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**On the Generation of Transient Numeric Identifiers
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Abstract

This document performs an analysis of the security and privacy implications of different types of "numeric identifiers" used in IETF protocols, and tries to categorize them based on their interoperability requirements and the associated failure severity when such requirements are not met. Subsequently, it provides advice on possible algorithms that could be employed to satisfy the interoperability requirements of each identifier category, while minimizing the security and privacy implications, thus providing guidance to protocol designers and protocol implementers. Finally, this describes a number of algorithms that have been employed in real implementations to generate transient numeric identifiers and analyzes their security and privacy properties.

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1. Introduction

Network protocols employ a variety of numeric identifiers for different protocol entities, ranging from DNS Transaction IDs (TxIDs) to transport protocol ports (e.g. TCP ports) or IPv6 Interface Identifiers (IIDs). These identifiers usually have specific properties (e.g. uniqueness during a specified period of time) that must be satisfied such that they do not result in negative interoperability implications, and an associated failure severity when such properties are not met, ranging from soft to hard failures.

For more than 30 years, a large number of implementations of the TCP/IP protocol suite have been subject to a variety of attacks, with effects ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) or data injection, to information leakages that could be exploited for pervasive monitoring [[RFC7258](#)]. The root cause of these issues has been, in many cases, the poor selection of transient numeric identifiers in such protocols, usually as a result of insufficient or misleading specifications. While it is generally trivial to identify an algorithm that can satisfy the interoperability requirements of a given identifier, empirical evidence exists that doing so without negatively affecting the security and/or privacy properties of the aforementioned protocols is prone to error [[I-D.irtf-pearg-numeric-ids-history](#)].

For example, implementations have been subject to security and/or privacy issues resulting from:

- o Predictable TCP Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs) [[RFC0793](#)]
- o Predictable initial timestamp in TCP timestamps Options (TSval in SYN or SYN/ACK) [[RFC7323](#)]
- o Predictable TCP ephemeral port numbers [[RFC0793](#)]
- o Predictable IPv4 or IPv6 Fragment Identifiers (Fragment IDs) [[RFC0791](#)] [[RFC8200](#)]
- o Predictable IPv6 Interface Identifiers (IIDs) [[RFC4291](#)]
- o Predictable DNS Transaction Identifiers (TxIDs) [[RFC1035](#)]

Recent history indicates that when new protocols are standardized or new protocol implementations are produced, the security and privacy properties of the associated identifiers tend to be overlooked, and inappropriate algorithms to generate transient numeric identifiers

are either suggested in the specification or selected by implementers. As a result, it should be evident that advice in this area is warranted.

This document contains a non-exhaustive survey of identifiers employed in various IETF protocols, and aims to categorize such identifiers based on their interoperability requirements, and the associated failure severity when such requirements are not met. Subsequently, it provides advice on possible algorithms that could be employed to satisfy the interoperability requirements of each category, while minimizing the associated security and privacy implications. Finally, it analyzes several algorithms that have been employed in real implementations to meet such requirements and analyzes their security and privacy properties.

2. Terminology

Transient Numeric Identifier:

A data object in a protocol specification that can be used to definitely distinguish a protocol object (a datagram, network interface, transport protocol endpoint, session, etc) from all other objects of the same type, in a given context. Transient numeric identifiers are usually defined as a series of bits, and represented using integer values. These identifiers are typically dynamically selected, as opposed to statically-assigned numeric identifiers (see e.g. [[IANA-PROT](#)]). We note that different identifiers may have additional requirements or properties depending on their specific use in a protocol. We use the term "transient numeric identifier" (or simply "numeric identifier" or "identifier" as short forms) as a generic term to refer to any data object in a protocol specification that satisfies the identification property stated above.

Failure Severity:

The consequences of a failure to comply with the interoperability requirements of a given identifier. Severity considers the worst potential consequence of a failure, determined by the system damage and/or time lost to repair the failure. In this document we define two types of failure severity: "soft failure" and "hard failure".

Soft Failure:

A soft failure is a recoverable condition in which a protocol does not operate in the prescribed manner but normal operation can be resumed automatically in a short period of time. For example, a simple packet-loss event that is subsequently recovered with a retransmission can be considered a soft failure.

Hard Failure:

A hard failure is a non-recoverable condition in which a protocol does not operate in the prescribed manner or it operates with excessive degradation of service. For example, an established TCP connection that is aborted due to an error condition constitutes, from the point of view of the transport protocol, a hard failure, since it enters a state from which normal operation cannot be resumed.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

3. Threat Model

Throughout this document, we assume an attacker does not have physical or logical access to the device(s) being attacked. We assume the attacker can simply send any traffic to the target device(s), to e.g. sample identifiers employed by such device(s).

4. Issues with the Specification of Identifiers

While assessing protocol specifications regarding the use of identifiers, we found that most of the issues discussed in this document arise as a result of one of the following conditions:

- o Protocol specifications which under-specify the requirements for their identifiers
- o Protocol specifications that over-specify their identifiers
- o Protocol implementations that simply fail to comply with the specified requirements

A number of protocol specifications (too many of them) have simply overlooked the security and privacy implications of transient numeric identifiers [[I-D.irtf-pearg-numeric-ids-history](#)]. Examples of them are the specification of TCP port numbers in [[RFC0793](#)], the specification of TCP sequence numbers in [[RFC0793](#)], or the specification of the DNS TxID in [[RFC1035](#)].

