

Security is a function, not a layer
draft-kuehlewind-security-is-not-a-layer-00

Abstract

This document argues that security functions should be implemented on each layer as needed. Especially security functions should not be separated in its own layer. Having security scoped to the needs of each layer makes it possible to separate different functions correctly without the risk of impacting security on another layer. Note that this does not mean that each layer needs to maintain and negotiate it's on security context.

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[1.](#) Introduction

Today, encryption and (server) authentication in the web is mostly provided by TLS. TLS is a security protocol on top of (usually) TCP. However, a TLS session might possibly not be end-to-end, where an end-point is associated with the actual user at the application level, but could be interrupted by an intermediate device that e.g. terminates the TCP connection, so-called TCP proxies. Further, intermediate devices might block TLS negotiation, as a side effect when higher layer in-network functions are preformed. This effect has been often observed in e.g. mobile network which a connection failure rate of up to 20% when TLS is used [[CROWD](#)].

[More information to follow... this 00-draft is a place-holder only.]

[2.](#) Definitions

[3.](#) Discussion

[4.](#) Informative References

[CROWD] Mandalari, A., Bagnulo, M., and A. Lutu, "Informing Protocol Design Through Crowdsourcing: The Case of Pervasive Encryption", 2015.

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