

ICNRG  
Internet-Draft  
Intended status: Experimental  
Expires: September 14, 2017

M. Mosko  
PARC, Inc.  
I. Solis  
LinkedIn  
C. Wood  
University of California Irvine  
March 13, 2017

**CCNx Messages in TLV Format**  
**[draft-irtf-icnrg-ccnxmessages-04](#)**

**Abstract**

This document specifies version "1" of CCNx message TLV packet format, including the TLV types used by each message element and the encoding of each value. The semantics of CCNx messages follow the CCNx Semantics specification.

**Status of This Memo**

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of [BCP 78](#) and [BCP 79](#).

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at <http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/>.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2017.

**Copyright Notice**

Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to [BCP 78](#) and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info>) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in [Section 4.e](#) of

the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

## Table of Contents

<a href="#">1. Introduction</a>	<a href="#">3</a>
<a href="#">1.1. Requirements Language</a>	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">2. Definitions</a>	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">3. Type-Length-Value (TLV) Packets</a>	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">3.1. Overall packet format</a>	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">3.2. Fixed Headers</a>	<a href="#">6</a>
<a href="#">3.2.1. Interest Fixed Header</a>	<a href="#">7</a>
<a href="#">3.2.1.1. Interest HopLimit</a>	<a href="#">8</a>
<a href="#">3.2.2. Content Object Fixed Header</a>	<a href="#">8</a>
<a href="#">3.2.3. InterestReturn Fixed Header</a>	<a href="#">8</a>
<a href="#">3.2.3.1. InterestReturn HopLimit</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">3.2.3.2. InterestReturn Flags</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">3.2.3.3. Return Code</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">3.3. Global Formats</a>	<a href="#">10</a>
<a href="#">3.3.1. Pad</a>	<a href="#">10</a>
<a href="#">3.3.2. Organization Specific TLVs</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">3.3.3. Hash Format</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">3.3.4. Link</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">3.4. Hop-by-hop TLV headers</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">3.4.1. Interest Lifetime</a>	<a href="#">13</a>
<a href="#">3.4.2. Recommended Cache Time</a>	<a href="#">13</a>
<a href="#">3.4.3. Message Hash</a>	<a href="#">14</a>
<a href="#">3.5. Top-Level Types</a>	<a href="#">15</a>
<a href="#">3.6. CCNx Message</a>	<a href="#">15</a>
<a href="#">3.6.1. Name</a>	<a href="#">16</a>
<a href="#">3.6.1.1. Name Segments</a>	<a href="#">17</a>
<a href="#">3.6.1.2. Interest Payload ID</a>	<a href="#">18</a>
<a href="#">3.6.2. Message TLVs</a>	<a href="#">19</a>
<a href="#">3.6.2.1. Interest Message TLVs</a>	<a href="#">19</a>
<a href="#">3.6.2.2. Content Object Message TLVs</a>	<a href="#">20</a>
<a href="#">3.6.3. Payload</a>	<a href="#">22</a>
<a href="#">3.6.4. Validation</a>	<a href="#">22</a>
<a href="#">3.6.4.1. Validation Algorithm</a>	<a href="#">22</a>
<a href="#">3.6.4.2. Validation Payload</a>	<a href="#">28</a>
<a href="#">4. IANA Considerations</a>	<a href="#">28</a>
<a href="#">4.1. Packet Type Registry</a>	<a href="#">29</a>
<a href="#">4.2. Interest Return Code Registry</a>	<a href="#">29</a>
<a href="#">4.3. Hop-by-Hop Type Registry</a>	<a href="#">31</a>
<a href="#">4.4. Top-Level Type Registry</a>	<a href="#">31</a>
<a href="#">4.5. Name Segment Type Registry</a>	<a href="#">32</a>
<a href="#">4.6. Message Type Registry</a>	<a href="#">33</a>
<a href="#">4.7. Payload Type Registry</a>	<a href="#">34</a>
<a href="#">4.8. Validation Algorithm Type Registry</a>	<a href="#">35</a>

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 2]

<a href="#">4.9.</a>	Validation Dependent Data Type Registry . . . . .	<a href="#">36</a>
<a href="#">4.10.</a>	Hash Function Type Registry . . . . .	<a href="#">37</a>
<a href="#">5.</a>	Security Considerations . . . . .	<a href="#">38</a>
<a href="#">6.</a>	References . . . . .	<a href="#">39</a>
<a href="#">6.1.</a>	Normative References . . . . .	<a href="#">39</a>
<a href="#">6.2.</a>	Informative References . . . . .	<a href="#">39</a>
	Authors' Addresses . . . . .	<a href="#">40</a>

## **[1. Introduction](#)**

This document specifies a Type-Length-Value (TLV) packet format and the TLV type and value encodings for CCNx messages. A full description of the CCNx network protocol, providing an encoding-free description of CCNx messages and message elements, may be found in [[CCNSemantics](#)]. Several additional protocols specified in their own documents are in use that extend this specification.

This document specifies:

- o The TLV packet format.
- o The overall packet format for CCNx messages.
- o The TLV types used by CCNx messages.
- o The encoding of values for each type.
- o Top level types that exist at the outermost containment.
- o Interest TLVs that exist within Interest containment.
- o Content Object TLVs that exist within Content Object containment.

This document is supplemented by this document:

- o Message semantics: see [[CCNSemantics](#)] for the protocol operation regarding Interest and Content Object, including the Interest Return protocol.
- o URI notation: see [[CCNxURI](#)] for the CCNx URI notation.

The type values in [Section 4](#) represent the values in common usage today. These values may change pending IANA assignments. All type values are relative to their parent containers. It is possible for a TLV to redefine a type value defined by its parent. For example, each level of a nested TLV structure might define a "type = 1" with a completely different meaning.

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 3]

Packets are represented as 32-bit wide words using ASCII art. Due to the nested levels of TLV encoding and the presence of optional fields and variable sizes, there is no concise way to represent all possibilities. We use the convention that ASCII art fields enclosed by vertical bars "|" represent exact bit widths. Fields with a forward slash "/" are variable bit widths, which we typically pad out to word alignment for picture readability.