On the other hand, there are a number of protocol specifications that over-specify some of their associated transient numeric identifiers. For example, [[RFC4291](#)] essentially overloads the semantics of IPv6 Interface Identifiers (IIDs) by embedding link-layer addresses in the IPv6 IIDs, when the interoperability requirement of uniqueness could be achieved in other ways that do not result in negative security and privacy implications [[RFC7721](#)]. Similarly, [[RFC2460](#)] suggested the

use of a global counter for the generation of Fragment Identification values, when the interoperability properties of uniqueness per {Src IP, Dst IP} could be achieved with other algorithms that do not result in negative security and privacy implications [[RFC7739](#)].

Finally, there are protocol implementations that simply fail to comply with existing protocol specifications. For example, some popular operating systems (notably Microsoft Windows) still fail to implement transport protocol ephemeral port randomization, as recommended in [[RFC6056](#)].

5. Protocol Failure Severity

[Section 2](#) defines the concept of "Failure Severity", along with two types of failure severities that we employ throughout this document: soft and hard.

Our analysis of the severity of a failure is performed from the point of view of the protocol in question. However, the corresponding severity on the upper application or protocol may not be the same as that of the protocol in question. For example, a TCP connection that is aborted may or may not result in a hard failure of the upper application protocol: if the upper application can establish a new TCP connection without any impact on the application, a hard failure at the TCP protocol may have no severity at the application level. On the other hand, if a hard failure of a TCP connection results in excessive degradation of service at the application layer, it will also result in a hard failure at the application.

6. Categorizing Identifiers

This section includes a non-exhaustive survey of transient numeric identifiers, and proposes a number of categories that can accommodate these identifiers based on their interoperability requirements and their failure modes (soft or hard)

Identifier	Interoperability Requirements	Failure Severity
IPv6 Frag ID	Uniqueness (for IP address pair)	Soft/Hard (1)
IPv6 IID	Uniqueness (and stable within IPv6 prefix) (2)	Soft (3)
TCP ISN	Monotonically-increasing (4)	Hard (4)
TCP initial timestamps	Monotonically-increasing (5)	Hard (5)
TCP eph. port	Uniqueness (for connection ID)	Hard
IPv6 Flow Label	Uniqueness	None (6)
DNS TxID	Uniqueness	None (7)

Table 1: Survey of Identifiers

Notes:

(1)

While a single collision of Fragment ID values would simply lead to a single packet drop (and hence a "soft" failure), repeated collisions at high data rates might trash the Fragment ID space, leading to a hard failure [[RFC4963](#)].

(2)

While the interoperability requirements are simply that the Interface ID results in a unique IPv6 address, for operational reasons it is typically desirable that the resulting IPv6 address (and hence the corresponding Interface ID) be stable within each network [[RFC7217](#)] [[RFC8064](#)].

(3)

While IPv6 Interface IDs must result in unique IPv6 addresses, IPv6 Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) [[RFC4862](#)] allows for the detection of duplicate addresses, and hence such Interface ID collisions can be recovered.

(4)

In theory, there are no interoperability requirements for TCP Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs), since the TIME-WAIT state and

TCP's "quiet time" concept take care of old segments from previous incarnations of the connection. However, a widespread optimization allows for a new incarnation of a previous connection to be created if the ISN of the incoming SYN is larger than the last sequence number seen in that direction for the previous incarnation of the connection. Thus, monotonically-increasing TCP sequence numbers allow for such optimization to work as expected [[RFC6528](#)], since otherwise such connection-establishment attempts would fail.

(5)

Strictly speaking, there are no interoperability requirements for the *initial* TCP timestamp employed by a TCP (i.e., the TS Value (TSval) in a segment with the SYN bit set). However, a some TCP implementations allow a new incarnation of a previous connection to be created if the TSval of the incoming SYN is larger than the last TSval seen in that direction for the previous incarnation of the connection (please see [[RFC6191](#)]). Thus, monotonically-increasing TCP initial timestamps (across connections to the same endpoint) allow for such optimization to work as expected [[RFC6191](#)], since otherwise such connection-establishment attempts could fail.

(6)

The IPv6 Flow Label is typically employed for load sharing [[RFC7098](#)], along with the Source and Destination IPv6 addresses. Reuse of a Flow Label value for the same set {Source Address, Destination Address} would typically cause both flows to be multiplexed onto the same link. However, as long as this does not occur deterministically, it will not result in any negative implications.

(7)

DNS TxIDs are employed, together with the Source Address, Destination Address, Source Port, and Destination Port, to match DNS requests and responses. However, since an implementation knows which DNS requests were sent for that set of {Source Address, Destination Address, Source Port, and Destination Port, DNS TxID}, a collision of TxID would result, if anything, in a small performance penalty (the response would nevertheless be discarded when it is found that it does not answer the query sent in the corresponding DNS query).

Based on the survey above, we can categorize identifiers as follows:

Cat #	Category	Sample Proto IDs
1	Uniqueness (soft failure)	IPv6 Flow L., DNS TxIDs
2	Uniqueness (hard failure)	IPv6 Frag ID, TCP ephemeral port
3	Uniqueness, stable within context (soft failure)	IPv6 IIDs
4	Uniqueness, monotonically increasing within context (hard failure)	TCP ISN, TCP initial timestamps

Table 2: Identifier Categories

We note that Category #4 could be considered a generalized case of category #3, in which a monotonically increasing element is added to a stable (within context) element, such that the resulting identifiers are monotonically increasing within a specified context. That is, the same algorithm could be employed for both #3 and #4, given appropriate parameters.

