

Network Working Group  
Internet-Draft  
Intended status: Informational  
Expires: May 09, 2014

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November 05, 2013

**Keyed IPv6 Tunnel**  
**draft-mkonstan-l2tpext-keyed-ipv6-tunnel-00**

Abstract

This document describes a simple L2 Ethernet over IPv6 tunnel encapsulation with mandatory 64-bit key for connecting L2 Ethernet attachment circuits identified by IPv6 addresses. The encapsulation is based on L2TPv3 over IP.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

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**1. Introduction**

L2TPv3, as defined in [RFC3931](#) [[RFC3931](#)], provides a dynamic mechanism for tunneling Layer 2 (L2) "circuits" across a packet-oriented data network (e.g., over IP), with multiple attachment circuits multiplexed over a single pair of IP address endpoints (i.e. a tunnel) using the L2TPv3 session ID as a circuit discriminator.

Implementing L2TPv3 over IPv6 provides the opportunity to utilize unique IPv6 addresses to identify Ethernet attachment circuits directly, leveraging the key property that IPv6 offers, a vast number of unique IP addresses. In this case, processing of the L2TPv3 Session ID may be bypassed upon receipt as each tunnel has one and only one associated session. This local optimization does not hinder the ability to continue supporting the multiplexing of circuits via the Session ID on the same router for other L2TPv3 tunnels.



## **2. Static 1:1 Mapping Without a Control Plane**

Static local configuration creates a one-to-one mapping between the access-side L2 attachment circuit and the IP address used in the network-side IPv6 encapsulation. The L2TPv3 Control Plane defined in [RFC3931](#) [[RFC3931](#)] is not used.

The IPv6 L2TPv3 tunnel encapsulating device uniquely identifies each Ethernet L2 attachment connection by a port ID or a combination of port ID and VLAN ID(s) on the access side, and by an IPv6 address on the network side.

Any VLAN identifiers, S-VID, C-VID or tuple ( S-VID, C-VID ) are treated with local significance within the Ethernet L2 port and are not forwarded over the IPv6 L2TPv3 tunnel. IPv6 address is treated as the IPv6 L2TPv3 tunnel endpoint.

Certain deployment scenarios may require using a single IPv6 address to identify a tunnel endpoint for many IPv6 L2TPv3 tunnels. For such cases the tunnel encapsulating device identifies each tunnel by a unique combination of tunnel source and destination IPv6 addresses.

As mentioned above Session ID processing is not required as each keyed IPv6 tunnel has one and only one associated session. However for compatibility with existing [RFC3931](#) [[RFC3931](#)] implementations, the packets need to be sent with Session ID. The router implementing L2TPv3 according to [RFC3931](#) [[RFC3931](#)] can be configured with multiple L2TPv3 tunnels, with one session per tunnel, to interoperate with the router implementing the keyed IPv6 tunnel as specified by this document.

Note that a previous IETF draft [[I.D.ietf-pppext-l2tphc](#)] introduces the concept of an L2TP tunnel carrying a single session and hence not requiring session ID processing.

## **3. 64-bit Cookie**

In line with [RFC3931](#) [[RFC3931](#)], the key in the cookie field is used for additional tunnel endpoint context check. All packets MUST carry a 64-bit key in the L2TPv3 cookie field. The cookie MUST be 64-bits long in order to provide sufficient protection against spoofing and brute force blind insertion attacks.

In the absence of the L2TPv3 Control Plane, the L2TPv3 encapsulating router must be provided with local configuration of the 64-bit cookie for each local and remote IPv6 endpoint - note that cookies are asymmetric, so local and remote endpoints may send different cookie values. The value of the cookie must be able to be changed at any




time in a manner that does not drop any legitimate tunneled packets - i.e. the receiver must be willing to accept both "old" and "new" cookie values during a change of cookie value.

4. Encapsulation


RFC4719 [RFC4719] describes encapsulation of Ethernet over L2TPv3. Paraphrasing from this document, the Ethernet frame, without the preamble or frame check sequence (FCS), is encapsulated in L2TPv3 and is sent as a single packet by the ingress router.

The s-tag (or in the multi-stack access case the s-tag and c-tag) SHOULD be removed before the packet is encapsulated.

The full encapsulation is as follows:







The combined IPv6 and L2TPv3 header contains the following fields:

- o Ver. Set to 0x6 to indicate IPv6.
- o Traffic Class. May be set by the ingress router to ensure correct PHB treatment by transit routers between the ingress and egress, and correct QoS disposition at the egress router.
- o Flow Label. May be set by the ingress router to indicate a flow of packets from the client which may not be reordered by the network (if there is a requirement for finer grained ECMP load balancing than per-circuit load balancing).
- o Payload Length. Set to the length of the packet, excluding the IPv6 header (i.e. the length from the Session ID to the end of the packet).
- o Next Header. Set to 0x73 to indicate that the next header is L2TPv3.
- o Hop Limit. Set to 0xFF, and decremented by one by each router in the path to the egress router.
- o Source Address. IPv6 source address for the tunnel. In the "Static 1:1" case the IPv6 source address may correspond to a port or VLAN being transported as an L2 circuit, or may be a loopback address terminating inside the router (e.g. if L2 circuits are being used within a multipoint VPN) or may be an anycast address terminating on a data center virtual machine.
- o Destination Address. IPv6 destination address for the tunnel. As with the source address this may correspond to a port or VLAN being transported as an L2 circuit or may be a loopback or anycast address.
- o Session ID. In the "Static 1:1 mapping" case described in [Section 2](#), the IPv6 address resolves to an L2TPv3 session immediately, thus the Session ID may be ignored upon receipt. For compatibility with other tunnel termination platforms supporting only 2-stage resolution (IPv6 Address + Session ID), this specification recommends supporting explicit configuration of Session ID to any value other than zero. For cases where both





tunnel endpoints support one-stage resolution (IPv6 Address only), this specification recommends setting the Session ID to all ones for easy identification in case of troubleshooting. The Session ID of zero MUST NOT be used, as it is reserved for use by L2TP control messages [RFC3931](#) [[RFC3931](#)].

