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# Knowledge Transmission Using Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel

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Abstract

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The document specifies new DOTS data channel configuration parameters that customize the DDoS knowledge transmission configuration between distributed knowledge bases. These options enable assist the distributed knowledge base to share attack knowledge in different fields and actively adapt to dynamically changing DDoS attacks.

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## **1**. Introduction

To detect DDoS attacks, various security organizations have designed series of network security datasets by conducting various simulations or collecting data related to DDoS attacks in actual network environments. Such an effort is meant aiming to reflect the recent trends of DDoS attacks that are more sophisticated and dynamic by designing a comprehensive data set containing normal and abnormal behavior.

As a new knowledge representation method, the knowledge graph [KG] represents the relationship between entities in the form of graphs, and is essentially a semantic network that reveals the relationships between entities. Knowledge graph technology can standardize and integrate DDoS attack-related intelligence, generate DDoS attack knowledge and store it in the network security malicious behavior knowledge base to solve the problem that multi-source heterogeneous data is difficult to share and reuse.

The DOTS data channel [RFC8783] is used to exchange bulk data between DOTS agents, coordinate multiple DOTS servers and DOTS clients, and perform tasks such as creating resource aliases and managing filtering rules. [RFC8783] specifies the YANG data model and the basic data channel functions.

The knowledge base can describe the malicious behavior of DDoS attacks from multiple dimensions, and contains a large number of DDoS attack-related data and knowledge graph structures, thereby assisting the DOTS server to issue mitigation measures to defend against DDoS attack traffic. In order to ensure the timeliness of the knowledge base, it is necessary to continuously transmit new data for the knowledge base and ensure the sharing and synchronization of knowledge among the distributed knowledge bases. The data channel as specified in [RFC8783] lacks a knowledge transmission structure. Therefore, it is difficult to meet the dynamically changing form of DDoS attacks.

This document defines new DOTS data channel attributes. It mainly builds a new YANG data model for distributed scenarios that need to constantly update and synchronize the content of the knowledge base, including a general tree structure and YANG data modules, aiming to customize the DDoS knowledge transmission configuration between distributed knowledge bases.

## 2.Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in <u>BCP</u> <u>14</u> [<u>RFC2119</u>] [<u>RFC8174</u>] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Readers should be familiar with the terms and concepts defined in [<u>RFC8612</u>] [<u>RFC8783</u>] and [<u>RFC8811</u>].

### 3.DOTS Knowledge Transmission Architecture

A complete example of the DOTS knowledge transmission architecture may be a DDoS attack-oriented network security knowledge base deployed on a large scale in the form of distributed nodes as the server, and the attacked target as the client. The host suspects that it is under a DDoS attack based on the detection results of the third-party intrusion detection model. It obtains DDoS attack information according to the traffic feature extraction tool deployed on the DOTS client, and forwards it through the access gateway. The access gateway matches DDoS attack traffic and converts it into attack knowledge and stores it in a nearby network security knowledge base. Specifically, each access gateway stores a mapping table between the knowledge base and the arrival delay. The access gateway will transmit the attack knowledge to the knowledge base with the lowest transmission delay at the current moment. After DDoS attacks

are mitigated, distributed nodes transmit new knowledge through data channels to achieve knowledge synchronization. Therefore, they aim to share attack knowledge in different domains and actively adapt to dynamically changing DDoS attacks.

The basic DOTS knowledge transmission architecture is illustrated in Figure 1:

+	+	++	++	
		Access Gateway		
	++	++	++	
	DDoS	Knowledge	knowledge	
	Target-1	Collection	+>  base-1	
	++	++	++	
DDoS	++	++	++	
Attack	DDoS	Knowledge	knowledge	
>	Target-2	Transmission	+>  base-2	
	++	++	++	
	++		++	
	DDoS		knowledge	
	Target-n		+>  base-n	
	++	Data Channel	++	
	C <-	-++-	-+> S	
++ ++ ++				
* C is for DOTS client				
* S is for DOTS server				

Figure 1: Basic DOTS Knowledge Transmission Architecture

In some cases, part of the domain has never been attacked, and another part of the domain may be frequently subjected to DDoS attacks, so new knowledge of DDoS attacks will be continuously introduced. The administrator needs to configure a corresponding update cycle according to the attack situation in the DOTS client domain. Specifically, for domains with few attack records, the update period should be appropriately extended to reduce bandwidth consumption. For domains with high security requirements, such as enterprise networks, the number of requests should be increased and DOTS data channels should be established with more domains with similar security requirements to obtain more comprehensive knowledge of DDoS attacks.

