

Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Informational
Expires: September 10, 2020

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March 9, 2020

**Unfortunate History of Transient Numeric Identifiers
draft-irtf-pearg-numeric-ids-history-01**

Abstract

This document analyzes the timeline of the specification and implementation of different types of "transient numeric identifiers" used in IETF protocols, and how the security and privacy implications of such protocols have been affected as a result of it. It provides empirical evidence that advice in this area is warranted.

Status of This Memo

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[1.](#) Introduction

Networking protocols employ a variety of transient numeric identifiers for different protocol objects, ranging from DNS Transaction IDs (TxIDs) to transport protocol ephemeral port numbers or IPv6 Interface Identifiers (IIDs). These identifiers typically have specific interoperability requirements (e.g. uniqueness during a specified period of time), and an associated failure severity when such properties are not met (e.g. "soft" or "hard" failures).

For more than 30 years, a large number of implementations of the TCP/IP protocol suite have been subject to a variety of attacks, with effects ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) or data injection, to information leakages that could be exploited for pervasive monitoring [[RFC7258](#)]. The root cause of these issues has been, in many cases, the poor selection of the aforementioned identifiers, usually as a result of insufficient or misleading specifications. While it is generally possible to identify an algorithm that can satisfy the interoperability requirements for a given numeric identifier, this document provides empirical evidence that doing so without negatively affecting the security and/or privacy properties of the aforementioned protocols is non-trivial.

For example, implementations have been subject to security and/or privacy issues resulting from:

- o Predictable TCP Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs) (see e.g. [[Morris1985](#)])

- o Predictable transport protocol ephemeral port numbers (see e.g. [\[RFC6056\]](#) and [\[Silbersack2005\]](#))
- o Predictable IPv4 or IPv6 Fragment Identifiers (see e.g. [\[RFC5722\]](#), [\[RFC6274\]](#), and [\[RFC7739\]](#))
- o Predictable IPv6 IIDs (see e.g. [\[RFC7721\]](#) and [\[RFC7707\]](#))
- o Predictable DNS TxIDs [\[RFC1035\]](#)

Recent history indicates that when new protocols are standardized and/or implemented, the security and privacy properties of the associated transient numeric identifiers tend to be overlooked, and inappropriate algorithms to generate such identifiers are either suggested in the specification or selected by implementers.

This document contains a non-exhaustive timeline of the specification and vulnerability disclosures related to some sample transient numeric identifiers, including other work that has led to advances in this area. The analysis of such timelines indicate that:

- o Vulnerabilities associated with the inappropriate generation of transient numeric identifiers have affected protocol implementations for an extremely long period of time.
- o Such vulnerabilities, even when addressed for a given protocol version, were later reintroduced in new versions or new implementations of the same protocol.
- o Standardization efforts that discuss and provide advice in this area can have a positive effect on protocol specifications and protocol implementations.

Other related documents ([\[I-D.irtf-pearg-numeric-ids-generation\]](#) and [\[I-D.gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations\]](#)) provide guidance in this area, as motivated by the present document.

2. Terminology

Transient Numeric Identifier:

A data object in a protocol specification that can be used to definitely distinguish a protocol object (a datagram, network interface, transport protocol endpoint, session, etc) from all other objects of the same type, in a given context. Transient numeric identifiers are usually defined as a series of bits, and represented using integer values. These identifiers are typically dynamically selected, as opposed to statically-assigned numeric identifiers (see e.g. [\[IANA-PROT\]](#)). We note that different

identifiers may have additional requirements or properties depending on their specific use in a protocol. We use the term "transient numeric identifier" (or simply "numeric identifier" or "identifier" as short forms) as a generic term to refer to any data object in a protocol specification that satisfies the identification property stated above.

Failure Severity:

The consequences of a failure to comply with the interoperability requirements of a given identifier. Severity considers the worst potential consequence of a failure, determined by the system damage and/or time lost to repair the failure. In this document we define two types of failure severity: "soft failure" and "hard failure".