### **1.1. Requirements Language**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

## **2. Definitions**

- o Name: A hierarchically structured variable length identifier. It is an ordered list of path segments, which may be variable length octet strings. In human-readable form, it is represented in URI format as ccnx:/path/part. There is no host or query string. See [[CCNxURI](#)] for complete details.
- o Interest: A message requesting a Content Object with a matching Name and other optional selectors to choose from multiple objects with the same Name. Any Content Object with a Name and optional selectors that matches the Name and optional selectors of the Interest is said to satisfy the Interest.
- o Content Object: A data object sent in response to an Interest request. It has an (optional) Name and a content payload that are bound together via cryptographic means.

## **3. Type-Length-Value (TLV) Packets**

We use 16-bit Type and 16-bit Length fields to encode TLV based packets. This provides 64K different possible types and value field lengths of up to 64KiB. With 64K possible types, there should be sufficient space for basic protocol types, while also allowing ample room for experimentation, application use, and growth.

Specifically, the TLV types in the range 0x1000 - 0x1FFF are reserved for experimental use. These type values are reserved in all TLV container contexts. In the event that more space is needed, either for types or for length, a new version of the protocol would be needed. See [Section 3.3.2](#) for more information about organization specific TLVs.

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 4]

Abbrev	Name	Description
T_ORG	Vendor Specific Information (Section 3.3.2)	Information specific to a vendor implementation (see below).
n/a	Experimental	Experimental use.

Table 1: Reserved TLV Types

1	2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1	Length
Type	

The Length field contains the length of the Value field in octets. It does not include the length of the Type and Length fields. They length MAY be zero.

TLV structures are nestable, allowing the Value field of one TLV structure to contain additional TLV structures. The enclosing TLV structure is called the container of the enclosed TLV.

Type values are context-dependent. Within a TLV container, one may re-use previous type values for new context-dependent purposes.

### 3.1. Overall packet format

Each packet includes the 8 byte fixed header described below, followed by a set of TLV fields. These fields are optional hop-by-hop headers and the Packet Payload.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1	PacketLength	
Version	PacketType	
PacketType specific fields		HeaderLength
/ Optional Hop-by-hop header TLVs		/
/ PacketPayload TLVs		/

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 5]

The packet payload is a TLV encoding of the CCNx message, followed by optional Validation TLVs.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+		
CCNx Message TLV		
+-----+-----+-----+ /		
/ Optional CCNx ValidationAlgorithm TLV		
+-----+-----+-----+ /		
/ Optional CCNx ValidationPayload TLV (ValidationAlg required) /		
+-----+-----+-----+ /		

This document describes the Version "1" TLV encoding.

After discarding the fixed and hop-by-hop headers the remaining PacketPayload should be a valid protocol message. Therefore, the PacketPayload always begins with a 4 byte TLV defining the protocol message (whether it is an Interest, Content Object, or other message type) and its total length. The embedding of a self-sufficient protocol data unit inside the fixed and hop-by-hop headers allows a network stack to discard the headers and operate only on the embedded message.

The range of bytes protected by the Validation includes the CCNx Message and the ValidationAlgorithm.

The ContentObjectHash begins with the CCNx Message and ends at the tail of the packet.

### 3.2. Fixed Headers

CCNx messages begin with an 8 byte fixed header (non-TLV format). The HeaderLength field represents the combined length of the Fixed and Hop-by-hop headers. The PacketLength field represents the entire Packet length.


A specific PacketType may assign meaning to the "PacketType specific fields".

The PacketPayload of a CCNx packet is the protocol message itself. The Content Object Hash is computed over the PacketPayload only, excluding the fixed and hop-by-hop headers as those might change from hop to hop. Signed information or Similarity Hashes should not include any of the fixed or hop-by-hop headers. The PacketPayload should be self-sufficient in the event that the fixed and hop-by-hop headers are removed.

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 6]



- o Version: defines the version of the packet.
- o HeaderLength: The length of the fixed header (8 bytes) and hop-by-hop headers. The minimum value MUST be "8".
- o PacketType: describes forwarder actions to take on the packet.
- o PacketLength: Total octets of packet including all headers (fixed header plus hop-by-hop headers) and protocol message.
- o PacketType Specific Fields: specific PacketTypes define the use of these bits.

The PacketType field indicates how the forwarder should process the packet. A Request Packet (Interest) has PacketType PT\_INTEREST, a Response (Content Object) has PacketType PT\_CONTENT, and an InterestReturn Packet has PacketType PT\_RETURN.

HeaderLength is the number of octets from the start of the packet (Version) to the end of the hop-by-hop headers. PacketLength is the number of octets from the start of the packet to the end of the packet.

The PacketType specific fields are reserved bits whose use depends on the PacketType. They are used for network-level signaling.

### **3.2.1. Interest Fixed Header**

If the PacketType in the Fixed Header is PT\_INTEREST, it indicates that the PacketPayload should be processed as an Interest message. For this type of packet, the Fixed Header includes a field for a HopLimit as well as Reserved and Flags fields. The Reserved field MUST be set to 0 in an Interest - this field will be set to a return code in the case of an Interest Return. There are currently no Flags defined, so this field MUST be set to 0.

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 7]

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
Version   PT_INTEREST	PacketLength	
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+	+-----+
HopLimit   Reserved   Flags   HeaderLength		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+	+-----+

### **3.2.1.1. Interest HopLimit**

For an Interest message, the HopLimit is a counter that is decremented with each hop. It limits the distance an Interest may travel on the network. The node originating the Interest MAY put in any value - up to the maximum of 255. Each node that receives an Interest with a HopLimit decrements the value upon reception. If the value is 0 after the decrement, the Interest MUST NOT be forwarded off the node.

It is an error to receive an Interest with a 0 hop-limit from a remote node.

