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NAT Classification Test Results
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Abstract

IETF has several working groups that are considering the impact of NATs on various protocols. Having a classification of the types of NATs that are being developed and deployed is useful in gauging the impact of various solutions. This draft records the results of classifying NATs.

This draft is not complete and has only a few test results but it is worth discussing all the testing we wish to do before all the test

results are collected. The test results here are very old and work is being done to update them with more current information.

1. Introduction

A major issue in working with NAT traversal solutions for various protocols is that NATs behave in many different ways. This draft describes the results of testing several residential style NATs.

2. Descriptions of Tests

2.1. UDP Mapping

This test sends STUN[1] packets from the same port on three different internal IP addresses to the same destination. The source port on the outside of the NAT is observed. The test records whether the port is preserved or not and whether all the mapping get different ports.

A second set of tests checks out how the NAT maps ports above and below 1024.

Tests are run with a group of several consecutive ports to see if the NAT preserves port parity.

2.2. UDP Filtering

This test sends STUN packets from the same port on three different internal IP addresses to the same destination. It then tests whether places on the outside with 1) a different port but the same IP address and then 2) a different port and a different IP address can successfully send a packet back to the sender. The test is based on technique described in [2].

2.3. UDP Hairpin

This test sends a STUN packet from the inside to the outside to create a mapping and discover the external source address called A. It does the same thing from a different internal IP address to get a second external mapping called B. It then sends a packet from A to B and B to A and notes if these packets are successfully delivered from one internal IP address to the other.

2.4. ICMP

A device on the inside sends a packet to an external address that causes an ICMP Destination Unreachable packet to be returned. The test records whether this packet makes it back through the NAT correctly.

2.5. Fragmentation

The MTU on the outside of the NAT is set to under 1000; on the inside it is set to 1500 or over. Then a 1200 byte packet is sent to the NAT. The test records whether the NAT correctly fragments this when sending it. Another test is done with DF=1. An additional test is done with DF=1 in which the adjacent MTU on the NAT is large enough the NAT does not need to fragment the packet but further on, a link has an MTU small enough that an ICMP packet gets generated. The test records whether the NAT correctly forwards the ICMP packet.

In the next test a fragmented packet with the packets in order is sent to the outside of the NAT, and the test records whether the packets are dropped, reassembled and forwarded, or forwarded individually. A similar test is done with the fragments out of order.

2.6. UDP Refresh

A test is done that involves sending out a STUN packet and then waiting a variable number of minutes before the server sends the response. The client sends different requests with different times on several different ports at the start of the test and then watches the responses to find out how long the NAT keeps the binding alive.

A second test is done with a request that is delayed more than the binding time but every minute an outbound packet is sent to keep the binding alive. This test checks that outbound traffic will update the timer.

A third test is done in which several requests are sent with the delay less than the binding time and one request with the delay greater. The early test responses will result in inbound traffic that may or may not update the binding timer. This test detects whether the packet with the time greater than the binding time will traverse the NAT which provide the information about whether the inbound packets have updated the binding timers.

An additional test is done to multiple different external IP addresses from the same source, to see if outbound traffic to one destination updates the timers on each session in that mapping.

2.7. Multicast and IGMP

Multicast traffic is sent to the outside of the NAT, and the test records whether the NAT forwards it to the inside. Next an IGMP Membership Report is sent from inside. The test records whether the NAT correctly forwards it to the outside and whether it allows incoming multicast traffic. More detail on NATs and IGMP is provided in [3].

2.8. Multicast Timers

The test records how long the NAT will forward multicast traffic without receiving any IGMP Membership Reports and whether receiving Reports refreshes this timer.

2.9. TCP Timers

TBD: Measure time before ACK, after ACK, and after FIN and RST.

2.10. TCP Port Mapping

Multiple SYN packets are sent from the same inside address to different outside IP addresses, and the source port used on the outside of the NAT is recorded.

2.11. SYN Filtering

Test that a SYN packet received on the outside interfaces that does not match anything gets discarded with no reply being sent. Test whether an outbound SYN packet will create a binding that allows an incoming SYN packet.