7. Common Algorithms for Transient Numeric Identifier Generation

The following subsections describe some sample algorithms that can be employed for generating transient numeric identifiers for each of the categories above.

7.1. Category #1: Uniqueness (soft failure)

The requirement of uniqueness with a soft failure mode can be complied with a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG).

We note that since the premise is that collisions of numeric identifiers of this category only leads to soft failures, in many (if not most) cases, the algorithm will not need to check the suitability of a selected identifier (i.e., `check_suitable_id()` would always be "true").

In scenarios where e.g. simultaneous use of a given numeric ID is undesirable and the implementation detects such condition, an implementation may opt to select the next available identifier in the same sequence, or select another random number. [Section 7.1.1](#) is an

implementation of the former strategy, while [Section 7.1.2](#) is an implementation of the later.

7.1.1. Simple Randomization Algorithm

```
/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */

id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;
next_id = min_id + (random() % id_range);
count = next_id;

do {
    if (check_suitable_id(next_id))
        return next_id;

    if (next_id == max_id) {
        next_id = min_id;
    } else {
        next_id++;
    }

    count--;
} while (count > 0);

return ERROR;
```

NOTES:

random() is a function that returns a pseudo-random unsigned integer number of appropriate size. Note that the output needs to be unpredictable, and typical implementations of the POSIX random() function do not necessarily meet this requirement. See [\[RFC4086\]](#) for randomness requirements for security. Beware that that "adapting" the length of the output of random() with a modulo operator (e.g., C language's "%") may change the distribution of the PRNG.

The function check_suitable_id() can check, when possible and desirable, whether this identifier is suitable (e.g. it is not already in use). Depending on how/where the numeric identifier is used, it may or may not be possible (or even desirable) to check whether the numeric identifier is in use (or whether it has been recently been employed). When an identifier is found to be unsuitable, this algorithm selects the next available numeric identifier in sequence.

Even when this algorithm selects numeric IDs randomly, it is biased towards the first available numeric ID after a sequence of

unavailable numeric IDs. For example, if this algorithm is employed for transport protocol ephemeral port randomization [[RFC6056](#)] and the local list unsuitable port numbers (e.g., registered port numbers that should not be used for ephemeral ports) is significant, an attacker may actually have a significantly better chance of guessing a port number.

All the variables (in this and all the algorithms discussed in this document) are unsigned integers.

This algorithm does not suffer from any of the issues discussed in [Section 8](#).

7.1.2. Another Simple Randomization Algorithm

The following pseudo-code illustrates another algorithm for selecting a random numeric identifier which, in the event a selected identifier is found to be unsuitable (e.g., already in use), another identifier is randomly selected:

```
/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */

id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;
next_id = min_id + (random() % id_range);
count = id_range;

do {
    if (check_suitable_id(next_id))
        return next_id;

    next_id = min_id + (random() % id_range);
    count--;
} while (count > 0);

return ERROR;
```

This algorithm might be unable to select an identifier (i.e., return "ERROR") even if there are suitable identifiers available, in cases where a large number of identifiers are unsuitable (e.g. "in use").

The same considerations from [Section 7.1.1](#) with respect to the properties of random() and the adaptation of its output length apply to this algorithm.

This algorithm does not suffer from any of the issues discussed in [Section 8](#).

7.2. Category #2: Uniqueness (hard failure)

One of the most trivial approaches for achieving uniqueness for an identifier (with a hard failure mode) is to reduce the identifier reuse frequency by generating the numeric identifiers with a monotonically-increasing function (e.g. linear). As a result, all of the algorithms described in [Section 7.4](#) ("Category #4: Uniqueness, monotonically increasing within context (hard failure)") can be readily employed for complying with the requirements of this numeric identifier category.

7.3. Category #3: Uniqueness, stable within context (soft failure)

The goal of the following algorithm is to produce identifiers that are stable for a given context (identified by "CONTEXT"), but that change when the aforementioned context changes.

In order to avoid storing in memory the numeric identifier computed for each CONTEXT value, the following algorithm employs a calculated technique (as opposed to keeping state in memory) to generate a stable identifier for each given context.

```
/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */  
  
id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;  
  
counter = 0;  
  
do {  
    offset = F(CONTEXT, counter, secret_key);  
    next_id = min_id + (offset % id_range);  
  
    if (check_suitable_id(next_id))  
        return next_id;  
  
    counter++;  
  
} while (counter <= MAX_RETRIES);  
  
return ERROR;
```

In the following algorithm, the function F() provides a stateless and stable per-CONTEXT numeric identifier, where CONTEXT is the concatenation of all the elements that define the given context.

For example, if this algorithm is expected to produce IPv6 IIDs that are unique per network interface card (NIC) and SLAAC

autoconfiguration prefix, the CONTEXT should be the concatenation of e.g. the interface index and the SLAAC autoconfiguration prefix (please see [\[RFC7217\]](#) for an implementation of this algorithm for generation of stable IPv6 IIDs).