### **3.2.2. Content Object Fixed Header**

If the PacketType in the Fixed Header is PT\_CONTENT, it indicates that the PacketPayload should be processed as a Content Object message. A Content Object defines a Flags field, however there are currently no flags defined, so the Flags field must be set to 0.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
Version   PT_CONTENT	PacketLength	
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+	+-----+
Reserved   Flags   HeaderLength		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+	+-----+

### **3.2.3. InterestReturn Fixed Header**

If the PacketType in the Fixed Header is PT\_RETURN, it indicates that the PacketPayload should be processed as a returned Interest message. The only difference between this InterestReturn message and the original Interest is that the PacketType is changed to PT\_RETURN and a ReturnCode is put into the Reserved octet. All other fields are unchanged. The purpose of this encoding is to prevent packet length changes so no additional bytes are needed to return an Interest to the previous hop. See [[CCNSemantics](#)] for a protocol description of this packet type.

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 8]

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
Version   PT_RETURN   PacketLength		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
HopLimit   ReturnCode   Flags   HeaderLength		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+

### [\*\*3.2.3.1. InterestReturn HopLimit\*\*](#)

This is the original Interest's HopLimit, as received. It is the value before being decremented at the current node (i.e. the received value).

### [\*\*3.2.3.2. InterestReturn Flags\*\*](#)

These are the original Flags as set in the Interest.

### [\*\*3.2.3.3. Return Code\*\*](#)

The numeric value assigned to the return types is defined below. This value is set by the node creating the Interest Return.

A return code of "0" MUST NOT be used, as it indicates that the returning system did not modify the Return Code field.



Type	Return Type
T_RETURN_NO_ROUTE	No Route
T_RETURN_LIMIT_EXCEEDED	Hop Limit Exceeded
T_RETURN_NO_RESOURCES	No Resources
T_RETURN_PATH_ERROR	Path Error
T_RETURN_PROHIBITED	Prohibited
T_RETURN_CONGESTED	Congested
T_RETURN_MTU_TOO_LARGE	MTU too large
T_RETURN_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_RESTRICTI ON	Unsupported ContentObjectHa shRestriction
T_RETURN_MALFORMED_INTEREST	Malformed Interest

Table 2: Return Codes

### [3.3. Global Formats](#)

This section defines global formats that may be nested within other TLVs.

#### [3.3.1. Pad](#)

The pad type may be used by protocols that prefer word-aligned data. The size of the word may be defined by the protocol. Padding 4-byte words, for example, would use a 1-byte, 2-byte, and 3-byte Length. Padding 8-byte words would use a (0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7)-byte Length.

A pad MAY be inserted after any TLV in the CCNx Message or in the Validation Dependent Data In the remainder of this document, we will not show optional pad TLVs.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
T_PAD	Length	
/	variable length pad MUST be zeros	


Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 10]

### 3.3.2. Organization Specific TLVs

Organization specific TLVs MUST use the T\_ORG type. The Length field is the length of the organization specific information plus 3. The Value begins with the 3 byte organization number derived from the last three digits of the IANA Private Enterprise Numbers [EnterpriseNumbers], followed by the organization specific information.



### 3.3.3. Hash Format

Hash values are used in several fields throughout a packet. This TLV encoding is commonly embedded inside those fields to specify the specific hash function used and its value. Note that the reserved TLV types are also reserved here for user-defined experimental functions.

The LENGTH field of the hash value MUST be less than or equal to the hash function length. If the LENGTH is less than the full length, it is taken as the left LENGTH bytes of the hash function output. Only the specified truncations are allowed.

This nested format is used because it allows binary comparison of hash values for certain fields without a router needing to understand a new hash function. For example, the KeyIdRestriction is bit-wise compared between an Interest's KeyIdRestriction field and a ContentObject's KeyId field. This format means the outer field values do not change with differing hash functions so a router can still identify those fields and do a binary comparison of the hash TLV without need to understand the specific hash used. An alternative approach, such as using T\_KEYID\_SHA512-256, would require each router keep an up-to-date parser and supporting user-defined hash functions here would explode the parsing state-space.

A CCN entity MUST support the hash type T\_SHA-256. An entity MAY support the remaining hash types.

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 11]

Abbrev	Lengths (octets)
T_SHA-256	32
T_SHA-512	64, 32
n/a	Experimental TLV types

Table 3: CCNx Hash Functions

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
T_FOO	36	
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
T_SHA512	32	
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
/ 32-byte hash value /		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+

Example nesting inside type T\_FOO

### 3.3.4. Link

A Link is the tuple: {Name, [KeyIdRestr], [ContentObjectHashRestr]}. It is a general encoding that is used in both the payload of a Content Object with PayloadType = "Link" and in the KeyLink field in a KeyLocator.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
/ Mandatory CCNx Name /		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
/ Optional KeyIdRestriction /		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
/ Optional ContentObjectHashRestriction /		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+

## 3.4. Hop-by-hop TLV headers

Hop-by-hop TLV headers are unordered and meaning MUST NOT be attached to their ordering. Three hop-by-hop headers are described in this document:

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 12]

Abbrev	Name	Description
T_INTLIFE	Interest Lifetime ( <a href="#">Section 3.4.1</a> )	The time an Interest should stay pending at an intermediate node.
T_CACHETIME	Recommended Cache Time (Section 3.4.2)	The Recommended Cache Time for Content Objects.
T_MSGHASH	Message Hash ( <a href="#">Section 3.4.3</a> )	The hash of the CCNx Message to end of packet using Section 3.3.3 format.

Table 4: Hop-by-hop Header Types

Additional hop-by-hop headers are defined in higher level specifications such as the fragmentation specification.

### [3.4.1. Interest Lifetime](#)

The Interest Lifetime is the time that an Interest should stay pending at an intermediate node. It is expressed in milliseconds as an unsigned, network byte order integer.

A value of 0 (encoded as 1 byte %x00) indicates the Interest does not elicit a Content Object response. It should still be forwarded, but no reply is expected.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
T_INTLIFE	Length	
/	/	/
/ Lifetime (length octets)		/
/		/

### [3.4.2. Recommended Cache Time](#)

The Recommended Cache Time (RCT) is a measure of the useful lifetime of a Content Object as assigned by a content producer or upstream node. It serves as a guideline to the Content Store cache in determining how long to keep the Content Object. It is a recommendation only and may be ignored by the cache. This is in



contrast to the ExpiryTime (described in [Section 3.6.2.2.2](#)) which takes precedence over the RCT and must be obeyed.

