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**Hybrid Two-Step Performance Measurement Method  
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**Abstract**

Development of, and advancements in, automation of network operations brought new requirements for measurement methodology. Among them is the ability to collect instant network state as the packet being processed by the networking elements along its path through the domain. This document introduces a new hybrid measurement method, referred to as hybrid two-step, as it separates the act of measuring and/or calculating the performance metric from the act of collecting and transporting network state.

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## [1.](#) Introduction

Successful resolution of challenges of automated network operation, as part of, for example, overall service orchestration or data center operation, relies on a timely collection of accurate information that reflects the state of network elements on an unprecedented scale. Because performing the analysis and act upon the collected information requires considerable computing and storage resources, the network state information is unlikely to be processed by the network elements themselves but will be relayed into the data storage facilities, e.g., data lakes. The process of producing, collecting network state information also referred to in this document as network telemetry, and transporting it for post-processing should work equally well with data flows or injected in the network test



packets. [RFC 7799](#) [[RFC7799](#)] describes a combination of elements of passive and active measurement as a hybrid measurement.

Several technical methods have been proposed to enable the collection of network state information instantaneous to the packet processing, among them [[P4.INT](#)] and [[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data](#)]. The instantaneous, i.e., in the data packet itself, collection of telemetry information simplifies the process of attribution of telemetry information to the particular monitored flow. On the other hand, this collection method impacts the data packets, potentially changing their treatment by the networking nodes. Also, the amount of information the instantaneous method collects might be incomplete because of the limited space it can be allotted. Other proposals defined methods to collect telemetry information in a separate packet from each node traversed by the monitored data flow. Examples of this approach to collecting telemetry information are [[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-direct-export](#)] and [[I-D.song-ippm-postcard-based-telemetry](#)]. These methods allow data collection from any arbitrary path and avoid directly impacting data packets. On the other hand, the correlation of data and the monitored flow requires that each packet with telemetry information also includes characteristic information about the monitored flow.

This document introduces Hybrid Two-Step (HTS) as a new method of telemetry collection that improves accuracy of a measurement by separating the act of measuring or calculating the performance metric from the collecting and transporting this information while minimizing the overhead of the generated load in a network. HTS method extends the two-step mode of Residence Time Measurement (RTM) defined in [[RFC8169](#)] to on-path network state collection and transport. HTS allows the collection of telemetry information from any arbitrary path, does not change data packets of the monitored flow and makes the process of attribution of telemetry to the data flow simple.

## **[2.](#) Conventions used in this document**

### **[2.1.](#) Acronyms**

RTM Residence Time Measurement

ECMP Equal Cost Multipath

MTU Maximum Transmission Unit

HTS Hybrid Two-Step

HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code



Network telemetry - the process of collecting and reporting of network state

## **2.2. Requirements Language**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## **3. Problem Overview**

Performance measurements are meant to provide data that characterize conditions experienced by traffic flows in the network and possibly trigger operational changes (e.g., re-route of flows, or changes in resource allocations). Modifications to a network are determined based on the performance metric information available when a change is to be made. The correctness of this determination is based on the quality of the collected metrics data. The quality of collected measurement data is defined by:

- o the resolution and accuracy of each measurement;
- o predictability of both the time at which each measurement is made and the timeliness of measurement collection data delivery for use.

Consider the case of delay measurement that relies on collecting time of packet arrival at the ingress interface and time of the packet transmission at the egress interface. The method includes recording a local clock value on receiving the first octet of an affected message at the device ingress, and again recording the clock value on transmitting the first byte of the same message at the device egress. In this ideal case, the difference between the two recorded clock times corresponds to the time that the message spent in traversing the device. In practice, the time recorded can differ from the ideal case by any fixed amount. A correction can be applied to compute the same time difference taking into account the known fixed time associated with the actual measurement. In this way, the resulting time difference reflects any variable delay associated with queuing.

Depending on the implementation, it may be a challenge to compute the difference between message arrival and departure times and - on the fly - add the necessary residence time information to the same message. And that task may become even more challenging if the packet is encrypted. Recording the departure of a packet time in the same packet may be detrimental to the accuracy of the measurement



because the departure time includes the variable time component (such as that associated with buffering and queuing of the packet). A similar problem may lower the quality of, for example, information that characterizes utilization of the egress interface. If unable to obtain the data consistently, without variable delays for additional processing, information may not accurately reflect the egress interface state. To mitigate this problem [[RFC8169](#)] defined an RTM two-step mode.

Another challenge associated with methods that collect network state information into the actual data packet is the risk to exceed the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) size, especially if the packet traverses overlay domains or VPNs. Since the fragmentation is not available at the transport network, operators may have to reduce MTU size advertised to the client layer or risk missing network state data for the part, most probably the latter part, of the path.