F() must be a cryptographically-secure hash function (e.g. SHA-256 [\[FIPS-SHS\]](#)), that is computed over the concatenation of its arguments. The result of F() is no more secure than the secret key, and therefore 'secret_key' must be unknown to the attacker, and must be of a reasonable length. 'secret_key' must remain stable for a given CONTEXT, since otherwise the numeric identifiers generated by this algorithm would not have the desired stability properties (i.e., stable for a given CONTEXT). In most cases, 'secret_key' can be selected with a PRNG (see [\[RFC4086\]](#) for recommendations on choosing secrets) at an appropriate time, and stored in stable or volatile storage for future use.

The result of F() is stored in the variable 'offset', which may take any value within the storage type range, since we are restricting the resulting identifier to be in the range [min_id, max_id] in a similar way as in the algorithm described in [Section 7.1.1](#).

check_suitable_id() checks that the candidate identifier has suitable uniqueness properties. Collisions (i.e., an identifier that is not unique) are recovered by incrementing the 'counter' variable and recomputing F(), up to a maximum of MAX_RETRIES times.

For obvious reasons, the transient network identifiers generated with this algorithm allow for network activity correlation within "CONTEXT". However, this is essentially a design goal of this category of transient numeric identifiers.

[7.4](#). Category #4: Uniqueness, monotonically increasing within context (hard failure)

[7.4.1](#). Per-context Counter Algorithm

One possible way to achieve low identifier reuse frequency while still avoiding predictable sequences would be to employ a per-context counter, as opposed to a global counter. Such an algorithm could be described as follows:


```
/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */

count = max_id - min_id + 1;
id_inc = increment() % count;

if(lookup_counter(CONTEXT) == ERROR){
    create_counter(CONTEXT);
}

next_id = lookup_counter(CONTEXT);

do {
    if ( (max_id - next_id) >= id_inc){
        next_id = next_id + id_inc;
    }
    else {
        next_id = min_id + id_inc - (max_id - next_id + 1);
    }

    if (check_suitable_id(next_id)){
        store_counter(CONTEXT, next_id);
        return next_id;
    }

    count = count - id_inc;

} while (count > 0);

return ERROR;
```

NOTE:

increment() returns a small integer that is employed to increment the current counter value to obtain a numeric ID. Most implementations of this algorithm employ a constant increment of 1. Using a value other than 1 may help mitigate some information leakages (please see below), at the expense of a possible increase in the numeric ID reuse frequency.

lookup_counter() returns the current counter for a given context, or an error condition if such a counter does not exist.

create_counter() creates a counter for a given context, and initializes such counter to a random value.

store_counter() saves (updates) the current counter for a given context.

`check_suitable_id()` is a function that checks whether the resulting identifier is acceptable (e.g., whether it is not already in use, etc.).

Essentially, whenever a new identifier is to be selected, the algorithm checks whether there is a counter for the corresponding context. If there is, such counter is incremented to obtain the new identifier, and the new identifier updates the corresponding counter. If there is no counter for such context, a new counter is created and initialized to a random value, and used as the new identifier. This algorithm produces a per-context counter, which results in one monotonically-increasing function for each context. Since each counter is initialized to a random value, the resulting values are unpredictable by an off-path attacker.

This algorithm has the following drawbacks:

- o This algorithm requires an implementation to store each per-CONTEXT counter in memory. If, as a result of resource management, the counter for a given context must be removed, the last identifier value used for that context will be lost. Thus, if subsequently an identifier needs to be generated for the same context, that counter will need to be recreated and reinitialized to random value, thus possibly leading to reuse/collision of numeric identifiers.
- o An implementation may map more than one context to the same counter, such that the amount of memory required to store counters is reduced, at the expense of a possible unnecessary increase in the numeric identifier reuse frequency. In such cases, if the identifiers are predictable by the destination system (in case the destination host represents the "context"), a vulnerable host might possibly leak to third parties the identifiers used by other hosts to send traffic to it (i.e., a vulnerable Host B could leak to Host C the identifier values that Host A is using to send packets to Host B). [Appendix A of \[RFC7739\]](#) describes one possible scenario for such leakage in detail. Employing small random numbers for the increments (i.e., for `increment()` function) may help mitigate this kind of information leakage.

Otherwise, the identifiers produced by this algorithm do not suffer from the other issues discussed in [Section 8](#).

7.4.2. Simple Hash-Based Algorithm

The goal of this algorithm is to produce monotonically-increasing sequences, with a randomized initial value, for each given context. For example, if the identifiers being generated must be unique for

each {src IP, dst IP} set, then each possible combination of {src IP, dst IP} should have a corresponding "next_id" value.

Keeping one counter for each possible "context" may in many cases be considered too onerous in terms of memory requirements. As a workaround, the following algorithm employs a calculated technique (as opposed to keeping state in memory) to maintain the random offset for each possible context.

In the following algorithm, the function F() provides a (stateless) unpredictable offset for each given context (as identified by 'CONTEXT').

```

/* Initialization code */
counter = 0;

/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */

id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;
offset = F(CONTEXT, secret_key);
count = id_range;

do {
    next_id = min_id + (offset + counter) % id_range;
    id_inc = increment();
    counter = counter + id_inc;

    if (check_suitable_id(next_id))
        return next_id;

    count = count - id_inc;
} while (count > 0);

return ERROR;

```

The function F() provides a "per-CONTEXT" fixed offset within the numeric identifier "space". Both the 'offset' and 'counter' variables may take any value within the storage type range since we are restricting the resulting identifier to be in the range [min_id, max_id] in a similar way as in the algorithm described in [Section 7.1.1](#). This allows us to simply increment the 'counter' variable and rely on the unsigned integer to wrap around.

