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**Multiple Provisioning Domains API Requirements**  
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Abstract

[RFC 7556](#) [[RFC7556](#)] provides the essential conceptual guidance an API designer would need to support use of PvDs. This document aims to capture the requirements for an API that can be used by applications that would be considered "advanced", according to [section 6.3](#) [1] of [RFC 7556](#) [[RFC7556](#)]. The "basic" [2] and "intermediate" [3] API support levels can in principle be implemented by means of layers wrapping the advanced API.

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## Table of Contents

<a href="#">1.</a>	<a href="#">Introduction . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">2</a>
<a href="#">1.1.</a>	<a href="#">Requirements Language . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">3</a>
<a href="#">2.</a>	<a href="#">High level requirements . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">3</a>
<a href="#">2.1.</a>	<a href="#">Requirements for an API . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">3</a>
<a href="#">2.2.</a>	<a href="#">Requirements for supporting operating systems . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">2.2.1.</a>	<a href="#">Source address selection . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">2.2.2.</a>	<a href="#">Route isolation . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">6</a>
<a href="#">2.2.3.</a>	<a href="#">Automatic PvD metadata marking . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">6</a>
<a href="#">2.2.4.</a>	<a href="#">Additional system and library support . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">7</a>
<a href="#">3.</a>	<a href="#">Conceptual PvDs . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">7</a>
<a href="#">3.1.</a>	<a href="#">The 'default' PvD . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">7</a>
<a href="#">3.2.</a>	<a href="#">The 'unspecified' PvD . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">8</a>
<a href="#">3.3.</a>	<a href="#">The 'null' PvD . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">8</a>
<a href="#">3.4.</a>	<a href="#">The 'loopback' PvD . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">8</a>
<a href="#">4.</a>	<a href="#">Requirements for new API functionality . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">4.1.</a>	<a href="#">Learning PvD availability . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">4.2.</a>	<a href="#">Learning network configuration information comprising a PvD . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">4.3.</a>	<a href="#">Scoping functionality to a specific PvD . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">10</a>
<a href="#">4.4.</a>	<a href="#">Explicit versus Implicit PvDs . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">10</a>
<a href="#">4.5.</a>	<a href="#">Policy restrictions . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">4.6.</a>	<a href="#">Programmatic reference implementation considerations . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">5.</a>	<a href="#">Existing networking APIs . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">5.1.</a>	<a href="#">Updating existing APIs . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">5.2.</a>	<a href="#">Requirements for name resolution APIs . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">6.</a>	<a href="#">Acknowledgements . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">13</a>
<a href="#">7.</a>	<a href="#">IANA Considerations . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">13</a>
<a href="#">8.</a>	<a href="#">Security Considerations . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">13</a>
<a href="#">9.</a>	<a href="#">References . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">13</a>
<a href="#">9.1.</a>	<a href="#">Normative References . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">13</a>
<a href="#">9.2.</a>	<a href="#">Informative References . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">14</a>
	<a href="#">Author's Address . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">14</a>

## [1.](#) Introduction

[RFC 7556](#) [[RFC7556](#)] provides the essential conceptual guidance an API designer would need to support use of PvDs. This document aims to capture the requirements for an API that can be used by applications that would be considered "advanced", according to [section 6.3](#) [4] of [RFC 7556](#) [[RFC7556](#)]. The "basic" [5] and "intermediate" [6] API support levels can in principle be implemented by means of layers wrapping the advanced API.

Kline

Expires May 04, 2016

[Page 2]

This document also attempts to make some of the API implementation requirements more concrete by discussion and example.

### **1.1. Requirements Language**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

## **2. High level requirements**

As described in [section 2](#) [7] of [RFC 7556](#) [[RFC7556](#)], a Provisioning Domain ("PvD") is fundamentally a "consistent set of network configuration information." This includes information like:

- o the list of participating interfaces
- o IPv4 and IPv6 addresses
- o IPv4 and IPv6 routes: both default routes and more specifics (such as may be learned via [RFC 4191](#) [[RFC4191](#)] Route Information Options ("RIOs"))
- o DNS nameservers, search path, et cetera
- o HTTP proxy configuration

and undoubtedly many more configuration elements yet to be specified (like metering hints, transmission medium and speed, captive portal URL, et cetera).

