Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication Using GSM 2G Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
draft-morand-http-digest-2g-aka-05

Abstract

This document specifies a one-time password generation mechanism for Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest access authentication based on Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) authentication and key generation functions A3 and A8, also known as GSM AKA or 2G AKA. The HTTP Authentication Framework includes two authentication schemes: Basic and Digest. Both schemes employ a shared secret based mechanism for access authentication. The GSM AKA mechanism performs user authentication and session key distribution in GSM and Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) networks. GSM AKA is a challenge-response based mechanism that uses symmetric cryptography.

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1. Introduction and Motivations

1.1. Motivation

The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Framework, described in [RFC2617], includes two authentication schemes: Basic and Digest. Both schemes employ a shared secret based mechanism for access authentication. The Basic scheme is inherently insecure in that it transmits user credentials in plain text. The Digest scheme
improves security by hiding user credentials with cryptographic hashes, and additionally by providing limited message integrity.

The 2G AKA functions [TS55.205] perform authentication and session key distribution in Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) and Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) networks. 2G AKA is a challenge-response based mechanism that uses symmetric cryptography. 2G AKA is typically run in a GSM Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), which resides in a smart card like device that also provides tamper resistant storage of shared secrets. The 3G Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) mechanism, also known as UMTS AKA, relying on the use of the UMTS Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) instead of the GSM SIM, is most closely associated with UMTS; however, mobile operators commonly distribute GSM SIMs with UMTS mobile phones, resulting in the use of 2G (GSM) AKA in place of UMTS AKA.

This document specifies a mapping of GSM AKA parameters onto HTTP Digest authentication. In essence, this mapping enables the usage of GSM 2G AKA as a one-time password generation mechanism for Digest authentication.

This document is based heavily on [RFC3310] which specified a mapping of Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) onto HTTP Digest authentication. While Digest AKA can be generally used when the mobile phones are equipped with a UMTS SIM card, it may be useful for mobile operators who have not yet fully deployed USIMs and have still millions of SIMs deployed in the network. Digest 2G AKA allows access to applications in a more secure way than would be possible with the use of passwords or with GSM without enhancements.

Moreover, as the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] Authentication Framework closely follows the HTTP Authentication Framework, Digest 2G AKA is directly applicable to SIP as well as to any other embodiment of HTTP Digest.

1.2. Relationship with 3GPP authentication mechanism over HTTP

3GPP has defined the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) that enables the authentication of mobile subscriber based on AKA protocol [TS33.220]. This architecture is originally designed to allow 3G AKA authentication over HTTP [RFC3310], involving the user's mobile smartcard, a bootstrapping server function (BSF) and the authentication center (AuC) collocated with the mobile subscriber profile repository in the mobile operator network (HLR/HSS). GBA also provides the optional support of authentication of 2G mobile users with the procedure called 2G GBA. This document does not
intend to define a new standard mechanism for 3GPP. The aim of this document is to provide mobile operators with an 2G-AKA authentication mechanism over HTTP in networks when no GBA is deployed in the mobile operator network. When the GBA architecture is deployed in the mobile operator network, it is recommended to rely on the 3GPP TS 33.220 [TS33_220] to perform 2G-AKA authentication over HTTP instead of the mechanism described in this document.

2. Terminology

3. Acronyms

    AuC  Authentication Center.
    AKA  Authentication and Key Agreement.
    GSM  Global System for Mobile Communication.
    IMS  IP Multimedia Subsystem.
    IMSI  International Mobile Subscriber Identity
    ISIM  IMS Subscriber Identity Module.
    Kc Cipher Key.
    Ki Subscriber Key.
    RAND  Random Challenge.
    SIM  Subscriber Identity Module.
    SRES  Signed Authentication Response.
    UMTS  Universal Mobile Telecommunications System.
    USIM  UMTS Subscriber Identity Module.

4. GSM 2G AKA Mechanism Overview

This following figure (Fig. 1) provides an overview of the GSM 2G AKA mechanism, which is based on a shared secret key (Ki) and the use of A3/A8 algorithms.

The GSM 2G AKA mechanism is a challenge-response mechanism that allows the authentication of the mobile subscriber/device in the network. This mechanism involves the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) hosted by the mobile subscriber's device, a server in the
serving network and the Authentication Centre (AuC) in the mobile subscriber's home network. When required, the authentication of the mobile subscriber is performed by the serving network using authentication material provided by the AuC.

