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Changing DNS Operators for DNSSEC signed Zones
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Abstract

Changing the DNS delegation for a DNS zone is quite involved if done by the books, but most often handled pragmatically in today's operational practice at the top level with registries and registrars. This document describes a delegation change procedure that maintains consistency and validation under DNSSEC.

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1. Introduction

When the NS RRSets in a DNS delegation is to be changed from one to a disjoint other, the most conservative approach would be to add the new servers as (stealth) secondary servers, then add them to the NS RRSets, change the primary master (that is, change the AXFR/IXFR source for all the secondary servers), remove the old name servers' names from the NS RRSets and finally cease service on those former name servers. This would involve two changes to the zone file for the apex NS RRSets and in turn two interactions with the parent zone (the registry) for the delegation NS RRSets. Another procedure would at least see the old name servers acquire the new data by transfer and then publish it until the NS records' time to live (TTL) values expire.

Operational practice deviates from this in many cases, especially where there is a combined role of the registrar as registrar, DNS operator and web hoster. Often the new infrastructure is set up independent of and in parallel to the old one and there is only one delegation change. Resolvers will access either version of the DNS zone and the inconsistency in DNS data and even at the application layer will be tolerated as long as the end user gets to see any result at all.

DNSSEC [[RFC4033](#)][RFC4034][[RFC4035](#)] is less tolerant to this inconsistency, and the challenge is that access to and validation of DNS data will involve multiple steps. The resolver might access DNS data through one (say, the old) name server infrastructure and DNS key material (the apex DNSKEY RRSets) through the other. A hard switch would increase the likelihood of a validation failure, should the signature over some RRSets not match any key in the DNSKEY RRSets.

1.1. Purpose of this Document

This document attempts to list requirements for a seamless change of DNS operators in a registry/registrar environment. It then suggests

a procedure that should work in an automated environment even for large numbers of DNS operator changes. It is meant as a supplement or contribution to the updated version of [[RFC4641](#)], as currently expressed in [[I-D.ietf-dnsop-rfc4641bis](#)], section 4.3.5.

[1.2.](#) Terminology

The change of DNS infrastructure involves multiple parties. We are using the following terms throughout the document.

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registrar The entity that can change entries in a DNS registry database, usually, but not restricted to, by means of a realtime provisioning protocol like EPP [[RFC5730](#)]. NB: the procedure described in this document does not require a strict registry-registrar-registrant separation. Where the registrant can directly interact with the registry they are considered filling the registrar role.

DNS operator provides the DNS infrastructure for a given DNS zone (delegated domain). This party may or may not be identical to the registrant or the registrar. The details of provisioning the DNS data into the DNS zone are beyond the scope of this document.

losing DNS operator is the party that controls zone content and DNS infrastructure at the beginning of a DNS operator change.

gaining DNS operator denotes the party that will control zone content and DNS infrastructure after the successful DNS operator change.

The terms Zone Signing Key (ZSK) and Key Signing Key (KSK) are defined in [section 2 of \[RFC4033\]](#).

Domain names and IP addresses herein are for explanatory purposes only and should not be expected to lead to useful information in real life [[RFC2606](#)],[[RFC5735](#)].

[2.](#) Requirements and Assumptions for Seamless Operator Change

Regardless of the the particular registry provisioning protocol (e.g., EPP, [[RFC5730](#)], [[RFC5731](#)]) DNS registries usually provide for a method to transfer a domain name between different registrars. However, from this angle there is no separate role for the DNS operator, the entity that is responsible for the DNS infrastructure and/or the content of the DNS zone. This entity may be identical to the registrar, the registrant, or neither. From the DNSSEC perspective it is important to consider the entity controlling the ZSK and KSK in any transfer that involves changing the NS RRSet to a disjoint set (as opposed to simple additions to or removals from the NS RRSet).

The change of a registrar is of limited effect from the DNSSEC perspective. The discussion of the ability of the gaining registrar to accept DNSSEC information within a domain object is beyond the scope of this document. The focus is kept on the change of the DNS operator. There are two cases: ideally, the losing operator will be able to incorporate data generated by the gaining operator into their

version of the DNS zone. However, the proposed solution should also be able to cover the case where this cooperation cannot be relied upon.

