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**SMTP Recipient Address Verification Using the Dynamic
Delegation Discovery Service (DDDS)
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Abstract

This memo proposes a mechanism based on the Dynamic Delegation Discovery Service (DDDS) which can be used for the verification of SMTP recipient addresses.

1. Introduction

SMTP servers for a domain identified through higher numbered MX records are sometimes specifically targetted for mail delivery as they do not enforce the same policies for the domain. This can generate backscatter where the message is accepted by a SMTP server and bounced because the SMTP recipient address was rejected by a SMTP server further down in the delivery path, generally identified by a lower numbered MX record, to a mailbox that did not elect to receive the non-delivery notification message.

SMTP provides a VRFY command [[RFC5321](#)] to verify a user name. This command is generally disabled in SMTP server implementations for security reasons. Some SMTP clients get around that by doing a partial mail transaction without proceeding to the third step (DATA command). This document proposes a mechanism based on the Dynamic Delegation Discovery Service (DDDS) [[RFC3401](#)][[RFC3402](#)][[RFC3403](#)][[RFC3404](#)] where the local-part of a [RFC 5321](#) [[RFC5321](#)] address is associated with a Naming Authority Pointer (NAPTR) DNS Record Resource [[RFC3403](#)]. This mechanism can be used for the verification of SMTP recipient addresses.

Subaddressing is the practice of augmenting the local-part of an [RFC 5321](#) address with some "detail" information in order to give some extra meaning to that address. One common way of encoding "detail" information into the local-part is to add a "separator character sequence", such as "+", to form a boundary between the "user" (original local-part) and "detail" sub-parts of the address, much like the "@" character forms the boundary between the local-part and domain. The NAPTR Record Resource was chosen as it is a Record Resource (RR) that includes a regular expression. That can be used to support subaddressing.

1.1. Comments

Comments and discussions about this draft can be directed to the SMTP mailing list, [ietf-smtp](#), maintained at [imc.org](#).
[RFC Editor: Please remove this subsection]

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

3. VRFY Application

The VRFY Application uses the NAPTR RR to map the local-part

of a [RFC 5321](#) address to a regular expression. SMTP servers can use the regular expression to verify local-part and "detail" of a [RFC 5321](#) address.

The maximum total length of a user name or other local-part, as defined in [RFC 5321](#), is 64 octets. It is important to note that domain labels are limited to 63 characters in length and the total length of the resulting string must be 255 octets or less [[RFC1035](#)]. For the purposes of this specification, the local-part of a [RFC 5321](#) address for the VRFY Application MUST be not be more than the limit defined for a domain label in [[RFC1035](#)].

3.1. Application Usage String

The application unique string is a [RFC 5321](#) address limited to 63 characters.

3.2. First Well Known Rule

The first known key is the local-part of the [RFC 5321](#) address. For example, postmaster@example.com would have "postmaster" as its first key.

3.3 Expected Output

The output of the First Well Known Rule for the VRFY Application is a regular expression. The "regexp" field is defined in [[RFC3402](#)] as consisting of a "delim-character", a POSIX Extended Regular Expression, a "delim-character" and a final "delim-character". The regular expression MUST match a valid local-part as defined for a [RFC 5321](#) address. For this application the following rules apply:

The "delim-character" MAY be any valid character as defined in [section 3.2 of \[RFC3402\]](#).

The regular expression MUST NOT contain a substitution expression.

The "replacement" field MUST be empty.

3.4. Valid Databases

A DDDS Database is specified for this Application. The Keys for this database are encoded as domain names. The characters allowed to be in a Key are those that are currently defined for DNS domain names.

The string "._vrfy._smtp._tcp." is appended to the output

of the First Well Known Rule. The domain name part of the [RFC 5321](#) address is then appended to the end.

3.5. Flags

The "flags" field MUST contain the character "U".

The "order" and "preference" fields are to be processed as specified in [\[RFC3403\]](#). If multiple records are returned, the one(s) with the lowest "order" value that have a matching "service" field MUST be used. Of those with the lowest order value, those with the lowest "preference" SHOULD be used.

3.6. Service Parameters

The "services" field MUST only contain the string "SMTP+VRFY".

4. Example

```
$ORIGIN example.com.
user._vrfy._smtp._tcp      IN NAPTR  10 1 (  ; order pref
                           "u" "SMTP+VRFY"  ; flags service
                           "!^(user)$!!" .   ; regexp replacement
                           )
```

The result of the extraction of the local-part of the [RFC 5321](#) address, user@example.com, is "user". The "separator character sequence" and "detail" are removed from the extracted string if subaddressing is used. The "user" (original local part) becomes the Application Usage String. The NAPTR RR to lookup is "user._vrfy._smtp._tcp.example.com.". The record returned is in the form:

```
user._vrfy._smtp._tcp.example.com. IN NAPTR
;; order pref flags service      regexp replacement
   10    1    "u" "SMTP+VRFY"  "!^(user)$!!"      .
```

The regular expression in the record is "!^(user)\$!!". The "!" character is used to delimit the parts of the substitution expression. The replacement field is empty. There is a match when the regular expression is applied to the local-part and "detail" of the [RFC 5321](#) address being verified.

5. Security Considerations

The SMTP VRFY command [\[RFC5321\]](#) is generally disabled in SMTP servers due to security considerations. It is recommended to use transaction level authentication such as Secret Key

Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG) [[RFC2845](#)] or access control mechanisms to restrict access to the DDDS database. Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [[RFC4033](#)] can be used to add data origin authentication and data integrity.

The amount of DNS queries generated by implementations can be substantial. Without the appropriate DNS infrastructure, that can cause a denial of service.

Regular expressions should be checked for sanity, not blindly passed.

6. Internationalization Considerations

Non-ASCII characters in domain names are encoded using the Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications specification [[RFC3490](#)].

7. IANA Considerations

The IANA maintains an Application Service Tag Registry for the S-NAPTR DDDS application defined in [[RFC3958](#)]. The IANA is advised that although the application defined in this document is not a S-NAPTR DDDS application, it defines a "SMTP+VRFY" value for the "services" field. That value should not be used in the Application Service Tag Registry for other applications.

8. Acknowledgements

The idea of using DNS for recipient address verification originated from David Skoll during a discussion about SMTP in May 2007.

9. References

9.1. Normative References

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9.2. Informative References

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