A shared secret (Ki) is established beforehand between the SIM and the AuC. The secret is stored in the SIM, which resides on a smart card like, tamper resistant device. The SIM is identified by the IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity), which is also used to identify the mobile subscriber/device in the network and the shared secret (Ki) in the AuC (Authentication Center).

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Figure 1. GSM 2G AKA overview
1. The mobile subscriber initiates a access/service request towards a server in the serving network. The request contains the IMSI.

2. When the request needs to be authenticated, the server queries the AuC of the mobile subscriber's home network to retrieve the necessary material for authenticating the mobile subscriber identified by the IMSI.

3. The IMSI received from the server is used as key entry by the AuC to select the corresponding shared secret Ki. The AuC uses the shared secret Ki and a generated random value (RAND) for calculating the expected response (SRES) using the A3 algorithm and the cipher key Kc using the A8 algorithm. the triple RAND, SRES and Kc form an Authentication Vector (AV).

4. The authentication vector (RAND, SRES, Kc) is downloaded to a server. Optionally, if request by the server, the AuC can also download more than one authentication vector, each AV generated with a different RAND value.

5. The server creates an authentication request, which contains the random challenge RAND and the authentication request is delivered to the client.

6. The client produces a authentication response RES, using the shared secret Ki and the random challenge RAND provided in the authentication request received from the server.

7. The authentication response RES is delivered to the server.

8. The server compares the authentication response RES with the expected response SRES. If the two match, the user has been successfully authenticated, and the session key Kc can be used for protecting further communication between the client and the server.

5. Example of Digest 2G AKA operations

Figure 2 below describes a message flow describing a Digest 2G AKA process of authenticating a SIP request, namely the SIP REGISTER request.
Figure 2: Message flow representing a successful authentication

1) Initial request

GET / HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Digest
    username="user1_private@home1.net",
    realm="service1.home1.net",
    nonce="",
    uri="/",
    response=""
2) Request to the AuC for 2G AKA authentication vector (AV) for the given IMSI

3) Response from the AuC providing 2G AKA AV (RAND, SRES, Kc) associated with the IMSI

4) Response containing a challenge

   HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
   WWW-Authenticate: Digest
   realm="service1.home1.net",
   nonce="base64(RAND)",
   qop="auth,auth-int",
   opaque="6dae728da9089dab9112373c9f0a9731",
   algorithm=2GAKA-MD5

5) Request containing credentials

   GET / HTTP/1.1
   Authorization: Digest
   username="user1_private@home1.net",
   realm="service1.home1.net",
   nonce="base64(RAND)",
   uri="/",
   nc=00000001,
   cnonce="0b8f29d6",
   response="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1",
   opaque="6dae728da9089dab9112373c9f0a9731",
   algorithm=2GAKA-MD5

6) Successful response

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Authentication-Info:
   qop=auth-int,
   rspauth="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1",
   cnonce="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1",
   nc=00000001,
   opaque="6dae728da9089dab9112373c9f0a9731",
   nonce="base64(RAND)"

6. Specification of Digest 2G AKA

   In general, the Digest 2G AKA operation is identical to the Digest operation in [RFC2617]. This chapter specifies the parts in which Digest 2G AKA extends the Digest operation. The notation used in the Augmented BNF definitions for the new and modified syntax elements in this section is as used in SIP [RFC3261], and any elements not
defined in this section are as defined in SIP and the documents to which it refers.

### 6.1. Algorithm Directive

In order to direct the client into using 2G AKA for authentication instead of the standard password system, the RFC 2617 defined algorithm directive is overloaded in Digest 2G AKA:

```
algorithm = "algorithm" EQUAL ( 2GAKA-namespace / algorithm-value )
2GAKA-namespace = "2GAKA" "-" algorithm-value
algorithm-value = ( "MD5" / "MD5-sess" / token )
```

algorithm

A string indicating the algorithm used in producing the digest and the checksum. If the directive is not understood, the nonce SHOULD be ignored, and another challenge (if one is present) should be used instead. Reuse of the same SRES value in authenticating subsequent requests and responses is NOT RECOMMENDED. An SRES value SHOULD only be used as a one-time password, and algorithms such as "MD5-sess", which limit the amount of material hashed with a single key, by producing a session key for authentication, SHOULD NOT be used.

