

IP Security Maintenance and Extensions  
(ipsecme)  
Internet-Draft  
Intended status: Informational  
Expires: April 4, 2013

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October 1, 2012

**Minimal IKEv2**  
**draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-minimal-01.txt**

Abstract

This document describes minimal version of the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocol. IKEv2 is a component of IPsec used for performing mutual authentication and establishing and maintaining Security Associations (SAs). IKEv2 includes several optional features, which are not needed in minimal implementations. This document describes what is required from the minimal implementation, and also describes various optimizations which can be done. The protocol described here is compliant with full IKEv2 with exception that this document only describes shared secret authentication (IKEv2 requires support for certificate authentication in addition to shared secret authentication).

This document does not update or modify [RFC 5996](#), but provides more compact description of the minimal version of the protocol. If this document and [RFC 5996](#) conflicts then [RFC 5996](#) is the authoritative description.

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Table of Contents

- [1. Introduction . . . . .](#) [4](#)
- [1.1. Use Cases . . . . .](#) [4](#)
- [2. Exchanges . . . . .](#) [6](#)
- [2.1. Initial Exchange . . . . .](#) [6](#)
- [2.2. Other Exchanges . . . . .](#) [11](#)
- [2.3. Generating Keying Material . . . . .](#) [12](#)
- [3. Conformance Requirements . . . . .](#) [14](#)
- [4. Security Considerations . . . . .](#) [15](#)
- [5. IANA Considerations . . . . .](#) [16](#)
- [6. Acknowledgements . . . . .](#) [17](#)
- [7. References . . . . .](#) [18](#)
- [7.1. Normative References . . . . .](#) [18](#)
- [7.2. Informative References . . . . .](#) [18](#)
- [Appendix A. Header and Payload Formats . . . . .](#) [19](#)
- [A.1. The IKE Header . . . . .](#) [19](#)
- [A.2. Generic Payload Header . . . . .](#) [21](#)
- [A.3. Security Association Payload . . . . .](#) [22](#)
- [A.3.1. Proposal Substructure . . . . .](#) [24](#)
- [A.3.2. Transform Substructure . . . . .](#) [25](#)
- [A.3.3. Valid Transform Types by Protocol . . . . .](#) [27](#)
- [A.3.4. Transform Attributes . . . . .](#) [28](#)
- [A.4. Key Exchange Payload . . . . .](#) [28](#)
- [A.5. Identification Payloads . . . . .](#) [29](#)
- [A.6. Certificate Payload . . . . .](#) [30](#)
- [A.7. Certificate Request Payload . . . . .](#) [31](#)
- [A.8. Authentication Payload . . . . .](#) [32](#)
- [A.9. Nonce Payload . . . . .](#) [33](#)
- [A.10. Notify Payload . . . . .](#) [33](#)
- [A.10.1. Notify Message Types . . . . .](#) [34](#)
- [A.11. Traffic Selector Payload . . . . .](#) [35](#)
- [A.11.1. Traffic Selector . . . . .](#) [37](#)
- [A.12. Encrypted Payload . . . . .](#) [38](#)
- [Appendix B. Useful Optional Features . . . . .](#) [41](#)
- [B.1. IKE SA Delete Notification . . . . .](#) [41](#)
- [B.2. Raw RSA keys . . . . .](#) [42](#)
- Author's Address . . . . . [44](#)



## **1. Introduction**

This document tells what minimal IKEv2 implementation could look like. Minimal IKEv2 implementation only supports initiator end of the protocol. It only supports the initial IKE\_SA\_INIT and IKE\_AUTH exchanges and does not initiate any other exchanges. It also replies with empty (or error) message to all incoming requests.

This means that most of the optional features of IKEv2 are left out: NAT Traversal, IKE SA rekey, Child SA Rekey, Multiple Child SAs, Deleting Child / IKE SAs, Configuration payloads, EAP authentication, COOKIES etc.

Some optimizations can be done because of limited set of supported features, and this text should not be considered for generic IKEv2 implementations (for example Message IDs can be done as specified as implementation is only sending out IKE\_SA\_INIT and IKE\_AUTH request, and do not ever send any other request).

This document should be stand-alone, meaning everything needed to implement IKEv2 is copied here except the description of the cryptographic algorithms. The IKEv2 specification has lots of background information and rationale which has been omitted from this document.

Numerous additional numeric values from IANA registries have been omitted from this document, only those which are of interest for minimal implementation are listed in this document.

For more information check the full IKEv2 specification in [RFC 5996](#) [[RFC5996](#)] and [[IKEV2IANA](#)].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

### **1.1. Use Cases**

One use case for this kind of minimal implementation is in small devices doing machine to machine communication. In such environments the node initiating connections is usually very small and the other end of the communication channel is some kind of larger device.

An example of the small initiating node could be an remote garage door opener device. I.e. device having buttons which open and close garage door, and which connects to the home area network server over wireless link.



Another example of the such device is some kind of sensor device, for example room temperature sensor, which sends periodic temperature data to some centralized node.

Those devices are usually sleeping long times, and only wakes up because of user interaction or periodically. The data transfer is always initiated from the sleeping node and after they send packets there might be ACKs or other packets coming back before they go back to sleep. If some data needs to be transferred from server node to the small device, it can be implemented by polling, i.e. small node periodically polls for the server to see if it for example have some configuration changes or similar.





## **2. Exchanges**

### **2.1. Initial Exchange**

All IKEv2 communications consist of pairs of messages: a request and a response. The pair is called an "exchange", and is sometimes called a "request/response pair". Every request requires a response.

For every pair of IKEv2 messages, the initiator is responsible for retransmission in the event of a timeout. The responder **MUST** never retransmit a response unless it receives a retransmission of the request.

IKEv2 is a reliable protocol: the initiator **MUST** retransmit a request until it either receives a corresponding response or deems the IKE SA to have failed. A retransmission from the initiator **MUST** be bitwise identical to the original request. Retransmission times **MUST** increase exponentially.

IKEv2 is run over UDP port 500. All IKEv2 implementations **MUST** be able to send, receive, and process IKEv2 messages that are up to 1280 octets long. An implementation **MUST** accept incoming requests even if the source port is not 500, and **MUST** respond to the address and port from which the request was received.

