputed in order to save per-record computation. AES-GCM-SIV varies the authenticator key based on the nonce and so does not permit this.

The performance for AES-GCM vs AES-GCM-SIV on small machines can be roughly characterised by the number of AES operations and the number of  $GF(2^{128})$  multiplications needed to process a message. Let  $a = (\text{bytelen}(\text{additional-data}) + 15) / 16$  and  $p = (\text{bytelen}(\text{plaintext}) + 15) / 16$ . Then AES-GCM requires  $p + 1$  AES operations and  $p + a + 1$  field multiplications.

Defined similarly, AES-GCM-SIV with AES-128 requires  $p + 5$  AES operations and  $p + a + 1$  field multiplications. With AES-256 that becomes  $p + 7$  AES operations.

With large machines, the available parallelism becomes far more important and such simple performance analysis is no longer representative. For such machines, we find that decryption of AES-GCM-SIV is only about 5% slower than AES-GCM, as long as the message is at least a couple of kilobytes. Encryption tends to be about 2/3's the speed because of the additional pass required.

## [Appendix C.](#) Test vectors

### [C.1.](#) AEAD\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SIV

```

Plaintext (0 bytes) =
AAD (0 bytes) =
Key =                01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =              03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key =    4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input =          00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result =         00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
... and masked =         03000000000000000000000000000000
Tag =                  dc20e2d83f25705bb49e439eca56de25
Initial counter =       dc20e2d83f25705bb49e439eca56dea5

```



Result (16 bytes) = dc20e2d83f25705bb49e439eca56de25

Plaintext (8 bytes) = 0100000000000000  
AAD (0 bytes) =  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377  
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
0000000000000000004000000000000000  
POLYVAL result = eb93b7740962c5e49d2a90a7dc5cec74  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = e893b7740962c5e49d2a90a7dc5cec74  
... and masked = e893b7740962c5e49d2a90a7dc5cec74  
Tag = 578782fff6013b815b287c22493a364c  
Initial counter = 578782fff6013b815b287c22493a36cc  
Result (24 bytes) = b5d839330ac7b786578782fff6013b81  
5b287c22493a364c

Plaintext (12 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
AAD (0 bytes) =  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377  
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
0000000000000000000600000000000000  
POLYVAL result = 48eb6c6c5a2dbe4a1dde508fee06361b  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 4beb6c6c5a2dbe4a1dde508fee06361b  
... and masked = 4beb6c6c5a2dbe4a1dde508fee06361b  
Tag = a4978db357391a0bc4fdec8b0d106639  
Initial counter = a4978db357391a0bc4fdec8b0d1066b9  
Result (28 bytes) = 7323ea61d05932260047d942a4978db3  
57391a0bc4fdec8b0d106639

Plaintext (16 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
AAD (0 bytes) =  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377  
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
0000000000000000000800000000000000  
POLYVAL result = 20806c26e3c1de019e111255708031d6  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 23806c26e3c1de019e111255708031d6  
... and masked = 23806c26e3c1de019e11125570803156



Tag = 303aaf90f6fe21199c6068577437a0c4  
Initial counter = 303aaf90f6fe21199c6068577437a0c4  
Result (32 bytes) = 743f7c8077ab25f8624e2e948579cf77  
303aaf90f6fe21199c6068577437a0c4

Plaintext (32 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
02000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (0 bytes) =  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377  
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
02000000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000  
POLYVAL result = ce6edc9a50b36d9a98986bbf6a261c3b  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = cd6edc9a50b36d9a98986bbf6a261c3b  
... and masked = cd6edc9a50b36d9a98986bbf6a261c3b  
Tag = 1a8e45dcd4578c667cd86847bf6155ff  
Initial counter = 1a8e45dcd4578c667cd86847bf6155ff  
Result (48 bytes) = 84e07e62ba83a6585417245d7ec413a9  
fe427d6315c09b57ce45f2e3936a9445  
1a8e45dcd4578c667cd86847bf6155ff

Plaintext (48 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (0 bytes) =  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377  
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000  
POLYVAL result = 81388746bc22d26b2abc3dcb15754222  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 82388746bc22d26b2abc3dcb15754222  
... and masked = 82388746bc22d26b2abc3dcb15754222  
Tag = 5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8  
Initial counter = 5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8  
Result (64 bytes) = 3fd24ce1f5a67b75bf2351f181a475c7  
b800a5b4d3dcf70106b1eea82fa1d64d  
f42bf7226122fa92e17a40eeaac1201b  
5e6e311dbf395d35b0fe39c2714388f8



Plaintext (64 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000  
04000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (0 bytes) =

Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000

Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000

Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377

Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c

POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000

02000000000000000000000000000000

03000000000000000000000000000000

04000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000020000000000000

POLYVAL result = 1e39b6d3344d348f6044f89935d1cf78

POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 1d39b6d3344d348f6044f89935d1cf78

... and masked = 1d39b6d3344d348f6044f89935d1cf78

Tag = 8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8

Initial counter = 8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8

Result (80 bytes) = 2433668f1058190f6d43e360f4f35cd8

e475127cfca7028ea8ab5c20f7ab2af0

2516a2bdcbbc08d521be37ff28c152bba

36697f25b4cd169c6590d1dd39566d3f

8a263dd317aa88d56bdf3936dba75bb8

Plaintext (8 bytes) = 0200000000000000

AAD (1 bytes) = 01

Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000

Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000

Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377

Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c

POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000

02000000000000000000000000000000

0800000000000000004000000000000000

POLYVAL result = b26781e7e2c1376f96bec195f3709b2a

POLYVAL result XOR nonce = b16781e7e2c1376f96bec195f3709b2a

... and masked = b16781e7e2c1376f96bec195f3709b2a

Tag = 3b0a1a2560969cdf790d99759abd1508

Initial counter = 3b0a1a2560969cdf790d99759abd1588

Result (24 bytes) = 1e6daba35669f4273b0a1a2560969cdf

790d99759abd1508

Plaintext (12 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (1 bytes) = 01

Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000

Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000



```
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
08000000000000000000000000000000

POLYVAL result = 111f5affb18e4cc1164a01bdc12a4145
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 121f5affb18e4cc1164a01bdc12a4145
... and masked = 121f5affb18e4cc1164a01bdc12a4145
Tag = 08299c5102745aaa3a0c469fad9e075a
Initial counter = 08299c5102745aaa3a0c469fad9e07da
Result (28 bytes) = 296c7889fd99f41917f4462008299c51
02745aaa3a0c469fad9e075a
```

```
Plaintext (16 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
08000000000000000000000000000000

POLYVAL result = 79745ab508622c8a958543675fac4688
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 7a745ab508622c8a958543675fac4688
... and masked = 7a745ab508622c8a958543675fac4608
Tag = 8f8936ec039e4e4bb97ebd8c4457441f
Initial counter = 8f8936ec039e4e4bb97ebd8c4457449f
Result (32 bytes) = e2b0c5da79a901c1745f700525cb335b
8f8936ec039e4e4bb97ebd8c4457441f
```

```
Plaintext (32 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
08000000000000000000000000000000

POLYVAL result = 2ce7daaf7c89490822051255b12eca6b
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 2fe7daaf7c89490822051255b12eca6b
... and masked = 2fe7daaf7c89490822051255b12eca6b
Tag = e6af6a7f87287da059a71684ed3498e1
Initial counter = e6af6a7f87287da059a71684ed3498e1
```



Result (48 bytes) = 620048ef3c1e73e57e02bb8562c416a3  
19e73e4caac8e96a1ecb2933145a1d71  
e6af6a7f87287da059a71684ed3498e1

Plaintext (48 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000  
04000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (1 bytes) = 01  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377  
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000  
04000000000000000000000000000000  
08000000000000000000000000000000

POLYVAL result = 9ca987715d69c1786711dfcd22f830fc  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 9fa987715d69c1786711dfcd22f830fc  
... and masked = 9fa987715d69c1786711dfcd22f8307c  
Tag = 6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2  
Initial counter = 6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2  
Result (64 bytes) = 50c8303ea93925d64090d07bd109dfd9  
515a5a33431019c17d93465999a8b005  
3201d723120a8562b838cdff25bf9d1e  
6a8cc3865f76897c2e4b245cf31c51f2

Plaintext (64 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000  
04000000000000000000000000000000  
05000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (1 bytes) = 01  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377  
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000  
04000000000000000000000000000000  
05000000000000000000000000000000

08000000000000000000000000000000  
POLYVAL result = ffc0d05d5770f34ad9267f0a59994b15a  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = fccd05d5770f34ad9267f0a59994b15a  
... and masked = fccd05d5770f34ad9267f0a59994b15a  
Tag = cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae21744



Initial counter = cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae217c4  
Result (80 bytes) = 2f5c64059db55ee0fb847ed513003746  
aca4e61c711b5de2e7a77ffd02da42fe  
ec601910d3467bb8b36ebbaebce5fba3  
0d36c95f48a3e7980f0e7ac299332a80  
cdc46ae475563de037001ef84ae21744

