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Use Cases for an Interface to BGP Protocol  
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## Abstract

A network routing protocol like BGP is typically configured and results of its operation are analyzed through some form of Command Line Interface (CLI) or NETCONF. These interactions to control BGP and diagnose its operation encompass: configuration of protocol parameters, display of protocol data, setting of certain protocol state and debugging of the protocol.

Interface to the Routing System's (IRS) Programmatic interfaces, as defined in [[I-D.ward-irs-framework](#)], provides an alternate way to control the configuration and diagnose the operation of the BGP protocol. IRS may be used for the configuration, manipulation, polling or analyzing protocol data. This document describes set of use cases for which IRS can be used for BGP protocol. It is intended to provide a base for the solution draft describing a set of interfaces to the BGP protocol.

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## [1.](#) Introduction

Typically, a network routing protocol like BGP is configured and results of its operation are analyzed through some form of Command Line Interface (CLI) or NETCONF. These interactions to control BGP and diagnose its operation encompass: configuration of protocol parameters, display of protocol data, setting of certain protocol state and debugging of the protocol.

The IRS Framework document [[I-D.ward-irs-framework](#)] describes a mechanism to control network protocols like BGP using a set of programmatic interfaces. These programmatic interfaces allow one to control the BGP protocol by analyzing its operational state and routing protocol data, plus manipulating BGP's configuration to achieve various goals. The IRS is not intended to replace any existing configuration mechanisms, (i.e.: Command Line Interface or NETCONF). Instead, IRS is intended to augment those existing mechanisms by defining a standardized set of programmatic interfaces to enable easier configuration, interrogation and analysis of the BGP protocol.

This document describes set of use cases for which IRS's programmatic interfaces can be used to control and analyze the operation of BGP. The use cases described in this document cover the following aspects of BGP: protocol parameter configuration, configuration of routing policies, protocol route manipulation and tracking of protocol events. The goal is to inform the community's understanding of where the IRS BGP extensions fit within the overall IRS architecture. It is intended to provide a basis for the solutions draft describing the set of Interfaces to the BGP protocol.

### [1.1.](#) Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

## [2.](#) BGP Configuration

The configuration of BGP is arduous to establish and maintain, particularly on networks whose services have a requirement for complex routing policies. This need is magnified by the need to routinely perform changes to large numbers of BGP routers to, for example: add or remove customer's BGP sessions, announce or withdraw

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(customer) IP prefixes in BGP, modify BGP policies to effect changes in Traffic Engineering, audit BGP routers to ensure they have consistent and appropriate BGP policies, etc.

There are three categories of BGP configuration:

1. Local BGP routing protocol configuration: local Autonomous System Number (ASN), BGP path selection properties of the router, injection of (aggregate) routes into BGP, etc.
2. Local BGP policies: policies designed to filter and then manipulate BGP attributes associated with BGP routes learned through BGP sessions. These policies typically live in the global configuration of a BGP router, but are applied on a per-BGP neighbor basis (or, group of BGP neighbors); and,
3. BGP neighbor sessions: remote ASN, remote IP address, address families, BGP policies to applied to routes, max-prefix limits, etc.

The sum total of BGP configuration on a BGP router is typically the largest quantify of configuration on Service Provider's BGP routers, by a fairly large margin. When that is combined with the large set of routine configuration changes, mentioned above, it should be fairly clear that systematic reading, configuration and control of BGP routers through a mechanism like IRS would greatly benefit all operators of BGP routers.

While it may not be possible to provide programmatic APIs for

esoteric vendor-specific policy configuration, it is possible to provide such API's for BGP protocol specific configuration and the more commonly used BGP routing policies.

## 2.1. BGP Protocol Configuration

Ability to enable and disable new address families within a BGP protocol for a network of BGP speaking routers is a challenge. The challenge is mainly in keeping track of BGP speaker's feature capabilities and then configuration of new address families on a multiple BGP speakers within a given network. With the necessary information, IRS controllers allow a network operator to push configuration information for enabling and disabling of new address families on a partial or entire set of BGP speakers within a given network. This would assist in building BGP overlay networks as needed.