Soft Failure:

A soft failure is a recoverable condition in which a protocol does not operate in the prescribed manner but normal operation can be resumed automatically in a short period of time. For example, a simple packet-loss event that is subsequently recovered with a retransmission can be considered a soft failure.

Hard Failure:

A hard failure is a non-recoverable condition in which a protocol does not operate in the prescribed manner or it operates with excessive degradation of service. For example, an established TCP connection that is aborted due to an error condition constitutes, from the point of view of the transport protocol, a hard failure, since it enters a state from which normal operation cannot be resumed.

The terms "transient numeric identifier", "failure severity", "temporary address", "constant IID", "stable IID", and "temporary IID" are to be interpreted as specified in [\[RFC7721\]](#).

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [\[RFC2119\]](#).

3. Threat Model

Throughout this document, we assume an attacker does not have physical or logical access to the device(s) being attacked. We assume the attacker can simply send any traffic to the target device(s), to e.g. sample identifiers employed by such device(s).

4. IPv4/IPv6 Identification

This section presents the timeline of the Identification field employed by IPv4 (in the base header) and IPv6 (in Fragment Headers). The reason for presenting both cases in the same section is to make it evident that while the Identification value serves the same purpose in both IPv4 and IPv6, the work and research done for the IPv4 case did not affect IPv6 specifications or implementations.

The IPv4 Identification value is specified in [\[RFC0791\]](#), which specifies the interoperability requirements for the Identification field: the sender must choose the Identification field to be unique for a given source address, destination address, and protocol, for the time the datagram (or any fragment of it) could be alive in the internet. It suggests that a node may keep "a table of Identifiers, one entry for each destination it has communicated with in the last maximum packet lifetime for the internet", and suggests that "since the Identifier field allows 65,536 different values, hosts may be able to simply use unique identifiers independent of destination". The above has been interpreted numerous times as a suggestion to employ per-destination or global counters for the generation of Identification values. While [\[RFC0791\]](#) does not suggest any flawed algorithm for the generation of Identification values, the specification misses a discussion of the security and privacy implications of predictable Identification values. This has resulted in virtually all IP4 implementations generating predictable fragment Identification values by means of a global counter, at least at some point in time.

The IPv6 Identification is specified in [\[RFC2460\]](#). It serves the same purpose as its IPv4 counterpart, with the only difference residing in the length of the corresponding field, and that while the IPv4 Identification field is part of the base IPv4 header, in the IPv6 case it is part of the Fragment header (which may or may not be present in an IPv6 packet). [\[RFC2460\]](#) states, in [Section 4.5](#), that the Identification must be different than that of any other fragmented packet sent recently (within the maximum likely lifetime of a packet) with the same Source Address and Destination Address. Subsequently, it notes that this requirement can be met by means of a wrap-around 32-bit counter that is incremented each time a packet must be fragmented, and that it is an implementation choice whether to use a global or a per-destination counter. Thus, the implementation of the IPv6 Identification is similar to that of the IPv4 case, with the only difference that in the IPv6 case the suggestions to use simple counters is more explicit.

September 1981:

[RFC0791] specifies the interoperability requirements for IPv4 Identification value, but does not specify any requirements in the area of security and privacy.

December 1998:

[[Sanfilippo1998a](#)] finds that predictable IPv4 Identification values (generated by most popular implementations) can be leveraged to count the number of packets sent by a target node. [[Sanfilippo1998b](#)] explains how to leverage the same vulnerability to implement a port-scanning technique known as dumb/idle scan. A tool that implements this attack is publicly released.

December 1998:

[[RFC2460](#)] suggests that a global counter be used to generate the IPv6 Identification value.

November 1999:

[[Sanfilippo1999](#)] discusses how to leverage predictable IPv4 Identification to uncover the rules of a number of firewalls.

November 1999:

[[Bellovin2002](#)] explains how the IPv4 Identification field can be exploited to count the number of systems behind a NAT.