Plaintext (4 bytes) = 02000000  
AAD (12 bytes) = 0100000000000000000000000000  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 0300000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377  
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
02000000000000000000000000000000  
6000000000000000002000000000000000  
POLYVAL result = f6ce9d3dcd68a2fd603c7ecc18fb9918  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = f5ce9d3dcd68a2fd603c7ecc18fb9918  
... and masked = f5ce9d3dcd68a2fd603c7ecc18fb9918  
Tag = 07eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99e2f48a14  
Initial counter = 07eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99e2f48a94  
Result (20 bytes) = a8fe3e8707eb1f84fb28f8cb73de8e99  
e2f48a14

Plaintext (20 bytes) = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
04000000  
AAD (18 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
0200  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 0300000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377  
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000  
04000000000000000000000000000000  
900000000000000000a000000000000000  
POLYVAL result = 4781d492cb8f926c504caa36f61008fe  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 4481d492cb8f926c504caa36f61008fe  
... and masked = 4481d492cb8f926c504caa36f610087e  
Tag = 24afc9805e976f451e6d87f6fe106514  
Initial counter = 24afc9805e976f451e6d87f6fe106594  
Result (36 bytes) = 6bb0fecf5ded9b77f902c7d5da236a43  
91dd029724afc9805e976f451e6d87f6  
fe106514



```
Plaintext (18 bytes) = 03000000000000000000000000000000
                        0400
AAD (20 bytes) =      01000000000000000000000000000000
                        02000000
Key =                  01000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce =                03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = d9b360279694941ac5dbc6987ada7377
Record encryption key = 4004a0dcd862f2a57360219d2d44ef6c
POLYVAL input =        01000000000000000000000000000000
                        02000000000000000000000000000000
                        03000000000000000000000000000000
                        04000000000000000000000000000000
                        a0000000000000000900000000000000
POLYVAL result =       75cbc23a1a10e348aeb8e384b5cc79fd
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 76cbc23a1a10e348aeb8e384b5cc79fd
... and masked =       76cbc23a1a10e348aeb8e384b5cc797d
Tag =                  bff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13b9fd
Initial counter =      bff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13b9fd
Result (34 bytes) =    44d0aaf6fb2f1f34add5e8064e83e12a
                        2adabff9b2ef00fb47920cc72a0c0f13
                        b9fd

Plaintext (0 bytes) =
AAD (0 bytes) =
Key =                  e66021d5eb8e4f4066d4adb9c33560e4
Nonce =                f46e44bb3da0015c94f70887
Record authentication key = 036ee1fe2d7926af68898095e54e7b3c
Record encryption key = 5e46482396008223b5c1d25173d87539
POLYVAL input =        00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result =       00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = f46e44bb3da0015c94f7088700000000
... and masked =       f46e44bb3da0015c94f7088700000000
Tag =                  a4194b79071b01a87d65f706e3949578
Initial counter =      a4194b79071b01a87d65f706e39495f8
Result (16 bytes) =    a4194b79071b01a87d65f706e3949578

Plaintext (3 bytes) = 7a806c
AAD (5 bytes) =       46bb91c3c5
Key =                  36864200e0eaf5284d884a0e77d31646
Nonce =                bae8e37fc83441b16034566b
Record authentication key = 3e28de1120b2981a0155795ca2812af6
Record encryption key = 6d4b78b31a4c9c03d8db0f42f7507fae
POLYVAL input =        46bb91c3c50000000000000000000000
                        7a806c000000000000000000000000
                        28000000000000001800000000000000
POLYVAL result =       43d9a745511dcfa21b96dd606f1d5720
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = f931443a99298e137ba28b0b6f1d5720
```



... and masked = f931443a99298e137ba28b0b6f1d5720  
Tag = 711bd85bc1e4d3e0a462e074eea428a8  
Initial counter = 711bd85bc1e4d3e0a462e074eea428a8  
Result (19 bytes) = af60eb711bd85bc1e4d3e0a462e074ee  
a428a8

Plaintext (6 bytes) = bdc66f146545  
AAD (10 bytes) = fc880c94a95198874296  
Key = aedb64a6c590bc84d1a5e269e4b47801  
Nonce = afc0577e34699b9e671fdd4f  
Record authentication key = 43b8de9cea62330d15cccfc84a33e8c8  
Record encryption key = 8e54631607e431e095b54852868e3a27  
POLYVAL input = fc880c94a95198874296000000000000  
bdc66f14654500000000000000000000  
50000000000000000300000000000000  
POLYVAL result = 26498e0d2b1ef004e808c458e8f2f515  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 8989d9731f776b9a8f171917e8f2f515  
... and masked = 8989d9731f776b9a8f171917e8f2f515  
Tag = d6a9c45545cfc11f03ad743dba20f966  
Initial counter = d6a9c45545cfc11f03ad743dba20f9e6  
Result (22 bytes) = bb93a3e34d3cd6a9c45545cfc11f03ad  
743dba20f966