2.12. DNS

Does the DNS proxy in them successfully pass through SRV requests.

2.13. DHCP

Do any DHCP options received on the WAN side get put into DHCP answers sent on LAN side?

2.14. Ping

Do ping request sent from LAN side work?

2.15. DHCP

Do traceroute request sent from LAN side work?

3. Observations

Several NATs attempt to use the same external port number as the internal host has used. This is referred to as port preservation. Some of the NATs that do this were found to have different characteristics depending on whether the port was already in use or not. This was tested by running the STUN tests from a particular port on one internal IP address and then running them again from the same port on a different internal IP address. The results from the first interface, where the port was preserved, are referred to as the primary type; while the results from the second interface, which did not manage to get the same external port because it was already in use, are referred to as the secondary type. On most NATs the secondary type is the same as the primary but on some it is different; these are referred to as nondeterministic NATs, since a client with a single internal IP address cannot figure out what type of NAT it is.

There are several NATs that would be detected as address restricted by the STUN tests but are not. These NATs always use the same external port as the internal port and store the IP address of the most recent internal host to send a packet on that port. The NATs then forward any traffic arriving at the external interface of the NAT on this port to the internal host that has most recently used it. These NATs are labeled "Bad" in the result table since they do not meet the definitions of NAPT in [RFC 3022](#). Interestingly, as long as the clients behind the NAT choose random port numbers, they often do work. STUN detects these NATs as address restricted although they are really not address restricted NATs. This type of NAT is easily detected by sending a STUN packet from the same port on two different internal IP addresses and looking at the mapped port in the return. If both packets have been mapped to the same external port, the NAT is of the Bad type.

Another important aspect of a NAT for some applications is whether it can send media from one internal host back to another host behind the same NAT. This is referred to as supporting hairpin media.

It was rumored that some NATs existed that looked in arbitrary packets for either the NATs' external IP address or the internal host IP address - either in binary or dotted decimal form - and rewrote it to something else. STUN could be extended to test for exactly this type of behavior by echoing arbitrary client data and the mapped

address but sending the bits inverted so these evil NATs did not mess with them. NATs that do this will break integrity detection on payloads.

To help organize the NATs by what types of applications they can support, the following groups are defined. The application of using a SIP phone with a TLS connection for signaling and using STUN for media ports is considered. It is assumed the RTP/RTCP media is on random port pairs as recommended for RTP.

Group A: NATs that are deterministic, not symmetric, and support hairpin media. These NATs would work with many phones behind them.

Group B: NATs that are not symmetric on the primary mapping. This group would work with many IP phones as long as the media ports did not conflict. This is unlikely to happen often but will occasionally. Because they may not support hairpin media, a call from one phone behind a NAT to another phone behind the same NAT may not work.

Group D: NATs of the type Bad. These have the same limitations of group B but when the ports conflict, media gets delivered to a random phone behind the NAT.

Group F: These NATs are symmetric and phones will not work.

4. Results

The following table shows the results from several NATs. The NATs tested include some random ones the author had lying around as well as every NAT that could be purchased in February 2004 in the San Jose Fry's, Best Buy, CompUSA, and Circuit City. Clearly this is not a very good approximation to a random sample. It is clear that the NATs widely purchased in the US are different from what are available in Japan and Europe.

In the following table the Prim column indicates the primary type of the NAT. A value of Port indicates port restricted, Cone is a full cone, Bad is described in the next section, Symm is Symmetric, and Addr is Address restricted. The Hair column value of Y or N indicates whether the NAT will hairpin media. The Pres column indicates whether the NAT attempts to preserve port numbers. The Sec column indicates the secondary type of the NAT, and a value of Same indicates it is the same as the primary type. The Grp indicates the group that this NAT falls into.

