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**Destination Originates Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Packet  
Too Big (PTB) Messages  
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**Abstract**

This document defines procedures that enhance Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD), so that it no longer relies on the network's ability to deliver an ICMP Packet Too Big (PTB) message from a downstream router to an IPv6 source node. According to these procedures, selected packets carry a new IPv6 Destination option. When a downstream router cannot forward one of these packets because of MTU issues, it truncates the packet, marks it to indicate that it has been truncated, and forwards it towards the destination node.

When the destination node receives a packet that has been truncated, it sends an ICMP PTB message to the source node. The source node uses MTU information contained by the ICMP PTB message to update its PMTU estimate.

The destination node also examines the new Destination option to determine whether it should discard the truncated packet or deliver it to an upper-layer protocol.

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## [1.](#) Introduction

An Internet path connects a source node to a destination node. A path can contain links and routers.

Each link is constrained by the number of bytes that it can convey in a single IP packet. This constraint is called the link Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU). IPv6 [[RFC8200](#)] requires every link to have



an MTU of 1280 bytes or greater. This value is called IPv6 minimum link MTU.

Likewise, each Internet path is constrained by the number of bytes that it can convey in a IP single packet. This constraint is called the Path MTU (PMTU). For any given path, the PMTU is equal to the smallest of its link MTUs.

IPv6 allows fragmentation at the source node only. If an IPv6 source node sends a packet whose length exceeds the destination PMTU, the packet will be discarded. In order to avoid this kind of packet loss, IPv6 nodes can either:

- o Refrain from sending packets whose length exceeds the IPv6 minimum link MTU.
- o Maintain a running estimate of the destination PMTU and refrain from sending packets whose length exceeds that estimate.

IPv6 nodes can execute Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD) [[RFC8201](#)] procedures in order to maintain a running estimate of the destination PMTU. According to these procedures, the source node produces an initial PMTU estimate. This initial estimate is equal to the MTU of the first link along the path to the destination node. It can be greater than the actual PMTU.

Having produced an initial PMTU estimate, the source node sends packets to the destination node. If one of these packets is larger than the actual PMTU, a downstream router will not be able to forward the packet through the next link along the path. Therefore, the downstream router discards the packet and sends an Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) [[RFC4443](#)] Packet Too Big (PTB) message to the source node. The ICMP PTB message indicates the MTU of the link through which the packet could not be forwarded. The source node uses this information to refine its PMTU estimate.

PMTUD relies on the network's ability to deliver ICMP PTB messages from the downstream router to the source node. If the network cannot deliver these messages, a persistent black hole can develop. In this scenario, the source node sends a packet whose length exceeds the destination PMTU. A downstream router discards the packet and sends an ICMP PTB message to the source. However, the network cannot deliver the ICMP PTB message to the source. Therefore, the source node does not update its PMTU estimate and it continues to send packets whose length exceeds the destination PMTU. The downstream router discards these packets and sends ICMP PTB messages to the source. These ICMP PTB messages are lost, exactly as previous ICMP PTB messages were lost.



In some operational scenarios ([Section 3](#)), networks cannot deliver ICMP PTB messages from a downstream router to the source node. Therefore, enhanced procedures are required.

This document defines procedures that enhance PMTUD, so that it no longer relies on the network's ability to deliver an ICMP PTB message from a downstream router to an IPv6 source node. According to these procedures, selected packets carry a new IPv6 Destination option. When a downstream router cannot forward one of these packets because of MTU issues, it truncates the packet, marks it to indicate that it has been truncated, and forwards it towards the destination node.

When the destination node receives a packet that has been truncated, it sends an ICMP PTB message to the source node. The source node uses MTU information contained by the ICMP PTB message to update its PMTU estimate.

The destination node also examines the new Destination option to determine whether it should discard the truncated packet or deliver it to an upper-layer protocol. If the truncated packet is delivered to an upper-layer protocol, the upper-layer protocol can infer the PMTU between the source node and itself from the packet's length. Having inferred the PMTU, the upper-layer protocol can negotiate a maximum packet size with its upper-layer peer, thus reducing its dependence upon PMTUD and IPv6 fragmentation.