### 6.2. Creating a Challenge

In order to deliver the GSM 2G AKA authentication challenge to the client in Digest 2G AKA, the nonce directive defined in [RFC2617] is extended:

```
nonce = "nonce" EQUAL ( 2GAKA-nonce / nonce-value )
2GAKA-nonce = LDQUOT 2GAKA-nonce-value RDQUOT
2GAKA-nonce-value = <base64 encoding of RAND>
```

nonce

A parameter which is populated with the Base64 [RFC2045] encoding of the 2G AKA authentication random challenge RAND.
6.3. Client Authentication

When a client receives a Digest 2G AKA authentication challenge, it extracts the RAND from the "nonce" parameter and runs the A3-A8 algorithms with the RAND challenge and shared secret Ki.

The resulting A3-A8 SRES parameter is treated as a "password" when calculating the response directive of [RFC2617]. Due to the fact that the SRES parameter is 32 bits and the response directive of [RFC2617] is defined as 32 hex digits, SRES is encoded in the low order (i.e. rightmost) 32 bits of "response", padded with leading zeroes.

Example:

SRES="0000000000000000000000007018d8a1"

6.4. Server Authentication

With Digest 2G AKA, the server MUST use the expected response SRES received in the authentication vector as "password" when calculating the "response-auth" of the "Authentication-Info" header defined in [RFC2617].

7. IANA Considerations

IANA is kindly requested to register the following fields in the HTTP Authentication Scheme Registry:

- Authentication Scheme Name: Digest-2G-AKA
- Pointer to specification text: draft-morand-http-digest-2g-aka-05
- Notes: This document specifies a mapping of GSM AKA parameters onto HTTP Digest authentication independent of the GBA architecture defined by 3GPP.

8. Security Considerations

In general, Digest 2G AKA is vulnerable to the same security threats as HTTP authentication [RFC2617]. This chapter discusses the relevant exceptions.

8.1. Authentication of Clients using Digest 2G AKA

2G AKA is typically -- though this isn't a theoretical limitation -- run on a SIM application that usually resides in a tamper resistant smart card. Interfaces to the SIM exist, which enable the host
device to request authentication to be performed on the card. However, these interfaces do not allow access to the long-term secret outside the SIM, and the authentication can only be performed if the device accessing the SIM has knowledge of a PIN code, shared between the user and the SIM. Such PIN codes are typically obtained from user input, and are usually required when the device is powered on.

The use of tamper resistant cards with secure interfaces implies that Digest 2G AKA is typically more secure than regular Digest implementations, as neither possession of the host device nor Trojan Horses in the software give access to the long-term secret. Where a PIN scheme is used, the user is also authenticated when the device is powered on. However, there may be a difference in the resulting security of Digest 2G AKA, compared to traditional Digest implementations, depending on whether those implementations cache/store passwords that are received from the user.

### 8.2. Limited Use of Nonce Values

The Digest scheme uses server-specified nonce values to seed the generation of the request-digest value. The server is free to construct the nonce in such a way that it may only be used from a particular client, for a particular resource, for a limited period of time or number or uses, or any other restrictions. Doing so strengthens the protection provided against, for example, replay attacks.

Digest 2G AKA limits the applicability of a nonce value to a particular SIM. Typically, the SIM is accessible only to one client device at a time. However, the nonce values are strong and secure even though limited to a particular SIM. Additionally, this requires that the server is provided with the client identity before an authentication challenge can be generated. If a client identity is not available, an additional round trip is needed to acquire it.

### 8.3. Multiple Authentication Schemes and Algorithms

In HTTP authentication, a user agent MUST choose the strongest authentication scheme it understands and request credentials from the user, based upon that challenge.

In general, using passwords generated by Digest 2G AKA with other HTTP authentication schemes is not recommended even though the realm values or protection domains would coincide. In these cases, a password should be requested from the end-user instead. Digest 2G AKA passwords MUST NOT be re-used with such HTTP authentication schemes, which send the password in the clear. In particular, 2G AKA passwords must not be re-used with HTTP Basic.
The same principle must be applied within a scheme if several algorithms are supported. A client receiving an HTTP Digest challenge with several available algorithms MUST choose the strongest algorithm it understands. For example, Digest with "2GAKA-MD5" would be stronger than Digest with "MD5".

