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PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification
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Abstract

This document provides recommendations for the implementation of password-based cryptography, covering key derivation functions, encryption schemes, message-authentication schemes, and ASN.1 syntax identifying the techniques.

The recommendations are intended for general application within computer and communications systems, and as such include a fair amount of flexibility. They are particularly intended for the protection of sensitive information such as private keys, as in PKCS #8. It is expected that application standards and implementation profiles based on these specifications may include additional constraints.

Other cryptographic techniques based on passwords, such as password-based-key entity authentication and key establishment protocols are outside the scope of this document. Guidelines for the selection of passwords are also outside the scope.

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Table of Contents

1.	Introduction	3
2.	Notation	4
3.	Overview	5
4.	Salt and Iteration Count	6
4.1.	Salt	6
4.2.	Iteration Count	8
5.	Key Derivation Functions	8
5.1.	PBKDF1	9
5.2.	PBKDFs	10
6.	Encryption Schemes	12
6.1.	PBES1	12
6.1.1.	PBES Encryption Operation	12
6.1.2.	PBES1 Decryption Operation	13
6.2.	PBES2	14
6.2.1.	PBES2 Encryption Operation	14
6.2.2.	PBES2 Decryption Operation	15
7.	Message Authentication Schemes	16
7.1.	PBMAC1	16
7.1.1.	PBMAC1 Generation Operation	16
7.1.2.	PBMAC1 Verification Operation	17
8.	Security Considerations	17
9.	IANA Considerations	18
A.	ASN.1 Syntax	18
A.1.	PBKDF1	18
A.2.	PBKDF2	18
A.3.	PBES1	20
A.4.	PBES2	21
A.5.	PBMAC1	21
B.	Supporting Techniques	22

B.1.	Pseudorandom functions	22
B.1.1.	HMAC-SHA-1	22
B.1.2.	HMAC-SHA-2	23
B.2.	Encryption Schemes	24
B.2.1.	DES-CBC-Pad	24
B.2.2.	DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad	25
B.2.3.	RC2-CBC-Pad	25
B.2.4.	RC5-CBC-Pad	26
B.2.5.	AES-CBC-Pad	27
B.3.	Message Authentication Schemes	27
B.3.1.	HMAC-SHA-1	27
B.3.2.	HMAC-SHA-2	28
C.	ASN.1 Module	28
D.	Intellectual Property Considerations	32
E.	Revision History	32
F.	References	33
F.1	Normative References	34
G.	About PKCS	36
	Authors' Addresses	37

[1.](#) Introduction

This document provides recommendations for the implementation of password-based cryptography, covering the following aspects:

- key derivation functions
- encryption schemes
- message-authentication schemes
- ASN.1 syntax identifying the techniques

The recommendations are intended for general application within computer and communications systems, and as such include a fair amount of flexibility. They are particularly intended for the protection of sensitive information such as private keys as in PKCS #8 [\[29\]](#)[\[33\]](#). It is expected that application standards and implementation profiles based on these specifications may include additional constraints.

Other cryptographic techniques based on passwords, such as password-based key entity authentication and key establishment protocols [\[4\]](#)[\[11\]](#)[\[31\]](#) are outside the scope of this document. Guidelines for the selection of passwords are also outside the scope. This document supersedes PKCS #5 version 2.0 [\[28\]](#), but includes compatible techniques.