This configuration information as a whole may not be able to be learned atomically, may need to be synthesized from multiple sources including administrative provisioning, and cannot be presumed to be unchanging over the lifetime of a node's association with a given PvD.

In order for an application to make consistent use [8] of a given PvD's network configuration several requirements are placed upon the API itself and the host operating system providing the API.

### **2.1. Requirements for an API**

At the highest level, the requirements for an API that enables applications to make sophisticated use of multiple PvDs amount to providing mechanisms by which they can:

- R1 observe accessible PvDs



It MUST be possible for an application to be informed of the set of all PvDs it can currently access, and to be informed of changes to this set.

R2 observe configuration elements of an accessible PvD

It MUST be possible to learn requested configuration information of any accessible PvD, and to be informed of any changes to the configuration information comprising an accessible PvD.

R3 scope networking functionality to a specified PvD

For every existing API function that interacts with the node's networking stack, be it at a relatively high level like `getaddrinfo()` [9] or at the level of something like Sockets API's `sendmsg()`, there MUST be a means by which an application can specify the PvD within which networking operations are to be restricted.

R4 use one and only specified scope per networking functionality invocation

For every unique invocation of a networking API function, there MUST only be one specified PvD to which networking functionality is to be restricted. At any given point in an application's lifetime there MAY be several encapsulating layers of unspecified PvDs ([Section 3.2](#)) through which the implementation must progressively search to find a specified PvD, but ultimately a networking function MUST use one and only one PvD for its operations, even if that PvD is a "null PvD" ([Section 3.3](#)).

R5 make consistent use of programmatic references to PvDs

For uniformity and simplicity, every PvD-aware API functional element SHOULD use (as return values of function calls, function arguments, et cetera) the same programmatic reference for PvDs, e.g. a construct containing a PvD identifier [10] or some equivalent shorthand reference token (see [Section 4.6](#) for a discussion of implementation considerations). Regardless of the implementation strategy chosen, a given programmatic reference MUST remain constant over the lifetime of the node's continuous attachment to the PvD to which it refers (until a disconnection or disassociation event occurs). Additionally, references MAY change with successive re-associations to the same PvD whereas PvD identifiers, by definition, will not.

It is important to note that there is always a provisioning domain within which networking functionality is scoped. For simply-



connected hosts this may be the implicit PvD [11] created by a single networking interface connected to a traditional, shared LAN segment. For multihomed hosts the "default provisioning domain" is likely a matter of policy, but MAY be a "null" PvD, i.e. one completely devoid of networking configuration information (no addresses, no routes, et cetera). See [Section 3](#) for further discussion.

The utility of such an API (allowing applications to learn of and control the scope of networking functionality) suggests that the Provisioning Domain is perhaps a more useful operational definition for the original IPv6 concept of a "site-local scope" than the ill-fated [[RFC3879](#)], "ill-defined concept" [12] of a site. It also suggests one possible way by which operating system support for a PvD-aware API might be implemented.

## **[2.2.](#) Requirements for supporting operating systems**

The multiple PvD model of host behaviour is perhaps closer to the Strong End System Model than the Weak End System Model characterized in [RFC 1122](#) [[RFC1122](#)] [section 3.3.4.2](#) [13], but owing to its recognition of a many-to-many relationship between interfaces and PvDs should be considered a unique model unto itself.

In the PvD-aware End System Model, the "two key requirement issues related to multihoming" are restated as:

- a. A host MAY silently discard an incoming datagram whose destination address does not correspond to any PvD associated with the physical (or virtual) interface through which it is received.
- b. A host MUST restrict itself to sending (non-source-routed) IP datagrams only through the physical (or virtual) interfaces that correspond to the PvD associated with the IP source address of the datagrams.

In order to support a PvD-aware application's use of multiple PVDs, several additional requirements must be met by the host operating system, especially when performing functions on behalf of applications or when no direct application intervention is possible, as discussed in the following sections.

### **[2.2.1.](#) Source address selection**





Whenever a source address is to be selected on behalf of an application it is essential for consistent use that only source addresses belonging to the specified PvD be used as a candidate set. (See [RFC 6418](#) [[RFC6418](#)] [section 3.5](#) [14] for references to issues arising from poor source address selection.)