For VPN address families, the main challenge lies in the complex VPN configuration required to setup the control plane for Customer VPNs.

The configuration involves creating a Virtual Routing and Forwarding instance (VRF), a Route Distinguisher (RD) that ensures each customer prefixes remains unique across VPNs, and Route Targets (RT) that help ensure that the Customer prefixes are segregated appropriately so that they do not cross the VPN boundaries. IRS would allow a network operator to push such configuration from a central location where a global VPN provisioning information could be stored. This helps avoid manual configuration of a VPN on multiple routers. Instead the configuration is controlled and pushed through a central IRS controller using a programmatic set of APIs on targeted set of BGP speakers.

Use of IRS controllers to announce protocol configuration information would simplify and automate configuration of BGP protocol in IBGP deployments where the protocol based policies are seldom used. To facilitate such a centralized configuration model, BGP speakers could be extended to use programmatic APIs to announce their feature capabilities as part of protocol initialization to the centralize IRS controllers. This would assist IRS controllers to auto-discover BGP protocol capabilities of various BGP speakers in a given network. IRS controllers in turn would use the information towards enabling/disabling of BGP specific features on BGP speakers.

## [2.2.](#) BGP Policy Configuration

Filtering of BGP routes is strongly recommended to control the announcements of BGP prefixes across the internet. Most providers make extensive use of BGP prefix filtering policies at the edge of their networks. The reasons for filtering BGP prefixes are:

- o Avoid Unwanted Route Announcements. Filter prefixes that MUST not be routed [[RFC5735](#)], [[RFC5156](#)]. Filter prefixes that are not allocated by Internet Routing Registries.
- o Facilitate Route Summarization. Filter prefixes beyond certain agreed prefix mask length between providers. Route Summarization helps control BGP RIB and FIB table size.
- o Defensive Security. Filter prefixes from Stub customer ASes that are not owned by the customers. Filter customer prefixes announced by other providers. This helps avoid prefix hijacking.

A set of standards-based schemas to enable configuration of Local BGP policies and BGP neighbor sessions was realized through the Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL) [[RFC2622](#)]. The RPSL defined a standards-based schemas, or 'objects' as it called them, that defined:

- o binding of IP prefixes to (one or more) Origin AS, (route objects);
- o collections of routes (route-set objects);
- o collections of Autonomous Systems (as-set objects); and,
- o routing policy of an Autonomous System to/from its adjacent neighbor AS'es, (aut-num objects)

Each ASN is responsible for creation, modification and deletion of its RPSL objects in an Internet Routing Registry (IRR). IRR's are typically operated by Regional Internet Registries (RIR's) and a few dozen larger ISP's and independent organizations. The IRR's provide a well-known location for all organizations attached to the Internet

to retrieve or update RPSL objects.

While still widely and actively used by Internet Service Providers, the prevailing belief is that the data contained in the IRR's is inaccurate, primarily due to a lack of deployed authorization method with respect to the creation or modification of RPSL objects. It should be noted that this criticism is not directed at the previously defined RPSL schemas, but rather at the data contained in RPSL schemas by end-users of the IRR system. Please refer to the IRR And Routing Policy Configuration Considerations [[I-D.mcpherson-irr-routing-policy-considerations](#)] document for a more thorough discussion of the history and present state of the IRR's.

Currently, RPSL schemas are exchanged between non-routing systems (servers) used within the IRR system. In addition, open-source and proprietary applications create or modify RPSL schemas, as necessary, to signal the announcement (or, withdrawal) of an IP prefix from an ASN or the creation (or, teardown) of a neighbor relationship between two adjacent ASN's. Most importantly, these RPSL schemas are consumed by similar applications to automatically build routing policies, (i.e.: lists of IP prefixes, corresponding Origin ASN's and /or AS\_PATH's), that then get translated to device-specific syntax (i.e.: CLI) before being pushed into individual BGP routers to effect routing policy on the network. It is common for Internet Service Providers to perform updates to these routing policies across their entire network on a daily basis.

