Reverse Secure Shell (Reverse SSH)
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Abstract

This memo presents a technique for a SSH (Secure Shell) server to initiate the underlying TCP connection to the SSH client. This role reversal is necessary in cases where the SSH client would otherwise be unable to initiate an SSH connection to the SSH server, such as a device "calling home" on its first boot.

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1. Requirements Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

2. Introduction

This memo presents a technique for a SSH (Secure Shell) server to initiate the underlying TCP connection to the SSH client. This role reversal is necessary in cases where the SSH client would otherwise be unable to initiate an SSH connection to the SSH server, such as a device "calling home" on its first boot.

This document uses the terms "Reverse SSH client" and "Reverse SSH server" in order to reflect the role of each peer. The Reverse SSH client is the peer that initiates the TCP connection and then starts the SSH server protocol. The Reverse SSH server is the peer that listens for and accepts TCP connections and then starts the SSH client protocol.

This RFC modifies the SSH protocol in two ways:

- Removes the restriction that the SSH Client must initiate the TCP connection.
- Defines the "hmac-*" family of public key algorithms.

This RFC additionally defines a YANG module for the configuration of the Reverse SSH client running on a device.

3. Benefits to Device Management

The SSH protocol is nearly ubiquitous for device management, as it is the transport for the command-line applications `ssh`, `scp`, and `sftp` and the required transport for the NETCONF protocol. However, in all these cases, the device expects to be the SSH server so that it can authenticate the user, apply security credentials, enable SSH channels to be opened, and so on. Reverse SSH allows the device to always be the SSH server regardless of which peer initiates the underlying TCP connection.
Reverse SSH is useful for both initial deployment and on-going device management. Use of Reverse SSH for initial deployment is independent of its use for on-going management.

For initial deployment, Reverse SSH may be used as a "call home" mechanism, similar to that provided by Broadband Forum TR-069 [TR069], but with the benefit of not being bound to any particular protocol (SOAP over HTTP).

For on-going management, Reverse SSH may be used to enable any of the following scenarios:

- The device may be deployed behind a NAT-ing device that doesn't provision an external address and port to connect to.
- The device may be deployed behind a firewall that doesn't allow SSH access to the internal network.
- The device may be configured in "stealth mode" with no open ports.
- The device may access the network in a way that dynamically assigns it an IP address and is not configured to use a service to register its dynamically-assigned IP address to a well-known domain name.
- The operator prefers to have one open-port to secure in the data center, rather than have an open port on each device in the network.

One key benefit of using SSH as the transport protocol for Reverse SSH is its ability to multiplex an unspecified number of independently flow-controlled TCP sessions on top of a single encrypted tunnel [RFC4254]. This feature is valuable as the device only needs to be configured to initiate a single Reverse SSH connection regardless the number the TCP-based protocols the application wishes to support. For instance, the application may "pin up" a channel for each distinct type of asynchronous notification the device supports (logs, traps, backups, etc.) and dynamically open/close channels as needed by its runtime. Lastly, using SSH channels has been found to be more straightforward and
supported than using other multiplexing protocols such as Block Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP) [RFC3080].

4. Protocol Overview

The Reverse SSH client's perspective

- The Reverse SSH client initiates a TCP connection to the Reverse SSH server on the IANA-assigned SSH port (port 22)

- Immediately after the TCP session starts, the Reverse SSH client starts the SSH server protocol using the accepted TCP connection. That is, the Reverse SSH client sends its SSH host key during the SSH key exchange.

The Reverse SSH server's perspective

- The Reverse SSH server listens for TCP connections on the IANA-assigned SSH port (port 22)

- The Reverse SSH server accepts an incoming TCP connection and immediately starts the SSH client protocol. That is, the Reverse SSH server will need to authenticate its peer's SSH host key during the SSH key exchange.

Note: in order to enable the Reverse SSH server to identify the Reverse SSH client and automatically authenticate its SSH host key, each peer SHOULD only advertise support for one of the following host key algorithms:

+-----------------------+-----------+
|       Algorithm       | Reference |
+-----------------------+-----------+
5. The hmac-* Public Key Algorithms

This section defines a family of public host key algorithms that can be used to both identify the SSH server and enable its host key to be automatically authenticated.

The algorithms presented in this section rely on a symmetric HMAC key to convey trust. This is in contrast to the PKI based authentication model used by the x.509 based public key algorithms [[RFC6187]]. Using an HMAC key, which can be interactively provided to the SSH Server, enables Reverse SSH to be used in deployments where it's not possible for a x.509 Certificate Authority to sign the device's certificate in time. For instance, when the device is "calling home" the first time in order to receive its full configuration.

The HMAC-based host keys defined in this specification mirror those defined in [[RFC6187]]. These host-keys are to be treated the same way as in [[RFC6187]], except that the peer authenticates the host key via an HMAC, instead of PKIX.