[2.](#) Notation

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| C | ciphertext, an octet string |
| c | iteration count, a positive integer |

DK	derived key, an octet string
dkLen	length in octets of derived key, a positive integer
EM	encoded message, an octet string
Hash	underlying hash function
hLen	length in octets of pseudorandom function output, a positive integer
l	length in blocks of derived key, a positive integer
IV	initialization vector, an octet string
K	encryption key, an octet string
KDF	key derivation function
M	message, an octet string
P	password, an octet string
PRF	underlying pseudorandom function
PS	padding string, an octet string
psLen	length in octets of padding string, a positive integer
S	salt, an octet string
T	message authentication code, an octet string
T ₁ , ..., T _l , U ₁ , ..., U _c	intermediate values, octet strings
01, 02, ..., 08	octets with value 1, 2, ..., 8
	bit-wise exclusive-or of two octet strings
	octet length operator
	concatenation operator
<i..j>	substring extraction operator: extracts octets i through j, 0 ≤ i ≤ j

3. Overview

In many applications of public-key cryptography, user security is ultimately dependent on one or more secret text values or passwords. Since a password is not directly applicable as a key to any

conventional cryptosystem, however, some processing of the password is required to perform cryptographic operations with it. Moreover, as passwords are often chosen from a relatively small space, special care is required in that processing to defend against search attacks.

A general approach to password-based cryptography, as described by Morris and Thompson [[14](#)] for the protection of password tables, is to combine a password with a salt to produce a key. The salt can be viewed as an index into a large set of keys derived from the password, and need not be kept secret. Although it may be possible for an opponent to construct a table of possible passwords (a so-called "dictionary attack"), constructing a table of possible keys will be difficult, since there will be many possible keys for each password. An opponent will thus be limited to searching through passwords separately for each salt.

Another approach to password-based cryptography is to construct key derivation techniques that are relatively expensive, thereby increasing the cost of exhaustive search. One way to do this is to include an iteration count in the key derivation technique, indicating how many times to iterate some underlying function by which keys are derived. A modest number of iterations, say 1000, is not likely to be a burden for legitimate parties when computing a key, but will be a significant burden for opponents.

Salt and iteration count formed the basis for password-based encryption in PKCS #5 v2.0, and adopted here as well for the various cryptographic operations. Thus, password-based key derivation as defined here is a function of a password, a salt, and an iteration count, where the latter two quantities need not be kept secret.

From a password-based key derivation function, it is straightforward to define password-based encryption and message authentication schemes. As in PKCS #5 v2.0, the password-based encryption schemes here are based on an underlying, conventional encryption scheme, where the key for the conventional scheme is derived from the password. Similarly, the password-based message authentication scheme is based on an underlying conventional scheme. This two-layered approach makes the password-based techniques modular in terms of the underlying techniques they can be based on.

It is expected that the password-based key derivation functions may find other applications than just the encryption and message authentication schemes defined here. For instance, one might derive a set of keys with a single application of a key derivation function, rather than derive each key with a separate application of the function. The keys in the set would be obtained as substrings of the output of the key derivation function. This approach might be employed as part of key establishment in a session-oriented protocol. Another application is password checking, where the output of the key derivation function is stored (along with the salt and iteration

count) for the purposes of subsequent verification of a password.

Throughout this document, a password is considered to be an octet string of arbitrary length whose interpretation as a text string is unspecified. In the interest of interoperability, however, it is recommended that applications follow some common text encoding rules. ASCII and UTF-8 [32] are two possibilities. (ASCII is a subset of UTF-8.)

Although the selection of passwords is outside the scope of this document, guidelines have been published [20] that may well be taken into account.

4. Salt and Iteration Count

Inasmuch as salt and iteration count are central to the techniques defined in this document, some further discussion is warranted.

4.1. Salt

A salt in password-based cryptography has traditionally served the purpose of producing a large set of keys corresponding to a given password, among which one is selected at random according to the salt. An individual key in the set is selected by applying a key derivation function KDF, as

$$DK = KDF (P, S)$$

where DK is the derived key, P is the password, and S is the salt. This has two benefits:

1. It is difficult for an opponent to precompute all the keys corresponding to a dictionary of passwords, or even the most likely keys. If the salt is 64 bits long, for instance, there will be as many as 2^{64} keys for each password. An opponent is thus limited to searching for passwords after a password-based operation has been performed and the salt is known.
2. It is unlikely that the same key will be selected twice. Again, if the salt is 64 bits long, the chance of "collision" between keys does not become significant until about 2^{32} keys have been produced, according to the Birthday Paradox. This addresses some of the concerns about interactions between multiple uses of the same key, which may apply for some encryption and authentication techniques.