With IRS it would be desirable to change the last step in the above process so that BGP policies derived from RPSL schemas, and other information sources, are translated into standards-based schemas that are then pushed, or pulled, into individual BGP routers. More generally, IRS controllers could use API's to gather information required to build various types of BGP routing policies plus the

corresponding set of Autonomous System Border Routers (ASBR's) where such policies need to be applied in the network and, finally, making those changes to individual network elements so those BGP policies take effect in the network. In doing so, a network operator now has a centralized way of building and making these policies take effect across the network in a coordinated manner.

### [3.](#) BGP Protocol Operation

It is increasingly common for services facilitated via BGP to be subject to severe, widespread disruptions (outages), primarily due to the destructive teardown of BGP sessions as a result of receiving malformed BGP attributes. The document Operational Requirements for Enhanced Error Handling Behaviour in BGP-4

[\[I-D.ietf-grow-ops-reqs-for-bgp-error-handling\]](#) outlines requirements to try to minimize the scope of the impact attributed to such errors. Unfortunately, more fine-grained BGP error handling solutions, which would result in little to no impact on the operation of BGP protocol, remain elusive.

### [3.1.](#) BGP Error Handling for Internal BGP Sessions

It is possible that IRS could enable enhanced error handling techniques for Internal BGP sessions. At a minimum, IRS-capable BGP routers could signal an event such as "Malformed Attribute Received" toward an IRS controller(s). IRS controller(s) may already have a real-time view of BGP routes, and corresponding BGP attributes, or may dynamically interrogate BGP routers in the network to identify the present propagation scope of the BGP route(s) that are affected. Finally, the IRS controller(s) could then signal back to BGP routers to apply a filter that would block propagation of the BGP attribute or BGP route, as necessary, in order to temporarily aid in consistency of BGP routing information across the entire network until a permanent fix can be developed and deployed within BGP routers.

IRS would enable the global visibility and global control over the operational state of BGP, within a given Autonomous System, that is necessary to facilitate the learning of, rapid response to and more fine-grained isolation/scoping of BGP protocol events that currently cause a destructive tear-down of BGP sessions that lead to widespread disruptions of services.

## [4.](#) BGP Route Manipulation



Multiprotocol BGP [[RFC4760](#)] provides support to carry routing information for different BGP address families. Route manipulation is heavily done across these different address families for different reasons. BGP IPv4 and IPv6 address families use BGP Communities [[RFC1997](#)] and other IBGP and EBGP attributes to manipulate BGP routes for Traffic Engineering purpose. BGP VPN address families use Extended Communities [[RFC4360](#)] to filter unwanted BGP routes. BGP Flowspec address family [[RFC5575](#)] is used to install Flow based filters to filter unwanted data traffic. The following sub-sections describe the use of IRS towards BGP Route Manipulation for different BGP address families.

#### [4.1.](#) Customized Best Path Selection Criteria

The BGP customized Bestpath facilitates custom bestpath computations within a BGP speaking network. It is usually used within an IBGP network. Customized bestpaths use special extended communities known as cost communities. Cost communities carry enough information; Point of Insertion (POI) and the cost value to signal where in BGP bestpath the customize checks need to be done. Both, the traffic engineering as well as backdoor (SHAM) links use customized bestpath computation.

With IRS, it would be possible for an IRS controller to push routes with custom cost communities on the BGP routers for Traffic Engineering purpose. IRS controller now can act as a central entity keeping track of all Traffic engineering data that get applied to BGP routes within an IBGP network.

#### [4.2.](#) Flowspec Routes

The BGP flowspec address family is used to disseminate the traffic flow specification to the BGP Autonomous System Border Routers (ASBRs) and Provider Edge (PE) routers. Both, the BGP ASBRs and the PEs would translate the received BGP traffic flow specification into an Access Control List (ACL) and install it in router's forwarding path. Using such ACLs routers can now classify, shape, rate limit, filter, or redirect traffic flows.