#### **4. Theory of Operation**

The HTS method consists of two phases:

- o performing a measurement or obtaining network state information, one or more than one type, on a node;
- o collecting and transporting the measurement.

HTS uses HTS Trigger carried in a data packet or a specially constructed test packet. For example, an HTS Trigger could be a packet that has IOAM Option-Type set to the "IOAM Hybrid Two-Step Option-Type" value (TBA1) allocated by IANA (see [Section 6.1](#)). The HTS Trigger also includes IOAM Namespace-ID and IOAM-Trace-Type information [[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data](#)]. A packet in the flow to which the Alternate-Marking method [[RFC8321](#)] is applied can be used as an HTS Trigger. The nature of the HTS Trigger is a transport network layer-specific, and its description is outside the scope of this document. The packet that includes the HTS Trigger in this document is also referred to as the trigger packet.

The HTS method uses the HTS Follow-up packet, referred to as the follow-up packet, to collect measurement and network state data from the nodes. The node that creates the HTS Trigger also generates the HTS Follow-up packet. The follow-up packet contains characteristic information, copied from the trigger packet, sufficient for participating HTS nodes to associate it with the original packet. The exact composition of the characteristic information is specific for each transport network, and its definition is outside the scope of this document. The follow-up packet also uses the same encapsulation as the data packet. If not payload but only network



information used to load-balance flows in equal cost multipath (ECMP), use of the network encapsulation identical to the trigger packet should guarantee that the follow-up packet remains in-band, i.e., traverses the same set of network elements, with the original data packet with the HTS Trigger. Only one outstanding follow-up packet MUST be on the node for the given path. That means that if the node receives an HTS Trigger for the flow on which it still waits for the follow-up packet to the previous HTS Trigger, the node will originate the follow-up packet to transport the former set of the network state data and transmit it before it sends the follow-up packet with the latest collection of network state information.

#### 4.1. Operation of the HTS Ingress Node

A node that originates the HTS Trigger is referred to as the HTS ingress node. As stated, the ingress node originates the follow-up packet. The follow-up packet has the transport network encapsulation identical with the trigger packet followed by the HTS shim and one or more telemetry information elements encoded as Type-Length-Value {TLV}. Figure 1 displays an example of the follow-up packet format.




Figure 1: Follow-up Packet Format

Fields of the HTS shim are as follows:

Version (Ver) is the two-bits long field. It specifies the version of the HTS shim format. This document defines the format for the 0b00 value of the field.

HTS Shim Length is the six bits-long field. It defines the length of the HTS shim in bytes. The minimal value of the field is four bytes.






Figure 2: Flags Field Format

Flags is eight-bits long. The format of the Flags field displayed in Figure 2.

Full (F) flag MUST be set to zero by the node originating the HTS follow-up packet and MUST be set to one by the node that does not add its telemetry data to avoid exceeding MTU size.

The node originating the follow-up packet MUST zero the Reserved field and ignore it on the receipt.

Sequence Number is 16 bits-long field. The zero-based value of the field reflects the place of the HTS follow-up packet in the sequence of the HTS follow-up packets that originated in response to the same HTS trigger. The ingress node MUST set the value of the field to zero.

Telemetry Data Profile is the optional variable-length field of bit-size flags. Each flag indicates the requested type of telemetry data to be collected at each HTS node. The increment of the field is four bytes with a minimum length of zero. For example, IOAM-Trace-Type information defined in [\[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data\]](#) can be used in the Telemetry Data Profile field.




Figure 3: Telemetry Data TLV Format

Telemetry Data TLV is a variable-length field. Multiple TLVs MAY be placed in an HTS packet. Additional TLVs may be enclosed within a given TLV, subject to the semantics of the (outer) TLV in



question. Figure 3 presents the format of a Telemetry Data TLV, where fields are defined as the following:

Type - a one-octet-long field that characterizes the interpretation of the Value field.

Reserved - one-octet-long field.

Length - two-octet-long field equal to the length of the Value field in octets.

Value - a variable-length field. The value of the Type field determines its interpretation and encoding. IOAM data fields, defined in [[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data](#)], MAY be carried in the Value field.

All multibyte fields defined in this specification are in network byte order.

#### **4.2. Operation of the HTS Intermediate Node**

Upon receiving the trigger packet, the HTS intermediate node MUST:

- o copy the transport information;
- o start the HTS Follow-up Timer for the obtained flow;
- o transmit the trigger packet.