Because the Recommended Cache Time is an optional hop-by-hop header and not a part of the signed message, a content producer may re-issue a previously signed Content Object with an updated RCT without needing to re-sign the message. There is little ill effect from an attacker changing the RCT as the RCT serves as a guideline only.

The Recommended Cache Time (a millisecond timestamp) is a network byte ordered unsigned integer of the number of milliseconds since the epoch in UTC of when the payload expires. It is a 64-bit field.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+
T_CACHETIME		8
+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+
/		/
/	Recommended Cache Time	/
/		/
+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+

### [3.4.3. Message Hash](#)

Within a trusted domain, an operator may calculate the message hash at a border device and insert that value into the hop-by-hop headers of a message. An egress device should remove the value. This permits intermediate devices within that trusted domain to match against a ContentObjectHashRestriction without calculating it at every hop.

The message hash is a cryptographic hash from the start of the CCNx Message to the end of the packet. It is used to match against the ContentObjectHashRestriction ([Section 3.6.2.1.2](#)). The Message Hash may be of longer length than an Interest's restriction, in which case the device should use the left bytes of the Message Hash to check against the Interest's value.


The Message Hash may only carry one hash type and there may only be one Message Hash header.

The Message Hash header is unprotected, so this header is only of practical use within a trusted domain, such as an operator's autonomous system.

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 14]



### [3.5. Top-Level Types](#)

The top-level TLV types listed below exist at the outermost level of a CCNx protocol message.

Abbrev	Name	Description
T_INTEREST	Interest (Section 3.6)	An Interest MessageType.
T_OBJECT	Content Object ( <a href="#">Section 3.6</a> )	A Content Object MessageType
T_VALIDATION_ALG	Validation Algorithm ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.4.1</a> )	The method of message verification such as Message Integrity Check (MIC), a Message Authentication Code (MAC), or a cryptographic signature.
T_VALIDATION_PAYLOAD	Validation Payload (Section 3.6.4.2)	The validation output, such as the CRC32C code or the RSA signature.

Table 5: CCNx Top Level Types

### [3.6. CCNx Message](#)

This is the format for the CCNx protocol message itself. The CCNx message is the portion of the packet between the hop-by-hop headers and the Validation TLVs. The figure below is an expansion of the

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 15]

"CCNx Message TLV" depicted in the beginning of [Section 3](#). The CCNx message begins with MessageType and runs through the optional Payload. The same general format is used for both Interest and Content Object messages which are differentiated by the MessageType field. The first enclosed TLV of a CCNx Message is always the Name TLV. This is followed by an optional Message TLVs and an optional Payload TLV.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
MessageType                    MessageLength		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
Name TLV        (Type = T_NAME)		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
/ Optional Message TLVs   (Various Types)                /		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
/ Optional Payload TLV   (Type = T_PAYLOAD)                /		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
Abbrev           Name                   Description		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
T_NAME         Name (Section         The CCNx Name requested in an		
3.6.1)              Interest or published in a Content		
Object.		
T_PAYLOAD       Payload             The message payload.		
( <a href="#">Section 3.6.3</a> )		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+

Table 6: CCNx Message Types

### [3.6.1. Name](#)

A Name is a TLV encoded sequence of segments. The table below lists the type values appropriate for these Name segments. A Name MUST NOT include PAD TLVs.

As described in CCNx Semantics [[CCNSemantics](#)], using the CCNx URI [[CCNxURI](#)] notation, a T\_NAME with 0 length corresponds to ccnx:/ (the default route) and is distinct from a name with one zero length segment, such as ccnx:/NAME=. In the TLV encoding, ccnx:/ corresponds to T\_NAME with 0 length, while ccnx:/NAME= corresponds to T\_NAME with 4 length and T\_NAMESEGMENT with 0 length.



	1		2		3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1					
	T_NAME		Length		
+-----+-----+-----+-----+					
/ Name segment TLVs					/
+-----+-----+-----+-----+					
Symbolic Name   Name   Description					
+-----+-----+-----+-----+					
T_NAMESEGMENT   Name segment   A generic name Segment.					
( <a href="#">Section 3.6.1.1</a> )					
T_IPID   Interest Payload   An identifier that represents					
ID (Section   the Interest Payload field.					
3.6.1.2)   As an example, the Payload ID					
might be a hash of the					
Interest Payload. This					
provides a way to					
differentiate between					
Interests based on their					
payloads without having to					
parse all the bytes of the					
payload itself; instead using					
only this Payload ID Name					
segment.					
T_APP:00 -   Application   Application-specific payload					
T_APP:4096   Components   in a name segment. An					
( <a href="#">Section 3.6.1.1</a> )   application may apply its own					
semantics to the 4096					
reserved types.					
+-----+-----+-----+-----+					

Table 7: CCNx Name Types

### [3.6.1.1. Name Segments](#)

4096 special application payload name segments are allocated. These have application semantics applied to them. A good convention is to put the application's identity in the name prior to using these name segments.

For example, a name like "ccnx:/foo/bar/hi" would be encoded as:



1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
(T_NAME)	%x14 (20)	
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+
(T_NAME_SEGMENT)	%x03 (3)	
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+
f o o   (T_NAME_SEGMENT)		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+
%x03 (3)   b		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+
a r   (T_NAME_SEGMENT)		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+
%x02 (2)   h   i		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+

### [3.6.1.2. Interest Payload ID](#)

The InterestPayloadID is a name segment created by the origin of an Interest to represent the Interest Payload. This allows the proper multiplexing of Interests based on their name if they have different payloads. A common representation is to use a hash of the Interest Payload as the InterestPayloadID.