Vendor	Model	Firmware	Prim	Sec	Hair	Pres	Grp
Airlink	ASOH04P	V1.01.0095	Port	Symm	N	Y	B
Apple	Air Base	V5.2	Cone	Same	Y	N	A
Belkin	F5D5321	V1.13	Port	Same	N	N	B
Cisco	IOS		Port	Symm			-
Cisco	PIX		Port	Same			-
Corega	BAR Pro2	R1.00 Feb 21 2003	Cone				-
DLink	DI-604	2.0 Jun 2002	Cone	Same	N	N	B
DLink	DI-704P	2.61 build 2	Cone	Same	Y	N	A
Dlink	DI-804	.30, Tue, Jun 24 20	Cone	Same	Y	N	A
Hawkings	FR24	6.26.02h Build 004	Bad	Same	Y	Y	D
Linksys	BEFSR11		Port				B
Linksys	BEFSR11 V2	1.42.7, Apr 02 200	Port				B
Linksys	BEFSR41	v1.44.2	Port				B
Linksys	BEFSR81	2.42.7.1 June 2002	Addr	Same	N	Y	B
Linksys	BEFSRU31		Port				B
Linksys	BEFSX41	1.44.3, Dec 24 200	Port				B
Linksys	BEFVP41	1.41.1, Sep 04 200	Port				B
Linksys	BEFW11S4	1.45.3, Jul 1 2003	Port				B
Linksys	WRT54G	1.42.2	Port	Symm	N	Y	B
Linksys	WRT55AG	1.04, Jun.30, 2003	Port				B
Linksys	WRV54G	2.03	Port	Same	N	Y	B
Microsoft	MN-700	02.00.07.0331	Cone	Same	N	N	B
Netgear	FVS318	V1.4 Jul. 15 2003	Port	Same	N	N	B
Netgear	RP114	3.26(CD.0) 8/17/20	Cone				-
Netgear	RP614	4.00 April 2002	Cone	Same	Y	N	A
NetworkEver	NR041	Version 1.0 Rel 10	Symm	Same	N	N	F
NetworkEver	NR041	Version 1.2 Rel 03	Bad	Same	Y	Y	D
SMC	2804WBRP-G	v1.00 Oct 14 2003	Port	Symm	Y	Y	B
SMC	7004ABR	V1.42.003	Port	Same	N	N	B
SMC	7004VBR	v1.03 Jun 12, 2002	Cone				-
Toshiba	WRC-1000	1.07.03a-C024a	Port	Cone	N	Y	B
umax	ugate-3000	2.06h	Port				-
US Robotics	USR8003	1.04 08	Cone	Same	N	N	B
ZOT	BR1014	Unknown	Bad	Same	N	Y	D

Since this testing was done, some additional testing and shopping sprees in France and Taiwan have provided the following results.

Vendor	Model	Firmware	Prim	Sec	Hair	Pres	Grp
Netgear	MR814v2	Version 5.01	Bad	Same	Y	Y	D
Cisco	PIX 515	6.3(3)	Port	Same	N	N	B
Dynex	DX-E401	1.03	Cone	Same	Y	N	A
Asante	FR1004	R1.13 V2	Cone	Same	N	N	B
Linksys	BEFSR81	2.42.7.1	Addr	Note 1	N	Y	B
Lanner	BRL-04FPU		Cone	Same	N	N	
AboCom	CAS3047		Port	Same	N	Y	
Lemmel	LM-IS6400B		Port	Same	N	Y	

The NAT with a secondary type of "Note 1" is particularly weird. The primary connection is address restricted. If a second host uses this same port, it also gets an Address Restricted, but when a third host uses this same port, it gets Symmetric.

Some more recent test results. On this set of NATs, more than half had UPnP disabled by default.