September 2002:

[[Fyodor2002](#)] explains how to implement a stealth port-scanning technique by leveraging nodes that employ predictable IPv4 Identification values.

December 2003:

[[Zalewski2003](#)] explains a technique to perform TCP data injection attack based on predictable IPv4 identification values which requires less effort than TCP injection attacks performed with bare TCP packets.

November 2005:

[[Silbersack2005](#)] discusses shortcoming in a number of techniques to mitigate predictable IPv4 Identification values.

October 2007:

[[Klein2007](#)] describes a weakness in the pseudo random number generator (PRNG) in use for the generation of the IP Identification by a number of operating systems.

June 2011:

[[Gont2011](#)] describes how to perform idle scan attacks in IPv6.

November 2011:

Linux mitigates predictable IPv6 Identification values
[[RedHat2011](#)] [[SUSE2011](#)] [[Ubuntu2011](#)].

December 2011:

[[draft-gont-6man-predictable-fragment-id-00](#)] describes the security implications of predictable IPv6 Identification values, and possible mitigations. This document is published on the Standards Track, meaning to formally update [[RFC2460](#)], to introduce security and privacy requirements on IPv6 Identification values.

May 2012:

[[Gont2012](#)] notes that some major IPv6 implementations still employ predictable IPv6 Identification values.

March 2013:

The 6man WG adopts [[I-D.gont-6man-predictable-fragment-id](#)], but changes the track to "BCP" (while still formally updating [[RFC2460](#)]), publishing the resulting document as [[draft-ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id-00](#)].

June 2013:

A patch that implements IPv6-based idle-scan in nmap is submitted [[Morbitz2013](#)].

December 2014:

The 6man WG changes the status of the aforementioned IETF Internet Draft to "Informational" and publishes it as [[draft-ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id-02](#)]. As a result, it no longer formally updates [[RFC2460](#)].

June 2015:

[[draft-ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id-08](#)] notes that some popular host and router implementations still employ predictable IPv6 Identification values.

February 2016:

[[RFC7739](#)] (based on [[I-D.ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id](#)]) analyzes the security and privacy implications of predictable IPv6 Identification values, and provides guidance for selecting an algorithm to generate such values. However, being published on the Informational track, it does not formally update [[RFC2460](#)].

June 2016:

[[I-D.ietf-6man-rfc2460bis](#)], revision of [[RFC2460](#)], removes the suggestion from [RFC2460](#) to employ a global counter for the generation of IPv6 Identification values, but does not specify any

security and privacy requirements for the IPv6 Identification value.

July 2017:

[[I-D.ietf-6man-rfc2460bis](#)] is finally published as [[RFC8200](#)], obsoleting [[RFC2460](#)], and pointing to [[RFC7739](#)] for sample algorithms for the generation of IPv6 Fragment Identification values.

June 2019:

[[IPID-DEV](#)] notes that the IPv6 ID generators of two popular operating systems are flawed.

5. TCP Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs)

[[RFC0793](#)] suggests that the choice of the ISN of a connection is not arbitrary, but aims to reduce the chances of a stale segment from being accepted by a new incarnation of a previous connection.

[[RFC0793](#)] suggests the use of a global 32-bit ISN generator that is incremented by 1 roughly every 4 microseconds. However, as a matter of fact, protection against stale segments from a previous incarnation of the connection is enforced by preventing the creation of a new incarnation of a previous connection before $2 \times \text{MSL}$ have passed since a segment corresponding to the old incarnation was last seen (where "MSL" is the "Maximum Segment Lifetime" [[RFC0793](#)]). This is accomplished by the TIME-WAIT state and TCP's "quiet time" concept (see [Appendix B of \[RFC1323\]](#)). Based on the assumption that ISNs are monotonically increasing across connections, many stacks (e.g., 4.2BSD-derived) use the ISN of an incoming SYN segment to perform "heuristics" that enable the creation of a new incarnation of a connection while the previous incarnation is still in the TIME-WAIT state (see p. 945 of [[Wright1994](#)]). This avoids an interoperability problem that may arise when a node establishes connections to a specific TCP end-point at a high rate [[Silbersack2005](#)].

he interoperability requirements for TCP ISNs are probably not clearly spelled out as one would expect. Furthermore, the suggestion of employing a global counter in [[RFC0793](#)] leads to negative security and privacy implications.