Plaintext (9 bytes) = 1177441f195495860f  
AAD (15 bytes) = 046787f3ea22c127aaf195d1894728  
Key = d5cc1fd161320b6920ce07787f86743b  
Nonce = 275d1ab32f6d1f0434d8848c  
Record authentication key = 8a51df64d93eaf667c2c09bd454ce5c5  
Record encryption key = 43ab276c2b4a473918ca73f2dd85109c  
POLYVAL input = 046787f3ea22c127aaf195d189472800  
1177441f195495860f00000000000000  
78000000000000004800000000000000  
POLYVAL result = 63a3451c0b23345ad02bba59956517cf  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 44fe5faf244e2b5ee4f33ed5956517cf  
... and masked = 44fe5faf244e2b5ee4f33ed59565174f  
Tag = 1d02fd0cd174c84fc5dae2f60f52fd2b  
Initial counter = 1d02fd0cd174c84fc5dae2f60f52fdab  
Result (25 bytes) = 4f37281f7ad12949d01d02fd0cd174c8  
4fc5dae2f60f52fd2b

Plaintext (12 bytes) = 9f572c614b4745914474e7c7  
AAD (20 bytes) = c9882e5386fd9f92ec489c8fde2be2cf  
97e74e93  
Key = b3fed1473c528b8426a582995929a149  
Nonce = 9e9ad8780c8d63d0ab4149c0







```

POLYVAL result = 55462a5afa0da8d646481e049ef9c764
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = fb407f354ca7d046f8f406fa9ef9c764
... and masked = fb407f354ca7d046f8f406fa9ef9c764
Tag = 3e377094f04709f64d7b985310a4db84
Initial counter = 3e377094f04709f64d7b985310a4db84
Result (34 bytes) = 6298b296e24e8cc35dce0bed484b7f30
                    d5803e377094f04709f64d7b985310a4
                    db84

```

```

Plaintext (21 bytes) = e42a3c02c25b64869e146d7b233987bd
                    dfc240871d
AAD (35 bytes) = 7576f7028ec6eb5ea7e298342a94d4b2
                02b370ef9768ec6561c4fe6b7e7296fa
                859c21
Key = f901cfe8a69615a93fdf7a98cad48179
Nonce = 6245709fb18853f68d833640
Record authentication key = 3724f55f1d22ac0ab830da0b6a995d74
Record encryption key = 75ac87b70c05db287de779006105a344
POLYVAL input = 7576f7028ec6eb5ea7e298342a94d4b2
                02b370ef9768ec6561c4fe6b7e7296fa
                859c2100000000000000000000000000000000
                e42a3c02c25b64869e146d7b233987bd
                dfc240871d000000000000000000000000000000
                180100000000000000a800000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 4cbba090f03f7d1188ea55749fa6c7bd
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 2efed00f41b72ee7056963349fa6c7bd
... and masked = 2efed00f41b72ee7056963349fa6c73d
Tag = 2d15506c84a9edd65e13e9d24a2a6e70
Initial counter = 2d15506c84a9edd65e13e9d24a2a6ef0
Result (37 bytes) = 391cc328d484a4f46406181bcd62efd9
                    b3ee197d052d15506c84a9edd65e13e9
                    d24a2a6e70

```

## **C.2. AEAD\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SIV**

```

Plaintext (0 bytes) =
AAD (0 bytes) =
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
      00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbf96dec3
                       456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
... and masked = 03000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

```



Tag = 07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd400f  
Initial counter = 07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd408f  
Result (16 bytes) = 07f5f4169bbf55a8400cd47ea6fd400f

Plaintext (8 bytes) = 0100000000000000  
AAD (0 bytes) =  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f  
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3  
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000400000000000000  
POLYVAL result = 05230f62f0eac8aa14fe4d646b59cd41  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 06230f62f0eac8aa14fe4d646b59cd41  
... and masked = 06230f62f0eac8aa14fe4d646b59cd41  
Tag = 843122130f7364b761e0b97427e3df28  
Initial counter = 843122130f7364b761e0b97427e3dfa8  
Result (24 bytes) = c2ef328e5c71c83b843122130f7364b7  
61e0b97427e3df28

Plaintext (12 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
AAD (0 bytes) =  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f  
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84addbf96dec3  
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000600000000000000  
POLYVAL result = 6d81a24732fd6d03ae5af544720a1c13  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 6e81a24732fd6d03ae5af544720a1c13  
... and masked = 6e81a24732fd6d03ae5af544720a1c13  
Tag = 8ca50da9ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca17e  
Initial counter = 8ca50da9ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca1fe  
Result (28 bytes) = 9aab2aeb3faa0a34aea8e2b18ca50da9  
ae6559e48fd10f6e5c9ca17e