In password-based encryption, the party encrypting a message can gain assurance that these benefits are realized simply by selecting a large and sufficiently random salt when deriving an encryption key from a password. A party generating a message authentication code can gain such assurance in a similar fashion.

The party decrypting a message or verifying a message authentication code, however, cannot be sure that a salt supplied by another party has actually been generated at random. It is possible, for instance, that the salt may have been copied from another password-based operation, in an attempt to exploit interactions between multiple uses of the same key. For instance, suppose two legitimate parties exchange a encrypted message, where the encryption key is an 80-bit key derived from a shared password with some salt. An opponent could take the salt from that encryption and provide it to one of the parties as though it were for a 40-bit key. If the party reveals the result of decryption with the 40-bit key, the opponent may be able to solve for the 40-bit key. In the case that 40-bit key is the first half of the 80-bit key, the opponent can then readily solve for the remaining 40 bits of the 80-bit key.

To defend against such attacks, either the interaction between multiple uses of the same key should be carefully analyzed, or the salt should contain data that explicitly distinguishes between different operations. For instance, the salt might have an additional, non-random octet that specifies whether the derived key is for encryption, for message authentication, or for some other operation.

Based on this, the following is recommended for salt selection:

1. If there is no concern about interactions between multiple uses of the same key (or a prefix of that key) with the password-based encryption and authentication techniques supported for a given password, then the salt may be generated at random and need not be checked for a particular format by the party receiving the salt. It should be at least eight octets (64 bits) long.
2. Otherwise, the salt should contain data that explicitly distinguishes between different operations and different key lengths, in addition to a random part that is at least eight octets long, and this data should be checked or regenerated by the party receiving the salt. For instance, the salt could have an additional non-random octet that specifies the purpose of the derived key. Alternatively, it could be the encoding of a structure that specifies detailed information about the derived key, such as the encryption or authentication technique and a sequence number among the different keys derived from the password. The particular format of the additional data is left to the application.

Note. If a random number generator or pseudorandom generator is not available, a deterministic alternative for generating the salt (or the random part of it) is to apply a password-based key derivation function to the password and the message M to be processed. For instance, the salt could be computed with a key derivation function

as $S = \text{KDF}(P, M)$. This approach is not recommended if the message M is known to belong to a small message space (e.g., "Yes" or "No"), however, since then there will only be a small number of possible salts.

4.2. Iteration Count

An iteration count has traditionally served the purpose of increasing the cost of producing keys from a password, thereby also increasing the difficulty of attack. Mathematically, an iteration count of c will increase the security strength of a password by $\log_2(c)$ bits against trial based attacks like brute force or dictionary attacks.

Choosing a reasonable value for the iteration count depends on environment and circumstances, and varies from application to application. This document follows the recommendations made in FIPS Special Publication 800-132 [21], which says "The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users. [...] A minimum iteration count of 1,000 is recommended. For especially critical keys, or for very powerful systems or systems where user-perceived performance is not critical, an iteration count of 10,000,000 may be appropriate".

5. Key Derivation Functions

A key derivation function produces a derived key from a base key and other parameters. In a password-based key derivation function, the base key is a password and the other parameters are a salt value and an iteration count, as outlined in [Section 3](#).

The primary application of the password-based key derivation functions defined here is in the encryption schemes in [Section 6](#) and the message authentication scheme in [Section 7](#). Other applications are certainly possible, hence the independent definition of these functions.

Two functions are specified in this section: PBKDF1 and PBKDF2. PBKDF2 is recommended for new applications; PBKDF1 is included only for compatibility with existing applications, and is not recommended for new applications.