September 1981:

[[RFC0793](#)], suggests the use of a global 32-bit ISN generator, whose lower bit is incremented roughly every 4 microseconds. However, such an ISN generator makes it trivial to predict the ISN that a TCP will use for new connections, thus allowing a variety of attacks against TCP.

February 1985:

[Morris1985] was the first to describe how to exploit predictable TCP ISNs for forging TCP connections that could then be leveraged for trust relationship exploitation.

April 1989:

[Bellovin1989] discussed the security implications of predictable ISNs (along with a range of other protocol-based vulnerabilities).

February 1995:

[Shimomura1995] reported a real-world exploitation of the attack described in 1985 (ten years before) in [Morris1985].

May 1996:

[RFC1948] was the first IETF effort, authored by Steven Bellovin, to address predictable TCP ISNs. The same concept specified in this document for TCP ISNs was later proposed for TCP ephemeral ports [RFC6056], TCP Timestamps, and eventually even IPv6 Interface Identifiers [RFC7217].

March 2001:

[Zalewski2001] provides a detailed analysis of statistical weaknesses in some ISN generators, and includes a survey of the algorithms in use by popular TCP implementations.

May 2001:

Vulnerability advisories [CERT2001] [USCERT2001] are released regarding statistical weaknesses in some ISN generators, affecting popular TCP/IP implementations.

March 2002:

[Zalewski2002] updates and complements [Zalewski2001]. It concludes that "while some vendors [...] reacted promptly and tested their solutions properly, many still either ignored the issue and never evaluated their implementations, or implemented a flawed solution that apparently was not tested using a known approach" [Zalewski2002].

February 2012:

[RFC6528], after 27 years of Morris' original work [Morris1985], formally updates [RFC0793] to mitigate predictable TCP ISNs.

August 2014:

[I-D.eddy-rfc793bis-04], the upcoming revision of the core TCP protocol specification, incorporates the algorithm specified in [RFC6528] as the recommended algorithm for TCP ISN generation.

6. IPv6 Interface Identifiers (IIDs)

IPv6 Interface Identifiers can be generated in multiple ways: SLAAC [[RFC4862](#)], DHCPv6 [[RFC8415](#)], and manual configuration. This section focuses on Interface Identifiers resulting from SLAAC.

The Interface Identifier of stable (traditional) IPv6 addresses resulting from SLAAC have traditionally resulted in the underlying link-layer address being embedded in the IID. At the time, employing the underlying link-layer address for the IID was seen as a convenient way to obtain a unique address. However, recent awareness about the security and privacy implications of this approach [[RFC7707](#)] [[RFC7721](#)] has led to the replacement of such flawed scheme with an alternative one that mitigates its security and privacy implications [[RFC7217](#)] [[RFC8064](#)].

January 1997:

[[RFC2073](#)] specifies the syntax of IPv6 global addresses (referred to as "An IPv6 Provider-Based Unicast Address Format" at the time), consistent with the IPv6 addressing architecture specified in [[RFC1884](#)]. Hosts are recommended to "generate addresses using link-specific addresses as Interface ID such as 48 bit IEEE-802 MAC addresses".

July 1998:

[[RFC2374](#)] specifies "An IPv6 Aggregatable Global Unicast Address Format" (obsoleting [[RFC2373](#)]) changing the size of the Interface ID to 64 bits, and specifies that that IIDs must be constructed in IEEE EUI-64 format. How such identifiers are constructed becomes specified in the appropriate "IPv6 over <link>" specification such as "IPv6 over Ethernet".