Upon receiving the follow-up packet, the HTS intermediate node MUST:

1. verify that the matching transport information exists and the Full flag is cleared, then stop the associated HTS Follow-up Timer;
2. otherwise, transmit the received packet. Proceed to Step 8;
3. collect telemetry data requested in the Telemetry Data Profile field or defined by the local HTS policy;
4. if adding the collected telemetry would not exceed MTU, then append data as a new Telemetry Data TLV and transmit the follow-up packet. Proceed to Step 8;
5. otherwise, set the value of the Full flag to one, copy the transport information from the received follow-up packet and transmit it accordingly. Proceed to Step 8;



6. originate the new follow-up packet using the transport information copied from the received follow-up packet. The value of the Sequence Number field in the HTS shim MUST be set to the value of the field in the received follow-up packet incremented by one;
7. copy collected telemetry data into the first Telemetry Data TLV's Value field and then transmit the packet;
8. processing completed.

If the HTS Follow-up Timer expires, the intermediate node MUST:

- o originate the follow-up packet using transport information associated with the expired timer;
- o initialize the HTS shim by setting the Version field's value to 0b00 and Sequence Number field to 0. Values of HTS Shim Length and Telemetry Data Profile fields MAY be set according to the local policy.
- o copy telemetry information into Telemetry Data TLV's Value field and transmit the packet.

If the intermediate node receives a "late" follow-up packet, i.e., a packet to which the node has no associated HTS Follow-up timer, the node MUST forward the "late" packet.

#### **4.3. Operation of the HTS Egress Node**

Upon receiving the trigger packet, the HTS egress node MUST:

- o copy the transport information;
- o start the HTS Collection timer for the obtained flow.

When the egress node receives the follow-up packet for the known flow, i.e., the flow to which the Collection timer is running, the node for each of Telemetry Data TLVs MUST:

- o if HTS is used in the authenticated mode, verify the authentication of the Telemetry Data TLV using the Authentication sub-TLV (see [Section 5](#));
- o copy telemetry information from the Value field;
- o restart the corresponding Collection timer.



When the Collection timer expires, the egress relays the collected telemetry information for processing and analysis to a local or remote agent.

#### **[4.4.](#) Considerations for HTS Timers**

This specification defines two timers - HTS Follow-up and HTS Collection. For the particular flow, there **MUST** be no more than one HTS Trigger, values of HTS timers bounded by the rate of the trigger generation for that flow.

#### **[4.5.](#) Deploying HTS in a Multicast Network**

Previous sections discussed the operation of HTS in a unicast network. Multicast services are important, and the ability to collect telemetry information is invaluable in delivering a high quality of experience. While the replication of data packets is necessary, replication of HTS follow-up packets is not. Replication of multicast data packets down a multicast tree may be set based on multicast routing information or explicit information included in the special header, as, for example, in Bit-Indexed Explicit Replication [[RFC8296](#)]. A replicating node processes the HTS packet as defined below:

- o the first transmitted multicast packet **MUST** be followed by the received corresponding HTS packet as described in [Section 4.2](#);
- o each consecutively transmitted copy of the original multicast packet **MUST** be followed by the new HTS packet originated by the replicating node that acts as an intermediate HTS node when the HTS Follow-up timer expired.

As a result, there are no duplicate copies of Telemetry Data TLV for the same pair of ingress and egress interfaces. At the same time, all ingress/egress pairs traversed by the given multicast packet reflected in their respective Telemetry Data TLV. Consequently, a centralized controller would reconstruct and analyze the state of the particular multicast distribution tree based on HTS packets collected from egress nodes.

### **[5.](#) Authentication in HTS**

Telemetry information may be used to drive network operation, closing the control loop for self-driving, self-healing networks. Thus it is critical to provide a mechanism to protect the telemetry information collected using the HTS method. This document defines an optional authentication of a Telemetry Data TLV that protects the collected information's integrity.



The format of the Authentication sub-TLV is displayed in Figure 4.




Figure 4: HMAC sub-TLV

where fields are defined as follows:

- o Authentication Type - is a one-octet-long field, value TBA2 allocated by IANA [Section 6.2](#).
- o Length - two-octet-long field, set equal to the length of the Digest field in octets.
- o HMAC Type - is a one-octet-long field that identifies the type of the HMAC and the length of the digest and the length of the digest according to the HTS HMAC Type sub-registry (see [Section 6.4](#)).
- o Digest - is a variable-length field that carries HMAC digest of the text that includes the encompassing TLV.