Plaintext (16 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
AAD (0 bytes) =  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000







```
03000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
POLYVAL result = c1f8593d8fc29b0c290cae1992f71f51
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = c2f8593d8fc29b0c290cae1992f71f51
... and masked = c2f8593d8fc29b0c290cae1992f71f51
Tag = 790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4
Initial counter = 790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4
Result (64 bytes) = c00d121893a9fa603f48ccc1ca3c57ce
7499245ea0046db16c53c7c66fe717e3
9cf6c748837b61f6ee3adcee17534ed5
790bc96880a99ba804bd12c0e6a22cc4

Plaintext (64 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (0 bytes) =
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222

POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000020000000000000

POLYVAL result = 6ef38b06046c7c0e225efaef8e2ec4c4
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 6df38b06046c7c0e225efaef8e2ec4c4
... and masked = 6df38b06046c7c0e225efaef8e2ec444
Tag = 112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa08
Initial counter = 112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa88
Result (80 bytes) = c2d5160a1f8683834910acdafc41fbb1
632d4a353e8b905ec9a5499ac34f96c7
e1049eb080883891a4db8caaa1f99dd0
04d80487540735234e3744512c6f90ce
112864c269fc0d9d88c61fa47e39aa08

Plaintext (8 bytes) = 0200000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3
```



```
POLYVAL input = 456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
0800000000000000004000000000000000

POLYVAL result = 34e57bafe011b9b36fc6821b7ffb3354
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 37e57bafe011b9b36fc6821b7ffb3354
... and masked = 37e57bafe011b9b36fc6821b7ffb3354
Tag = 91213f267e3b452f02d01ae33e4ec854
Initial counter = 91213f267e3b452f02d01ae33e4ec8d4
Result (24 bytes) = 1de22967237a813291213f267e3b452f
02d01ae33e4ec854
```

```
Plaintext (12 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000

Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222

POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
0800000000000000006000000000000000

POLYVAL result = 5c47d68a22061c1ad5623a3b66a8e206
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 5f47d68a22061c1ad5623a3b66a8e206
... and masked = 5f47d68a22061c1ad5623a3b66a8e206
Tag = c1a4a19ae800941ccdc57cc8413c277f
Initial counter = c1a4a19ae800941ccdc57cc8413c27ff
Result (28 bytes) = 163d6f9cc1b346cd453a2e4cc1a4a19a
e800941ccdc57cc8413c277f
```

```
Plaintext (16 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000
AAD (1 bytes) = 01
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000

Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222

POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
0800000000000000008000000000000000

POLYVAL result = 452896726c616746f01d11d82911d478
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 462896726c616746f01d11d82911d478
... and masked = 462896726c616746f01d11d82911d478
Tag = b292d28ff61189e8e49f3875ef91aff7
```



Initial counter = b292d28ff61189e8e49f3875ef91aff7  
Result (32 bytes) = c91545823cc24f17dbb0e9e807d5ec17  
b292d28ff61189e8e49f3875ef91aff7

Plaintext (32 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000  
AAD (1 bytes) = 01  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f  
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3  
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000  
08000000000000000000000010000000000000  
POLYVAL result = 4e58c1e341c9bb0ae34eda9509dfc90c  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 4d58c1e341c9bb0ae34eda9509dfc90c  
... and masked = 4d58c1e341c9bb0ae34eda9509dfc90c  
Tag = aea1bad12702e1965604374aab96dbbc  
Initial counter = aea1bad12702e1965604374aab96dbbc  
Result (48 bytes) = 07dad364bfc2b9da89116d7bef6daaaf  
6f255510aa654f920ac81b94e8bad365  
aea1bad12702e1965604374aab96dbbc

Plaintext (48 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000  
04000000000000000000000000000000  
AAD (1 bytes) = 01  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f  
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3  
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000  
04000000000000000000000000000000  
080000000000000000000000080010000000000000  
POLYVAL result = 2566a4aff9a525df9772c16d4eaf8d2a  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 2666a4aff9a525df9772c16d4eaf8d2a  
... and masked = 2666a4aff9a525df9772c16d4eaf8d2a  
Tag = 03332742b228c647173616cfd44c54eb  
Initial counter = 03332742b228c647173616cfd44c54eb



Result (64 bytes) = c67a1f0f567a5198aa1fcc8e3f213143  
36f7f51ca8b1af61feac35a86416fa47  
fbca3b5f749cdf564527f2314f42fe25  
03332742b228c647173616cfd44c54eb

Plaintext (64 bytes) = 02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000  
04000000000000000000000000000000  
05000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (1 bytes) = 01  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000

Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f  
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbf96dec3  
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222

POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
02000000000000000000000000000000  
03000000000000000000000000000000  
04000000000000000000000000000000  
05000000000000000000000000000000  
08000000000000000000000000000000