As part of the TLV 'value', the InterestPayloadID contains a one identifier of method used to create the InterestPayloadID followed by a variable length octet string. An implementation is not required to implement any of the methods to receive an Interest; the InterestPayloadID may be treated only as an opaque octet string for purposes of multiplexing Interests with different payloads. Only a device creating an InterestPayloadID name segment or a device verifying such a segment need to implement the algorithms.

It uses the [Section 3.3.3](#) encoding of hash values.

In normal operations, we recommend displaying the InterestPayloadID as an opaque octet string in a CCNx URI, as this is the common denominator for implementation parsing.

The InterestPayloadID, even if it is a hash, should not convey any security context. If a system requires confirmation that a specific entity created the InterestPayload, it should use a cryptographic signature on the Interest via the ValidationAlgorithm and ValidationPayload or use its own methods inside the Interest Payload.

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 18]

### [3.6.2. Message TLVs](#)

Each message type (Interest or Content Object) is associated with a set of optional Message TLVs. Additional specification documents may extend the types associated with each.

#### [3.6.2.1. Interest Message TLVs](#)

There are two Message TLVs currently associated with an Interest message: the KeyIdRestriction selector and the ContentObjectHashRestriction selector are used to narrow the universe of acceptable Content Objects that would satisfy the Interest.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
MessageType	MessageLength	
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+
Name TLV		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+
/ Optional KeyIdRestriction TLV		/
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+
/ Optional ContentObjectHashRestriction TLV		/
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+
Abbrev	Name	Description
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+
T_KEYIDRESTR	KeyIdRestriction (Section	A <a href="#">Section 3.3.3</a>
	3.6.2.1.1)	representation of
		the KeyId
T_OBJHASHRESTR	ContentObjectHashRestriction	A <a href="#">Section 3.3.3</a>
	( <a href="#">Section 3.6.2.1.2</a> )	representation of
		the hash of the
		specific Content
		Object that would
		satisfy the
		Interest.
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+

Table 8: CCNx Interest Message TLV Types

#### [3.6.2.1.1. KeyIdRestriction](#)

An Interest MAY include a KeyIdRestriction selector. This ensures that only Content Objects with matching KeyIds will satisfy the Interest. See [Section 3.6.4.1.4.1](#) for the format of a KeyId.



### [3.6.2.1.2. ContentObjectHashRestriction](#)

An Interest MAY contain a ContentObjectHashRestriction selector. This is the hash of the Content Object - the self-certifying name restriction that must be verified in the network, if an Interest carried this restriction. It is calculated from the beginning of the CCNx Message to the end of the packet. The LENGTH MUST be from one of the allowed values for that hash (see [Section 3.3.3](#)).

The ContentObjectHashRestriction SHOULD be of type T\_SHA-256 and of length 32 bytes.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
T_OBJHASHRESTR   LENGTH+4		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
<hash type>   LENGTH		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
/ LENGTH octets of hash /		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+

### [3.6.2.2. Content Object Message TLVs](#)

The following message TLVs are currently defined for Content Objects: PayloadType (optional) and ExpiryTime (optional).

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
MessageType   MessageLength		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
Name TLV		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
/ Optional PayloadType TLV /		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
/ Optional ExpiryTime TLV /		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 20]

Abbrev	Name	Description
T_PAYLDTYPE	PayloadType ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.2.2.1</a> )	Indicates the type of Payload contents.
T_EXPIRY	ExpiryTime ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.2.2.2</a> )	The time at which the Payload expires, as expressed in the number of milliseconds since the epoch in UTC. If missing, Content Object may be used as long as desired.

Table 9: CCNx Content Object Message TLV Types

### [3.6.2.2.1. PayloadType](#)

The PayloadType is a network byte order integer representing the general type of the Payload TLV.

- o T\_PAYLOADTYPE\_DATA: Data (possibly encrypted)
- o T\_PAYLOADTYPE\_KEY: Key
- o T\_PAYLOADTYPE\_LINK: Link

The Data type indicate that the Payload of the ContentObject is opaque application bytes. The Key type indicates that the Payload is a DER encoded public key. The Link type indicates that the Payload is one or more Link ([Section 3.3.4](#)). If this field is missing, a "Data" type is assumed.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
T_PAYLDTYPE		Length
/		

### [3.6.2.2.2. ExpiryTime](#)

The ExpiryTime is the time at which the Payload expires, as expressed by a timestamp containing the number of milliseconds since the epoch in UTC. It is a network byte order unsigned integer in a 64-bit field. A cache or end system should not respond with a Content Object past its ExpiryTime. Routers forwarding a Content Object do



not need to check the ExpiryTime. If the ExpiryTime field is missing, the Content Object has no expressed expiration and a cache or end system may use the Content Object for as long as desired.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
T_EXPIRY		8
+-----+-----+-----+		+-----+-----+
/ ExpiryTime /		/ /
/		
+-----+-----+-----+		

### [3.6.3. Payload](#)

The Payload TLV contains the content of the packet. It MAY be of zero length. If a packet does not have any payload, this field MAY be omitted, rather than carrying a zero length.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
T_PAYLOAD		Length
+-----+-----+-----+		+-----+-----+
/ Payload Contents /		
+-----+-----+-----+		

### [3.6.4. Validation](#)

Both Interests and Content Objects have the option to include information about how to validate the CCNx message. This information is contained in two TLVs: the ValidationAlgorithm TLV and the ValidationPayload TLV. The ValidationAlgorithm TLV specifies the mechanism to be used to verify the CCNx message. Examples include verification with a Message Integrity Check (MIC), a Message Authentication Code (MAC), or a cryptographic signature. The ValidationPayload TLV contains the validation output, such as the CRC32C code or the RSA signature.

An Interest would most likely only use a MIC type of validation - a crc, checksum, or digest.

#### [3.6.4.1. Validation Algorithm](#)

The ValidationAlgorithm is a set of nested TLVs containing all of the information needed to verify the message. The outermost container has type = T\_VALIDATION\_ALG. The first nested TLV defines the specific type of validation to be performed on the message. The type

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 22]

is identified with the "ValidationType" as shown in the figure below and elaborated in the table below. Nested within that container are the TLVs for any ValidationType dependent data, for example a Key Id, Key Locator etc.