The minimal implementation of IKEv2 only uses first two exchanges called `IKE_SA_INIT` and `IKE_AUTH`. Those are used to create the IKE SA and the first child SA. In addition to those messages minimal IKEv2 implementation need to understand `CREATE_CHILD_SA` request so it can reply with `CREATE_CHILD_SA` error response saying `NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS` to it, and understand `INFORMATIONAL` request so much, it can reply with empty `INFORMATIONAL` response to it. There is no requirement to be able to respond to any other requests.

All messages following the `IKE_SA_INIT` exchange are cryptographically protected using the cryptographic algorithms and keys negotiated in the `IKE_SA_INIT` exchange.

Every IKEv2 message contains a Message ID as part of its fixed header. This Message ID is used to match up requests and responses, and to identify retransmissions of messages.

Minimal implementation need only support of being initiator, so it does not ever need to send any other request as one `IKE_SA_INIT`, and one `IKE_AUTH` message. As those messages have fixed Message IDs (0 and 1) it does not need to keep track of its own Message IDs for outgoing requests after that.



Minimal implementations can also optimize Message ID handling of the incoming requests, as they do not need to protect incoming requests against replays. This is possible because minimal implementation will only return error or empty notifications replies to incoming requests. This means that any of those incoming requests do not have any effect on the minimal implementation, thus processing them again does not cause any harm. Because of this the minimal implementation can always answer to request coming in, with the same Message ID than what the request had and then forget the request/response pair immediately. This means there is no need to keep any kind of track of Message IDs of the incoming requests.

In the following descriptions, the payloads contained in the message are indicated by names as listed below.

Notation	Payload
-----	
AUTH	Authentication
CERTREQ	Certificate Request
D	Delete
HDR	IKE header (not a payload)
Idi	Identification - Initiator
IDr	Identification - Responder
KE	Key Exchange
Ni, Nr	Nonce
N	Notify
SA	Security Association
SK	Encrypted and Authenticated
TSi	Traffic Selector - Initiator
TSr	Traffic Selector - Responder

The initial exchanges are as follows:

Initiator	Responder
-----	
HDR(SPIi=xxx, SPIr=0, IKE_SA_INIT, Flags: Initiator, Message ID=0), SAi1, KEi, Ni -->	<-- HDR(SPIi=xxx, SPIr=yyy, IKE_SA_INIT, Flags: Response, Message ID=0), SAR1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]

HDR contains the Security Parameter Indexes (SPIs), version numbers, and flags of various sorts. Each endpoint chooses one of the two SPIs and MUST choose them so as to be unique identifiers of an IKE SA. An SPI value of zero is special: it indicates that the remote SPI value is not yet known by the sender.



Incoming IKEv2 packets are mapped to an IKE SA only using the packet's SPI, not using (for example) the source IP address of the packet.

The SAI1 payload states the cryptographic algorithms the initiator supports for the IKE SA. The KEi and KEr payload contain Diffie-Hellman values and Ni and Nr are the nonces. The SAR1 contains chosen cryptographic suite from initiator's offered choices. Minimal implementation using shared secrets will ignore the CERTREQ payload.

Minimal implementation will most likely support exactly one set of cryptographic algorithms, meaning the SAI1 payload will be static. It needs to check that the SAR1 received matches the proposal it sent.

At this point in the negotiation, each party can generate SKEYSEED, from which all keys are derived for that IKE SA.

$$\text{SKEYSEED} = \text{prf}(\text{Ni} \mid \text{Nr}, g^{\text{air}})$$

$$\{\text{SK}_d \mid \text{SK}_{ai} \mid \text{SK}_{ar} \mid \text{SK}_{ei} \mid \text{SK}_{er} \mid \text{SK}_{pi} \mid \text{SK}_{pr}\} \\ = \text{prf}^+(\text{SKEYSEED}, \text{Ni} \mid \text{Nr} \mid \text{SPIi} \mid \text{SPIr})$$

$$\text{prf}^+(K, S) = T1 \mid T2 \mid T3 \mid T4 \mid \dots$$

where:

$$T1 = \text{prf}(K, S \mid 0x01)$$

$$T2 = \text{prf}(K, T1 \mid S \mid 0x02)$$

$$T3 = \text{prf}(K, T2 \mid S \mid 0x03)$$

$$T4 = \text{prf}(K, T3 \mid S \mid 0x04)$$

...

(indicating that the quantities SK\_d, SK\_ai, SK\_ar, SK\_ei, SK\_er, SK\_pi, and SK\_pr are taken in order from the generated bits of the prf+). g<sup>air</sup> is the shared secret from the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange. g<sup>air</sup> is represented as a string of octets in big endian order padded with zeros if necessary to make it the length of the modulus. Ni and Nr are the nonces, stripped of any headers.

The SK\_d is used for deriving new keys for the Child SAs. The SK\_ai and SK\_ar are used as a key to the integrity protection algorithm for authenticating the component messages of subsequent exchanges. The SK\_ei and SK\_er are used for encrypting (and of course decrypting) all subsequent exchanges. The SK\_pi and SK\_pr are used when generating an AUTH payload. The lengths of SK\_d, SK\_pi, and SK\_pr MUST be the preferred key length of the PRF agreed upon.

A separate SK\_e and SK\_a is computed for each direction. The keys



used to protect messages from the original initiator are SK\_ai and SK\_ei. The keys used to protect messages in the other direction are SK\_ar and SK\_er. The notation SK { ... } indicates that these payloads are encrypted and integrity protected using that direction's SK\_e and SK\_a.

Initiator	Responder
-----	
HDR(SPIi=xxx, SPIr=yyy, IKE_AUTH,	
Flags: Initiator, Message ID=1),	
SK {IDi, AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr,	
N(INITIAL_CONTACT)} -->	
	<-- HDR(SPIi=xxx, SPIr=yyy, IKE_AUTH, Flags:
	Response, Message ID=1),
	SK {IDr, AUTH, SAR2, TSi, TSr}

The initiator asserts its identity with the IDi payload, proves knowledge of the secret corresponding to IDi and integrity protects the contents of the first message using the AUTH payload. The responder asserts its identity with the IDr payload, authenticates its identity and protects the integrity of the second message with the AUTH payload.

As minimal implementation usually has only one host where it connects, and that means it has only one shared secret. This means it does not need to care about IDr payload that much. If the other end sends AUTH payload which initiator can verify using the shared secret it has, then it knows the other end is the peer it was configured to talk to.