While packet truncation may facilitate new upper-layer procedures, upper-layer procedures are beyond the scope of this document.

## **2. Requirements Language**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## **3. Operational Considerations**

The packet truncation procedures described herein make PMTUD more resilient when:

- o The network can deliver ICMP PTB messages from the destination node to the source node.
- o The network cannot deliver ICMP PTB messages from a downstream router to the source node.



The following are operational scenarios in which packet truncation procedures can make PMTUD more resilient:

- o The destination node has a viable route to the source node, but the downstream router does not.
- o The source node is protected by a firewall that administratively blocks all packets except for those from specified subnetworks. The destination node resides in one of the specified subnetworks, but the downstream router does not.
- o The source address of the original packet (i.e., the packet that elicited the ICMP PTB message) was an anycast address. Therefore, the destination address of the ICMP PTB message is the same anycast address. In this case, an ICMP PTB message from the destination node is likely to be delivered to the correct anycast instance. By contrast, an ICMP PTB message from a downstream router is less likely to be delivered to the correct anycast instance.

Packet truncation procedures do not make PMTUD more resilient when the network cannot reliably deliver any ICMP PTB messages to the source node. The following are operational scenarios where the network cannot reliably deliver any ICMP PTB messages to the source node:

- o The source node is protected by a firewall that administratively blocks all ICMP PTB messages.
- o The source node is an anycast instance served by a load-balancer as defined in [\[RFC7690\]](#). The load-balancer does not implement the mitigations defined in [\[RFC7690\]](#).

#### 4. Reference Topology




Figure 1





NOTE 1: The highest-order two bits of the Option Type (i.e., the "act" bits) are 10. These bits specify the action taken by a destination node that does not recognize Truncation option. The required action is to discard the packet and, regardless of whether or not the packet's Destination Address was a multicast address, send



an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 2, message to the packet's Source Address, pointing to the unrecognized Option Type.

NOTE 2: The third highest-order bit of the Option Type (i.e., the "chg" bit) is 1. This indicates that Option Data can be modified along the path between the packet's source and its destination.

## **6. PMTU Signaling Procedures**

In the Reference Topology (Figure 1), the upper-layer protocol that resides on the source node submits a packet to its local IP layer. The packet includes a Truncation option ([Section 5](#)). Within the Truncation option:

- o The T-bit is set to zero, indicating that the packet has not been truncated.
- o The D-bit is set to zero, indicating that the packet MUST NOT be delivered to an upper-layer protocol if the packet has been truncated.
- o The R-bit is set to zero, indicating that the source node does not request delivery of truncated packets

The packet length is 500 bytes. Because the packet length is less than the destination PMTU, the packet can be delivered without encountering MTU issues.

The IP layer on the source node forwards the packet to the downstream router and the downstream router forwards the packet to the destination node. The IP layer on the destination node examines the Destination Option header. Because it recognizes the Truncation option, and because the packet has not been truncated, it delivers the packet to an upper-layer protocol.

Now, the upper-layer protocol that resides on the source node submits another packet to its local IP layer. This packet is identical to the first, except that the packet length is 2000 bytes. Because the packet length is greater than the destination PMTU, the packet cannot be delivered without encountering MTU issues.

The IP layer on the source node forwards the packet to the downstream router but the downstream router cannot forward the packet because its length exceeds the MTU of the next-hop link. Because an MTU issue has been encountered, the IP Layer on the downstream router examines the Destination Options header, searching for a Truncation option. (Normally, the downstream router would ignore the Destination Options header).



Because the downstream router finds and recognizes the Truncation option, it:

- o Truncates the packet, so that its new length equals the MTU of the next-hop link.
- o Updates the Payload Length field in the IPv6 header as appropriate.
- o Sets the T-bit in the Truncation option.
- o Forwards the packet to the destination node.

The IP layer on the destination node examines the Destination Option header. Because it recognizes the Truncation option, and because the packet has been truncated, it sends an ICMP PTB message to the source node. The MTU field in the ICMP PTB message is set to the packet's length.