Regardless of which underlying host key is used, the format of the hmac-* based public key is as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{x509v3-ssh-dss} & \quad \text{[RFC6187]} \\
\text{x509v3-ssh-rsa} & \quad \text{[RFC6187]} \\
\text{x509v3-rsa2048-sha256} & \quad \text{[RFC6187]} \\
\text{x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-*} & \quad \text{[RFC6187]} \\
\text{hmac-ssh-dss} & \quad \text{[RFCXXXX]} \\
\text{hmac-ssh-rsa} & \quad \text{[RFCXXXX]} \\
\text{hmac-rsa2048-sha256} & \quad \text{[RFCXXXX]} \\
\text{hmac-ecdsa-sha2-*} & \quad \text{[RFCXXXX]} \\
\end{align*}
\]
The "server-id" field encodes a user-configured unique identifier for the SSH Server. This field is necessary as the Reverse SSH client MAY not be identifiable from its TCP session's source address. For instance, the Reverse SSH client may be "calling home" for the first time or have a dynamically assigned address (DHCP, NAT, etc.).

The "host-key" field is the SSH Server's corresponding SSH host key. For instance, if the "hmac-ssh-rsa" public key was negotiated during key exchange, this field would encode the "ssh-rsa" host key.

The "hmac" field is the value produced using the MAC algorithm negotiated during key exchange over the selected host key and a user-configured HMAC key [[RFC2104]].

6. Device Configuration

For devices supporting NETCONF [[RFC4741]], this section defines a YANG [[RFC6020]] module to configure the Reverse SSH client on the device. For devices that do not support NETCONF, this section illustrates what its configuration data model SHOULD include.

This YANG module enables a NETCONF client to generically manage the NETCONF server's Reverse SSH client configuration without needing to understand a device-specific data-model. This is important as a normalized configuration is necessary to bootstrap multi-vendor devices for their "initial deployment". The definition of a YANG module also ensures that key features are enabled such as supporting more than one application, more than one server per application, and the definition of a reconnection strategy.

This RFC does not attempt to define any strategy for how an initial deployment might obtain its bootstrapping "call home" configuration (address to connect to, signature algorithm to use, authentication credentials to use, etc.). That said, implementations may consider use of a DHCP server or a USB pen drive as viable options for these kinds of deployments.
Configuration Example

<config xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <reverse-ssh xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-reverse-ssh">
    <applications>
      <application>
        <name>config-mgr</name>
        <description>
          This entry requests the device to periodically connect to the Configuration Manager application
        </description>
        <device-id>9876436534</device-id>
        <periodic-connection>
          <interval-mins>5</interval-mins>
          <linger-secs>20</linger-secs>
        </periodic-connection>
        <symmetric-authentication>
          <algorithm>hmac-sha1</algorithm>
          <hmac-key>secret</hmac-key>
        </symmetric-authentication>
        <servers>
          <server>
            <host>config-mgr1.acme.com</host>
            <port>7022</port>
          </server>
          <server>
            <host>config-mgr2.acme.com</host>
            <port>7022</port>
          </server>
        </servers>
        <keep-alive-strategy>
          <interval-secs>5</interval-secs>
          <count-max>3</count-max>
        </keep-alive-strategy>
        <reconnect-strategy>
          <start-with>last-connected</start-with>
          <interval-secs>10</interval-secs>
          <count-max>4</count-max>
        </reconnect-strategy>
      </application>
    </applications>
  </reverse-ssh>
</config>
<application>
  <name>log-monitor</name>
  <description>
    This entry requests the device to maintain a persistent connection to the Log Monitoring application
  </description>
  <device-id>device-23.53432</device-id>
  <persistent-connection/>
  <asymmetric-authentication>
    <algorithm>rsa-sha1</algorithm>
    <asymmetric-key>secret</asymmetric-key>
  </asymmetric-authentication>
  <servers>
    <server>
      <host>log-mon1.acme.com</host>
      <port>7514</port>
    </server>
    <server>
      <host>log-monitor2.acme.com</host>
      <port>7514</port>
    </server>
  </servers>
  <keep-alive-strategy>
    <interval-secs>5</interval-secs>
    <count-max>3</count-max>
  </keep-alive-strategy>
  <reconnect-strategy>
    <start-with>last-connected</start-with>
    <interval-secs>10</interval-secs>
    <count-max>4</count-max>
  </reconnect-strategy>
</application>
module ietf-reverse-ssh {
    prefix "rssh";
    import ietf-inet-types { prefix inet; }
    organization "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration Protocol) Working Group";
    contact "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
    WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
    WG Chair: Bert Wijnen
    <mailto:bertietf@bwijnen.net>
    WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
    <mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
    Editor: Kent Watsen
    <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
    revision 2011-04-26 {
        description "Initial conception";
        reference "RFC XXXX: Reverse SSH";
    }  
    // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with actual
    // RFC number and remove this note
    container reverse-ssh {
        container applications {
            description "All the application that the device
               initiates Reverse SSH connections to";
            list application {
                key name;
                min-elements 1;
                leaf name {
                    mandatory true;
                    type string {
                        length 1..32;
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
description
  "The name of the specific application";
}
leaf description {
  type string;
  description
  "An optional description for the application";
}
leaf device-id {
  type string {
    length 1..32;
  }
  description
  "The identifier the device uses to identify itself to this application. If not specified, the device will use it's serial-number (not recommended)";
}
choice connection-type {
  description "Indicates the application's preference for how the device's connection is maintained.";
  default persistent-connection;
  leaf persistent-connection {
    type empty;
  }
  container periodic-connection {
    leaf interval-mins {
      type uint8;
      default 5;
      units minutes;
      description
      "The amount of unconnected time the device will wait until establishing a connection just in case the application has some data pending to send it. The device MAY establish a connection before this time if it has data is needs to send to the device.";
    }
    leaf linger-secs {
      type uint8;
      default 30;
      units seconds;
      description
    }
  }
}
The amount of time it should wait after last receiving from or sending data to the device before closing the connection. This optimization trades off the latency for resources.

```yabaml
choice authentication-strategy {
  mandatory true;
  container symmetric-authentication {
    leaf algorithm {
      default hmac-sha1;
      type enumeration {
        enum hmac-md5;
        enum hmac-sha1;
        enum hmac-sha256;
      }
    }
    leaf hmac-key {
      mandatory true;
      type string; // secret
    }
  }
  container assymmetric-authentication {
    leaf algorithm {
      default rsa-sha1;
      type enumeration {
        enum rsa-sha1;
      }
    }
    leaf assymetric-key {
      mandatory true;
      type string; // secret
    }
  }
}
```