[2.1](#). Requirements for Seamless Operator Change

This is a list of requirements for the operator change:

no validation failures During the operator change, as in normal operations, DNSSEC validation failures, resulting from unavailable or outdated key or signature material, must be avoided.

validation failures worse than insecure Where there is the choice between DNSSEC validation failures and an insecure state, the latter is to be preferred, although its extent still ought to be kept to a necessary minimum.

no private keys Private cryptographic keys will not be exchanged between the losing and the gaining operator. Scenarios in which this would be feasible would not pose the challenges addressed in this document.

no use of foreign RRSIG information The process of signing a zone is usually done in one of three ways: The zone is signed completely as a file, then loaded into a name server, the signer is a "bump in the wire" solution or the name server combines signing and serving on the primary master. Adding foreign signatures into a zone is not easily achieved in any of these setups, so it ought to be avoided. It also helps contain the effect of changes to an RRSet locally, as no signatures have to be generated remotely with subsequent re-import.

little interaction To ease automation the number of interactions between registry, registrar or registrars and operators should be minimized.

little overhead for losing operator Whenever interaction or action cannot be avoided, the losing operator should be involved as little as possible to avoid overhead for the leaving customer. In turn, this suggests the gaining operator should be in control of the process.

[2.2.](#) Assumptions for Seamless Operator Change

This is a list of assumptions for the operator change:

no direct communication channel between operators We do not assume the existence of a direct, confidential, authenticated communication channel between the losing and the gaining operator. On an abstract level, the registrant could be viewed as an indirect channel, but involving the registrant is not necessarily easily automated.

secure communication channel between operator, registrar, and registry We do, though, assume the existence of a direct, confidential, authenticated communication channel between an operator and their registrar as well as between the registrar and the registry.

incorporation of foreign DNSKEY RRs To achieve a symmetric validation chain along the DS/KSK/ZSK of both the losing and the

gaining DNS operator it is assumed that either operator can, technically, incorporate DNSKEY RRs into their apex DNSKEY RRSet. This includes the ability to subsequently properly sign the DNSKEY RRSet.

ability to store and retrieve DNSKEY RRs We assume that registrars are able to store in and retrieve from the registry DNSKEY RRs or equivalent information. This can be achieved by the registry using DNSKEY RRs as key material (as opposed to or in addition to DS RRs) or by the ability to insert DNSKEY data in free text or remarks fields within or associated with the domain object.

no algorithm rollover Current reading is that an algorithm rollover requires a full validation with all algorithms involved, whereas a key rollover will work whenever data can be validated using either key ([\[RFC4035\], section 2.2](#)). Therefore, it is assumed that both operators utilize the same DNSSEC key algorithm during the transfer. This does neither preclude the use of different key sizes nor the change of key algorithms after the DNS operator change.

ZSK/KSK separation This document assumes a key separation between Zone Signing Key (ZSK) and Key Signing Key (KSK) as per [\[RFC4641\]](#). Where a zone maintainer decides to use only a single key [\[I-D.ietf-dnsop-rfc4641bis\]](#) the process layout will remain the same, details of differences to be explored in a future update of this draft.

no ZSK/KSK rollover in progress Since no private keys will change hands, the operator change implies a key rollover from the losing to the gaining operator. A progressing rollover of the ZSK or KSK at the losing DNS operator would add complexity due to more possible validation paths. While both a rollover and a DNS

operator change can be combined, we will, for the sake of simplicity, assume they will not. How to implement this business constraint is beyond the scope of this document. Since the DNS zone at the gaining DNS operator will be set up from scratch, it is assumed there is no rollover in progress, either.

resolver does not indefinitely prolongate retention of cached data
Some resolvers are known to refresh the TTL of an NS RRSet of a

zone upon every authoritative response they receive that carries this NS RRSets in the authority section. This is partly in the spirit of [RFC2181] in that this source (the authoritative child) is more credible than the NS RRSets in a referral, but independent of DNSSEC this behaviour leads to an undesired side effect. These 'sticky' resolvers will never learn of a redelegation if that happens by switching between two non-overlapping sets of name servers, which is current practice in many environments. Therefore the process for operator change does not have to take this behaviour into account but may assume benign resolver operation.