In the IKE\_AUTH initiator sends SA offer(s) in the SAi2 payload, and the proposed Traffic Selectors for the proposed Child SA in the TSi and TSr payloads. The responder replies with the accepted offer in an SAR2 payload, and selected Traffic Selectors. The selected Traffic Selectors may be a subset of what the initiator proposed.

In the minimal implementation both SA payloads and TS payloads are going to be mostly static. The SA payload will have the SPI value used in the ESP, but the algorithms are most likely going to be the one and only supported set. The TS payloads on the initiator end will most likely say from any to any, i.e. full wildcard ranges, or from the local IP to the remote IP. In the wildcard case the server quite often narrow the range down to the one IP address pair. Using single IP address pair as a traffic selectors when sending IKE\_AUTH will simplify processing as then server will either accept that pair or return error. If wildcard ranges are used, there is possibility that server narrows the range to some other range than what was





intended.

The IKE\_AUTH (and IKE\_SA\_INIT) responses may contain multiple status notification payloads which can be ignored by minimal implementation. There can also be Vendor ID, Certificate, Certificate Request or Configuration payloads, but any payload unknown to minimal implementation can simply be skipped over (response messages cannot have critical unsupported payloads).

The exchange above includes N(INITIAL\_CONTACT) notification in the request as that is quite commonly sent by the minimal implementation. It indicates to the other end that the initiator does not have any other IKE SAs between them, and if there is any left from previous runs they can be deleted. As minimal implementation does not delete IKE SAs by sending IKE SA delete, this will help server to clean up leftover state.

When using shared secret authentication, the peers are authenticated by having each calculating a MAC over a block of data:

For the initiator:

```
AUTH = prf( prf(Shared Secret, "Key Pad for IKEv2"),  
           <InitiatorSignedOctets>)
```

For the responder:

```
AUTH = prf( prf(Shared Secret, "Key Pad for IKEv2"),  
           <ResponderSignedOctets>)
```

The string "Key Pad for IKEv2" is 17 ASCII characters without null termination. The implementation can precalculate the inner prf and only store the output of it. This is possible because minimal IKEv2 implementation usually only supports one PRF.

The initiator signs the first message (IKE\_SA\_INIT request), starting with the first octet of the first SPI in the header and ending with the last octet of the last payload in that first message. Appended to this (for purposes of computing the signature) are the responder's nonce Nr, and the value prf(SK\_pi, IDi').

For the responder, the octets to be signed start with the first octet of the first SPI in the header of the second message (IKE\_SA\_INIT response) and end with the last octet of the last payload in that second message. Appended to this are the initiator's nonce Ni, and the value prf(SK\_pr, IDr').

In these calculations, IDi' and IDr' are the entire ID payloads excluding the fixed header and the Ni, and Nr are only the value, not the payload containing it. Note that neither the nonce Ni/Nr nor the value prf(SK\_pr, IDr')/prf(SK\_pi, IDi') are transmitted.



The initiator's signed octets can be described as:

```
InitiatorSignedOctets = RealMessage1 | NonceRData | MACedIDForI
GenIKEHDR = [ four octets 0 if using port 4500 ] | RealIKEHDR
RealIKEHDR = SPIi | SPIr | . . . | Length
RealMessage1 = RealIKEHDR | RestOfMessage1
NonceRPayload = PayloadHeader | NonceRData
InitiatorIDPayload = PayloadHeader | RestOfInitIDPayload
RestOfInitIDPayload = IDType | RESERVED | InitIDData
MACedIDForI = prf(SK_pi, RestOfInitIDPayload)
```

The responder's signed octets can be described as:

```
ResponderSignedOctets = RealMessage2 | NonceIData | MACedIDForR
GenIKEHDR = [ four octets 0 if using port 4500 ] | RealIKEHDR
RealIKEHDR = SPIi | SPIr | . . . | Length
RealMessage2 = RealIKEHDR | RestOfMessage2
NonceIPayload = PayloadHeader | NonceIData
ResponderIDPayload = PayloadHeader | RestOfRespIDPayload
RestOfRespIDPayload = IDType | RESERVED | RespIDData
MACedIDForR = prf(SK_pr, RestOfRespIDPayload)
```

Note that all of the payloads inside the RestOfMessageX are included under the signature, including any payload types not listed in this document.

The initiator might also get unauthenticated response back having notification payload with error code inside. As that error code will be unauthenticated and may be faked, there is no need to do anything for those. Minimal implementation can simply ignore those errors, and retransmit its request until it times out and if that happens then the IKE SA (and Child SA) creation failed.

Responder might also reply with IKE\_AUTH response packet which do not contain payloads needed to set up Child SA (SAr2, TSi and TSr), but contains AUTH payload and an error. As minimal implementation probably do not support multiple SAs nor sending the CREATE\_CHILD\_SA exchanges the IKE SA is useless for initiator. It can delete the IKE SA and start over from the beginning (which might fail again if this is configuration error, or it might succeed if this was temporal failure).

## 2.2. Other Exchanges

Minimal implementation MUST be able to reply to INFORMATIONAL request by sending empty response back:



Initiator	Responder
-----	
	<-- HDR(SPIi=xxx, SPIr=yyy, INFORMATIONAL, Flags: none, Message ID=m), SK {...}
HDR(SPIi=xxx, SPIr=yyy, INFORMATIONAL, Flags: Initiator   Response, Message ID=m), SK {} -->	

Minimal implementation also MUST be able to reply to incoming CREATE\_CHILD\_SA requests. Typical implementation will reject the CREATE\_CHILD\_SA exchanges by sending NO\_ADDITIONAL\_SAS error notify back:

Initiator	Responder
-----	
	<-- HDR(SPIi=xxx, SPIr=yyy, CREATE_CHILD_SA, Flags: none, Message ID=m), SK {...}
HDR(SPIi=xxx, SPIr=yyy, CREATE_CHILD_SA, Flags: Initiator   Response, Message ID=m), SK {N(NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS)} -->	

Note, that INFORMATIONAL and CREATE\_CHILD\_SA requests might contain unsupported critical payloads, in which case compliant implementation MUST ignore the request, and send response message back having the UNSUPPORTED\_CRITICAL\_PAYLOAD notification. That notification payload data contains one-octet payload type of the unsupported critical payload.

### 2.3. Generating Keying Material

Keying material for Child SA created by the IKE\_AUTH exchange is generated as follows:

KEYMAT = prf+(SK\_d, Ni | Nr)

Where Ni and Nr are the nonces from the IKE\_SA\_INIT exchange.