With IRS, it would be possible for an IRS controller to push traffic flow specifications to the BGP ASBRs and the PE routers. IRS controller can act as a central entity tracking all the traffic flow specifications that are installed within an IBGP network. IRS controller could also prioritize and control the announcement of traffic flow specifications according to various ASRBs and PE router's capacity. BGP ASBRs and PE routers MAY forward traffic flow

specifications received from EBGp speakers to IRS Controllers. This would allow IRS controllers to centrally manage and track any externally received traffic flow specifications.

#### [4.3.](#) Route Filter Routes for Legacy Routers

The BGP Route Filter address family is used to disseminate the Route Target filter information between VPN BGP speakers. This information is then used to build a route distribution graph that helps in limiting the propagation of VPN NLRI within a VPN network. However, it requires that all the BGP VPN routers are upgraded to support this functionality. Otherwise, the graph information is incomplete when a VPN network consists of legacy routers that participates in VPN but does not implement the BGP route filter address family.

With IRS, it would be possible for an IRS controller to push router filter information to BGP RR routers on behalf of all legacy routers that participates in VPN but does not support or implement the BGP route filter address family. IRS controller can act as a central entity tracking all the configured Route Filters for legacy routers and push them on appropriate RRs who in turn would push it to ASBRs and PE routers. In this way, IRS controllers help build an optimal route distribution graph that would assist in filtering of VPN NLRIs in a VPN network.

#### [4.4.](#) Optimized Exit Control

Optimized Exit Control is used to provide route optimization and load distribution for multiple network connections between networks. Network operators can monitor IP traffic flows and then could define policies and rules based on traffic class performance, link bandwidth monetary costs, link load distribution, traffic types, link failures, etc.

With IRS, it would be possible for an IRS controller to manipulate BGP routes and its parameters that influence BGP bestpath decisions. IRS controller could act as a central entity that would monitor and manipulate BGP routes based on central network based policies. Such routes would then be injected by a IRS controller into the network so as to get the load distribution for multiple network connections.

### [5.](#) BGP Events

Given the extremely large number of BGP Routes in networks, it is critical to have scalable mechanisms that can be used to monitor for events affecting routing state and, consequently, reachability. In addition, similar tools are needed in order to monitor BGP protocol statistics, which help operators and developers better understand scalability of software and hardware that BGP utilizes.

IRS could provide a publish-subscribe capability to applications to:

- o request monitoring of BGP routes and related events; and,
- o subscribe to the IRS controller to receive events related to BGP routes or other protocol-related events of interest.

#### [5.1.](#) Notification of Routing Events

There are certain IP prefixes, for example those that are arbitrarily classified by a given network operator as "high visibility" by its end-users, for which immediate notification of changes in their state are extremely useful to know about. Upon notification of such events, a Network Operations Center (NOC) could respond to customer inquiries in a more timely fashion; alternatively, the NOC may decide to perform Traffic Engineering to restore service, etc.

Currently, the only way to learn of such events is for a BGP monitoring system to establish a BGP session with a multitude of BGP routers in an AS. Then, the BGP monitoring system needs to look through all BGP UPDATE's in order to identify those events that are of interest to it. Note, this doesn't account for the fact that there are several applications that might be simultaneously interested in learning of events to a given IP prefix nor the fact that some applications may want to dynamically insert or remove "IP prefixes of interest", depending on the needs of their constituent applications.

With IRS, it is conceivable that applications could tell an IRS controller, through a North-Bound API, their "IP prefixes" (or, AS\_PATH's, BGP communities, etc.) that are of interest. For example, a NOC application may be interested in changes to high visibility

content or service-provider Web sites; alternatively, a security application may be interested in events associated with a different set of IP prefixes. The IRS controller would then consolidate the list of IP prefixes, and associated characteristics, to be monitored and program BGP routers in an AS to observe this subset of routes for changes. Some examples of changes in routing state might include:

- o an IP prefix being announced or withdrawn

- o an IP prefix being suppressed, due to route flap dampening
- o an alternative best-path being chosen for a given IP prefix

When the requisite events for a BGP Route are observed by a BGP router, it would notify IRS controllers.