### 8.4. Online Dictionary Attacks

Since user-selected passwords are typically quite simple, it has been proposed that servers should not accept passwords for HTTP Digest which are in the dictionary [RFC2617]. This potential threat does not exist in HTTP Digest 2G AKA because the algorithm will use SIM originated passwords. However, the end-user must still be careful with PIN codes. Even though HTTP Digest 2G AKA password requests are never displayed to the end-user, the end-user will be authenticated to the SIM via a PIN code. Commonly known initial PIN codes are typically installed to the SIM during manufacturing and if the end-users do not change them, there is a danger than an unauthorized user may be able to use the device. Naturally this requires that the unauthorized user has access to the physical device, and that the end-user has not changed the initial PIN code. For this reason, end-users are strongly encouraged to change their PIN codes when they receive a SIM.

### 8.5. Session Protection

Digest 2G AKA is able to generate an additional session key for integrity (Kc) protection. Even though this document does not specify the use of these additional keys, they may be used for creating additional security within HTTP authentication or some other security mechanisms.

### 8.6. Replay Protection

The generation of RAND used as one-time or very limited-use nonces and the use of the integrity protection of qop=auth-int will limit the possibility of replay attacks.

In GSM, the network is allowed to re-use the RAND challenge in consecutive authentication exchanges. This is not allowed in Digest 2G AKA. The server is mandated to use fresh triplets (RAND challenges) in consecutive authentication exchanges. Digest 2G AKA does not mandate any means for the client to check if the RANDs are fresh, so the security of the scheme leans on the secrecy of the triplets. However, the peer MAY employ implementation-specific mechanisms to remember some of the previously used RANDs, and the client MAY check the freshness of the server's RANDs.
8.7. Mutual Authentication

With Digest 2G AKA, network authentication is performed only after client authentication, in contrary to Digest AKA [RFC3310] in which the UE authenticates the network before responding to the challenge. To prevent an impersonation attack of the server to the client, the authentication of the server to the UE SHOULD be improved by protecting the communication with Transport Layer Security (TLS). An attacker succeeds only if he can break both, the certificate-based TLS authentication to the client and mutual authentication provided by HTTP Digest using a password derived from GSM procedures. One way to break TLS is to compromise the certificate. However, the risk of clients using the root certificates associated with a compromised Certification Authority (CA) is minimized if the clients use a preconfigured list of trusted root certificates restricted to a low number of CAs trusted by the operator, as opposed to the list of all root certificates in a browser's key store, as described in section 8.10.

When TLS is used for server authentication, the recommendations given in section 8.10 apply.

8.8. Flooding the Authentication Centre

The server typically obtains authentication vectors from the Authentication Centre (AuC). Digest 2G AKA introduces a new usage for the AuC. The protocols between the server and the AuC are out of the scope of this document. However, it should be noted that a malicious client may generate a lot of protocol requests to mount a denial of service attack. The server implementation SHOULD take this into account and SHOULD take steps to limit the traffic that it generates towards the AuC, preventing the attacker from flooding the AuC and from extending the denial of service attack from Digest 2G AKA to other users of the AuC.

8.9. AKA Security

Evolutions of GSM networks, specifically Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) and IP Multimedia System (IMS) networks, use an enhanced shared secret based mechanism for authentication known as Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA). In these networks, AKA is typically run in a UMTS Services Identity Module (USIM) or IP Multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM). GSM phones can also be equipped with a USIM or ISIM. In that case, Digest AKA as described in [RFC3310] is used for authentication as opposed to Digest 2G AKA.
8.10. TLS Profile

When TLS is used for server authentication prior to the Digest 2G AKA authentication procedures, the following recommendations apply.

- The TLS endpoints MUST support TLS version 1.1 as specified in RFC 4346 [RFC4346] and SHOULD support TLS version 1.2 as specified in RFC 5246 [RFC5246] should be supported.
- The highest TLS version supported on both TLS endpoints MUST be used.
- The TLS endpoints MUST comply with the 3GPP TLS profile given in 3GPP TS 33.310, Annex E [TS33.310] is. The only difference is that TLS cipher suites without encryption MUST not be used.
- The certificates used for TLS MUST comply with the 3GPP certificate profile defined in the section 6.1 of 3GPP TS 33.310 [TS33.310] is.
- Support of certificate revocation and of the related fields in certificates is recommended.
- Server name matching MUST be performed by the client using the matching rules specified by RFC 2818 [RFC2818] is.
- The client MUST use a preconfigured list of trusted root certificates for server certificate validation.
- Server certificate validation MUST not require manual user interaction.
- The server MUST not request a certificate in a Server Hello Message from the client (as the client is authenticated using Digest 2G AKA as described in section 5).
- The TLS endpoints MUST allow for resuming a session. The lifetime of a Session ID is subject to local policies set on the TLS endpoints.

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10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References


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