TRENDnet TW100-BRF114U Version 1.1 Release 04

Primary: Independent Mapping, Address Dependent Filter,
preserves ports, no hairpin

Secondary: Dependent Mapping, random port, no hairpin

Netgear RP614v2 5.13 Jul 08 2003

Primary: Independent Mapping, Independent Filter, random port,
will hairpin

Secondary: Independent Mapping, Independent Filter, random port,
will hairpin

Netgear WGM124 Version 1.0 Release 07

Primary: Independent Mapping, Port Dependent Filter,
preserves ports, no hairpin

Secondary: Dependent Mapping, random port, no hairpin

Netgear MBR814v3 V5.4_06

Primary: Independent Mapping, Address Dependent Filter,
preserves ports, will hairpin

Secondary: Dependent Mapping, random port, no hairpin

Linksys WRT54G 1.00.20

Primary: Independent Mapping, Port Dependent Filter,
preserves ports, no hairpin

Secondary: Dependent Mapping, random port, no hairpin

Linksys WRT54Gv5 v1.00.6, Jan. 20, 2006

Primary: Independent Mapping, Port Dependent Filter,
preserves ports, will hairpin

Secondary: Independent Mapping, Port Dependent Filter,
random port, will hairpin

Linksys WRT55AG Firmware: 1.04, Jun. 30, 2003

Primary: Independent Mapping, Port Dependent Filter,
preserves ports, no hairpin

Secondary: Dependent Mapping, random port, no hairpin

Linksys BEFSR41v4 1.04.02, Feb 18 2005

Primary: Independent Mapping, Independent Filter, preserves ports,
no hairpin

Secondary: Dependent Mapping, random port, no hairpin

DLink DI-808HV V1.40, Thu, Aug 12 2004

Primary: Independent Mapping, Independent Filter, random port,
will hairpin

Secondary: Independent Mapping, Independent Filter, random port,
will hairpin

Netgear WGR614v6 V2.0.13_1.0.13NA

Primary: Dependent Mapping, preserves ports, no hairpin

Secondary: Dependent Mapping, random port, no hairpin

Netgear WNR834M 1.1.15NA

Primary: Independent Mapping, Port Dependent Filter,
preserves ports, no hairpin

Secondary: Dependent Mapping, random port, no hairpin

DLink WBR-1310 1.01 , Dec 30 , 2005

Primary: Independent Mapping, Independent Filter, random port,
will hairpin

Secondary: Independent Mapping, Independent Filter, random port,
will hairpin

Linksys WTR54GS V1.0_15

Primary: Independent Mapping, Address Dependent Filter,
preserves ports, no hairpin

Secondary: Dependent Mapping, random port, no hairpin

Another good source of information for behavior of various NATs is
the NATCECK [\[4\]](#) and STUNT [\[5\]](#) web pages.

Testing of PING and Traceroute functionality on these NATs provided
the following results:

Vendor	Model	Firmware	Ping	TraceRt
Airlink	ASOH04P	V1.01.0095	Y	Y
Apple	Air Base	V5.2	Y	Y
Belkin	F5D5321	V1.13	Y	Y
Cisco	IOS		Y	Y
Cisco	PIX		Y	Y
Corega	BAR Pro2	R1.00 Feb 21 2003	Y	Y
DLink	DI-604	2.0 Jun 2002	Y	Y
DLink	DI-704P	2.61 build 2	Y	Y
Dlink	DI-804	.30, Tue, Jun 24 20	Y	Y
Hawkings	FR24	6.26.02h Build 004	Y	Y
Linksys	BEFSR11 V2	1.42.7, Apr 02 200	Y	Y
Linksys	BEFSR41	v1.44.2	Y	Y
Linksys	BEFSR81	2.42.7.1 June 2002	Y	Y
Linksys	BEFSX41	1.44.3, Dec 24 200	Y	Y
Linksys	BEFVP41	1.41.1, Sep 04 200	Y	Y
Linksys	BEFW11S4	1.45.3, Jul 1 2003	Y	Y
Linksys	WRT54G	1.42.2	Y	Y
Linksys	WRT55AG	1.04, Jun.30, 2003	Y	Y
Linksys	WRV54G	2.03	Y	Y
Microsoft	MN-700	02.00.07.0331	Y	Y
Netgear	FVS318	V1.4 Jul. 15 2003	Y	Y
Netgear	RP114	3.26(CD.0) 8/17/20	Y	Y
Netgear	RP614	4.00 April 2002	Y	Y
NetworkEver	NR041	Version 1.0 Rel 10	Y	Y
NetworkEver	NR041	Version 1.2 Rel 03	Y	Y
SMC	2804WBRP-G	v1.00 Oct 14 2003	Y	Y
SMC	7004ABR	V1.42.003	Y	Y
SMC	7004VBR	v1.03 Jun 12, 2002	Y	Y
Toshiba	WRC-1000	1.07.03a-C024a	Y	Y
US Robotics	USR8003	1.04 08	Y	Y
ZOT	BR1014	Unknown	Y	Y
Netgear	MR814v2	Version 5.01	Y	Y
Cisco	PIX 515	6.3(3)	Y	Y
Dynex	DX-E401	1.03	Y	Y
Asante	FR1004	R1.13 V2	Y	Y
Linksys	BEFSR81	2.42.7.1	Y	Y
Lanner	BRL-04FPU		Y	Y
Lemmel	LM-IS6400B		Y	Y