The IRS controllers would have a publish/subscribe mechanism whereby various sets of applications may subscribe to events of interest. The IRS controller would then publish these events so applications would immediately receive them and take the appropriate domain-specific action necessary.

## [5.2.](#) Tracing Dropped BGP Routes

It is extremely useful to operators to be able to rapidly identify instances where a BGP route is not being propagated within an Autonomous System. At a minimum, this could result in sub-optimal performance when attempting to reach such destinations.

There are two instances when this scenario will occur. First, when a Service Provider is using "Soft Reconfiguration Inbound", it allows their ASBR routers to receive a copy of a BGP route, but show that route was not permitted into the Adj-RIB-In most likely as a result of the inbound BGP policy not permitting that IP prefix. Thus, this BGP route is not even eligible for BGP Path Selection. The second instance is where the BGP route is permitted by the inbound BGP policy into the Adj-RIB-In, but due to BGP Path Selection (i.e.: lower LOCAL\_PREF, longer AS\_PATH length, etc.) was not chosen as the best path and, subsequently, this particular BGP route is not forwarded on to other internal BGP speakers in the AS. In both instances, the BGP route is only visible within the ASBR on which

that BGP route was first learned. Needless to say, in large Service Provider networks with a numerous interconnects to a single customer it can be very time-consuming to discover where such a BGP route is learned before ultimately determining why the route was blocked or not preferred.

With IRS, it would be possible for an IRS controller to rapidly gather information from across a large set of BGP routers in the network to determine at what ASBR's the BGP route is being learned. Next, the IRS controller could interrogate those routers BGP policies to determine the root cause of why the route was either not learned or not preferred in BGP. Finally, if necessary, the IRS controller(s) could amend BGP policies and push them out to BGP routers to permit the BGP route or make it a preferred route according to the BGP path selection algorithm.

### [5.3.](#) BGP Protocol Statistics

There are a variety of statistics related to the operation of BGP that are invaluable to network operators. These statistics generally help operators, and developers, understand the present state and future scalability of BGP.

One statistic that is invaluable to operators is the current number of BGP routes learned through an eBGP session. Operators then apply a command against each eBGP session to limit the maximum number of BGP routes that may be learned through that eBGP session before a warning message is triggered and/or the eBGP session is torn down completely. This configuration capability is often referred to as a "max-prefix limit". This command must be routinely audited and, if necessary, adjusted in order to not trigger a false warning or teardown due to the natural organic growth in BGP routes learned from a given BGP neighbor.

IRS controllers could provide an invaluable capability to help audit and re-program the "max-prefix limit" on a periodic basis, which is generally once per day. Specifically, the first task would be for an IRS controller to validate that there is a "max-prefix limit" applied to every eBGP session. (If there is not, that should either trigger a red alarm to the NOC to manually fix this condition or for the IRS controller to automatically apply a "max-prefix limit" that would

alleviate this hazardous condition). Assuming there is a "max-prefix limit" already in place, the IRS controller would simultaneously retrieve, from each BGP router, the current number of BGP routes learned through a BGP session and value used for the "max-prefix limit" on that same BGP session. These two values could then be handed off to an application that determines if adjustments in the "max-prefix limit" value are required for each BGP session. The application would then notify the IRS controller of the subset of eBGP sessions and their associated change in "max-prefix limit" value, whereby the IRS controller would then adjust the BGP protocol configuration on each requisite BGP router in the network. Finally, it should be noted that the above is just one method whereby "max-prefix limit" values are adjusted. It's similarly possible that the BGP routers may, through the IRS, pull the "max-prefix limit" values for each eBGP neighbor they have onboard on a periodic basis and validate their accuracy.

The above is just one use case related to BGP protocol statistics. There are wealth of other BGP protocol statistics or state information that would be invaluable to have programmatic visibility into that operators do not have today.

## [6.](#) Security Considerations

The BGP use cases described in this document assumes use of IRS's programmatic interfaces described in the IRS framework mentioned in [\[I-D.ward-irs-framework\]](#). This document does not change the underlying security issues inherent in the existing [\[I-D.ward-irs-framework\]](#).

## [7.](#) Acknowledgements

TBD.

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