A typical application of the key derivation functions defined here might include the following steps:

1. Select a salt S and an iteration count c , as outlined in [Section 4](#).
2. Select a length in octets for the derived key, $dkLen$.
3. Apply the key derivation function to the password, the salt,

the iteration count and the key length to produce a derived key.

4. Output the derived key.

Any number of keys may be derived from a password by varying the salt, as described in [Section 3](#).

5.1. PBKDF1

PBKDF1 applies a hash function, which shall be MD2 [[12](#)], MD5 [[22](#)] or SHA-1 [[17](#)], to derive keys. The length of the derived key is bounded by the length of the hash function output, which is 16 octets for MD2 and MD5 and 20 octets for SHA-1. PBKDF1 is compatible with the key derivation process in PKCS #5 v1.5 [[27](#)].

PBKDF1 is recommended only for compatibility with existing applications since the keys it produces may not be large enough for some applications.

PBKDF1 (P, S, c, dkLen)

Options:	Hash	underlying hash function
Input:	P	password, an octet string
	S	salt, an eight-octet string
	c	iteration count, a positive integer
	dkLen	intended length in octets of derived key, a positive integer, at most 16 for MD2 or MD5 and 20 for SHA-1
Output:	DK	derived key, a dkLen-octet string

Steps:

1. If $dkLen > 16$ for MD2 and MD5, or $dkLen > 20$ for SHA-1, output "derived key too long" and stop.
2. Apply the underlying hash function Hash for c iterations to the concatenation of the password P and the salt S , then extract the first $dkLen$ octets to produce a derived key DK :

$$\begin{aligned}T_1 &= \text{Hash}(P \parallel S), \\T_2 &= \text{Hash}(T_1), \\&\dots \\T_c &= \text{Hash}(T_{c-1}), \\DK &= T_{c-1} \text{[0..dkLen-1]}\end{aligned}$$

3. Output the derived key DK .

5.2. PBKDFs

PBKDF2 applies a pseudorandom function (see [Appendix B.1](#) for an

example) to derive keys. The length of the derived key is essentially unbounded. (However, the maximum effective search space for the derived key may be limited by the structure of the underlying pseudorandom function. See [Appendix B.1](#) for further discussion.) PBKDF2 is recommended for new applications.

PBKDF2 (P, S, c, dkLen)

Options:	PRF	underlying pseudorandom function (hLen denotes the length in octets of the pseudorandom function output)
Input:	P	password, an octet string
	S	salt, an octet string
	c	iteration count, a positive integer
	dkLen	intended length in octets of the derived key, a positive integer, at most $(2^{32} - 1) * hLen$
Output:	DK	derived key, a dkLen-octet string

Steps:

1. If $dkLen > (2^{32} - 1) * hLen$, output "derived key too long" and stop.
2. Let l be the number of $hLen$ -octet blocks in the derived key, rounding up, and let r be the number of octets in the last block:

$$l = \text{CEIL} (dkLen / hLen) ,$$

$$r = dkLen - (l - 1) * hLen .$$

Here, $\text{CEIL} (x)$ is the "ceiling" function, i.e. the smallest integer greater than, or equal to, x .

3. For each block of the derived key apply the function F defined below to the password P , the salt S , the iteration count c , and the block index to compute the block:

$$T_1 = F (P, S, c, 1) ,$$

$$T_2 = F (P, S, c, 2) ,$$

$$\dots$$

$$T_l = F (P, S, c, l) ,$$

where the function F is defined as the exclusive-or sum of the first c iterates of the underlying pseudorandom function PRF applied to the password P and the concatenation of the salt S and the block index i :

where

$$U_1 = \text{PRF} (P, S || \text{INT} (i)) ,$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 U_2 &= \text{PRF}(P, U_1), \\
 &\dots \\
 U_c &= \text{PRF}(P, U_{\{c-1\}}).
 \end{aligned}$$

Here, $\text{INT}(i)$ is a four-octet encoding of the integer i , most significant octet first.