The function F() should be a cryptographically-secure hash function (e.g. SHA-256 [[FIPS-SHS](#)]). CONTEXT is the concatenation of all the elements that define a given context. For example, if this algorithm

is expected to produce identifiers that are monotonically-increasing for each set (Source IP Address, Destination IP Address), CONTEXT should be the concatenation of these two IP addresses.

The result of $F()$ is no more secure than the secret key, and therefore 'secret_key' must be unknown to the attacker, and must be of a reasonable length. 'secret_key' must remain stable for a given CONTEXT, since otherwise the numeric identifiers generated by this algorithm would not have the desired stability properties (i.e., stable for a given CONTEXT). In most cases, 'secret_key' can be selected with a PRNG (see [[RFC4086](#)] for recommendations on choosing secrets) at an appropriate time, and stored in stable or volatile storage for future use.

It should be noted that, since this algorithm uses a global counter ("counter") for selecting identifiers (i.e., all counters share the same increments space), this algorithm produces an information leakage (as described in [Section 8.2](#)). For example, if this algorithm were used for selecting TCP ephemeral ports, and an attacker could force a client to periodically establish a new TCP connection to an attacker-controlled machine (or through an attacker-observable routing path), the attacker could subtract consecutive source port values to obtain the number of outgoing TCP connections established globally by the target host within that time period (up to wrap-around issues and five-tuple collisions, of course). This information leakage could be mitigated by employing small random values for the increments (i.e., $\text{increment}()$ function), instead of the constant "1".

[7.4.3](#). Double-Hash Algorithm

A trade-off between maintaining a single global 'counter' variable and maintaining 2^*N 'counter' variables (where N is the width of the result of $F()$), could be achieved as follows. The system would keep an array of TABLE_LENGTH integers, which would provide a separation of the increment space into multiple buckets. This improvement could be incorporated into the algorithm from [Section 7.4.2](#) as follows:


```
/* Initialization code */

for(i = 0; i < TABLE_LENGTH; i++)
    table[i] = random();

/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */

id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;
offset = F(CONTEXT, secret_key1);
index = G(CONTEXT, secret_key2) % TABLE_LENGTH;
count = id_range;

do {
    next_id = min_id + (offset + table[index]) % id_range;
    id_inc = increment();
    table[index] = table[index] + id_inc;

    if (check_suitable_id(next_id))
        return next_id;

    count = count - id_inc;
} while (count > 0);

return ERROR;
```

'table[]' could be initialized with random values, as indicated by the initialization code in the pseudo-code above.

Both F() and G() should be a cryptographically-secure hash functions (e.g. SHA-256 [[FIPS-SHS](#)]) computed over the concatenation of each of their respective arguments. Both F() and G() would employ the same CONTEXT (the concatenation of all the elements that define a given context), and would use separate secreted keys (secret_key1, and secret_key2, respectively).

The results of F() and G() are no more secure than their respective secret keys ('secret_key1' and 'secret_key2', respectively), and therefore both secret keys must be unknown to the attacker, and must be of a reasonable length. Both secret keys must remain stable for the given CONTEXT, since otherwise the numeric identifiers generated by this algorithm would not have the desired stability properties (i.e., stable for a given CONTEXT). In most cases, both secret keys can be selected with a PRNG (see [[RFC4086](#)] for recommendations on choosing secrets) at an appropriate time, and stored in stable or volatile storage for future use.

The array 'table[]' assures that successive identifiers for a given context will be monotonically-increasing. However, the increments space is separated into TABLE_LENGTH different spaces, and thus identifier reuse frequency will be (probabilistically) lower than that of the algorithm in [Section 7.4.2](#). That is, the generation of an identifier for one given context will not necessarily result in increments in the identifier sequence for other contexts. It is interesting to note that the size of 'table[]' does not limit the number of different identifier sequences, but rather separates the *increments* into TABLE_LENGTH different spaces. The identifier sequence will result from adding the corresponding entry of 'table[]' to the variable 'offset', which selects the actual identifier sequence (as in the algorithm from [Section 7.4.2](#)).

An attacker can perform traffic analysis for any "increment space" (i.e., context) into which the attacker has "visibility" -- namely, the attacker can force a node to generate identifiers where $G(\text{CONTEXT}, \text{secret_key2})$ identifies the target "increment space". However, the attacker's ability to perform traffic analysis is very reduced when compared to the predictable linear identifiers (described in [Appendix A.1](#)) and the hash-based identifiers (described in [Section 7.4.2](#)). Additionally, an implementation can further limit the attacker's ability to perform traffic analysis by further separating the increment space (that is, using a larger value for TABLE_LENGTH) and/or by randomizing the increments (i.e., `increment()` returning a small random number as opposed to the constant 1).

Otherwise, this algorithm does not suffer from the issues discussed in [Section 8](#).

8. Common Vulnerabilities Associated with Transient Numeric Identifiers

8.1. Network Activity Correlation

An identifier that is predictable or stable within a given context allows for network activity correlation within that context.