A single CHILD\_SA negotiation may result in multiple Security Associations. ESP and AH SAs exist in pairs (one in each direction), so two SAs are created in a single Child SA negotiation for them. The keying material for each Child SA MUST be taken from the expanded KEYMAT using the following rules:



- o All keys for SAs carrying data from the initiator to the responder are taken before SAs going from the responder to the initiator.
- o If an IPsec protocol requires multiple keys, the order in which they are taken from the SA's keying material needs to be described in the protocol's specification. For ESP and AH, [IPSECARCH] defines the order, namely: the encryption key (if any) MUST be taken from the first bits and the integrity key (if any) MUST be taken from the remaining bits.

Each cryptographic algorithm takes a fixed number of bits of keying material specified as part of the algorithm, or negotiated in SA payloads.





### 3. Conformance Requirements

For an implementation to be called conforming to [RFC 5996](#) specification, it MUST be possible to configure it to accept the following:

- o Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates containing and signed by RSA keys of size 1024 or 2048 bits, where the ID passed is any of ID\_KEY\_ID, ID\_FQDN, ID\_RFC822\_ADDR, or ID\_DER\_ASN1\_DN.
- o Shared key authentication where the ID passed is any of ID\_KEY\_ID, ID\_FQDN, or ID\_RFC822\_ADDR.
- o Authentication where the responder is authenticated using PKIX Certificates and the initiator is authenticated using shared key authentication.

This document only supports the second bullet, it does not support PKIX certificates at all. As full [RFC5996](#) responders must also support that shared key authentication, this allows minimal implementation to be able to interoperate with all [RFC 5996](#) compliant implementations.

PKIX certificates are left out from the minimal implementation as those would add quite a lot of complexity to the implementation. The actual code changes needed in the IKEv2 protocol are small, but the certificate validation code would be more complex than the whole minimal IKEv2 implementation itself. If public key based authentication is needed for scalability reasons, then raw RSA keys would probably be the best compromise (see [Appendix B.2](#)).



#### **4. Security Considerations**

As this implements same protocol as [RFC 5996](#) this means all security considerations from it also apply to this document.

## **5. IANA Considerations**

There is no new IANA considerations in this document.

## **6. Acknowledgements**

Most of the contents of this document is copied from the [RFC 5996](#).

## **7. References**

### **7.1. Normative References**

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), March 1997.
- [RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", [RFC 5996](#), September 2010.

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- [IKEV2IANA] "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters", <<http://www.iana.org>>.
- [MODES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation", SP 800-38A, 2001.
- [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", [RFC 3447](#), February 2003.
- [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", [RFC 5280](#), May 2008.
- [RSA] R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, "A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems", February 1978.





**Appendix A. Header and Payload Formats**

This appendix describes actual packet payload formats. This is required to make the document self contained. The descriptions are mostly copied from the [RFC5996](#) and more information can be found from there.

Various payload contains RESERVED fields and those MUST be sent as zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.

All multi-octet fields representing integers are laid out in big endian order (also known as "most significant byte first", or "network byte order").

**A.1. The IKE Header**

Each IKEv2 message begins with the IKE header, denoted HDR in this document. Following the header are one or more IKE payloads each identified by a "Next Payload" field in the preceding payload. Payloads are identified in the order in which they appear in an IKE message by looking in the "Next Payload" field in the IKE header, and subsequently according to the "Next Payload" field in the IKE payload itself until a "Next Payload" field of zero indicates that no payloads follow. If a payload of type "Encrypted" is found, that payload is decrypted and its contents parsed as additional payloads. An Encrypted payload MUST be the last payload in a packet and an Encrypted payload MUST NOT contain another Encrypted payload.

The format of the IKE header is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: IKE Header Format



- o Initiator's SPI (8 octets) - A value chosen by the initiator to identify a unique IKE Security Association. This value MUST NOT be zero.
- o Responder's SPI (8 octets) - A value chosen by the responder to identify a unique IKE Security Association. This value MUST be zero in the first message of an IKE initial exchange.
- o Next Payload (1 octet) - Indicates the type of payload that immediately follows the header. The format and value of each payload are defined below.
- o Major Version (4 bits) - Indicates the major version of the IKE protocol in use. Implementations based on this version of IKE MUST set the major version to 2 and MUST drop the messages with a higher major version number.
- o Minor Version (4 bits) - Indicates the minor version of the IKE protocol in use. Implementations based on this version of IKE MUST set the minor version to 0. They MUST ignore the minor version number of received messages.
- o Exchange Type (1 octet) - Indicates the type of exchange being used. This constrains the payloads sent in each message in an exchange.

Exchange Type	Value
-----	
IKE_SA_INIT	34
IKE_AUTH	35
CREATE_CHILD_SA	36
INFORMATIONAL	37

- o Flags (1 octet) - Indicates specific options that are set for the message. Presence of options is indicated by the appropriate bit in the flags field being set. The bits are as follows:

```

+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|X|X|R|V|I|X|X|X|
+--+--+--+--+--+--+

```

In the description below, a bit being 'set' means its value is '1', while 'cleared' means its value is '0'. 'X' bits MUST be cleared when sending and MUST be ignored on receipt.

- \* R (Response) - This bit indicates that this message is a response to a message containing the same Message ID. This bit MUST be cleared in all request messages and MUST be set in all







always be the last payload of a message, is an exception. It contains data structures in the format of additional payloads. In the header of an Encrypted payload, the Next Payload field is set to the payload type of the first contained payload (instead of 0); conversely, the Next Payload field of the last contained payload is set to zero). The payload type values needed for minimal implementations are listed here.

Next Payload Type	Notation	Value
-----		
No Next Payload		0
Security Association	SA	33
Key Exchange	KE	34
Identification - Initiator	IDi	35
Identification - Responder	IDr	36
Certificate	CERT	37
Certificate Request	CERTREQ	38
Authentication	AUTH	39
Nonce	Ni, Nr	40
Notify	N	41
Delete	D	42
Traffic Selector - Initiator	TSi	44
Traffic Selector - Responder	TSr	45
Encrypted and Authenticated	SK	46

- o Critical (1 bit) - MUST be set to zero if the sender wants the recipient to skip this payload if it does not understand the payload type code in the Next Payload field of the previous payload. MUST be set to one if the sender wants the recipient to reject this entire message if it does not understand the payload type. MUST be ignored by the recipient if the recipient understands the payload type code. MUST be set to zero for payload types defined in this document. Note that the critical bit applies to the current payload rather than the "next" payload whose type code appears in the first octet.
- o Payload Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length in octets of the current payload, including the generic payload header.