container servers {
  description
  "An ordered listing of the application's
servers that the device should attempt
cconnecting to."
list server {
key host;
min-elements 1;
ordered-by user;
leaf host {
  mandatory true;
type inet:host;
}
leaf port {
type inet:port-number;
description
"The IP port for this server. The device will use the IANA-assigned port if not specified.";
}
}
}
container keep-alive-strategy {
  leaf interval-secs {
type uint8;
  units seconds;
default 15;
description
"Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the client, a message will be sent to request a response from the SSH client. A value of '0' indicates that no messages should be sent.";
}
leaf count-max {
type uint8;
default 3;
description
"Sets the number of keep alive messages
that may be sent without receiving any response from the SSH client before assuming the SSH client is no longer alive. If this threshold is reached the device will disconnect the SSH session. The keep alive interval timer is reset after each transmission. Thus, an unresponsive SSH client will be disconnected after approximately 'count-max * interval-secs' seconds."

Watsen
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leaf start-with {
  default first-listed;
  type enumeration {
    enum first-listed;
    enum last-connected;
  }
}
leaf interval-secs {
  type uint8;
  units seconds;
  default 5;
  description
    "time delay between connection attempts";
}
leaf count-max {
  type uint8;
  default 3;
  description
    "num times try to connect to a server";
}
7. Security Considerations

This RFC deviates from standard SSH protocol usage by allowing the SSH server to initiate the TCP connection. This conflicts with section 4 of the SSH Transport Layer Protocol RFC [RFC4253], which states "The client initiates the connection". This role reversal, however, does not alter the fundamentals for how SSH client and SSH server authenticate each other, and thus doesn't affect the security of the solution.

This RFC defines new HMAC-based public key algorithms. Implementations SHOULD use a MAC algorithm and an HMAC-key such that the cryptographic strength of the HMAC is not less than the strength of the host key it vouches for.

The HMAC-based public key algorithms specify a "server-id" field that is passed in the clear. The server-id field SHOULD NOT contain a value that might provide an observer any undue information about the device. Specifically, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to use the device's serial number for its "server-id", as it may reveal the device's model-number and/or manufacturing date.

The hmac-* public key algorithms require the application consume the server-id field without being able to first verify that it is the value the device sent. The application must use the server-id value to lookup the device's record in a local datastore in order to obtain the HMAC-key needed to authenticate the HMAC. The application must be sure to process the server-id carefully as it may have been purposely encoded to illicit unexpected behaviour.

An attacker could DoS the application using valid "server-id" values, forcing the application to perform computationally expensive operations, only to deduce that the attacker doesn't possess a valid key. This is no different than any secured service and all common precautions apply (e.g. blacklisting the source address after a set number of unsuccessful login attempts).

8. IANA Considerations

Consistent with Section 8 of [[RFC4251]] and Section 4.6 of
[RFC4250], this document makes the following registrations:

In the Public Key Algorithm Names registry:

- The SSH public key algorithm "hmac-ssh-dss".
- The SSH public key algorithm "hmac-ssh-rsa".
- The SSH public key algorithm "hmac-rsa2048-sha256".
- The family of SSH public key algorithm names beginning with "hmac-ecdsa-sha2-" and not containing the at-sign ('@').

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References