4. Concatenate the blocks and extract the first dkLen octets to produce a derived key DK:

$$\text{DK} = T_1 \parallel T_2 \parallel \dots \parallel T_{\lfloor 0..r-1 \rfloor}$$

5. Output the derived key DK.

Note. The construction of the function F follows a "belt-and-suspenders" approach. The iterates U_i are computed recursively to remove a degree of parallelism from an opponent; they are exclusive-ored together to reduce concerns about the recursion degenerating into a small set of values.

6. Encryption Schemes

An encryption scheme, in the symmetric setting, consists of an encryption operation and a decryption operation, where the encryption operation produces a ciphertext from a message under a key, and the decryption operation recovers the message from the ciphertext under the same key. In a password-based encryption scheme, the key is a password.

A typical application of a password-based encryption scheme is a private-key protection method, where the message contains private-key information, as in PKCS #8. The encryption schemes defined here would be suitable encryption algorithms in that context.

Two schemes are specified in this section: PBES1 and PBES2. PBES2 is recommended for new applications; PBES1 is included only for compatibility with existing applications, and is not recommended for new applications.

6.1. PBES1

PBES1 combines the PBKDF1 function ([Section 5.1](#)) with an underlying block cipher, which shall be either DES [[15](#)] or RC2(tm) [[24](#)] in CBC mode [[16](#)]. PBES1 is compatible with the encryption scheme in PKCS #5 v1.5 [[27](#)].

PBES1 is recommended only for compatibility with existing applications, since it supports only two underlying encryption schemes, each of which has a key size (56 or 64 bits) that may not be large enough for some applications.

6.1.1. PBES Encryption Operation

The encryption operation for PBES1 consists of the following steps, which encrypt a message M under a password P to produce a ciphertext C:

1. Select an eight-octet salt S and an iteration count c, as outlined in [Section 4](#).
2. Apply the PBKDF1 key derivation function ([Section 5.1](#)) to the password P, the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived key DK of length 16 octets:

$$DK = \text{PBKDF1}(P, S, c, 16) .$$

3. Separate the derived key DK into an encryption key K consisting of the first eight octets of DK and an initialization vector IV consisting of the next eight octets:

$$\begin{aligned} K &= DK\langle 0..7 \rangle , \\ IV &= DK\langle 8..15 \rangle . \end{aligned}$$

4. Concatenate M and a padding string PS to form an encoded message EM:

$$EM = M \parallel PS ,$$

where the padding string PS consists of $8 - (||M|| \bmod 8)$ octets each with value $8 - (||M|| \bmod 8)$. The padding string PS will satisfy one of the following statements:

$$\begin{aligned} PS &= 01, \text{ if } ||M|| \bmod 8 = 7 ; \\ PS &= 02\ 02, \text{ if } ||M|| \bmod 8 = 6 ; \\ &\dots \\ PS &= 08\ 08\ 08\ 08\ 08\ 08\ 08\ 08, \text{ if } ||M|| \bmod 8 = 0. \end{aligned}$$

The length in octets of the encoded message will be a multiple of eight and it will be possible to recover the message M unambiguously from the encoded message. (This padding rule is taken from [RFC 1423](#) [3].)

5. Encrypt the encoded message EM with the underlying block cipher (DES or RC2) in cipher block chaining mode under the encryption key K with initialization vector IV to produce the ciphertext C. For DES, the key K shall be considered as a 64-bit encoding of a 56-bit DES key with parity bits ignored (see [\[15\]](#)). For RC2, the "effective key bits" shall be 64 bits.
6. Output the ciphertext C.

The salt S and the iteration count c may be conveyed to the party performing decryption in an AlgorithmIdentifier value (see [Appendix](#)

[A.3](#)).