POLYVAL result = da58d2f61b0a9d343b2f37fb0c519733  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = d958d2f61b0a9d343b2f37fb0c519733  
... and masked = d958d2f61b0a9d343b2f37fb0c519733  
Tag = 5bde0285037c5de81e5b570a049b62a0  
Initial counter = 5bde0285037c5de81e5b570a049b62a0  
Result (80 bytes) = 67fd45e126bfb9a79930c43aad2d3696  
7d3f0e4d217c1e551f59727870beefc9  
8cb933a8fce9de887b1e40799988db1f  
c3f91880ed405b2dd298318858467c89  
5bde0285037c5de81e5b570a049b62a0

Plaintext (4 bytes) = 02000000  
AAD (12 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000  
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000  
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f  
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbf96dec3  
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222  
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000  
02000000000000000000000000000000  
60000000000000000000000000000000  
POLYVAL result = 6dc76ae84b88916e073a303aafde05cf  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 6ec76ae84b88916e073a303aafde05cf



```
... and masked = 6ec76ae84b88916e073a303aafde054f
Tag = 1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4661b74cf
Initial counter = 1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4661b74cf
Result (20 bytes) = 22b3f4cd1835e517741dfddccfa07fa4
661b74cf

Plaintext (20 bytes) = 03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000
AAD (18 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000
0200
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000
900000000000000000a000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 973ef4fd04bd31d193816ab26f8655ca
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 943ef4fd04bd31d193816ab26f8655ca
... and masked = 943ef4fd04bd31d193816ab26f86554a
Tag = b879ad976d8242acc188ab59cabfe307
Initial counter = b879ad976d8242acc188ab59cabfe387
Result (36 bytes) = 43dd0163cdb48f9fe3212bf61b201976
067f342bb879ad976d8242acc188ab59
cabfe307

Plaintext (18 bytes) = 03000000000000000000000000000000
0400
AAD (20 bytes) = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000
Key = 01000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Nonce = 03000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = b5d3c529dfafac43136d2d11be284d7f
Record encryption key = b914f4742be9e1d7a2f84adbbf96dec3
456e3c6c05ecc157cdbf0700fedad222
POLYVAL input = 01000000000000000000000000000000
02000000000000000000000000000000
03000000000000000000000000000000
04000000000000000000000000000000
a000000000000000090000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 2cbb6b7ab2dbffefb797f825f826870c
```



POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 2fbb6b7ab2dbffefb797f825f826870c  
... and masked = 2fbb6b7ab2dbffefb797f825f826870c  
Tag = cfcdf5042112aa29685c912fc2056543  
Initial counter = cfcdf5042112aa29685c912fc20565c3  
Result (34 bytes) = 462401724b5ce6588d5a54aae5375513  
a075cfcdf5042112aa29685c912fc205  
6543

Plaintext (0 bytes) =  
AAD (0 bytes) =  
Key = e66021d5eb8e4f4066d4adb9c33560e4  
f46e44bb3da0015c94f7088736864200  
Nonce = e0eaf5284d884a0e77d31646  
Record authentication key = e40d26f82774aa27f47b047b608b9585  
Record encryption key = 7c7c3d9a542cef53dde0e6de9b580040  
0f82e73ec5f7ee41b7ba8dcb9ba078c3  
POLYVAL input = 00000000000000000000000000000000  
POLYVAL result = 00000000000000000000000000000000  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = e0eaf5284d884a0e77d3164600000000  
... and masked = e0eaf5284d884a0e77d3164600000000  
Tag = 169fbb2fbf389a995f6390af22228a62  
Initial counter = 169fbb2fbf389a995f6390af22228ae2  
Result (16 bytes) = 169fbb2fbf389a995f6390af22228a62

Plaintext (3 bytes) = 671fdd  
AAD (5 bytes) = 4fbdc66f14  
Key = bae8e37fc83441b16034566b7a806c46  
bb91c3c5aedb64a6c590bc84d1a5e269  
Nonce = e4b47801afc0577e34699b9e  
Record authentication key = b546f5a850d0a90adfe39e95c2510fc6  
Record encryption key = b9d1e239d62cbb5c49273ddac8838bdc  
c53bca478a770f07087caa4e0a924a55  
POLYVAL input = 4fbdc66f140000000000000000000000  
671fdd00000000000000000000000000  
28000000000000000180000000000000  
POLYVAL result = b91f91f96b159a7c611c05035b839e92  
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 5dabe9f8c4d5cd0255759e9d5b839e92  
... and masked = 5dabe9f8c4d5cd0255759e9d5b839e12  
Tag = 93da9bb81333aee0c785b240d319719d  
Initial counter = 93da9bb81333aee0c785b240d319719d  
Result (19 bytes) = 0eaccb93da9bb81333aee0c785b240d3  
19719d