For example, a stable IPv6 Interface Identifier allows for network activity to be correlated for the context in which that address is stable [[RFC7721](#)]. A stable-per-network IPv6 Interface Identifier (as in [[RFC7217](#)]) allows for network activity correlation within a network, whereas a constant IPv6 Interface Identifier (that remains the same across networks) allows not only network activity correlation within the same network, but also across networks ("host tracking").

Similarly, a node that generates TCP ISNs with a global counter could allow network activity correlation across networks, since the

communicating nodes could infer the identity of the node based on the TCP ISNs employed for subsequent communication instances. Similarly, a node that generates predictable IPv6 Fragment Identification values could be subject to network activity correlation (see e.g. [[Bellovin2002](#)]).

8.2. Information Leakage

Transient numeric identifiers that are not randomized can leak out information to other communicating nodes. For example, it is common to generate identifiers like:

$$\text{ID} = \text{offset}(\text{CONTEXT_1}) + \text{mono}(\text{CONTEXT_2});$$

This generic expression generates identifiers by adding a monotonically-increasing function (e.g. linear) to an offset. `offset()` is constant within a given context, whereas `mono()` is a monotonically-increasing function for a given context (possibly different to that of `offset()`). Identifiers generated with this expression will generally be predictable within `CONTEXT_1`. Thus, `CONTEXT_1` essentially specifies the context within which information will be "leaked". When both `CONTEXT_1` and `CONTEXT_2` are a constant value, then all the corresponding transient numeric identifiers become predictable in all contexts.

NOTE: If `offset()` has a global context and the specific value is known, the resulting identifiers may leak even more information. For example, the if Fragment Identification values are generated with the generic function above, and `CONTEXT_1` is "global", then the corresponding identifiers will leak the number of fragmented datagrams sent for `CONTEXT_2`. If both `CONTEXT_1` and `CONTEXT_2` are "global", then Fragment Identification values would be generated with a global counter (initialized to `offset()`), and thus each generated Fragment Identification value would leak the number of fragmented datagrams transmitted by the node since it has been bootstrapped.

On the other hand, `mono()` will be predictable within `CONTEXT_2`. The predictability of `mono()`, irrespective of the context and/or predictability of `offset()`, can leak out information that is of use to attackers. For example, a node that selects ephemeral port numbers on as in:

$$\text{ephemeral_port} = \text{offset}(\text{Dest_IP}) + \text{mono}()$$

that is, with a per-destination offset, but global `mono()` function (e.g., a global counter), will leak information about the number of

outgoing connections that have been issued between any two issued outgoing connections.

Similarly, a node that generates Fragment Identification values as in:

$$\text{Frag_ID} = \text{offset}(\text{Src_IP}, \text{Dst_IP}) + \text{mono}()$$

will leak out information about the number of fragmented packets that have been transmitted between any two other transmitted fragmented packets. The vulnerabilities described in [[Sanfilippo1998a](#)], [[Sanfilippo1998b](#)], and [[Sanfilippo1999](#)] are all associated with the use of a global `mono()` function (i.e., a global `CONTEXT_2`) -- particularly when it is a linear function (constant increments of 1).

8.3. Exploitation of Semantics of Transient Numeric Identifiers

Identifiers that are not semantically opaque tend to be more predictable than semantically-opaque identifiers. For example, a MAC address contains an OUI (Organizationally-Unique Identifier) which identifies the vendor that manufactured the underlying network interface card. This fact may be leveraged by an attacker meaning to "guess" MAC addresses and who has some knowledge about the possible NIC vendor.

[RFC7707] discusses a number of techniques to reduce the search space when performing IPv6 address-scanning attacks by leveraging the semantics of the IIDs produced by a number by traditional IID-generation algorithms that embed MAC addresses (now replaced by [[RFC8064](#)] with [[RFC7217](#)]).

8.4. Exploitation of Collisions of Transient Numeric Identifiers

In many cases, the collision of transient network identifiers can have a hard failure severity (or result in a hard failure severity if an attacker can cause multiple collisions deterministically, one after another). For example, predictable Fragment Identification values open the door to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks (see e.g. [[RFC5722](#)]). Similarly, predictable TCP ISNs open the door to trivial connection-reset and data injection attacks (see e.g. [[Joncheray1995](#)]).

8.5. Cryptanalysis

A number of algorithms discussed in this document (such as [Section 7.4.2](#) and [Section 7.4.3](#)) rely on cryptographically-secure hash functions. Implementations that employ weak hash functions and keys of inappropriate size may be subject to cryptanalysis, where an

attacker may be able to obtain the secret key employed for the hash algorithms, predict numeric identifiers, etc.

Furthermore, an implementation that overloads the semantics of the secret key may result in more trivial cryptanalysis, possibly resulting in the leakage of the value employed for the secret key.

NOTE:

[[IPID-DEV](#)] describes two vulnerable numeric ID generators that employ cryptographically-weak hash functions. Additionally, one of such implementations employs a 32-bits of a kernel address as the secret key for a hash function, and therefore successful cryptanalysis leaks the aforementioned kernel address, allowing for Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR) [[KASLR](#)] bypass.

9. Vulnerability Analysis of Specific Transient Numeric Identifiers Categories

The following subsections analyze common vulnerabilities associated with the generation of identifiers for each of the categories identified in [Section 6](#).