For nodes following the PvD-aware End System Model, [RFC 6724](#) [[RFC6724](#)] [section 4](#) [15] is amended as follows:

R6 The candidate source addresses MUST be restricted to the set of unicast addresses associated with the concurrently specified PvD.

Additionally, source address selection policies from PvDs other than the concurrently specified PvD MUST NOT be applied.

#### **2.2.2. Route isolation**

Whenever a routing lookup for a given destination is to be performed, it is essential that only routes belonging to the currently specified PvD be consulted. Applications and libraries that use the inherent routing reachability check (and subsequent source address selection) performed during something like the Sockets API `connect()` call on a UDP socket to learn reachability information cheaply cannot function correctly otherwise. [RFC 6418](#) [[RFC6418](#)] [section 4.2](#) [16] contains more discussion and references to issues arising from insufficiently isolated routing information.

For nodes following the PvD-aware End System Model:

R7 The set of routes consulted for any routing decision MUST be restricted to the routes associated with the concurrently specified PvD.

#### **2.2.3. Automatic PvD metadata marking**

In many cases, an application can examine a source address or the destination address of a received datagram and use that address's association with a given PvD to learn, for example, the PvD with which an incoming connection may be associated. It may, however, be impossible for an application to make this determination on its own if, for example, an incoming TCP connection is destined to a [RFC 1918](#) [[RFC1918](#)] address that happens to be configured in multiple PvDs at the same time. In such circumstances, the supporting operating system will need to provide additional assistance.

For nodes following the PvD-aware End System Model:



- R8 When performing networking functionality on behalf of an application, the supporting operating system **MUST** record and make available to the application either (1) all the information the application might need to make a determination of the applicable PvD on its own or (2) the API's PvD programmatic reference directly.

A supporting operating system **SHOULD** record and make available the API's PvD programmatic reference; other approaches invite ambiguity among applications' interpretation of available information.

#### **2.2.4. Additional system and library support**

Frequently, operating systems have several additional supporting libraries and services for more advance networking functionality. Using the system's own PvD API, and fulfilling the above requirements, it should be possible to extend these services to provide correct per-PvD isolation of information and enable consistent application use of PvDs.

### **3. Conceptual PvDs**

#### **3.1. The 'default' PvD**

Because there is always one specified provisioning domain to which an individual invocation of networking functionality is restricted ([Section 2.1](#)) there must necessarily exist a system "default PvD". This provisioning domain is the one which networking functionality **MUST** use when no other specified PvD can be determined.

Using the system's default PvD enables support of basic [17] uses of the PvD API (i.e. backward compatibility for unmodified applications).

The operating system **MAY** change the default PvD accordingly to policy. It is expected that nodes will use a variety of information, coupled with administrative policy, to promote one of any number of concurrently available PvDs to be the system's default PvD.

- R9 A PvD-aware API implementation **MUST** include a mechanism for applications to learn the programmatic reference to the system's concurrent default PvD.

- R10 A PvD-aware API implementation **SHOULD** contain a mechanism enabling an application to be notified of changes to the concurrent default PvD in a comparatively efficient manner (i.e. more efficient than polling).



### **3.2. The 'unspecified' PvD**

An application may at some times wish to be specific about which PvD should be used for networking operations and at other times may prefer to defer the choice of specific PvD to one specified elsewhere (including the system default PvD).

For example, if an application has specified the PvD to be used for all functions called by its process and child processes ([Section 4.3](#)), it may indicate that certain invocations should instead use the system default PvD by using a programmatic reference to the "unspecified PvD".

R11 API implementors MUST reserve a programmatic reference to represent an "unspecified PvD": an indication that the application defers the selection of a specific PvD.

R12 When invoked without a specific PvD, or with a programmatic reference to the "unspecified PvD", networking functionality MUST find a specific PvD to be used by examining the successive encapsulating layers of possible specificity supported by the API ([Section 4.3](#)), e.g. look first for a "fiber-specific default" PvD, then a "thread-specific default" PvD, a "process-specific default" PvD, and ultimately use the system's default PvD if no other specified PvD can be found.