The IP layer on the destination node then discards the packet because the packet has been truncated and the D-bit is set to 0. It does not deliver the packet to an upper-layer protocol.

As per [RFC8201], the source node updates its PMTU estimate using information contained by the ICMP PTB message.

## 7. Truncation Considerations

A packet can be truncated multiple times.




Figure 3: Double Truncation

Figure 3 depicts a network that contains a Source Node, Router1, Router2 and a Destination Node. The link that connects the Source Node to Router1 has an MTU of 9000 bytes. The link that connects Router1 to Router2 has an MTU of 4000 bytes, and the link that

connects Router2 to the Destination Node has an MTU of 1500 bytes.

Assume that the Source Node sends a packet to the Destination Node.  
The packet is 8000 bytes long. When Router1 receives this packet, it

identifies the next-hop towards the destination. This is the link that connects Router1 to Router2. Router 1 encounters an MTU issue, because the packet length (8000 bytes) is greater than the MTU associated with the next-hop link (4000 bytes). Therefore, Router 1 truncates the packet to 4000 bytes, sets the T-bit in the Truncation Option, and forwards the packet towards Router2. When Router2 receives this packet, it identifies the next-hop towards the destination. This is the link that connects Router2 to the Destination Node. Router 2 encounters an MTU issue, because the packet length (4000 bytes) is greater than the MTU associated with the next-hop link (1500 bytes). Therefore, Router 2 truncates the packet to 1500 bytes, sets the T-bit in the Truncation Option, and forwards the packet towards the Destination Node. The Destination Node sends an ICMP PTB packet to the source node. The MTU field in the ICMP PTB field is set to 1500.

A truncated packet MUST contain the basic IPv6 header, all extension headers and the first upper-layer header. When a router cannot forward a packet through the next-hop link due to MTU issues, and the total length of the basic IPv6 header, all extension headers, and first upper-layer header exceeds the MTU of the next-hop link, the router MUST discard the packet and send an ICMP PTB message to the source.

Source nodes MUST NOT emit packets that contain both the Fragment Header and Truncation Option.

Routers MUST NOT truncate packets that include the Fragment header. When a router cannot forward a packet through the next-hop link due to MTU issues, and the packet includes a Fragment header, the router MUST discard the packet and send an ICMP PTB message to the source.

Routers MUST NOT emit truncated packets whose length is less than the IPv6 minimum link MTU.

## **8. ICMP Considerations**

When a destination node receives a truncated packet whose length is less than the IPv6 minimum link MTU, the destination node MUST discard the packet. It MUST NOT send an ICMP PTB message to the packet's source and it MUST NOT deliver the packet to an upper-layer protocol.

## **9. Delivering Truncated Packets**

A destination node MUST NOT deliver a truncated packet to an upper-layer protocol if the D-bit is set to zero. However, a destination





node SHOULD deliver a truncated packet to an upper-layer protocol if the D-bit is set to one.

The upper-layer protocol on the source node determines the D-bit value. The following are possible behaviors:

- o Some upper-layer protocols never set the D-bit.
- o Some upper-layer protocols always set the D-bit.
- o Some upper-layer protocols only set the D-bit when requested to do so by the upper-layer protocol on the destination node. These upper-layer protocols interpret the receipt of a Truncation option with the R-bit set as a request to set the D-bit on all subsequent packets.

## **10. Backward Compatibility**

The procedures described in [Section 6](#) of this document assume that the source node, downstream router and destination node all recognized the Truncation option. This section explores backwards compatibility, where one or more nodes do not recognize the Truncation option.

If the destination node does not recognize the Truncation option, and it receives a packet that includes the Truncation option, it discards the packet and, regardless of whether or not the packet's Destination Address was a multicast address, sends an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 2, message to the packet's Source Address, pointing to the unrecognized Option Type. This behavior is determined by the highest-order two bytes of the Option Type. When the source node receives the ICMP Parameter Problem message, it refrains from sending packets that contain the Truncation option.