This specification defines the use of HMAC-SHA-256 truncated to 128 bits ([\[RFC4868\]](#)) in HTS. Future specifications may define the use in HTS of more advanced cryptographic algorithms or the use of digest of a different length. HMAC is calculated as defined in [\[RFC2104\]](#) over text as the concatenation of the Sequence Number field of the follow-up packet (see Figure 1) and the preceding data collected in the Telemetry Data TLV. The digest then MUST be truncated to 128 bits and written into the Digest field. Distribution and management of shared keys are outside the scope of this document. In the HTS authenticated mode, the Authentication sub-TLV MUST be present in each Telemetry Data TLV. HMAC MUST be verified before using any data in the included Telemetry Data TLV. If HMAC verification fails, the system MUST stop processing corresponding Telemetry Data TLV and notify an operator. Specification of the notification mechanism is outside the scope of this document.



## 6. IANA Considerations

### 6.1. IOAM Option-Type for HTS

The IOAM Option-Type registry is requested in [\[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data\]](#). IANA is requested to allocate a new code point as listed in Table 1.

Value	Description	Reference
TBA1	IOAM Hybrid Two-Step Option-Type	This document

Table 1: IOAM Option-Type for HTS

### 6.2. HTS TLV Registry

IANA is requested to create the HTS TLV Type registry. All code points in the range 1 through 175 in this registry shall be allocated according to the "IETF Review" procedure specified in [\[RFC8126\]](#). Code points in the range 176 through 239 in this registry shall be allocated according to the "First Come First Served" procedure specified in [\[RFC8126\]](#). The remaining code points are allocated according to Table 2:

Value	Description	Reference
0	Reserved	This document
1- 175	Unassigned	This document
176 - 239	Unassigned	This document
240 - 251	Experimental	This document
252 - 254	Private Use	This document
255	Reserved	This document

Table 2: HTS TLV Type Registry

### 6.3. HTS Sub-TLV Type Sub-registry

IANA is requested to create the HTS sub-TLV Type sub-registry as part of the HTS TLV Type registry. All code points in the range 1 through 175 in this registry shall be allocated according to the "IETF Review" procedure specified in [\[RFC8126\]](#). Code points in the range 176 through 239 in this registry shall be allocated according to the "First Come First Served" procedure specified in [\[RFC8126\]](#). The remaining code points are allocated according to Table 3:



Value	Description	Reference
0	Reserved	This document
1- 175	Unassigned	This document
176 - 239	Unassigned	This document
240 - 251	Experimental	This document
252 - 254	Private Use	This document
255	Reserved	This document

Table 3: HTS Sub-TLV Type Sub-registry

This document defines the following new values in the IETF Review range of the HTS sub-TLV Type sub-registry:

Value	Description	TLV Used	Reference
TBA2	HMAC	Any	This document

Table 4: HTS sub-TLV Types

#### 6.4. HMAC Type Sub-registry

IANA is requested to create the HMAC Type sub-registry as part of the HTS TLV Type registry. All code points in the range 1 through 127 in this registry shall be allocated according to the "IETF Review" procedure specified in [\[RFC8126\]](#). Code points in the range 128 through 239 in this registry shall be allocated according to the "First Come First Served" procedure specified in [\[RFC8126\]](#). The remaining code points are allocated according to Table 5:

Value	Description	Reference
0	Reserved	This document
1- 127	Unassigned	This document
128 - 239	Unassigned	This document
240 - 249	Experimental	This document
250 - 254	Private Use	This document
255	Reserved	This document

Table 5: HMAC Type Sub-registry



This document defines the following new values in the HMAC Type sub-registry:

Value	Description	Reference
1	HMAC-SHA-256 16 octets long	This document

Table 6: HMAC Types

## 7. Security Considerations

Nodes that practice the HTS method are presumed to share a trust model that depends on the existence of a trusted relationship among nodes. This is necessary as these nodes are expected to correctly modify the specific content of the data in the follow-up packet, and the degree to which HTS measurement is useful for network operation depends on this ability. In practice, this means either confidentiality or integrity protection cannot cover those portions of messages that contain the network state data. Though there are methods that make it possible in theory to provide either or both such protections and still allow for intermediate nodes to make detectable yet authenticated modifications, such methods do not seem practical at present, particularly for protocols that used to measure latency and/or jitter.

This document defines the use of authentication ([Section 5](#)) to protect the integrity of the telemetry information collected using the HTS method. Privacy protection can be achieved by, for example, sharing the IPsec tunnel with a data flow that generates information that is collected using HTS.

While it is possible for a supposed compromised node to intercept and modify the network state information in the follow-up packet; this is an issue that exists for nodes in general - for all data that to be carried over the particular networking technology - and is therefore the basis for an additional presumed trust model associated with an existing network.

## 8. Acknowledgments

Authors express their gratitude and appreciation to Joel Halpern for the most helpful and insightful discussion on the applicability of HTS in a Service Function Chaining domain.



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