9.1. Category #1: Uniqueness (soft failure)

Possible vulnerabilities associated with identifiers of this category are:

- o Use of trivial algorithms (e.g. global counters) that generate predictable identifiers
- o Use of flawed PRNGs (please see e.g. [[Zalewski2001](#)], [[Zalewski2002](#)] and [[Klein2007](#)])

Since the only interoperability requirement for these identifiers is uniqueness (with an associated soft failure), the obvious approach to generate them is to employ a PRNG. An implementer should consult [[RFC4086](#)] regarding randomness requirements for security, and consult relevant documentation when employing a PRNG provided by the underlying system.

Use of algorithms other than PRNGs for generating identifiers of this category is discouraged.

9.2. Category #2: Uniqueness (hard failure)

As noted in [Section 7.2](#) this category typically employs the same algorithms as Category #4, since a monotonically-increasing sequence tends to minimize the identifier reuse frequency. Therefore, the vulnerability analysis of [Section 9.4](#) applies to this category.

9.3. Category #3: Uniqueness, stable within context (soft failure)

There are three main vulnerabilities that may be associated with identifiers of this category:

1. Use algorithms or sources that result in predictable identifiers
2. Use cryptographically-weak hash functions, or inappropriate secret key sizes that allow for cryptanalysis
3. Employing the same identifier across contexts in which stability is not required (overloading the numeric identifier)

At times, an implementation or specification may be tempted to employ a source for the numeric identifiers which is known to provide unique values, that may have other properties such as being predictable or leaking information about the node in question. For example, as noted in [[RFC7721](#)], embedding link-layer addresses for generating IPv6 IIDs not only results in predictable values, but also leaks information about the manufacturer of the network interface card.

Employing cryptographically-weak hash functions or inappropriate secret key sizes may allow for cryptanalysis, which may eventually be exploited by an attacker to predict future numeric identifiers and perform a variety of attacks.

On the other hand, using an identifier across contexts where stability is not required can be leveraged for correlation of activities. One of the most trivial examples of this is the use of IPv6 IIDs that are stable across networks (such as IIDs that embed the underlying link-layer address).

9.4. Category #4: Uniqueness, monotonically increasing within context (hard failure)

A simple way to generalize algorithms employed for generating identifiers of Category #4 would be as follows:


```
/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */

count = max_id - min_id + 1;

do {
    id_inc = increment();
    update_mono(CONTEXT_2, id_inc);
    next_id = offset(CONTEXT_1) + mono(CONTEXT_2);

    if (check_suitable_id(next_id))
        return next_id;

    count = count - id_inc;
} while (count > 0);

return ERROR;
```

NOTES:

update_mono(CONTEXT_2, id_inc) increments the counter corresponding to CONTEXT_2 by "id_inc" (usually 1).

mono(CONTEXT_2) reads the counter corresponding to CONTEXT_2.

Essentially, an identifier (next_id) is generated by adding a monotonically-increasing function (mono()) to an offset value, which is unknown to the attacker, and stable for given context (CONTEXT_1).

The following aspects of the algorithm should be considered:

- o For the most part, it is the offset() function that results in identifiers that are unpredictable by an off-path attacker. While the resulting sequence will be monotonically-increasing, the use of an offset value that is unknown to the attacker makes the resulting values unknown to the attacker.
- o The most straightforward "stateless" implementation of offset would be that in which offset() is the result of a cryptographically-secure hash-function that takes the values that identify the context and a "secret_key" (not shown in the figure above) as arguments.
- o Another possible (but stateful) approach would be to simply generate a random "per-context" "counter" and store it in memory, and then look-up the corresponding context when a new identifier is to be selected, and increment the counter to obtain the transient numeric identifier. The algorithm in [Section 7.4.1](#) is essentially an implementation of this type.

- o The monotonically increasing function is implemented by incrementing the previous value of the function by `increment()`. In the most trivial case `increment()` could return the constant "1". But it could also possibly return small random integers such the increments are unpredictable. This represents a tradeoff between the unpredictability of the resulting numeric IDs, and the numeric ID reuse frequency.

Considering the generic algorithm illustrated above we can identify the following possible vulnerabilities:

- o All the vulnerabilities discussed in [Section 9.3](#) ("Category #3: Uniqueness, stable within context (soft failure)") since the algorithms for this category are similar to those of [Section 9.3](#), with the addition of a monotonically-increasing function.
- o The function `mono()` could be seen as representing the number of identifiers that have so far been generated for a given context (`CONTEXT_2`). If `mono()` spans more than the necessary context, the "increments" could be leaked to other parties, thus disclosing information about the number of identifiers that have so far been generated. This is particularly the case when the algorithm employs a constant increment of 1. For example, an implementation in which `mono()` is implemented as a single global counter will unnecessarily leak information the number of identifiers that have been produced. [\[Fyodor2004\]](#) is one example of how such information leakages can be exploited. However, limiting the span of the increments space will require a larger number of counters to be stored in memory (i.e., a larger size for the `TABLE_LENGTH` parameter of the algorithm in [Section 7.4.3](#)).
- o `increment()` determines the increments of `mono()` for each identifier that is selected. In the most simple case, `increment()` returns the constant "1". However, `increment()` may be implemented so as to return a small random integer value such that even if the current `mono()` value employed by the generator is guessed (see [Appendix A of \[RFC7739\]](#)), the exact next identifier to be selected will be harder to guess.