Complete examples of several types may be found in [Section 3.6.4.1.5](#)

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
T_VALIDATION_ALG	ValidationAlgLength	
ValidationType	Length	
/ ValidationType dependent data		/
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
+	+	+
Abbrev	Name	Description
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
T_CRC32C	CRC32C (Section 3.6.4.1.1)	Castagnoli CRC32 (iSCSI, ext4, etc.), with normal form polynomial 0x1EDC6F41.
T_HMAC-SHA256	HMAC-SHA256 (Section 3.6.4.1.2)	HMAC ( <a href="#">RFC 2104</a> ) using SHA256 hash.
T_RSA-SHA256	RSA-SHA256 (Section 3.6.4.1.3)	RSA public key signature using SHA256 digest.
EC-SECP-256K1	SECP-256K1 (Section 3.6.4.1.3)	Elliptic Curve signature with SECP-256K1 parameters (see [ <a href="#">ECC</a> ]).
EC-SECP-384R1	SECP-384R1 (Section 3.6.4.1.3)	Elliptic Curve signature with SECP-384R1 parameters (see [ <a href="#">ECC</a> ]).
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+

Table 10: CCNx Validation Types

### [3.6.4.1.1. Message Integrity Checks](#)

MICs do not require additional data in order to perform the verification. An example is CRC32C that has a "0" length value.

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 23]

#### 3.6.4.1.2. Message Authentication Checks

MACs are useful for communication between two trusting parties who have already shared private keys. Examples include an RSA signature of a SHA256 digest or others. They rely on a KeyId. Some MACs might use more than a KeyId, but those would be defined in the future.

#### 3.6.4.1.3. Signature

Signature type Validators specify a digest mechanism and a signing algorithm to verify the message. Examples include RSA signature of a SHA256 digest, an Elliptic Curve signature with SECP-256K1 parameters, etc. These Validators require a KeyId and a mechanism for locating the publishers public key (a KeyLocator) - optionally a PublicKey or Certificate or KeyLink.

#### 3.6.4.1.4. Validation Dependent Data

Different Validation Algorithms require access to different pieces of data contained in the ValidationAlgorithm TLV. As described above, Key Ids, Key Locators, Public Keys, Certificates, Links and Key Names all play a role in different Validation Algorithms. Any number of Validation Dependent Data containers can be present in a Validation Algorithm TLV.

Following is a table of CCNx ValidationType dependent data types:



Abbrev	Name	Description
T_KEYID	SignerKeyId (Section 3.6.4.1.4.1)	An identifier of the shared secret or public key associated with a MAC or Signature.
T_PUBLICKEY	Public Key (Section 3.6.4.1.4.2)	DER encoded public key.
T_CERT	Certificate (Section 3.6.4.1.4.3)	DER encoded X509 certificate.
T_KEYLINK	KeyLink (Section 3.6.4.1.4.4)	A CCNx Link object.
T_SIGTIME	SignatureTime (Section 3.6.4.1.4.5)	A millisecond timestamp indicating the time when the signature was created.

Table 11: CCNx Validation Dependent Data Types

### 3.6.4.1.4.1. KeyId

The KeyId is the publisher key identifier. It is similar to a Subject Key Identifier from X509 [RFC 5280, [Section 4.2.1.2](#)]. It should be derived from the key used to sign, such as from the SHA-256 hash of the key. It applies to both public/private key systems and to symmetric key systems.

The KeyId is represented using the [Section 3.3.3](#). If a protocol uses a non-hash identifier, it should use one of the reserved values.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
T_KEYID	LENGTH+4	
<hash type>	LENGTH	
/ LENGTH octets of hash		/



#### 3.6.4.1.4.2. Public Key

A Public Key is a DER encoded Subject Public Key Info block, as in an X509 certificate.

1			
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5			
+-----+-----+-----+			
T_PUBLICKEY   Length			
+-----+-----+-----+			
/ Public Key (DER encoded SPKI) /			
+-----+-----+-----+			

#### 3.6.4.1.4.3. Certificate

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		
+-----+-----+-----+		
T_CERT   Length		
+-----+-----+-----+		
/ Certificate (DER encoded X509) /		
+-----+-----+-----+		

#### 3.6.4.1.4.4. KeyLink

A KeyLink type KeyLocator is a Link.

The KeyLink ContentObjectHashRestr, if included, is the digest of the Content Object identified by KeyLink, not the digest of the public key. Likewise, theKeyIdRestr of the KeyLink is the KeyId of the ContentObject, not necessarily of the wrapped key.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		
+-----+-----+-----+		
T_KEYKINK   Length		
+-----+-----+-----+		
/ Link /		
+-----+-----+-----+		

#### 3.6.4.1.4.5. SignatureTime

The SignatureTime is a millisecond timestamp indicating the time at which a signature was created. The signer sets this field to the current time when creating a signature. A verifier may use this time to determine whether or not the signature was created during the validity period of a key, or if it occurred in a reasonable sequence with other associated signatures. The SignatureTime is unrelated to

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 26]

any time associated with the actual CCNx Message, which could have been created long before the signature. The default behavior is to always include a SignatureTime when creating an authenticated message (e.g. HMAC or RSA).

SignatureTime is a network byte ordered unsigned integer of the number of milliseconds since the epoch in UTC of when the signature was created. It is a fixed 64-bit field.

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
T_SIGTIME		8
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
/	SignatureTime	/
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+

#### 3.6.4.1.5. Validation Examples

As an example of a MIC type validation, the encoding for CRC32C validation would be:

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
T_VALIDATION_ALG		4
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
T_CRC32C		0
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+

As an example of a MAC type validation, the encoding for an HMAC using a SHA256 hash would be:

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
T_VALIDATION_ALG		40
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
T_HMAC-SHA256		36
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
T_KEYID		32
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+
/	KeyId	/
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+

As an example of a Signature type validation, the encoding for an RSA public key signing using a SHA256 digest and Public Key would be:



1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+
T_VALIDATION_ALG	44 + Variable Length	
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+
T_RSA-SHA256	40 + Variable Length	
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+
T_KEYID	32	
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+
/ KeyId /		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+
T_PUBLICKEY	Variable Length (~ 160)	
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+
/ Public Key (DER encoded SPKI) /		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+

### 3.6.4.2. Validation Payload

1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+
T_VALIDATION_PAYLOAD   ValidationPayloadLength		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+
/ Type-dependent data /		
+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+

The ValidationPayload contains the validation output, such as the CRC32C code or the RSA signature.