### **A.3. Security Association Payload**

The Security Association payload, denoted SA in this document, is used to negotiate attributes of a Security Association.

An SA payload consists of one or more proposals. Each proposal includes one protocol. Each protocol contains one or more transforms -- each specifying a cryptographic algorithm. Each transform contains zero or more attributes (attributes are needed only if the





Transform ID does not completely specify the cryptographic algorithm, currently only attribute is key length attribute for variable length ciphers, meaning there is exactly zero or one attribute).

The responder MUST choose a single suite, which may be any subset of the SA proposal following the rules below.

Each proposal contains one protocol. If a proposal is accepted, the SA response MUST contain the same protocol. Each IPsec protocol proposal contains one or more transforms. Each transform contains a Transform Type. The accepted cryptographic suite MUST contain exactly one transform of each type included in the proposal. For example: if an ESP proposal includes transforms ENCR\_3DES, ENCR\_AES w/keysize 128, ENCR\_AES w/keysize 256, AUTH\_HMAC\_MD5, and AUTH\_HMAC\_SHA, the accepted suite MUST contain one of the ENCR\_ transforms and one of the AUTH\_ transforms. Thus, six combinations are acceptable.

Minimal implementation can create very simple SA proposal, i.e. include one proposal, which contains exactly one transform for each transform type. It is important to only include one Diffie-Hellman group in proposal, so there is no need to do INVALID\_KEY\_PAYLOAD processing in responses.

When parsing an SA, an implementation MUST check that the total Payload Length is consistent with the payload's internal lengths and counts. Proposals, Transforms, and Attributes each have their own variable-length encodings. They are nested such that the Payload Length of an SA includes the combined contents of the SA, Proposal, Transform, and Attribute information. The length of a Proposal includes the lengths of all Transforms and Attributes it contains. The length of a Transform includes the lengths of all Attributes it contains.

Each Proposal/Protocol structure is followed by one or more transform structures. The number of different transforms is generally determined by the Protocol. AH generally has two transforms: Extended Sequence Numbers (ESNs) and an integrity check algorithm. ESP generally has three: ESN, an encryption algorithm, and an integrity check algorithm. IKEv2 generally has four transforms: a Diffie-Hellman group, an integrity check algorithm, a PRF algorithm, and an encryption algorithm. For each Protocol, the set of permissible transforms is assigned Transform ID numbers, which appear in the header of each transform.

If there are multiple transforms with the same Transform Type, the proposal is an OR of those transforms. If there are multiple transforms with different Transform Types, the proposal is an AND of



the different groups.

A given transform MAY have one or more Attributes. Attributes are necessary when the transform can be used in more than one way, as when an encryption algorithm has a variable key size. The transform would specify the algorithm and the attribute would specify the key size. To propose alternate values for an attribute (for example, multiple key sizes for the AES encryption algorithm), an implementation MUST include multiple transforms with the same Transform Type each with a single Attribute.




Figure 3: Security Association Payload

- o Proposals (variable) - One or more proposal substructures.

**A.3.1. Proposal Substructure**




Figure 4: Proposal Substructure

- o 0 (last) or 2 (more) (1 octet) - Specifies whether this is the last Proposal Substructure in the SA.
- o Proposal Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of this proposal, including all transforms and attributes that follow.



- o Proposal Num (1 octet) - When a proposal is made, the first proposal in an SA payload MUST be 1, and subsequent proposals MUST be one more than the previous proposal. When a proposal is accepted, the proposal number in the SA payload MUST match the number on the proposal sent that was accepted.
- o Protocol ID (1 octet) - Specifies the IPsec protocol identifier for the current negotiation.

Protocol	Protocol ID
IKE	1
AH	2
ESP	3

- o SPI Size (1 octet) - For an initial IKE SA negotiation, this field MUST be zero; the SPI is obtained from the outer header. During subsequent negotiations, it is equal to the size, in octets, of the SPI of the corresponding protocol (8 for IKE, 4 for ESP and AH).
- o Num Transforms (1 octet) - Specifies the number of transforms in this proposal.
- o SPI (variable) - The sending entity's SPI. When the SPI Size field is zero, this field is not present in the Security Association payload.
- o Transforms (variable) - One or more transform substructures.

**A.3.2. Transform Substructure**




Figure 5: Transform Substructure



- o 0 (last) or 3 (more) (1 octet) - Specifies whether this is the last Transform Substructure in the Proposal.
- o Transform Length - The length (in octets) of the Transform Substructure including Header and Attributes.
- o Transform Type (1 octet) - The type of transform being specified in this transform. Different protocols support different Transform Types. For some protocols, some of the transforms may be optional. If a transform is optional and the initiator wishes to propose that the transform be omitted, no transform of the given type is included in the proposal. If the initiator wishes to make use of the transform optional to the responder, it includes a transform substructure with Transform ID = 0 as one of the options.
- o Transform ID (2 octets) - The specific instance of the Transform Type being proposed.

The relevant Transform Type values are listed below.

Description	Trans. Type	Used In
Encryption Algorithm (ENCR)	1	IKE and ESP
Pseudorandom Function (PRF)	2	IKE
Integrity Algorithm (INTEG)	3	IKE, AH, optional in ESP
Diffie-Hellman group (D-H)	4	IKE, optional in AH & ESP
Extended Sequence Numbers (ESN)	5	AH and ESP

For Transform Type 1 (Encryption Algorithm), the relevant Transform IDs are listed below.

Name	Number	Defined In
ENCR_3DES	3	( <a href="#">RFC2451</a> )
ENCR_AES_CBC	12	( <a href="#">RFC3602</a> )

For Transform Type 2 (Pseudorandom Function), the relevant Transform IDs are listed below.

Name	Number	Defined In
PRF_HMAC_MD5	1	( <a href="#">RFC2104</a> ), [MD5]
PRF_HMAC_SHA1	2	( <a href="#">RFC2104</a> ), [SHA]

For Transform Type 3 (Integrity Algorithm), relevant Transform IDs are listed below.