[10.](#) IANA Considerations

There are no IANA registries within this document. The RFC-Editor can remove this section before publication of this document as an RFC.

11. Security Considerations

The entire document is about the security and privacy implications of transient numeric identifiers.

[[I-D.gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations](#)] recommends that protocol specifications to include an appropriate analysis of the interoperability, security, and privacy implications of the transient numeric identifiers they specify and employ, while this document analyzes possible algorithms (and their implications) that could be employed to comply with the interoperability properties of a transient numeric identifier, while mitigating the possible security and privacy implications.

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Appendix A. Flawed Algorithms

The following subsections document algorithms with known negative security and privacy implications.

A.1. Predictable Linear Identifiers Algorithm

One of the most trivial ways to achieve uniqueness with a low identifier reuse frequency is to produce a linear sequence.

For example, the following algorithm has been employed (see e.g. [[Morris1985](#)], [[Shimomura1995](#)], [[Silbersack2005](#)] and [[CPNI-TCP](#)]) in a number of operating systems for selecting IP fragment IDs, TCP ephemeral ports, etc.:

```
/* Initialization code */

next_id = min_id;
id_inc= 1;

/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */

count = max_id - min_id + 1;

do {
    if (next_id == max_id) {
        next_id = min_id;
    }
    else {
        next_id = next_id + id_inc;
    }

    if (check_suitable_id(next_id))
        return next_id;

    count--;
} while (count > 0);

return ERROR;
```

Note:

check_suitable_id() is a function that checks whether the resulting identifier is acceptable (e.g., whether it's in use, etc.).

For obvious reasons, this algorithm results in predictable sequences. If a global counter is used (such as "next_id" in the example above), a node that learns one numeric identifier can also learn or guess values employed by past and future protocol instances. On the other hand, when the value of increments is known (such as "1" in this case), an attacker can sample two values, and learn the number of identifiers that were generated in-between. Furthermore, if the counter is initialized e.g. when the system is bootstrapped to some known value, it will likely leak information (for example, the number of transmitted in the case of an IP ID generator [[Sanfilippo1998a](#)], or the system uptime in the case of TCP timestamps [[TCPT-uptime](#)]).

Where identifier reuse would lead to a hard failure, one typical approach to generate unique identifiers (while minimizing the security and privacy implications of predictable identifiers) is to obfuscate the resulting numeric identifiers by either:

- o Replacing the global counter with multiple counters (initialized to a random value)
- o Randomizing the "increments"

Avoiding global counters essentially means that learning one identifier for a given context (e.g., one TCP ephemeral port for a given {src IP, Dst IP, Dst Port}) is of no use for learning or guessing identifiers for a different context (e.g., TCP ephemeral ports that involve other peers). However, this may imply keeping one additional variables/counter per contexts, which may be prohibitive in some environments.

The choice of id_inc has implications on both the security and privacy properties of the resulting identifiers, but also on the corresponding interoperability properties. On one hand, minimizing the increments (as in "id_inc = 1" in our case) generally minimizes the identifier reuse frequency, albeit at increased predictability. On the other hand, if the increments are randomized, predictability of the resulting identifiers is reduced, and the information leakage produced by global constant increments is mitigated. However, using larger increments than necessary can result in higher identifier reuse frequency.

A.2. Random-Increments Algorithm

This algorithm offers a middle ground between the algorithms that select numeric identifiers randomly (such as those described in [Section 7.1.1](#) and [Section 7.1.2](#)), and those that offer obfuscation but no randomization (such as those described in [Section 7.4.2](#) and [Section 7.4.3](#)).


```
/* Initialization code */

next_id = random();      /* Initialization value */
id_inc = 500;           /* Determines the trade-off */

/* Transient Numeric ID selection function */

id_range = max_id - min_id + 1;

count = id_range;

do {
    /* Random increment */
    next_id = next_id + (random() % id_inc) + 1;

    /* Keep the identifier within acceptable range */
    next_id = min_id + (next_id % id_range);

    if (check_suitable_id(next_id))
        return next_id;

    count--;
} while (count > 0);

return ERROR;
```

This algorithm aims at producing a monotonically-increasing sequence of numeric identifiers, while avoiding the use of fixed increments, which would lead to trivially predictable sequences. The value "id_inc" allows for direct control of the trade-off between the level of obfuscation and the identifier reuse frequency. The smaller the value of "id_inc", the more similar this algorithm is to a predictable, global monotonically-increasing ID generation algorithm. The larger the value of "id_inc", the more similar this algorithm is to the algorithm described in [Section 7.1.1](#) of this document.

When the identifiers wrap, there is the risk of collisions of identifiers (i.e., identifier reuse). Therefore, "id_inc" should be selected according to the following criteria:

- o It should maximize the wrapping time of the identifier space.
- o It should minimize identifier reuse frequency.
- o It should maximize obfuscation.

Clearly, these are competing goals, and the decision of which value of "id_inc" to use is a trade-off. Therefore, the value of "id_inc" should be configurable so that system administrators can make the trade-off for themselves. We note that the alternative algorithms discussed throughout this document offer better interoperability, security and privacy implications than this algorithm, and hence implementation of this algorithm is discouraged.

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