## 4. IANA Considerations

This section details each kind of protocol value that can be registered. Each type registry can be updated by incrementally expanding the type space, i.e., by allocating and reserving new types. As per [[RFC5226](#)] this section details the creation of the "CCNx Registry" and several sub-registries.

+-----+-----+-----+		
Property   Value		
+-----+-----+-----+		
Name   CCNx Registry		
Abbrev   CCNx		
+-----+-----+-----+		

Registry Creation

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 28]

#### 4.1. Packet Type Registry

The following packet types should be allocated. A PacketType MUST be 1 byte. New packet types are allocated via "RFC Required" action.

Property	Value
Name	Packet Type Registry
Parent	CCNx Registry
Review process	RFC Required
Syntax	1 octet (decimal)

Registry Creation

Type	Name	Reference
0	PT_INTEREST	Fixed Header Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.2</a> )
1	PT_CONTENT	Fixed Header Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.2</a> )
2	PT_RETURN	Fixed Header Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.2</a> )

Packet Type Namespace

#### 4.2. Interest Return Code Registry

The following InterestReturn code types should be allocated.



Property	Value
Name	Interest Return Code
Parent	CCNx Registry
Review process	Expert Review, should include public standard leading to RFC.
Syntax	1 octet (decimal)

### Registry Creation

Type	Name	Reference
1	T_RETURN_NO_ROUTE	Fixed Header Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.2.3.3</a> )
2	T_RETURN_LIMIT_EXCEEDED	Fixed Header Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.2.3.3</a> )
3	T_RETURN_NO_RESOURCES	Fixed Header Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.2.3.3</a> )
4	T_RETURN_PATH_ERROR	Fixed Header Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.2.3.3</a> )
5	T_RETURN_PROHIBITED	Fixed Header Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.2.3.3</a> )
6	T_RETURN_CONGESTED	Fixed Header Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.2.3.3</a> )
7	T_RETURN_MTU_TOO_LARGE	Fixed Header Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.2.3.3</a> )
8	T_RETURN_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_RESTRICTION	Fixed Header Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.2.3.3</a> )
9	T_RETURN_MALFORMED_INTEREST	Fixed Header Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.2.3.3</a> )

### Interest Return Type Namespace

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 30]

#### 4.3. Hop-by-Hop Type Registry

The following hop-by-hop types should be allocated.

Property	Value
Name	Hop-by-Hop Type Registry
Parent	CCNx Registry
Review process	RFC Required
Syntax	2 octet TLV type (decimal)

#### Registry Creation

Type	Name	Reference
1	T_INTLIFE	Hop-by-hop TLV headers (Section 3.4)
2	T_CACHETIME	Hop-by-hop TLV headers (Section 3.4)
3	T_MSGHASH	Hop-by-hop TLV headers (Section 3.4)
4 - 7	Reserved	
%x0FFE	T_PAD	Pad ( <a href="#">Section 3.3.1</a> )
%x0FFF	T_ORG	Organization-Specific TLVs (Section 3.3.2)
%x1000-%x1FFF	Reserved	Experimental Use ( <a href="#">Section 3</a> )

#### Hop-by-Hop Type Namespace

#### 4.4. Top-Level Type Registry

The following top-level types should be allocated.

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 31]

Property	Value
Name	Top-Level Type Registry
Parent	CCNx Registry
Review process	RFC Required
Syntax	2 octet TLV type (decimal)

### Registry Creation

Type	Name	Reference
1	T_INTEREST	Top-Level Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.5</a> )
2	T_OBJECT	Top-Level Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.5</a> )
3	T_VALIDATION_ALG	Top-Level Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.5</a> )
4	T_VALIDATION_PAYLOAD	Top-Level Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.5</a> )

### Top-Level Type Namespace

#### [4.5. Name Segment Type Registry](#)

The following name segment types should be allocated.

Property	Value
Name	Name Segment Type Registry
Parent	CCNx Registry
Review process	Expert Review with public specification
Syntax	2 octet TLV type (decimal)

### Registry Creation

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 32]

Type	Name	Reference
1	T_NAMESEGMENT	Name ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.1</a> )
2	T_IPID	Name ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.1</a> )
16 - 19	Reserved	Used in other drafts
%x0FFF	T_ORG	Organization-Specific TLVs ( <a href="#">Section 3.3.2</a> )
%x1000 - %x1FFF	T_APP:00 - T_APP:4096	Application Components (Section 3.6.1)

Name Segment Type Namespace

#### [4.6. Message Type Registry](#)

The following CCNx message segment types should be allocated.

Property	Value
Name	Message Type Registry
Parent	CCNx Registry
Review process	RFC Required
Syntax	2 octet TLV type (decimal)

Registry Creation



Type	Name	Reference
0	T_NAME	Message Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.6</a> )
1	T_PAYLOAD	Message Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.6</a> )
2	T_KEYIDRESTR	Message Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.6</a> )
3	T_OBJHASHRESTR	Message Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.6</a> )
5	T_PAYLDTYPE	Content Object Message Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.2.2</a> )
6	T_EXPIRY	Content Object Message Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.2.2</a> )
7 - 12	Reserved	Used in other RFC drafts
%x0FFE	T_PAD	Pad ( <a href="#">Section 3.3.1</a> )
%x0FFF	T_ORG	Organization-Specific TLVs ( <a href="#">Section 3.3.2</a> )
%x1000-%x1FFF	Reserved	Experimental Use ( <a href="#">Section 3</a> )

## CCNx Message Type Namespace

**4.7. Payload Type Registry**

The following payload types should be allocated.