- o Cookie. 64 bits, configured and described as in [Section 3](#). All packets for a destined L2 Circuit (or L2TPv3 Session) must match the configured Cookie value or be discarded (see [RFC3931](#) [[RFC3931](#)] for more details).
- o Payload. The customer data, with s-tag or s-tag/c-tag removed. As noted above preamble and FCS are stripped before encapsulation. A new FCS will be added at each hop when the IP packet is transmitted.

## **5. Fragmentation and Reassembly**

Using tunnel encapsulation, Ethernet L2 datagrams in IPv6 in this case, will reduce the effective MTU of the Ethernet L2 datagram.

The recommended solution to deal with this problem is for the network operator to increase the MTU size of all the links between the devices acting as IPv6 L2TPv3 tunnel endpoints to accommodate both the IPv6 L2TPv3 encapsulation header and the Ethernet L2 datagram without fragmenting the IPv6 packet.

If it is impossible to increase the link MTU across the network, the IPv6 L2TPv3 encapsulating device MUST perform fragmentation and reassembly if the outgoing link MTU cannot accommodate the extra IPv6 L2TPv3 header for specific Ethernet L2 payload. Fragmentation MUST happen after the encapsulation of the IPv6 L2TPv3 packet. Reassembly MUST happen before the decapsulation of the IPv6 L2TPv3 packet.

The proposed approach is in line with the DS-Lite specification [RFC6333](#) [[RFC6333](#)].

## **6. OAM Considerations**

OAM is an important consideration when providing circuit-oriented services such as those described in this document, and all the more so in the absence of a dedicated tunnel control plane, as OAM becomes the only way to detect failures in the tunnel overlay.

Note that in the context of keyed IP tunnels, failures in the IPv6 underlay network can be detected using the usual methods such as through the routing protocol.



Since keyed IP tunnels always carry an Ethernet payload, and since OAM at the tunnel layer is unable to detect failures in the Ethernet service processing at the ingress or egress router, or on the Ethernet attachment circuit between the router and the Ethernet client, this document recommends that Ethernet OAM as defined in IEEE 802.1ag [[IEEE802.1ag](#)] and/or ITU Y.1731 [[Y.1731](#)] is enabled for keyed IP tunnels. More specifically the following Connectivity Fault Management ( CFM ) and/or Ethernet continuity check ( ETH-CC ) configurations are to be used in conjunction with keyed IPv6 tunnels:

- o Connectivity verification between the tunnel endpoints across the tunnel - use an Up MEP located at the tunnel endpoint for transmitting the CFM PDUs towards, and receiving them from the direction of the tunnel.
- o Connectivity verification from the tunnel endpoint across the local attachment circuit - use a Down MEP located at the tunnel endpoint for transmitting the CFM PDUs towards, and receiving them from the direction of the local attachment circuit.
- o Intermediate connectivity verification - use a MIP located at the tunnel endpoint to generate CFM PDUs in response to received CFM PDUs.

In addition the Pseudowire Virtual Circuit Connectivity Verification ( VCCV ) [RFC5085](#) [[RFC5085](#)] MAY be used.

## **7. IANA Considerations**

None.

## **8. Security Considerations**

Packet spoofing for any type of Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunneling protocol is of particular concern as insertion of carefully constructed rogue packets into the VPN transit network could result in a violation of VPN traffic separation, leaking data into a customer VPN. This is complicated by the fact that it may be particularly difficult for the operator of the VPN to even be aware that it has become a point of transit into or between customer VPNs.

Keyed IPv6 encapsulation provides traffic separation for its VPNs via use of separate 128-bit IPv6 addresses to identify the endpoints. The mandatory authentication key carried in the L2TPv3 cookie field, provides an additional check to ensure that an arriving packet is intended for the identified tunnel.



In the presence of a blind packet spoofing attack, the authentication key provides security against inadvertent leaking of frames into a customer VPN, like in case of L2TPv3 [RFC3931](#) [[RFC3931](#)]. To illustrate the type of security that it is provided in this case, consider comparing the validation of a 64-bit Cookie in the L2TPv3 header to the admission of packets that match a given source and destination IP address pair. Both the source and destination IP address pair validation and Cookie validation consist of a fast check on cleartext header information on all arriving packets. However, since L2TPv3 uses its own value, it removes the requirement for one to maintain a list of (potentially several) permitted or denied IP addresses, and moreover, to guard knowledge of the permitted IP addresses from hackers who may obtain and spoof them. Further, it is far easier to change a compromised L2TPv3 Cookie than a compromised IP address," and a cryptographically random [RFC4086](#) [[RFC4086](#)] value is far less likely to be discovered by brute-force attacks compared to an IP address.

For protection against brute-force, blind, insertion attacks, a 64-bit Cookie MUST be used with all tunnels.

Note that the Cookie provides no protection against a sophisticated man-in-the-middle attacker who can sniff and correlate captured data between nodes for use in a coordinated attack.

The L2TPv3 64-bit cookie must not be regarded as a substitute for security such as that provided by IPsec when operating over an open or untrusted network where packets may be sniffed, decoded, and correlated for use in a coordinated attack.

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## **10. Acknowledgements**

The authors would like to thank Carlos Pignataro for his suggestions and review.

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