### **3.3. The 'null' PvD**

If there are no PvDs accessible to an application, whether as a matter of policy (insufficient privileges) ([Section 4.5](#)) or as a matter of natural circumstance (the node is not connected to any network), the construct of a 'null' PvD may be useful to ensure networking functions fail (and fail quickly).

R13 API implementors MAY reserve a programmatic reference to represent a "null PvD": an unchanging provisioning domain devoid of any and all networking configuration information.

It is possible for operating systems to enforce that only PvD-aware applications may function normally by administratively configuring the default PvD to be the "null PvD".

### **3.4. The 'loopback' PvD**

TBD: is it useful to have a "loopback" PvD, i.e. one consisting solely of all addresses configured on the node and all locally delivered routes?



## **4. Requirements for new API functionality**

### **4.1. Learning PvD availability**

R14 A PvD-aware API **MUST** implement a mechanism whereby an application can receive a set of the API's PvD programmatic references representing the complete set of PvDs (both explicit [18] and implicit [19]) with which the node is currently associated.

R15 A PvD-aware API implementation **SHOULD** contain a mechanism enabling an application to be notified of changes in the above set of actively associated PvDs in a comparatively efficient manner (i.e. more efficient than polling).

It may also be of use to applications to receive notifications of pending changes to the set of currently connected PvDs. For example, if it is known that a connection to a PvD is scheduled to be terminated shortly, an application may be able to take some appropriate action (migrate connections to another PvD, send notifications, et cetera).

### **4.2. Learning network configuration information comprising a PvD**

R16 A PvD-aware API **MUST** include a mechanism whereby by an application, using the API's PvD programmatic reference, can receive elements of the network configuration information that comprise a PvD. At a minimum, this mechanism **MUST** be capable of answering queries for:

- \* the PvD identifier
- \* all participating interfaces
- \* all IPv4 and all non-deprecated IPv6 addresses
- \* all configured DNS nameservers

A PvD's network configuration information is neither guaranteed to be learned atomically nor is it guaranteed to be static. Addresses, routes, and even DNS nameservers and participating interfaces may each change over the lifetime of the node's association to a given PvD. Timely notification of such changes may be of particular importance to some applications.





- R17 A Pvd-aware API implementation SHOULD contain a mechanism enabling an application to be notified of changes in the networking configuration information comprising a Pvd in a comparatively efficient manner (i.e. more efficient than polling).
- R18 A network configuration query API implementation SHOULD take extensibility into account, to support querying for configuration information not yet conceived of with minimal adverse impact to applications.

#### **4.3. Scoping functionality to a specific Pvd**

- R19 A Pvd-aware API implementation MUST include a mechanism for an application to specify the programmatic reference of the Pvd to which all networking functionality MUST be restricted when not otherwise explicitly specified (a configurable, application-specific "default Pvd").
- R20 The API implementation MUST support setting such a "default Pvd" for an application's entire process (and by extension its child processes). Additionally, the API SHOULD support an application setting a "default Pvd" at every granularity of "programming parallelization", i.e. not only per-process, but also per-thread, per-fiber, et cetera. At every supported layer of granularity, if no Pvd reference has been set the next coarser layer's setting MUST be consulted (up to and including the system's default Pvd) when identifying the specified Pvd to be used.
- R21 For every degree of granularity at which an application may specify a "default Pvd" there MUST exist a corresponding mechanism to retrieve any concurrently specified implementation-specific Pvd programmatic reference. If no Pvd has been specified for at the granularity of a given query, the "unspecified Pvd" must be returned.

With access to this functionality it is possible to start non-Pvd-aware applications within a single Pvd context with no adverse impact. Furthermore, with judicious use of a sufficiently granular API, existing general purpose networking APIs can be wrapped to appear Pvd-aware.

#### **4.4. Explicit versus Implicit PvdS**



R22 Because programmatic references to PvDs are returned for both explicit and implicit PvDs, the MPvD API implementation MUST be equally applicable and useful for any valid type of PvD; it MUST NOT be necessary for a PvD-aware application to distinguish between explicit and implicit PvDs to function properly.