Property	Value
Name	PayloadType Registry
Parent	CCNx Registry
Review process	Expert Review with public specification
Syntax	Variable length unsigned integer (decimal)

## Registry Creation

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 34]

Type	Name	Reference
0	T_PAYLOADTYPE_DATA	Payload Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.2.2.1</a> )
1	T_PAYLOADTYPE_KEY	Payload Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.2.2.1</a> )
2	T_PAYLOADTYPE_LINK	Payload Types ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.2.2.1</a> )

Payload Type Namespace

#### [\*\*4.8. Validation Algorithm Type Registry\*\*](#)

The following validation algorithm types should be allocated.

Property	Value
Name	Validation Algorithm Type Registry
Parent	CCNx Registry
Review process	Expert Review with public specification of the algorithm
Syntax	2 octet TLV type (decimal)

Registry Creation



Type	Name	Reference
2	T_CRC32C	Validation Algorithm (Section 3.6.4.1)
4	T_HMAC-SHA256	Validation Algorithm (Section 3.6.4.1)
5	T_RSA-SHA256	Validation Algorithm (Section 3.6.4.1)
6	EC-SECP-256K1	Validation Algorithm (Section 3.6.4.1)
7	EC-SECP-384R1	Validation Algorithm (Section 3.6.4.1)
%x0FFE	T_PAD	Pad ( <a href="#">Section 3.3.1</a> )
%x0FFF	T_ORG	Organization-Specific TLVs ( <a href="#">Section 3.3.2</a> )
%x1000-%x1FFF	Reserved	Experimental Use ( <a href="#">Section 3</a> )

### Validation Algorithm Type Namespace

#### [4.9. Validation Dependent Data Type Registry](#)

The following validation dependent data types should be allocated.

Property	Value
Name	Validation Dependent Data Type Registry
Parent	CCNx Registry
Review process	RFC Required
Syntax	2 octet TLV type (decimal)

### Registry Creation



Type	Name	Reference
9	T_KEYID	Validation Dependent Data ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.4.1.4</a> )
10	T_PUBLICKEYLOC	Validation Dependent Data ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.4.1.4</a> )
11	T_PUBLICKEY	Validation Dependent Data ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.4.1.4</a> )
12	T_CERT	Validation Dependent Data ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.4.1.4</a> )
13	T_LINK	Validation Dependent Data ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.4.1.4</a> )
14	T_KEYLINK	Validation Dependent Data ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.4.1.4</a> )
15	T_SIGTIME	Validation Dependent Data ( <a href="#">Section 3.6.4.1.4</a> )
%x0FFF	T_ORG	Organization-Specific TLVs ( <a href="#">Section 3.3.2</a> )
%x1000-%x1FFF	Reserved	Experimental Use ( <a href="#">Section 3</a> )

Validation Dependent Data Type Namespace

#### [4.10. Hash Function Type Registry](#)

The following CCNx hash function types should be allocated.



Property	Value
Name	Hash Function Type Registry
Parent	CCNx Registry
Review process	Expert Review with public specification of the hash function
Syntax	2 octet TLV type (decimal)

### Registry Creation

Type	Name	Reference
1	T_SHA-256	Hash Format ( <a href="#">Section 3.3.3</a> )
2	T_SHA-512	Hash Format ( <a href="#">Section 3.3.3</a> )
%x0FFF	T_ORG	Organization-Specific TLVs (Section 3.3.2)
%x1000-%x1FFF	Reserved	Experimental Use ( <a href="#">Section 3</a> )

### CCNx Hash Function Type Namespace

## 5. Security Considerations

The CCNx message format includes the ability to attach MICs, MACs, and Signatures to all packet types. This does not mean that it is a good idea to use an arbitrary ValidationAlgorithm, nor to include computationally expensive algorithms in Interest packets, as that could lead to computational DoS attacks. Application protocols should use an explicit protocol to guide their use of packet signatures.

The CCNx message format does not include explicit guidance for encryption. This is covered by other specifications.

Because some implementations may store the entire Name at intermediate hops, application designers should use concise names and not store large fields there. Deployments may choose to use their own guidelines for name limitations. There is currently no recommended practices for Interest deployments.



## 6. References

### 6.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.

### 6.2. Informative References

[CCN] PARC, Inc., "CCNx Open Source", 2007, <<http://www.CCNx.org>>.

[CCNSemantics] Mosko, M., Solis, I., and C. Wood, "CCNx Semantics (Internet draft)", 2017, <<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mosko-icnrg-ccnxsemantics-04>>.

[CCNxURI] Mosko, M. and C. Wood, "The CCNx URI Scheme (Internet draft)", 2017, <<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mosko-icnrg-ccnxuri-02>>.

[ECC] Certicom Research, "SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", 2010, <<http://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf>>.

[EnterpriseNumbers] IANA, "IANA Private Enterprise Numbers", 2015, <<http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers/enterprise-numbers>>.

[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations", [BCP 72](#), [RFC 3552](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>>.

[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", [BCP 26](#), [RFC 5226](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>>.

[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", [RFC 5280](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>>.

Mosko, et al.

Expires September 14, 2017

[Page 39]

[RFC6920] Farrell, S., Kutscher, D., Dannewitz, C., Ohlman, B., Keranen, A., and P. Hallam-Baker, "Naming Things with Hashes", [RFC 6920](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC6920, April 2013,  
<<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6920>>.

#### Authors' Addresses

Marc Mosko  
PARC, Inc.  
Palo Alto, California 94304  
USA

Phone: +01 650-812-4405  
Email: [marc.mosko@parc.com](mailto:marc.mosko@parc.com)

Ignacio Solis  
LinkedIn  
Mountain View, California 94043  
USA

Email: [nsolis@linkedin.com](mailto:nsolis@linkedin.com)

Christopher A. Wood  
University of California Irvine  
Irvine, California 92697  
USA

Phone: +01 315-806-5939  
Email: [woodc1@uci.edu](mailto:woodc1@uci.edu)