If the downstream router does not recognize the Truncation option and it receives a packet that contains the Truncation option and that packet's length does not exceed the next-hop MTU, the downstream router forwards the packet, without examining the Truncation option or any other Destination option. If the downstream router does not recognize the Truncation option and it receives a packet that contains the Truncation option and that packet's length exceeds the next-hop MTU, the downstream discards the packet and sends an ICMP PTB message to the source node, as per [\[RFC8200\]](#).

In all cases mentioned above, PMTUD continues to function as specified in [\[RFC8201\]](#).



## **11. Optimizations**

The procedures described in [Section 6](#) of this document can be optimized by omitting the Truncation option on packets whose length is known to be less than the destination PMTU (e.g., packets whose length is less than the IPv6 minimum link MTU).

## **12. Upper-Layer Considerations**

The procedures described herein rely upon:

- o The network's ability to convey packets that contain destination options from a source node to a destination node.
- o The network's ability to convey ICMP Parameter Problem messages in the reverse direction.

Operational experience [[RFC7872](#)] reveals that a significant number of networks drop packets that contain IPv6 destination options. Likewise, many networks drop ICMP Parameter Problem messages.

[I-D.bonica-6man-unrecognized-opt] describes procedures that upper-layer protocols can execute to verify that the above-mentioned requirements are satisfied. Upper-layer protocols can execute these procedures before emitting packets that contain the Truncation option.

## **13. Encapsulating Security Payload Considerations**

An IPv6 packet can contain both:

- o An Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [[RFC4303](#)] header.
- o The Truncation Option.

In this case, the packet MUST contain a Destination Options header that precedes the ESP. That Destination Options header contains the Truncation Option and is not protected by the ESP. The packet MAY also contain another Destination Options header that follows the ESP. This Destination Options header is protected by the ESP and MUST NOT contain the Truncation Option.

As per [RFC 4303](#), a packet can contain two Destination Option headers one preceding the ESP and one following the ESP.



#### **14. Extension Header Considerations**

According to [[RFC8201](#)], the following IPv6 extension headers can carry options:

- o The Hop-by-hop Options header.
- o The Destination Options header.

The Hop-by-hop Options header is examined by the destination node. It can also be examined by intermediate nodes (i.e., nodes along the path between the source and the destination), so long as those nodes are configured to process Hop-by-hop options. By contrast, the Destination Options header is examined by the destination node only.

The Truncation option is examined by:

- o The destination node.
- o Intermediate nodes, but only on an exception basis (i.e., when the intermediate node cannot forward the packet due to MTU issues)

If performance were not a concern, the Hop-by-hop Options header could carry the Truncation Option. The destination node would examine the Truncation option, as would every intermediate node. However, the performance impact would not be acceptable.

By contrast, the Destination Option can carry the truncation option, so long as intermediate nodes can examine the Destination Option header on an exception basis (e.g., when the packet cannot be forwarded due to MTU issues). [[RFC2473](#)] sets a precedent for intermediate nodes examining the Destination Options header on an exception basis. (See the Tunnel Encapsulation Limit.)

Therefore, The IPv6 Destination Options header MAY include the Truncation option and the IPv6 Hop-by-hop header MUST NOT include the Truncation option.

#### **15. Security Considerations**

PMTUD is vulnerable to ICMP PTB forgery attacks. The procedures described herein do nothing to mitigate that vulnerability.

The procedures described herein are susceptible to a new variation on that attack, in which an attacker forges a truncated packet. In this case, the attackers cause the destination node to produce an ICMP PTB message on their behalf. To some degree, this vulnerability is mitigated, because the destination node will not emit an ICMP PTB



message in response to a truncated packet whose length is less than the IPv6 minimum link MTU.

## **16. IANA Considerations**

IANA is requested to allocate a codepoint from the Destination Options and Hop-by-hop Options registry (<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-parameters/ipv6-parameters.xhtml#ipv6-parameters-2>). This option is called "Truncation". The "act" bits are 10 and the "chg" bit is 1.

## **17. Acknowledgements**

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