6.1.2. PBES1 Decryption Operation

The decryption operation for PBES1 consists of the following steps, which decrypt a ciphertext *C* under a password *P* to recover a message *M*:

1. Obtain the eight-octet salt *S* and the iteration count *c*.
2. Apply the PBKDF1 key derivation function ([Section 5.1](#)) to the password *P*, the salt *S*, and the iteration count *c* to produce a derived key *DK* of length 16 octets:

$$DK = \text{PBKDF1}(P, S, c, 16)$$

3. Separate the derived key *DK* into an encryption key *K* consisting of the first eight octets of *DK* and an initialization vector *IV* consisting of the next eight octets:

$$\begin{aligned} K &= DK\langle 0..7 \rangle , \\ IV &= DK\langle 8..15 \rangle . \end{aligned}$$

4. Decrypt the ciphertext *C* with the underlying block cipher (DES or RC2) in cipher block chaining mode under the encryption key *K* with initialization vector *IV* to recover an encoded message *EM*. If the length in octets of the ciphertext *C* is not a multiple of eight, output "decryption error" and stop.
5. Separate the encoded message *EM* into a message *M* and a padding string *PS*:

$$EM = M \parallel PS ,$$

where the padding string *PS* consists of some number *psLen* octets each with value *psLen*, where *psLen* is between 1 and 8. If it is not possible to separate the encoded message *EM* in this manner, output "decryption error" and stop.

6. Output the recovered message *M*.

6.2. PBES2

PBES2 combines a password-based key derivation function, which shall be PBKDF2 ([Section 5.2](#)) for this version of PKCS #5, with an underlying encryption scheme (see [Appendix B.2](#) for examples). The key length and any other parameters for the underlying encryption scheme depend on the scheme.

PBES2 is recommended for new applications.

6.2.1. PBES2 Encryption Operation

The encryption operation for PBES2 consists of the following steps, which encrypt a message M under a password P to produce a ciphertext C, applying a selected key derivation function KDF and a selected underlying encryption scheme:

1. Select a salt S and an iteration count c, as outlined in [Section 4](#).
2. Select the length in octets, dkLen, for the derived key for the underlying encryption scheme.
3. Apply the selected key derivation function to the password P, the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived key DK of length dkLen octets:

$$DK = KDF (P, S, c, dkLen) .$$

4. Encrypt the message M with the underlying encryption scheme under the derived key DK to produce a ciphertext C. (This step may involve selection of parameters such as an initialization vector and padding, depending on the underlying scheme.)
5. Output the ciphertext C.

The salt S, the iteration count c, the key length dkLen, and identifiers for the key derivation function and the underlying encryption scheme may be conveyed to the party performing decryption in an AlgorithmIdentifier value (see [Appendix A.4](#)).

[6.2.2](#). PBES2 Decryption Operation

The decryption operation for PBES2 consists of the following steps, which decrypt a ciphertext C under a password P to recover a message M:

1. Obtain the salt S for the operation.
2. Obtain the iteration count c for the key derivation function.
3. Obtain the key length in octets, dkLen, for the derived key for the underlying encryption scheme.
4. Apply the selected key derivation function to the password P, the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived key DK of length dkLen octets:

$$DK = KDF (P, S, c, dkLen) .$$

5. Decrypt the ciphertext C with the underlying encryption scheme under the derived key DK to recover a message M. If the decryption function outputs "decryption error," then output

"decryption error" and stop.

6. Output the recovered message M.

7. Message Authentication Schemes

A message authentication scheme consists of a MAC (message authentication code) generation operation and a MAC verification operation, where the MAC generation operation produces a message authentication code from a message under a key, and the MAC verification operation verifies the message authentication code under the same key. In a password-based message authentication scheme, the key is a password.

One scheme is specified in this section: PBMAC1.

7.1. PBMAC1

PBMAC1 combines a password-based key derivation function, which shall be PBKDF2 ([Section 5.2](#)) for this version of PKCS #5, with an underlying message authentication scheme (see [Appendix B.3](#) for an example). The key length and any other parameters for the underlying message authentication scheme depend on the scheme.