January 2001:

[[RFC3041](#)] recognizes the problem of network activity correlation, and specifies temporary addresses. Temporary addresses are to be used along with stable addresses.

August 2003:

[[RFC3587](#)] obsoletes [[RFC2374](#)], making the TLA/NLA structure historic. The syntax and recommendations for the traditional stable IIDs remain unchanged, though.

February 2006:

[[RFC4291](#)] is published as the latest "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture", requiring the IIDs of the traditional (stable) autoconfigured addresses to employ the Modified EUI-64 format. The details of constructing such interface identifiers are defined in the appropriate "IPv6 over <link>" specifications.

March 2008:

[[RFC5157](#)] provides hints regarding how patterns in IPv6 addresses could be leveraged for the purpose of address scanning.

December 2011:

[[draft-gont-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-00](#)] notes that the traditional scheme for generating stable addresses allows for address scanning, and also does not prevent active node tracking. It also specifies an alternative algorithm meant to replace IIDs based on Modified EUI-64 format identifiers.

November 2012:

The 6man WG adopts [[I-D.gont-6man-stable-privacy-addresses](#)] as a working group item (as [[draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-00](#)]). However, the specified algorithm no longer formally replaces the Modified EUI-64 format identifiers.

February 2013:

An address-scanning tool (scan6 of [[IPv6-Toolkit](#)]) that leverages IPv6 address patterns is released [[Gont2013](#)].

July 2013:

[[I-D.cooper-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy](#)] elaborates on the security and privacy implications on all known algorithms for generating IPv6 IIDs.

January 2014:

The 6man wg publishes [[draft-ietf-6man-default-iids-00](#)] ("Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers"), recommending [[I-D.ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses](#)] for the generation of stable addresses.

April 2014:

[[RFC7217](#)] is published, specifying "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)" as an alternative to (but *not* replacement of) Modified EUI-64 format IIDs.

March 2016:

[[RFC7707](#)] (formerly [[I-D.gont-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning](#)] and later [[I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning](#)]), about "Network Reconnaissance in IPv6 Networks", is published.

March 2016:

[[RFC7721](#)] (formerly [[I-D.cooper-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy](#)] and later [[I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy](#)]), about "Security

and Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms", is published.

May 2016:

[[draft-gont-6man-non-stable-iids-00](#)] is published, with the goal of specifying requirements for non-stable addresses, and updating [[RFC4941](#)] such that use of only temporary addresses is allowed.

May 2016:

[[draft-gont-6man-address-usage-recommendations-00](#)] is published, providing an analysis of how different aspects on an address (from stability to usage mode) affect their corresponding security and privacy implications, and meaning to eventually provide advice in this area.

February 2017:

The 6man wg publishes [[RFC8064](#)] ("Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers") (formerly [[I-D.ietf-6man-default-iids](#)]), with requirements for stable addresses and a recommendation to employ [[RFC7217](#)] for the generation of stable addresses. It formally updated a large number of RFCs.

March 2018:

[[draft-fgont-6man-rfc4941bis-00](#)] is published (as suggested by the 6man wg), to address flaws in [[RFC4941](#)] by revising it (as an alternative to the [[draft-gont-6man-non-stable-iids-00](#)] effort, published in March 2016).

July 2018:

[[draft-ietf-6man-rfc4941bis-00](#)] is adopted (as [[draft-fgont-6man-rfc4941bis-00](#)]) as a wg item of the 6man wg.

March 2020:

[[I-D.ietf-6man-rfc4941bis](#)] passes WGLC.

7. NTP Reference IDs (REFID)

The NTP [[RFC5905](#)] is employed to avoid degree-one timing loops in scenarios where two NTP peers are (mutually) the time source of each other.

June 2010:

[[RFC5905](#)], "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification" is published. It specifies that for NTP peers with stratum higher than 1 the REFID embeds the IPv4 Address of the time source or an MD5 hash of the IPv6 address of the time source.