Plaintext (6 bytes) = 195495860f04  
AAD (10 bytes) = 6787f3ea22c127aaf195  
Key = 6545fc880c94a95198874296d5cc1fd1



```
61320b6920ce07787f86743b275d1ab3
Nonce = 2f6d1f0434d8848c1177441f
Record authentication key = e156e1f9b0b07b780cbe30f259e3c8da
Record encryption key = 6fc1c494519f944aae52fcd8b14e5b17
1b5a9429d3b76e430d49940c0021d612
POLYVAL input = 6787f3ea22c127aaf1950000000000000
195495860f0400000000000000000000
50000000000000003000000000000000
POLYVAL result = 2c480ed9d236b1df24c6eec109bd40c1
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 032511dde6ee355335b1aade09bd40c1
... and masked = 032511dde6ee355335b1aade09bd4041
Tag = 6b62b84dc40c84636a5ec12020ec8c2c
Initial counter = 6b62b84dc40c84636a5ec12020ec8cac
Result (22 bytes) = a254dad4f3f96b62b84dc40c84636a5e
c12020ec8c2c
```

```
Plaintext (9 bytes) = c9882e5386fd9f92ec
AAD (15 bytes) = 489c8fde2be2cf97e74e932d4ed87d
Key = d1894728b3fed1473c528b8426a58299
5929a1499e9ad8780c8d63d0ab4149c0
Nonce = 9f572c614b4745914474e7c7
Record authentication key = 0533fd71f4119257361a3ff1469dd4e5
Record encryption key = 4feba89799be8ac3684fa2bb30ade0ea
51390e6d87dcf3627d2ee44493853abe
POLYVAL input = 489c8fde2be2cf97e74e932d4ed87d00
c9882e5386fd9f92ec0000000000000000
78000000000000004800000000000000
POLYVAL result = bf160bc9ded8c63057d2c38aae552fb4
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 204127a8959f83a113a6244dae552fb4
... and masked = 204127a8959f83a113a6244dae552f34
Tag = c0fd3dc6628dfe55ebb0b9fb2295c8c2
Initial counter = c0fd3dc6628dfe55ebb0b9fb2295c8c2
Result (25 bytes) = 0df9e308678244c44bc0fd3dc6628dfe
55ebb0b9fb2295c8c2
```

```
Plaintext (12 bytes) = 1db2316fd568378da107b52b
AAD (20 bytes) = 0da55210cc1c1b0abde3b2f204d1e9f8
b06bc47f
Key = a44102952ef94b02b805249bac80e6f6
1455bfac8308a2d40d8c845117808235
Nonce = 5c9e940fea2f582950a70d5a
Record authentication key = 64779ab10ee8a280272f14cc8851b727
Record encryption key = 25f40fc63f49d3b9016a8eeeb75846e0
d72ca36ddbd312b6f5ef38ad14bd2651
POLYVAL input = 0da55210cc1c1b0abde3b2f204d1e9f8
b06bc47f000000000000000000000000
```



|                            |                                                              |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
|                            | 1db2316fd568378da107b52b000000000                            |
|                            | a000000000000000006000000000000000                           |
| POLYVAL result =           | cc86ee22c861e1fd474c84676b42739c                             |
| POLYVAL result XOR nonce = | 90187a2d224eb9d417eb893d6b42739c                             |
| ... and masked =           | 90187a2d224eb9d417eb893d6b42731c                             |
| Tag =                      | 404099c2587f64979f21826706d497d5                             |
| Initial counter =          | 404099c2587f64979f21826706d497d5                             |
| Result (28 bytes) =        | 8dbeb9f7255bf5769dd56692404099c2<br>587f64979f21826706d497d5 |

|                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Plaintext (15 bytes) =      | 21702de0de18baa9c9596291b08466                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| AAD (25 bytes) =            | f37de21c7ff901cfe8a69615a93fdf7a98cad481796245709f                                                                                                                                                                              |
| Key =                       | 9745b3d1ae06556fb6aa7890bebc18fe6b3db4da3d57aa94842b9803a96e07fb6de71860f762ebfbfd08284e4                                                                                                                                       |
| Nonce =                     | 27c2959ed4daea3b1f52e849478de376307a38a5a6cf231c0a9af3b527f23a62e9a6fff09aff8ae669f760153e864fc93f37de21c7ff901cfe8a69615a93fdf7a98cad481796245709f0000000000000000                                                             |
| Record authentication key = | 21702de0de18baa9c9596291b0846600c8000000000000007800000000000000                                                                                                                                                                |
| Record encryption key =     | c4fa5e5b713853703bcf8e6424505fa5a91d463b865ab88beb4d0a8024505fa5a91d463b865ab88beb4d0a8024505f25b3080d28f6ebb5d3648ce97bd5ba67fdb3080d28f6ebb5d3648ce97bd5ba67fdb793576dfa5c0f88729a7ed3c2f1bffb3080d28f6ebb5d3648ce97bd5ba67fd |
| POLYVAL input =             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| POLYVAL result =            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| POLYVAL result XOR nonce =  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| ... and masked =            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Tag =                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Initial counter =           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Result (31 bytes) =         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