This document augments the "ietf-dots-data-channel" (dots-data) DOTS data YANG module defined in [<u>RFC8783</u>] with the following additional attributes that can be shared between DOTS servers to realize the secure and periodic transmission of DDoS attack knowledge:

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related-time: This attribute contains the creation-time and mergetime of DDoS attack knowledge. The default value of this attribute is 'now-date' obtained from the system.

This is an optional attribute.

label: This attribute represents the type of network security knowledge graph currently transmitted. Different types of graphs are responsible for different security functions. Among them, the graph type used to maintain traffic characteristics is set to '0'. The graph type used to describe topological relationships is set to '1'. The graph type used to store the detection results corresponding to the flow is set to '2'. The default value of this attribute is '0'.

This is an optional attribute.

knowledge-base: This attribute represents the name of the currently transmitted network security knowledge graph. The default value of this attribute is 'none'.

This is an optional attribute.

entities: This attribute contains all node information in the knowledge graph. Optional under this attribute include 'type', 'id', 'labels', and 'properties'.

This is an optional attribute.

relationship: This attribute contains all the node relationships in the knowledge graph. Optional under this attribute include 'id', 'type', 'label', 'properties', 'start', and 'end'.

This is an optional attribute.

### **<u>4</u>**. DOTS Knowledge Transmission YANG Module

## 4.1 Generic Tree Structure

This document defines the YANG module "li-dots-knowledge-trans" (<u>Section 3</u>), which has the following tree structure:

```
module: li-dots-knowledge-trans
+--rw dots-data
    +--rw dots-client* [cuid]
    | ...
    +--ro capabilities
    | ...
    +-- knowledge-trans
```

+-- related-time +--rw creation-date-and-time string +--rw merge-date-and-time string +--rw label +--rw knowledge-base string +--rw model-param string +-- entities | +--rw type string | +--rw id uint32 | +--rw labels string +-- properties 1 +-- rw name string +-- rw establishdate uint8 +-- relationship +--rw id uint32 +--rw type string +--rw label string +--rw properties string +-- start | +--rw id uint32 string | +--rw labels +-- end +--rw id uint32 +--rw labels1 string

Figure 2: DOTS Knowledge Transmission Subtree

Based on the above-mentioned yang module structure, a method is provided for the distributed network security knowledge base to periodically update and synchronize the new DDoS attack knowledge in each domain, so as to more effectively deal with the ever-changing DDoS attack types.

### 4.2 YANG Module

This module uses the common YANG types defined in [RFC6991] and types defined in [RFC8519].

```
<CODE BEGINS> file "li-dots-knowledge-trans@2021-08-06.yang"
module li-dots-knowledge-trans {
   yang-version 1.1;
   namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:li-dots-knowledge-trans";
   prefix dots-knowledge;
   import ietf-dots-data-channel {
      prefix dots-data;
      reference
        "RFC 8783: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
```

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[Page 6]

# }

```
organization
  "IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
contact
     "WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
     WG List: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
     Author: Kun Li
              <mailto:19111021@bjtu.edu.cn>;
     Author: Huachun Zhou
              <mailto:hchzhou@bjtu.edu.cn>";
     Author: Zhe Tu
              <mailto:19111038@bjtu.edu.cn>;
     Author: Feiyang Liu
              <mailto:19120077@bjtu.edu.cn>;
     Author: Weilin Wang
              <mailto:19111021@bjtu.edu.cn>;
description
  "This module contains YANG definitions for the configuration
  of parameters that can be negotiated between DOTS servers to
  realize the secure and periodic transmission of DDoS
  attack knowledge.
  Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
  authors of the code. All rights reserved.
  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
  without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
```

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(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

This version of this YANG module is part of <u>RFC 8783;</u> see the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

```
revision 2021-08-06 {
  description
    "Initial revision.";
  reference
    "<u>RFC 8783</u>: Knowledge Transmission Using Distributed
        Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
        (DOTS) Data Channel";
```