Name	Number	Defined In
NONE	0	
AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96	1	( <a href="#">RFC2403</a> )
AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96	2	( <a href="#">RFC2404</a> )
AUTH_AES_XCBC_96	5	( <a href="#">RFC3566</a> )

For Transform Type 4 (Diffie-Hellman group), relevant Transform IDs are listed below.

Name	Number	Defined In
NONE	0	
768-bit MODP	1	<a href="#">Appendix B</a>
1024-bit MODP	2	<a href="#">Appendix B</a>
1536-bit MODP	5	[ADDGROUP]
2048-bit MODP	14	[ADDGROUP]

For Transform Type 5 (Extended Sequence Numbers), relevant Transform IDs are listed below.

Name	Number
No Extended Sequence Numbers	0
Extended Sequence Numbers	1

Note that an initiator who supports ESNs will usually include two ESN transforms, with values "0" and "1", in its proposals. A proposal containing a single ESN transform with value "1" means that using normal (non-extended) sequence numbers is not acceptable.

### **A.3.3. Valid Transform Types by Protocol**

The number and type of transforms that accompany an SA payload are dependent on the protocol in the SA itself. An SA payload proposing the establishment of an SA has the following mandatory and optional Transform Types. A compliant implementation MUST understand all mandatory and optional types for each protocol it supports (though it need not accept proposals with unacceptable suites). A proposal MAY omit the optional types if the only value for them it will accept is NONE.

Protocol	Mandatory Types	Optional Types
IKE	ENCR, PRF, INTEG, D-H	
ESP	ENCR, ESN	INTEG, D-H
AH	INTEG, ESN	D-H



**A.3.4. Transform Attributes**

Transform type 1 (Encryption Algorithm) transforms might include one transform attribute: Key Length.




Figure 6: Data Attributes

- o Attribute Type (15 bits) - Unique identifier for each type of attribute (see below).
- o Attribute Value - Value of the attribute associated with the attribute type.

Attribute Type	Value
-----	
Key Length (in bits)	14

The Key Length attribute specifies the key length in bits (MUST use network byte order) for certain transforms as follows:

- o The Key Length attribute MUST NOT be used with transforms that use a fixed-length key.
- o Some transforms specify that the Key Length attribute MUST be always included. For example ENCR\_AES\_CBC.

**A.4. Key Exchange Payload**




Figure 7: Key Exchange Payload Format



A Key Exchange payload is constructed by copying one's Diffie-Hellman public value into the "Key Exchange Data" portion of the payload. The length of the Diffie-Hellman public value for modular exponentiation group (MODP) groups MUST be equal to the length of the prime modulus over which the exponentiation was performed, prepending zero bits to the value if necessary.

The Diffie-Hellman Group Num identifies the Diffie-Hellman group in which the Key Exchange Data was computed. This Diffie-Hellman Group Num MUST match a Diffie-Hellman group specified in a proposal in the SA payload that is sent in the same message

**A.5. Identification Payloads**

The Identification payloads, denoted IDi and IDr in this document, allow peers to assert an identity to one another. When using the ID\_IPV4\_ADDR/ID\_IPV6\_ADDR identity types in IDi/IDr payloads, IKEv2 does not require this address to match the address in the IP header of IKEv2 packets, or anything in the TSi/TSr payloads. The contents of IDi/IDr are used purely to fetch the policy and authentication data related to the other party. In minimal implementation it might be easiest to always use KEY\_ID type. This allows the ID payload to be static. Using IP address has problems in environments where IP addresses are dynamically allocated.




Figure 8: Identification Payload Format

- o ID Type (1 octet) - Specifies the type of Identification being used.
- o Identification Data (variable length) - Value, as indicated by the Identification Type. The length of the Identification Data is computed from the size in the ID payload header.

The following table lists the assigned semantics for the Identification Type field.



ID Type	Value
ID_IPV4_ADDR	1 A single four (4) octet IPv4 address.
ID_FQDN	2 A fully-qualified domain name string. An example of an ID_FQDN is "example.com". The string MUST NOT contain any terminators (e.g., NULL, CR, etc.). All characters in the ID_FQDN are ASCII; for an "internationalized domain name", the syntax is as defined in [IDNA], for example "xn--tmonesimerkki-bfbb.example.net".
ID_RFC822_ADDR	3 A fully-qualified <a href="#">RFC 822</a> email address string. An example of a ID_RFC822_ADDR is "jsmith@example.com". The string MUST NOT contain any terminators. Because of [EAI], implementations would be wise to treat this field as UTF-8 encoded text, not as pure ASCII.
ID_IPV6_ADDR	5 A single sixteen (16) octet IPv6 address.
ID_KEY_ID	11 An opaque octet stream that may be used to pass vendor-specific information necessary to do certain proprietary types of identification. Minimal implementation might use this type to send out serial number or similar device specific unique static identification data for the device.

**A.6. Certificate Payload**



Figure 9: Certificate Payload Format

- o Certificate Encoding (1 octet) - This field indicates the type of certificate or certificate-related information contained in the Certificate Data field.





Certificate Encoding	Value
X.509 Certificate - Signature	4
Raw RSA Key	11

- o Certificate Data (variable length) - Actual encoding of certificate data. The type of certificate is indicated by the Certificate Encoding field.

The syntax of the types above are:

- o "X.509 Certificate - Signature" contains a DER-encoded X.509 certificate whose public key is used to validate the sender's AUTH payload. Note that with this encoding, if a chain of certificates needs to be sent, multiple CERT payloads are used, only the first of which holds the public key used to validate the sender's AUTH payload.
- o "Raw RSA Key" contains a PKCS #1 encoded RSA key, that is, a DER-encoded RSAPublicKey structure (see [RSA] and [RFC3447]).

**A.7. Certificate Request Payload**




Figure 10: Certificate Request Payload Format

- o Certificate Encoding (1 octet) - Contains an encoding of the type or format of certificate requested.
- o Certification Authority (variable length) - Contains an encoding of an acceptable certification authority for the type of certificate requested.

The Certificate Encoding field has the same values as those defined certificate payload. The Certification Authority field contains an indicator of trusted authorities for this certificate type. The Certification Authority value is a concatenated list of SHA-1 hashes of the public keys of trusted Certification Authorities (CAs). Each



is encoded as the SHA-1 hash of the Subject Public Key Info element (see [section 4.1.2.7 of \[RFC5280\]](#)) from each Trust Anchor certificate. The 20-octet hashes are concatenated and included with no other formatting.

