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P. Koch  
DENIC eG  
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**Confidentiality Aspects of DNS Data, Publication, and Resolution  
draft-koch-perpass-dns-confidentiality-00**

Abstract

This document describes aspects of DNS data confidentiality in the light of recent IETF discussions on pervasive monitoring. It focuses on potential information leaks rather than prescribing methods of mitigation.

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## **1. Introduction**

The Domain Name System (DNS) [[RFC1034](#)] [[RFC1035](#)] is the Internet's primary name lookup system. It consists of a publication aspect, represented by authoritative name servers providing access to DNS data covering parts of the DNS tree in units of zones, and a resolution aspect. The latter consists of applications that initiate DNS requests, DNS stub resolvers and DNS full resolvers (sometimes also called recursive resolvers or recursive name servers). Resolvers might be chained using a forwarding mechanism. In today's reality, there is a variety of intercepting DNS proxies and other middle boxes which are currently out of scope but may be addressed in future versions of this memo.

Threats to the DNS are described in [[RFC3833](#)] and have been addressed by DNSSEC [[RFC4033](#)] [[RFC4034](#)] [[RFC4035](#)], both to the extent that data origin authentication is concerned. Confidentiality was not a DNSSEC design goal, although in subsequent discussion that eventually led to the specification and deployment of NSEC3 [[RFC5155](#)], confidentiality of zone content was a major issue.

### **1.1. The alleged public nature of DNS data**

It has long been claimed that "the data in the DNS is public". While this sentence makes sense for an Internet wide lookup system, there are multiple facets to data and meta data that deserve a more detailed look. First, access control lists and private name spaces notwithstanding, the DNS operates under the assumption that public facing authoritative name servers will respond to "usual" DNS queries for any zone they are authoritative for without further authentication or authorization of the client (resolver). A DNS query consists of QNAME, QCLASS and QTYPE. Due to the lack of search capabilities, only a given QNAME will reveal the resource records associated with that name (or that name's non existence). In other words: one needs to know what to ask for to receive a response. The zone transfer QTYPE [[RFC5936](#)] is often blocked or restricted to authenticated/authorized access to enforce this difference (and maybe for other, more dubious reasons).

Another differentiation to be applied is between the DNS data as mentioned above and a particular transaction, most prominently but not limited to a DNS name lookup. The fact that the results of a DNS query are public within the boundaries described in the previous paragraph and therefore might have no confidentiality requirements does not imply the same for a single or a sequence of transactions. Any transaction has meta data associated with the query data, e.g., a source address and a timestamp.

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## **1.2. Disclaimer**

The practices listed in this document appear only to support an informed discussion. Their presence (or absence) does not imply any form of support, engagement, applicability, appropriateness, fitness, or stance on legal status.

## **2. DNS Element walk through**

This section will address the specific confidentiality issues of various elements of the DNS ecosystem. We will start at the authoritative servers, leaving the provisioning side out of scope, cover the resolution and recursive resolvers and finally address DNS queries at large and packet capturing.

### **2.1. Authoritative Name Servers**

DNS zone data is published by authoritative name servers. Starting at the primary master, zone data is transferred in full (AXFR) or increments (IXFR) to secondary servers along the XFR dependency graph. The zone data thereby is inevitably revealed to any of the authoritative servers. Some zones, including the DNS root zone, are deliberately published by methods other than DNS AXFR.

While client as well as server authentication and data integrity are usually achieved by TSIG [[RFC2845](#)], there is no DNS protocol feature that provides zone transfer confidentiality. However, VPNs or other private arrangements are occasionally used. [[RFC2182](#)] is the most recent IETF document potentially dealing with this issue.

### **2.2. DNS Name Resolution**

Since the communication between an application and the local resolver or between the local (stub) resolver and a full recursive resolver is rarely authenticated, DNS queries can and have been redirected. This has mostly been done with the malicious intent to inject forged responses, but could also be used as a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack to learn a particular system's DNS queries and the response content.