July 2016:

[[draft-stenn-ntp-not-you-refid-00](#)] is published, describing the information leakage produced via de NTP REFID. It proposes that NTP returns a special REFID when a packet employs an IP Source Address that is not believed to be a current NTP peer, but otherwise generates and returns the traditional REFID. It is subsequently adopted by the NTP WG as [[I-D.ietf-ntp-refid-updates](#)].

April 2019:

[[Gont-NTP](#)] notes that the proposed fix specified in [[draft-ietf-ntp-refid-updates-00](#)] is, at the very least, sub-optimal.

8. Transport Protocol Ephemeral Port Numbers

Most (if not all) transport protocols employ "port numbers" to demultiplex packets to the corresponding transport protocol instances.

August 1980:

[[RFC0768](#)] notes that the UDP source port is optional and identifies the port of the sending process. It does not specify interoperability requirements for source port selection, nor does it suggest possible ways to select port numbers. Most popular implementations end up selecting source ports from a system-wide global counter.

September 1981:

[[RFC0793](#)] (the TCP specification) essentially describes the use of port numbers, and specifies that port numbers should result in a unique socket pair (local address, local port, remote address, remote port). How ephemeral ports (i.e. port numbers for "active opens") are selected, and the port range from which they are selected, are left unspecified.

January 2009:

[[RFC5452](#)] mandates the use of port randomization for DNS resolvers, and mandates that implementations must randomize ports from the range (53 or 1024, and above) or the largest possible port range. It does not recommend possible algorithms for port randomization, although the document specifically targets DNS resolvers, for which a simple port randomization suffices (e.g. Algorithm 1 of [[RFC6056](#)]). This document led to the implementation of port randomization in the DNS resolver themselves, rather than in the underlying transport-protocols.

January 2011:

[RFC6056] notes that many TCP and UDP implementations result in predictable port numbers, and also notes that many implementations select port numbers from a small portion of the whole port number space. It recommends the implementation and use of ephemeral port randomization, proposes a number of possible algorithms for port randomization, and also recommends to randomize port numbers over the range 1024-65535.

March 2016:

[[NIST-NTP](#)] reports a non-normal distribution of the ephemeral port numbers employed by the NTP clients of an Internet Time Service.

April 2019:

[[I-D.gont-ntp-port-randomization](#)] notes that some NTP implementations employ the NTP service port (123) as the local port for non-symmetric modes, and aims to update the NTP specification to recommend port randomization in such cases, in line with [[RFC6056](#)]. The proposal experiments some push-back in the relevant working group (NTP WG) [[NTP-PORTR](#)], but is finally adopted as a working group item as [[I-D.ietf-ntp-port-randomization](#)].

9. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA registries within this document. The RFC-Editor can remove this section before publication of this document as an RFC.

10. Security Considerations

This document analyzes the timeline of the specification of different types of "numeric identifiers" used in IETF protocols, and how the security and privacy implications of such protocols has been affected as a result of it. It provides concrete evidence that advice in this area is warranted. [[I-D.gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations](#)] formally requires protocol specifications to do a warranted analysis of the interoperability implications of the transient numeric identifiers they specify, and to recommend possible algorithms for their generation, such that possible security and privacy implications are mitigated. [[I-D.gont-numeric-ids-generation](#)] analyzes categorizes transient numeric identifiers based on their interoperability requirements and their associated failure modes, and recommends possible algorithms to that can comply with the associated requirements while mitigating possible security and privacy implications.

11. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Dave Crocker, Christian Huitema, and Joe Touch, for providing valuable comments on earlier versions of this document.

The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Steven Bellovin, Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Gre Norcie, and Martin Thomson, for providing valuable comments on [[I-D.gont-predictable-numeric-ids](#)], on which this document is based.

[Section 5](#) of this document borrows text from [[RFC6528](#)], authored by Fernando Gont and Steven Bellovin.

The authors would like to thank Diego Armando Maradona for his magic and inspiration.

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