**A.8. Authentication Payload**




Figure 11: Authentication Payload Format

- o Auth Method (1 octet) - Specifies the method of authentication used.

Mechanism	Value
RSA Digital Signature	1 Using an RSA private key with RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme specified in [PKCS1], see <a href="#">[RFC5996] section 2.15</a> for details.
Shared Key Message Integrity Code	2 Computed as specified earlier using the shared key associated with the identity in the ID payload and the negotiated PRF.
DSS Digital Signature	3 Using a DSS private key (see [DSS]) over a SHA-1 hash, see <a href="#">[RFC5996] Section 2.15</a> for details.

- o Authentication Data (variable length) - see [Section 2.1](#).



**A.9. Nonce Payload**




Figure 12: Nonce Payload Format

- o Nonce Data (variable length) - Contains the random data generated by the transmitting entity.

The size of the Nonce Data MUST be between 16 and 256 octets, inclusive. Nonce values MUST NOT be reused.

**A.10. Notify Payload**

The Notify payload, denoted N in this document, is used to transmit informational data, such as error conditions and state transitions, to an IKE peer. A Notify payload may appear in a response message (usually specifying why a request was rejected), in an INFORMATIONAL Exchange (to report an error not in an IKE request), or in any other message to indicate sender capabilities or to modify the meaning of the request.




Figure 13: Notify Payload Format



- o Protocol ID (1 octet) - If this notification concerns an existing SA whose SPI is given in the SPI field, this field indicates the type of that SA. If the SPI field is empty, this field MUST be sent as zero and MUST be ignored on receipt.
- o SPI Size (1 octet) - Length in octets of the SPI as defined by the IPsec protocol ID or zero if no SPI is applicable. For a notification concerning the IKE SA, the SPI Size MUST be zero and the field must be empty.
- o Notify Message Type (2 octets) - Specifies the type of notification message.
- o SPI (variable length) - Security Parameter Index.
- o Notification Data (variable length) - Status or error data transmitted in addition to the Notify Message Type. Values for this field are type specific.

#### **A.10.1. Notify Message Types**

Notification information can be error messages specifying why an SA could not be established. It can also be status data that a process managing an SA database wishes to communicate with a peer process.

Types in the range 0 - 16383 are intended for reporting errors. An implementation receiving a Notify payload with one of these types that it does not recognize in a response MUST assume that the corresponding request has failed entirely. Unrecognized error types in a request and status types in a request or response MUST be ignored, and they should be logged.

Notify payloads with status types MAY be added to any message and MUST be ignored if not recognized. They are intended to indicate capabilities, and as part of SA negotiation, are used to negotiate non-cryptographic parameters.





NOTIFY messages: error types	Value
-----	
UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD	1
Indicates that the one-octet payload type included in the Notification Data field is unknown.	
INVALID_SYNTAX	7
Indicates the IKE message that was received was invalid because some type, length, or value was out of range or because the request was rejected for policy reasons. To avoid a DoS attack using forged messages, this status may only be returned for and in an encrypted packet if the Message ID and cryptographic checksum were valid. To avoid leaking information to someone probing a node, this status MUST be sent in response to any error not covered by one of the other status types. To aid debugging, more detailed error information should be written to a console or log.	
NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN	14
None of the proposed crypto suites was acceptable. This can be sent in any case where the offered proposals are not acceptable for the responder.	
NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS	35
Specifies that the node is unwilling to accept any more Child SAs.	

NOTIFY messages: status types	Value
-----	
INITIAL_CONTACT	16384
Asserts that this IKE SA is the only IKE SA currently active between the authenticated identities.	

**A.11. Traffic Selector Payload**

Traffic Selector (TS) payloads allow endpoints to communicate some of the information from their SPD to their peers. TS payloads specify the selection criteria for packets that will be forwarded over the newly set up SA.






Figure 14: Traffic Selectors Payload Format

- o Number of TSs (1 octet) - Number of Traffic Selectors being provided.
- o Traffic Selectors (variable length) - One or more individual Traffic Selectors.

The length of the Traffic Selector payload includes the TS header and all the Traffic Selectors.

There is no requirement that TSi and TSr contain the same number of individual Traffic Selectors. Thus, they are interpreted as follows: a packet matches a given TSi/TSr if it matches at least one of the individual selectors in TSi, and at least one of the individual selectors in TSr.

Two TS payloads appear in each of the messages in the exchange that creates a Child SA pair. Each TS payload contains one or more Traffic Selectors. Each Traffic Selector consists of an address range (IPv4 or IPv6), a port range, and an IP protocol ID.

The first of the two TS payloads is known as TSi (Traffic Selector-initiator). The second is known as TSr (Traffic Selector-responder). TSi specifies the source address of traffic forwarded from (or the destination address of traffic forwarded to) the initiator of the Child SA pair. TSr specifies the destination address of the traffic forwarded to (or the source address of the traffic forwarded from) the responder of the Child SA pair.

IKEv2 allows the responder to choose a subset of the traffic proposed by the initiator.

When the responder chooses a subset of the traffic proposed by the initiator, it narrows the Traffic Selectors to some subset of the initiator's proposal (provided the set does not become the null set).



If the type of Traffic Selector proposed is unknown, the responder ignores that Traffic Selector, so that the unknown type is not returned in the narrowed set.

To enable the responder to choose the appropriate range, if the initiator has requested the SA due to a data packet, the initiator SHOULD include as the first Traffic Selector in each of TS<sub>i</sub> and TS<sub>r</sub> a very specific Traffic Selector including the addresses in the packet triggering the request. If the initiator creates the Child SA pair not in response to an arriving packet, but rather, say, upon startup, then there may be no specific addresses the initiator prefers for the initial tunnel over any other. In that case, the first values in TS<sub>i</sub> and TS<sub>r</sub> can be ranges rather than specific values.

As minimal implementations might only support one SA, the traffic selectors will usually be from initiator's IP address to responders IP address (i.e. no port or protocol selectors and only one range).

**A.11.1. Traffic Selector**




Figure 15: Traffic Selector

- o TS Type (one octet) - Specifies the type of Traffic Selector.
- o IP protocol ID (1 octet) - Value specifying an associated IP protocol ID (such as UDP, TCP, and ICMP). A value of zero means that the protocol ID is not relevant to this Traffic Selector -- the SA can carry all protocols.
- o Selector Length - Specifies the length of this Traffic Selector substructure including the header.