The same queries (and responses) could be captured on the wire, even on the way to (and from) the correct, intended full resolver. Usually it has been assumed that the DNS resolution would not add additional intelligence given that subsequent communication would most likely reveal more than the DNS lookup. However, with recent suggestions to encrypt, say, web (HTTP) and mail (SMTP) connections, the DNS information could be of increased interest, disclosing otherwise unavailable information.



Operators of recursive resolvers could collect and examine queries directed to their systems.

The content of resolvers can reveal data about the clients using it. This information can sometimes be examined by sending DNS queries with RD=0 to inspect cache content, particularly looking at the DNS TTLs. Since this also is a reconnaissance technique for subsequent cache poisoning attacks, some counter measures have already been developed and deployed.

### **2.3. DNS Queries**

DNS queries are initiated by an application handed over to a stub resolver, sometimes involving a host dependent name caching mechanism that is out of scope of this document. They consist of a QNAME, QCLASS and QTYPE, a DNS query ID and other parameters at the IP or transport layer. Among those are an IP source address, an IP ID and a source port number [[RFC5452](#)]. While some of these parameters have received increased attention due to their significance for DNS response spoofing mitigation, they do not contribute to confidentiality and may in fact deliver additional intelligence by supporting correlation of multiple queries from one system or even a single process or application at the same source. This is sometimes used in resolver software fingerprinting or behavioural analysis.

The source address in a DNS query is necessary to direct the response, but it may help to identify the requesting entity, be that a system, a process or an end user. For recursive resolvers it is sometimes argued that the size of the population 'behind' that resolver contributes to the noise. However, a private extension [[I-D.vandergaast-edns-client-subnet](#)] exists that will disclose the source address, or some prefix of the source address to the receiver, usually an authoritative name server.

The QNAME itself will be an existing or a non existing domain name. With reference to the earlier discussion of the public (or not) nature of DNS data, the response may reveal information. More importantly, due to the use of search paths [[RFC1535](#)] the QNAME may also disclose information relative to the querying entity:

```
_ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.gc._msdcs.example.org.
```



For parts of the domain name tree that more deeply enjoy the hierarchic nature of the DNS, like the IPv6 reverse delegation [[RFC3596](#)] or ENUM [[RFC6116](#)], the query name itself, asked for at a particular time, may disclose related, either ongoing or subsequent communication. This is partly due to the fact that the DNS treats the QNAME in full all the time.

Attempts have been made to encrypt the resource record RDATA [[I-D.timms-encrypt-naptr](#)].

#### **2.4. DNS Packet Capturing**

Both ephemeral and long term DNS captures have become DNS operational practice [[DITL1](#)] [[DITL2](#)]. Taking these packet traces usually occurs close to the authoritative servers, packets being captured on the wire, but under the control of the endpoint operator.

Initially designed to reconstruct DNS zone content from query response data, passive DNS [[FW2005](#)] has evolved into a widely used tool. These traces are usually sourced by on the wire traffic between recursive resolver and authoritative server.

### **3. Security Considerations**

This document does not define a new protocol. It deals with confidentiality issues of the current DNS protocol and operations.

### **4. IANA Considerations**

This document does not propose any new IANA registry nor does it ask for any allocation from an existing IANA registry.

### **5. Acknowledgements**

This document was inspired by discussion with Wouter Wijngaards and Alexander Mayrhofer. Stephane Bortzmeyer and Nathalie Boulevard raised the issue of packet captures at a CENTR workshop. Jonathan Spring triggered some thoughts on the same topic.

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## **Appendix A. Document Revision History**

This section is to be removed should the draft be published.

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### **A.1. Initial Document**

First draft

Author's Address

Peter Koch  
DENIC eG  
Kaiserstrasse 75-77  
Frankfurt 60329  
DE

Phone: +49 69 27235 0  
Email: pk@DENIC.DE