[illegible]



```

POLYVAL result =          4e4108f09f41d797dc9256f8da8d58c7
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 4ccfce1bc1e6350fe8b8c22cda8d58c7
... and masked =          4ccfce1bc1e6350fe8b8c22cda8d5847
Tag =                     454fc2a154fea91f8363a39fec7d0a49
Initial counter =         454fc2a154fea91f8363a39fec7d0ac9
Result (34 bytes) =       857e16a64915a787637687db4a951963
                           5cdd454fc2a154fea91f8363a39fec7d
                           0a49

```

```

Plaintext (21 bytes) =    ced532ce4159b035277d4dfbb7db6296
                           8b13cd4eec
AAD (35 bytes) =          734320ccc9d9bbbb19cb81b2af4ecbc3
                           e72834321f7aa0f70b7282b4f33df23f
                           167541
Key =                     3c535de192eaed3822a2fbbe2ca9dfc8
                           8255e14a661b8aa82cc54236093bbc23
Nonce =                   688089e55540db1872504e1c
Record authentication key = cb8c3aa3f8dbaeb4b28a3e86ff6625f8
Record encryption key =   02426ce1aa3ab31313b0848469a1b5fc
                           6c9af9602600b195b04ad407026bc06d
POLYVAL input =           734320ccc9d9bbbb19cb81b2af4ecbc3
                           e72834321f7aa0f70b7282b4f33df23f
                           1675410000000000000000000000000000
                           ced532ce4159b035277d4dfbb7db6296
                           8b13cd4eec000000000000000000000000
                           1801000000000000a80000000000000000
POLYVAL result =          ffd503c7dd712eb3791b7114b17bb0cf
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 97558a228831f5ab0b4b3f08b17bb0cf
... and masked =          97558a228831f5ab0b4b3f08b17bb04f
Tag =                     9d6c7029675b89eaf4ba1ded1a286594
Initial counter =         9d6c7029675b89eaf4ba1ded1a286594
Result (37 bytes) =       626660c26ea6612fb17ad91e8e767639
                           edd6c9faee9d6c7029675b89eaf4ba1d
                           ed1a286594

```

### C.3. Counter wrap tests

The tests in this section use AEAD\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SIV and are crafted to test correct wrapping of the block counter.



```

Plaintext (32 bytes) = 00000000000000000000000000000000
                        4db923dc793ee6497c76dcc03a98e108

AAD (0 bytes) =
Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
      00000000000000000000000000000000

Nonce = 00000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = dc95c078a24089895275f3d86b4fb868
Record encryption key = 779b38d15bffb63d39d6e9ae76a9b2f3
                        75d11b0e3a68c422845c7d4690fa594f

POLYVAL input = 00000000000000000000000000000000
                4db923dc793ee6497c76dcc03a98e108
                00000000000000000000000000000000

POLYVAL result = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
... and masked = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
Tag = ffffffff00000000000000000000000000000000
Initial counter = ffffffff00000000000000000000000080
Result (48 bytes) = f3f80f2cf0cb2dd9c5984fcda908456c
                    c537703b5ba70324a6793a7bf218d3ea
                    ffffffff00000000000000000000000000000000

```

```

Plaintext (24 bytes) = eb3640277c7ffd1303c7a542d02d3e4c
                        00000000000000000000000000000000

AAD (0 bytes) =
Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000
      00000000000000000000000000000000

Nonce = 00000000000000000000000000000000
Record authentication key = dc95c078a24089895275f3d86b4fb868
Record encryption key = 779b38d15bffb63d39d6e9ae76a9b2f3
                        75d11b0e3a68c422845c7d4690fa594f

POLYVAL input = eb3640277c7ffd1303c7a542d02d3e4c
                00000000000000000000000000000000
                00000000000000000000000000000000

POLYVAL result = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
POLYVAL result XOR nonce = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
... and masked = 7367cdb411b730128dd56e8edc0eff56
Tag = ffffffff00000000000000000000000000000000
Initial counter = ffffffff00000000000000000000000080
Result (40 bytes) = 18ce4f0b8cb4d0cac65fea8f79257b20
                    888e53e72299e56dffffffff0000000000
                    00000000000000000000000000000000

```

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