3. Executing the Change

The challenge to face is that during the DNS operator change resolvers may see an NS RRSets pointing to either the losing or the gaining operator's name servers. They may also have cached DNS data and corresponding signatures from either source and this may in particular mean that the apex DNSKEY RRSets and its signature or signatures have a different origin than some other to-be-validated RRSets.

To prevent validation failures, resolvers need, through careful timing, be given the chance to acquire the necessary DNSKEY data that allows them to validate signed DNS data from either source. Therefore the DNSKEY RRSets originating from either infrastructure or a limited time window need to have a non zero intersection set that will be covered by both the old and the new trust anchor (or KSK).

Changing the DNS operator will be a three step process involving both the gaining and the losing DNS operator. For the sake of simplicity, the first case will not cover a registrar change.

3.1. Changing DNS operator only

At the beginning, there is a delegation to the losing operator's name servers and a DS RR pointing to a KSK controlled by that losing registrar in the parent zone. As a first step, the gaining operator will obtain through the DNS the ZSK(!) from the losing operator's

information, add it to its apex DNSKEY RRSset and re-sign that RRSset. At this point, the new infrastructure will not yet be queried, but it would provide a validation path through the new KSK for signatures generated with the old ZSK. To achieve symmetry, the new ZSK needs to be incorporated into the old apex DNSKEY RRSset. Since a (trusted, validatable) path to that information is not available in the DNS, yet and no direct communication path between the losing and the gaining operator is assumed, the registry will act as a dropbox. Again, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the registry accepts key material in the form DNSKEY rather than DS resource records.

The first change to the registration data, to be initiated by the gaining operator will add the new KSK and the new ZSK to the domain object. This way, the parent zone can publish two (or three, taking into account the ZSK) DS RRs, one for either KSK. At the same time, the registry can make available the new ZSK to the losing operator. No change is initiated yet to the parent zone NS RRSset.

Upon appearance of the gaining operator's ZSK in the registry database the losing operator is supposed to copy this ZSK into its version of the apex DNSKEY RRSset and to re-sign the DNSKEY RRSset with the old KSK.

Once that has happened and the TTL value of the (previous, sans new ZSK) DNSKEY RRSset has passed, all resolver caches will either have no DNSKEY RRSset for this zone or they will have acquired one that has a signature made by the old KSK over both the old and the new ZSK. The second precondition for the next step is that no DS RRSets exist without reference to the new KSK that was inserted in the previous, first step. This will be the case after the new DS RRSset will have been visible in the DNS and the TTL of the DS RRSset (actually, that of the previous instance of that DS RRSset) will have expired. Both expiration intervals may and likely will overlap, but may start at different times and are otherwise independent. The termination of the later of the two will determine the earliest point in time for progress.

The gaining operator can now initiate the second step, changing the NS RRSset in the parent to the new name server infrastructure. At the same time, the ZSK can be removed from the domain object since the registry has fulfilled its role as a ZSK dropbox. Note that a hard delegation change rather than a multi-step phase-in is part of the design to reflect today's operational practice.

After this second step, the parent zone will contain an NS RRSset delegating to the gaining operator's name servers as well as two DS

records, one referring to the old KSK, the other referring to the new KSK. Due to the two DS RRs, either DNSKEY RRSets can be validated. Either path will provide validation for both the old and the new ZSK. That enables RRSIG validation on all DNS data independent of its origin at the losing or gaining operator's version of the zone.

The final third step can be started after all instances of DNSKEY RRSets containing the old KSK have expired. This also requires that no queries are directed to the name servers of the losing operator. The latter can be assumed after the TTL of the (old) NS RRSets at the parent has passed (no delegations to old infrastructure) and subsequently the TTL of the NS RRSets at the losing operator's zone has also passed (no refresh or overwrite of referral data by authoritative data from the child zone). Since a DNSKEY RRSets might have been sent as part of a DNS response just before this expiry, this DNSKEY RRSets's (originating from the losing operator, containing old KSK and new ZSK) TTL must pass, too. In total, counting from the appearance of the new NS RRSets in the parent zone, the sum of the TTL of the NS RRSets at the parent, the TTL of the NS RRSets at the child (losing operator) and the TTL of the DNSKEY RR at the losing operator determines the earliest point in time for proceeding with the next step.