- o Start Port (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Value specifying the smallest port number allowed by this Traffic Selector. For protocols for which port is undefined (including protocol 0), or if all ports are allowed, this field MUST be zero.
- o End Port (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Value specifying the largest port number allowed by this Traffic Selector. For protocols for which port is undefined (including protocol 0), or if all ports are allowed, this field MUST be 65535.
- o Starting Address - The smallest address included in this Traffic Selector (length determined by TS Type).
- o Ending Address - The largest address included in this Traffic Selector (length determined by TS Type).

The following table lists values for the Traffic Selector Type field and the corresponding Address Selector Data.

TS Type	Value
-----	
TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE	7

A range of IPv4 addresses, represented by two four-octet values. The first value is the beginning IPv4 address (inclusive) and the second value is the ending IPv4 address (inclusive). All addresses falling between the two specified addresses are considered to be within the list.

TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE	8
--------------------	---

A range of IPv6 addresses, represented by two sixteen-octet values. The first value is the beginning IPv6 address (inclusive) and the second value is the ending IPv6 address (inclusive). All addresses falling between the two specified addresses are considered to be within the list.

**A.12. Encrypted Payload**

The Encrypted payload, denoted SK{...} in this document, contains other payloads in encrypted form.








Figure 16: Encrypted Payload Format

- o Next Payload - The payload type of the first embedded payload. Note that this is an exception in the standard header format, since the Encrypted payload is the last payload in the message and therefore the Next Payload field would normally be zero. But because the content of this payload is embedded payloads and there was no natural place to put the type of the first one, that type is placed here.
- o Payload Length - Includes the lengths of the header, initialization vector (IV), Encrypted IKE payloads, Padding, Pad Length, and Integrity Checksum Data.
- o Initialization Vector - For CBC mode ciphers, the length of the initialization vector (IV) is equal to the block length of the underlying encryption algorithm. Senders MUST select a new unpredictable IV for every message; recipients MUST accept any value. The reader is encouraged to consult [\[MODES\]](#) for advice on IV generation. In particular, using the final ciphertext block of the previous message is not considered unpredictable. For modes other than CBC, the IV format and processing is specified in the document specifying the encryption algorithm and mode.
- o IKE payloads are as specified earlier in this section. This field is encrypted with the negotiated cipher.
- o Padding MAY contain any value chosen by the sender, and MUST have a length that makes the combination of the payloads, the Padding, and the Pad Length to be a multiple of the encryption block size. This field is encrypted with the negotiated cipher.



- o Pad Length is the length of the Padding field. The sender SHOULD set the Pad Length to the minimum value that makes the combination of the payloads, the Padding, and the Pad Length a multiple of the block size, but the recipient MUST accept any length that results in proper alignment. This field is encrypted with the negotiated cipher.
- o Integrity Checksum Data is the cryptographic checksum of the entire message starting with the Fixed IKE header through the Pad Length. The checksum MUST be computed over the encrypted message. Its length is determined by the integrity algorithm negotiated.



**Appendix B. Useful Optional Features**

There are some optional features of IKEv2, which might be useful for minimal implementations in some scenarios. Such features include Raw RSA keys authentication, and sending IKE SA delete notification.

**B.1. IKE SA Delete Notification**

In some scenarios the minimal implementation device creates IKE SA, sends one or few packets, perhaps gets some packets back, and then device goes back to sleep forgetting the IKE SA. In such scenarios it would be nice for the minimal implementation to send the IKE SA delete notification to tell the other end that the IKE SA is going away, so it can free the resources.

Deleting the IKE SA can be done using by sending one packet with fixed Message ID, and with only one payload inside the encrypted payload. The other end will send back an empty response:

```

Initiator                                Responder
-----
HDR(SPIi=xxx, SPIr=yyy, INFORMATIONAL,
  Flags: Initiator, Message ID=2),
  SK {D} -->

      <-- HDR(SPIi=xxx, SPIr=yyy, INFORMATIONAL,
            Flags: Response, Message ID=2),
            SK {}

```

The delete payload format is:




Figure 17: Delete Payload Format

- o Protocol ID (1 octet) - Must be 1 for an IKE SA.



- o SPI Size (1 octet) - Length in octets of the SPI as defined by the protocol ID. It MUST be zero for IKE (SPI is in message header).
- o Num of SPIs (2 octets, unsigned integer) - The number of SPIs contained in the Delete payload. This MUST be zero for IKE.
- o Security Parameter Index(es) (variable length) - Identifies the specific Security Association(s) to delete. The length of this field is determined by the SPI Size and Num of SPIs fields. This field is empty for the IKE SA delete.

**B.2. Raw RSA keys**

In some scenarios the shared secret authentication is not safe enough, as anybody who knows the secret can impersonate himself of being the server. If the shared secret is printed on the side of the device, then anybody who gets physical access to the device can read it. In such environments public key authentication allows stronger authentication with minimal operational overhead. Certificate support is quite complex, and minimal implementations do not usually have need for them. Using Raw RSA keys is much simpler, and it allows similar scalability than certificates. The fingerprint of the Raw RSA key can still be distributed by for example printing it on the side of the device allowing similar setup than using shared secret.

Raw RSA keys can also be used in leap of faith or baby duck style initial setup, where the device imprints itself to the first device it sees when it first time boots up. After that initial connection it stores the fingerprint of the Raw RSA key of the server to its own configuration and verifies that it never changes (unless reset to factory setting or similar command is issued).

This changes the initial IKE\_AUTH payloads as follows:

```

Initiator                               Responder
-----
HDR(SPIi=xxx, SPIr=yyy, IKE_AUTH,
  Flags: Initiator, Message ID=1),
  SK {IDi, CERT, AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr,
    N(INITIAL_CONTACT)} -->

      <-- HDR(SPIi=xxx, SPIr=yyy, IKE_AUTH, Flags:
          Response, Message ID=1),
          SK {IDr, CERT, AUTH, SAR2, TSi, TSr}
    
```

The CERT payloads contains the Raw RSA keys used the sign the hash of the InitiatorSignedOctects/ResponderSignedOctects when generating





AUTH payload. Minimal implementations should use SHA-1 as the hash function as that is the SHOULD support algorithm specified in the [RFC5996](#), so it is the most likely one that is supported by all devices.

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