}

```
list knowledge-trans {
  description
     "Top-level grouping for knowledge transmission.";
  container related-time {
     description
       "Relevant time for knowledge transmission.";
     leaf creation-date-and-time {
       type string
       description
         "Knowledge graph establishment date and time.";
   }
   leaf merge-date-and-time {
      type string
      description
         "Knowledge synchronization initiation date and time.";
   }
  }
  leaf label {
     type string
     description
       "Type of network security knowledge graph currently
        transmitted.";
  }
  leaf knowledge-base {
     type string
     description
       "Name of network security knowledge graph currently
       transmitted.";
  }
  leaf model-param {
     type string
     description
       "Attached machine learning h5 model parameters.";
  }
  list entities {
     key id;
     description
       "Entity contains all node information in the knowledge
        graph.";
     leaf id {
      type uint32
      description
         "Id of the new node.";
     }
     leaf type {
       type string
```

description

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```
"Type of the new node.";
  }
  leaf labels {
    type string
    description
      "Label of the new node.";
  }
  container properties {
    description
      "Properties of the new node.";
    leaf name {
      type string
      description
        "Property name of the new node.";
    }
    leaf establishdate {
      type uint8
      description
        "Node creation time.";
    }
  }
}
list relationship {
  key id;
  description
  "Relationship contains all the node relationships in the
   knowledge graph.";
 leaf id {
   type uint32
   description
     "Id of the new relationship.";
}
 leaf type {
   type string
   description
     "Type of the new relationship.";
 }
 leaf labels {
   type string
   description
     "Label of the new relationship.";
 }
 leaf properties {
   type string
   description
     "Properties of the new relationship.";
 }
  container start {
```

description

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```
"Starting node of the new relationship.";
       leaf id {
         type uint32
         description
           "Id of starting node.";
       }
       leaf labels {
         type string
         description
           "Label of starting node.";
       }
     }
     container end {
       description
         "Ending node of the new relationship.";
       leaf id {
         type uint32
         description
           "Id of ending node.";
       }
       leaf labels {
         type string
         description
           "Label of ending node.";
       }
     }
   }
<CODE ENDS>
```

# 5. Managing DOTS Knowledge Transmission

}

```
A POST request is used by a DOTS client to periodically synchronize
knowledge about DDoS attacks. This knowledge can be used to guide
subsequent mitigation measures to more effectively deal with multiple
types of DDoS attacks. An example of a request for periodic
transmission of DDoS attack knowledge is shown in Figure 3.
```

```
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
     /dots-client=cuid HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}: {port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:knowledge-trans": {
    [
      {
```

"type": "node",

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```
"id": 0,
    "labels": ["Slow-DDoS"],
    "properties": {
      "name": "Shrew",
      "establishdate": 20210806094618
    },
  {
    "type": "node",
    "id": 1,
    "labels": ["Application-layer-DDoS"],
    "properties": {
      "name": "Http-get",
      "establishdate": 20210806100512
    },
  },
  {
    "id": 0,
    "type": "relationship",
    "label": "Related-to",
    "properties": {}
    "start": {
      "id": 0,
      "labels": "Slow-DDoS"
    }
    "end": {
      "id": 1,
      "labels": "Application-layer-DDoS"
    }
  }
]
```

Figure 3: An Example of DOTS Request Knowledge Update Process

A DOTS client use the POST request to update the knowledge, otherwise the server respond with a "404 Not Found" status-line.

# <u>6</u>. IANA Considerations

} }

This document has no IANA actions.

# 7. Security Considerations

The security considerations for the DOTS data channel protocol are discussed in <u>Section 10 of [RFC8783]</u>.

This document defines YANG data structures that are meant to be used as an abstract representation in DOTS data channel. As such, the "li-dots-knowledge-trans" module does not introduce any new vulnerabilities beyond those specified above.

## 8. References

### 8.1 Normative References

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- [RFC8519] Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Huang, L., and D. Blair, "YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)", <u>RFC 8519</u>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8519, March 2019, <<u>https://www.</u> rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8519>.

## 8.2 Informative References

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