The third step will be removing the old KSK from the domain object as part of the KSK rollover. The parent zone will then publish a single DS RR pointing to the new KSK only. As soon as the new DS RRSets will be the only one present in caches, the losing operator may cease to serve the zone. The gaining operator, in turn, can remove the old ZSK from its apex DNSKEY RRSets, not without re-signing this RRSets afterwards.

[3.2.](#) Changing DNS operator and registrar

Should the DNS operator change involve a registrar change the procedure described in the previous paragraph can be followed with one minor change. The first step, adding the new KSK and the new ZSK, will be immediately preceded by a transfer initiated by the gaining registrar. Until the second step will have been executed, the gaining registrar will be the sponsoring entity for a domain object that continues to refer to the losing operator's infrastructure and therefore probably also the losing registrar's data.

[3.3.](#) Losing operator not participating

The procedure described in the previous sections depends upon the

losing DNS operator's participation to incorporate the new ZSK into their DNSKEY RRSet. Should the losing operator not participate,

reasons for this being beyond the scope of this document, the gaining operator can notice this after waiting a reasonable amount of time after executing the first step.

The only known working way to avoid validation failures in this case is to declare the zone insecure by removing the DS RR from the parent zone. Some timing considerations are still due. After the parent has stopped publishing the DS RRSet, and at least one DS TTL has passed, the registered NS RRSet can be changed from the losing operator's to the gaining operator's infrastructure. The gaining operator's key material can be registered in a second step only after the maximum of the TTL values of the parent's and the (losing operator's) child's NS RRSet has passed, again counting from the appearance of the NS RRSet in the parent zone. At this point, the zone's security status is back to "secure".

[4.](#) Security Considerations

Since the procedure described in this document is incompatible with a DNSKEY algorithm rollover during the operator change, it may encourage the use of the same algorithm across all operators involved. This could essentially limit the algorithm agility from an operational perspective. Concerted action might be advised should that preferred algorithm no longer be appropriate.

Preferring insecure state over validation failure is a judgement that should be revisited, especially in the light of emerging application protocols that will ignore unsigned or unvalidated DNS data.

As with a regular ZSK key rollover there is an odd chance that RRsets with larger TTL values than the DNSKEY and NS RRsets, which dominate the timing considerations, stay in a validator's cache. Any attempt to revalidate these would lead to validation failures due to the unavailability of the old ZSK.

[5.](#) IANA Considerations

This document does not request any IANA action.

6. Acknowledgements

The review, comments, and contributions by James Galvin, Antoin Verschuren, and Paul Wouters are much appreciated. Special thanks go to the authors and contributors of [[RFC4641](#)] and [[I-D.ietf-dnsop-rfc4641bis](#)] for detailed work on key rollovers.

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Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", [RFC 5910](#), May 2010.

[Appendix A](#). Document Revision History

This section is to be removed should the draft be published.

\$Id: [draft-koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change.xml](#),v 1.7 2012/03/11 11:52:38 p

[A.1](#). Changes between -03 and -04

Clarified operational practice in the introduction.

Added timing considerations for going through insecure.

Elaborated on combined transfer and operator change.

Expanded security considerations section.

Elevated 4033, 4641, and 4641bis to normative references; relaxed 1034, 1035, and 2181 to informative.

[A.2](#). Changes between -02 and -03

Removed redundant requirement.

Reclassified 'sticky' resolver issue to assumption.

Explicitly assume secure path between registrar and registry.

Clarified rollover in progress.

[A.3.](#) Changes between -01 and -02

Split requirements and assumptions.

Declared sticky resolvers a non-issue.

Increased level of detail of discussion of TTL expiration between updates.

Added early security considerations.

[A.4.](#) Changes between -00 and -01

Expanded on the assumptions and requirements.

Added initial version of the process description.

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