Open Issue: How should we arrange all the results? There are going to be too many to put it as one row per device.

5. Discussion

It is clear from discussions with various vendors and watching how

Jennings

Expires January 8, 2008

[Page 10]

tests have changed over the years that symmetric is becoming less common. This change is being driven primarily by the desire to make online gaming work; many games use methods similar to STUN for NAT traversal. The only symmetric NAT found was an old device. More recent versions of the software on the same device were not symmetric. It is clear that other symmetric NATs are deployed, but it is hard to find them.

6. IANA Considerations

This document requires no actions by IANA.

7. Security Considerations

It is often assumed that symmetric NATs are more secure than port restricted NATs. This is not true - they are identical from a security point of view. They both only allow a packet to come inside the NAT if the host inside has previously sent to the exact same external IP and port. One can argue that cone is less secure than port restricted, but this is not true if the attacker can spoof the IP address, which is fairly easy to do in many cases. What level of security can be expected from NATs at all is a strange and curious topic. With all the NATs, if you allow packets out, packets can come in, so don't be surprised if NATs provide less security than anticipated.

8. Open Issues

The hairpin media tests were done by having a single host use STUN to find a public address on the NAT and then send media to itself and see if it was received. It is possible that NATs might not hairpin media to the same host but would hairpin media to another host behind the same NAT. It is possible that because of this, the hairpin results reported here might be wrong.

This sample set of NATs is very US-centric: D-Link, Linksys, and Netgear dominate the US consumer market. It would be good to get more results from other places.

These test results should be verified by another group. This has not been done yet.

This draft should be moved to be consistent with the classification in [6].

9. Acknowledgments

Many people and several mailing lists have contributed to the material on understanding NATs in this document. Many thanks to Larry Metzger, Dan Wing, and Rohan Mahy. The STUN server and client is open source and available at <http://sourceforge.net/projects/stun>, and thank you to Jason Fischl who runs the public STUN server at larry.gloo.net. Thanks to Yutaka Takeda who tested and found bugs and Christian Stredicke for getting people thinking. Thanks to Francois Audet for catching mistakes, verifying several results, and finding the very strange non-deterministic nature in the BEFSR81.

The work of the various people on STUN Client and Server [[7](#)], NATCECK [[8](#)], and STUNT [[9](#)] has greatly helped this work.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

- [1] Rosenberg, J., "Simple Traversal of UDP Through Network Address Translators (NAT) (STUN)", [draft-ietf-behave-rfc3489bis-02](#) (work in progress), July 2005.
- [2] Rosenberg, J., Weinberger, J., Huitema, C., and R. Mahy, "STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Through Network Address Translators (NATs)", [RFC 3489](#), March 2003.

10.2. Informative References

- [3] Wing, D., "IGMP Proxy Behavior", [draft-ietf-behave-multicast-07](#) (work in progress).
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- [7] Jennings, C., "STUN Client and Server: <http://www.vovida.org/applications/downloads/stun>", February 2005.
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