#### **4.5. Policy restrictions**

This document does not make recommendations about policies governing the use of any or all elements of a PvD API, save only to note that some restrictions on use may be deemed necessary or appropriate.

R23 A PvD API implementation MAY implement policy controls whereby access to PvD availability information, configuration elements, and/or explicit scoping requests is variously permitted or denied to certain applications.

#### **4.6. Programmatic reference implementation considerations**

PvD identifiers may be of a length or form not easily handled directly in some programming environments, and unauthenticated PvD identifiers are assumed to be only probabilistically unique [20]. As such, API implementations should consider using some alternative programmatic reference (a node-specific "handle" or "token"), which is fully under the control of the operating system, to identify an instance of a single provisioning domain's network configuration information.

Even though a PvD identifier may uniquely correspond to, say, a network operator, there is no guarantee that the configuration information (delegated prefixes, configured IP addresses, and so on) will be the same with every successive association to the same PvD identifier. An implementation may elect to change the value of the programmatic reference to a given PvD identifier for each temporally distinct association. Doing so presents some advantages worth considering:

Collisions in the PvD identifier space will inherently be treated as distinct by applications not concerned solely with identifiers.

Changing the value of a reference can disabuse application writers of inappropriately caching configuration information from one association instance to another.

Whether two PvDs are "identical" is perhaps better left to applications to decide since "PvD equivalence" for a given application may alternatively be determined by successfully accessing some restricted resource.



This document makes no specific requirement on the type of programmatic reference used by the API.

## **5. Existing networking APIs**

### **5.1. Updating existing APIs**

From the perspective of a PvD-aware operating system, all previously existing non-PvD-enabled networking functionality had historically been executed within the context of a single, implicit provisioning domain. A sufficiently granular API to specify which PvD is to be used to scope subsequent networking functionality ([Section 4.3](#)) can be used to wrap non-PvD-aware APIs, giving them this new PvD-aware capability. However,

R24 Operating system implementors SHOULD consider updating existing networking APIs to take or return programmatic references to PvDs directly.

This may mean creating new functions with an additional PvD programmatic reference argument, adding a PvD programmatic reference field to an existing structure or class that is itself an argument or return type, or finding other means by which to use a programmatic reference with minimal or no disruption to existing applications or libraries.

### **5.2. Requirements for name resolution APIs**

[RFC 3493](#) [[RFC3493](#)] `getaddrinfo()` [21] and `getnameinfo()` [22] APIs deserve explicit discussion. Previously stated requirements make it clear that it MUST be possible for an application to perform normal name resolution constrained to the DNS configuration within a specified PVD. This MUST be possible using at least the techniques of [Section 4.3](#).

The following additional requirements are places on PvD-aware implementations of these functions:

R25 All DNS protocol communications with a PvD's nameservers MUST be restricted to use only source addresses and routes associated with the PvD.



R26 If `getaddrinfo()` is called with the `AI_ADDRCONFIG` flag specified, IPv4 addresses shall be returned only if an IPv4 address is configured within the specified provisioning domain and IPv6 addresses shall be returned only if an IPv6 address is configured within the specified provision domain. The loopback address is (still) not considered for this case as valid as a configured address.

## **6. Acknowledgements**

The core concepts presented in this document were developed during the Android multinetworking effort by Lorenzo Colitti, Robert Greenwalt, Paul Jensen, and Sreeram Ramachandran.

Additional thanks to the coffee shops of Tokyo.

## **7. IANA Considerations**

This memo includes no request to IANA.

## **8. Security Considerations**

An important new security impact of a PvD-aware API is that it becomes much simpler (by design) to write a well-functioning application to create a bridging data path between two PvDs that would not otherwise have been so easily connected.

For some operating systems, existing APIs already make this bridging possible, though some functionality like DNS resolution may have been difficult to implement. Indeed, the very aim of an MPvD API is to make implementing a PvD-aware application simple and to make its functioning more "correct" ("first class" support for such functionality).

Operating system implementations have several points of potential policy control including:

- o use of certain PvDs MAY be restricted by policy (e.g. only approved users, groups, or applications might be permitted access), and/or
- o use of more than one PvD (or the MPvD API itself) MAY be similarly restricted.

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### **9.1. Normative References**





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