

**An IANA registry for Level of Assurance (LoA) Profiles
draft-johansson-loa-registry-06**

Abstract

This document establishes an IANA registry for Level of Assurance (LoA) Profiles. The registry is intended to be used as an aid to discovering such LoA definitions in protocols that use an LoA concept, including SAML 2.0 and OpenID Connect.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

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1. Introduction

This document establishes an IANA registry for Level of Assurance Profiles.

Quoting from `sstc.saml-assurance-profile` [[OASIS.sstc.saml-assurance-profile](#)] we find the following definition of the concept of 'level of assurance':

Many existing (and potential) SAML federation deployments have adopted a "levels of assurance" (or LOA) model for categorizing the wide variety of authentication methods into a small number of levels, typically based on some notion of the strength of the authentication. Federation members (service providers or "relying parties") then decide which level of assurance is required to access specific protected resources, based on some assessment of "value" or "risk".

Another definition of a 'level of assurance' is given in [RFC4949](#) [[RFC4949](#)] which also identifies the roots of such profiles in the NIST special publication series, in particular SP 800-63 [[SP63](#)]. Level of Assurance profiles are used in various protocols, including the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) version 2.0 and OpenID Connect.

Several so called trust frameworks and identity federations now exist, some of which define one or more Level of Assurance (LoA). The purpose of this specification is to create an IANA registry where such LoA definitions can be discovered. While the quote above references SAML the notion of a "level of assurance" has gained widespread acceptance and should be treated as a protocol-independent concept. The proposed IANA registry attempts to reflect this.

Although the registry will contain URIs that reference SAML Authentication Context Profiles other protocols may use such URIs to identify levels of assurance definitions without relying on or transmitting their SAML XML definitions. Use of the registry by protocols other than SAML is encouraged.

For instance OpenID Connect defines the standard claim 'acr' as a identifier that may reference a SAML Authentication Context Class even though OpenID Connect is not itself based on XML or SAML.

Protocol designers who want to reference the registry should be aware that registered LoAs may depend on assumptions that do not carry over to all protocols and that such assumptions may vary among the protocols for which the LoAs were originally registered.

2. Name of Registry

The name of the registry shall be "Level of Assurance Profile", in plural "Level of Assurance Profiles". The term LoA is an abbreviation of Level of Assurance.

3. Registration Template

The following information must be provided with each registration:

URI: A URI referencing a Level of Assurance Profile. This is the registry key.

Context Class: A valid XML schema definition for the SAML 2.0 LoA Context Class fulfilling the requirements of sstc.saml-assurance-profile [[OASIS.sstc.saml-assurance-profile](#)]. The registry key (the URI) is the unique identifier for the Context Class.

Name: A string uniquely and unambiguously identifying the LoA for use in protocols where URIs are not appropriate.

Informational URL: A URL containing auxilliary information. This URL must minimally reference contact information for the administrative authority of the level of assurance definition and must use either the http or https schemes.

Note that it is possible for a single SAML Authentication Context Class to contain definitions of multiple URIs. In that case a separate registration is to be used for each URI. Both the name and the URI are to uniquely and unambiguously identify the LoA. The name is meant to be used in protocols where URIs are not appropriate. In addition the requester is expected to provide basic contact information and the name of the organization on behalf of which the LoA definition is registered.

The Name is defined by the following ABNF (as defined in [RFC5234](#) [[RFC5234](#)]):

label = (ALPHA / DIGIT)

name = label 1*(label / "-" / "." / "_")

The elements defined by the following ABNF productions represent a set of reserved values for the Name element and are not to be registered:

reserved = loa / al / num

loa = ("l" / "L") ("o" / "O") ("a" / "A") *DIGIT

al = ("a" / "A") ("l" / "L") *DIGIT

num = *DIGIT

The reason for excluding these productions is a desire to avoid a race to register overly generic LoA profiles under names like "AL1" or "LOA2".

3.1. Example Registration

1. Name of requester: J. Random User
2. E-mail address of requester: jrandom@example.com
3. Organization of requester: Example Trust Frameworks LLP
4. Requested registration:

URI `http://foo.example.com/assurance/loa-1`

Name `foo-loa-1`

Information URL `https://foo.example.com/assurance/`

SAML 2.0 Authentication Context Class Definition

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema
  targetNamespace="http://foo.example.com/assurance/loa-1"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns="http://foo.example.com/assurance/loa-1"
  finalDefault="extension"
  blockDefault="substitution"
  version="2.0">
  <xs:redefine
    schemaLocation="saml-schema-authn-context-loa-profile.xsd">
    <xs:annotation>
      <xs:documentation>
        Class identifier:
          http://foo.example.com/assurance/loa-1
        Defines Level 1 of the Foo Assurance Framework
      </xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:complexType name="GoverningAgreementRefType">
      <xs:complexContent>
        <xs:restriction base="GoverningAgreementRefType">
          <xs:attribute name="governingAgreementRef"
            type="xs:anyURI"
            fixed="https://foo.example.com/assurance/"
            use="required"/>
        </xs:restriction>
      </xs:complexContent>
    </xs:complexType>
  </xs:redefine>
</xs:schema>
```

3.2. Note on the Example

The example is borrowed (slightly modified) from `sstc.saml-assurance-profile` [[OASIS.sstc.saml-assurance-profile](#)]. The example should not be registered.

4. Registration Policy

The registry is to be operated under the "Expert Review" policy from [RFC5226](#) [[RFC5226](#)] employing a pool of experts. IANA is kindly asked to do rough randomized load-balancing among the experts and also do an initial review of each submission to ensure that the name is and URI are unique within the registry. The review criteria are outlined below.

Registrations that reference multiple LoAs in a consistent set of

policies - for instance when a trust framework defines multiple levels of assurance - the registered LoA Name and URIs should be consistently named so that they identified as belonging to the same set of registrations. For instance fruitLoA1, fruitLoA2 and fruitLoA3 is preferred over apple, pear and banana when these Names refer to a single set of policies defining 3 LoAs.

4.1. Reviewer Expectations

The expectation of the IANA LoA Registry is that it contain registrations of bona fide Level of Assurance Profiles while not presenting a very high bar for entry.

Expert reviewers are expected to verify that:

- o the registration is consistent and that the provided XML fulfills the requirements of sstc.saml-assurance-profile [[OASIS.sstc.saml-assurance-profile](#)].
- o the Name element is clearly associated with the registered LoA Profile and is not a reserved value.
- o the URI and Name elements are not already registered.
- o the Information URL can be expected to be stable and permanent.

Note that multiple registrations may share a common Informational URL.

The reviewers should exclude registrations where the Name does not unambiguously identify the LoA definition or where the Name is a simple variation on one of the reserved names.

Expert reviewers are expected to allow registrations made in good faith that fulfil these requirements.

5. Registry Semantics

The intended use for this registry is to serve as a basis for discovery of LoA definitions that might for instance be used by protocol-specific (eg SAML 2.0 or OpenID Connect) management tools.

Note that consumers of the registry, being implementations of [OASIS.sstc.saml-ass], are expected to allow configuration of LoA URIs at system deploy-time. If multiple sources of LOA URIs are permitted in addition to the registry (eg manual input) then it is important to avoid collisions with URIs found in the registry.

The presence of an entry in the registry does not imply any semantic or quality beyond that which results from the review done by the expert reviewer as part of the registration process.

6. IANA Considerations

This document sets up a registry with IANA making the whole document a set of considerations for IANA.

7. Security Considerations

The registry is not a federation or trust framework. Consumers of the registry are strongly advised to review the information about an LoA before relying on it.

8. Acknowledgements

RL 'Bob' Morgan, Scott Cantor, Lucy Lynch and John Bradley were involved in the initial discussions around this idea and contributed to the semantics of the registry. The various versions of the draft were socialized in the Kantara Federation Interoperability WG and in other parts of the identity community.

9. Changes

Note to the RFC editor: This section should be removed before publication.

9.1. since -00

- o Clarified the security considerations wrt the status of the IANA registry.
- o Text in the introduction that explains that the registry can be used by other protocols than SAML and that this is encouraged.

9.2. since -01

- o Allow for registration of short identifiers.

9.3. since -02

- o Make the text less explicitly dependent on SAML.
- o Include OpenID Connect reference.
- o Corrected the SSTC reference
- o Reserve numeric-only LoA names (eg '1')

9.4. since -03

- o comments from PROTO writeup, AD and document shepherd
- o remove initial list of reviewers - it will be decided by IESG
- o example registration

9.5. since -04

- o ABNF fixes
- o example registration
- o policy for consistent naming across multiple related registrations
- o minor nits

9.6. since -05

- o clarified introduction by re-arranging paragraphs
- o removed [RFC2119](#)-language
- o clarified security considerations section
- o clarified reviewer expectations
- o corrected the example
- o corrected reference to IANA Expert Review policy
- o included ABNF reference
- o expectations on Information URI stability
- o limit the allowed Information URI scheme

- o various nits

10. References

10.1. Normative References

- [OASIS.sstc.saml-assurance-profile]
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10.2. Informative References

- [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
[RFC 4949](#), August 2007.
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