7.1.1 PBMAC1 Generation Operation

The MAC generation operation for PBMAC1 consists of the following steps, which process a message M under a password P to generate a message authentication code T, applying a selected key derivation function KDF and a selected underlying message authentication scheme:

1. Select a salt S and an iteration count c, as outlined in [Section 4](#).
2. Select a key length in octets, dkLen, for the derived key for the underlying message authentication function.
3. Apply the selected key derivation function to the password P, the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived key DK of length dkLen octets:

$$DK = KDF (P, S, c, dkLen) .$$

4. Process the message M with the underlying message authentication scheme under the derived key DK to generate a message authentication code T.
5. Output the message authentication code T.

The salt S, the iteration count c, the key length dkLen, and identifiers for the key derivation function and underlying message authentication scheme may be conveyed to the party performing

verification in an AlgorithmIdentifier value (see [Appendix A.5](#)).

7.1.2. PBMAC1 Verification Operation

The MAC verification operation for PBMAC1 consists of the following steps, which process a message M under a password P to verify a message authentication code T:

1. Obtain the salt S and the iteration count c.
2. Obtain the key length in octets, dkLen, for the derived key for the underlying message authentication scheme.
3. Apply the selected key derivation function to the password P, the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived key DK of length dkLen octets:

$$DK = KDF (P, S, c, dkLen) .$$

4. Process the message M with the underlying message authentication scheme under the derived key DK to verify the message authentication code T.
5. If the message authentication code verifies, output "correct"; else output "incorrect."

8. Security Considerations

Password-based cryptography is generally limited in the security that it can provide, particularly for methods such as those defined in this document where off-line password search is possible. While the use of salt and iteration count can increase the complexity of attack (see [Section 4](#) for recommendations), it is essential that passwords are selected well, and relevant guidelines (e.g., [\[20\]](#)) should be taken into account. It is also important that passwords be protected well if stored.

In general, different keys should be derived from a password for different uses to minimize the possibility of unintended interactions. For password-based encryption with a single algorithm, a random salt is sufficient to ensure that different keys will be produced. In certain other situations, as outlined in [Section 4](#), a structured salt is necessary. The recommendations in [Section 4](#) should thus be taken into account when selecting the salt value.

For information on security considerations for MD2 [\[12\]](#) see [\[34\]](#), for MD5 [\[22\]](#) see [\[35\]](#), for SHA-1 [\[17\]](#) see [\[36\]](#).

9. IANA Considerations

None.

A. ASN.1 Syntax

This section defines ASN.1 syntax for the key derivation functions, the encryption schemes, the message authentication scheme, and supporting techniques. The intended application of these definitions includes PKCS #8 and other syntax for key management, encrypted data, and integrity-protected data. (Various aspects of ASN.1 are specified in several ISO/IEC standards [[7](#)][[8](#)][[9](#)][[10](#)].)

The object identifier pkcs-5 identifies the arc of the OID tree from which the PKCS #5-specific OIDs in this section are derived:

```
rsadsi OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 113549}
pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER   ::= {rsadsi 1}
pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs 5}
```

A.1. PBKDF1

No object identifier is given for PBKDF1, as the object identifiers for PBES1 are sufficient for existing applications and PBKDF2 is recommended for new applications.

A.2. PBKDF2

The object identifier id-PBKDF2 identifies the PBKDF2 key derivation function ([Section 5.2](#)).

```
id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 12}
```

The parameters field associated with this OID in an AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBKDF2-params:

```
PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
    salt CHOICE {
        specified OCTET STRING,
        otherSource AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-SaltSources}}
    },
    iterationCount INTEGER (1..MAX),
    keyLength INTEGER (1..MAX) OPTIONAL,
    prf AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}} DEFAULT
    algid-hmacWithSHA1 }
```

The fields of type PBKDF2-params have the following meanings:

- salt specifies the salt value, or the source of the salt value. It shall either be an octet string or an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PBKDF2-SaltSources, which is reserved for future versions of PKCS #5.

The salt-source approach is intended to indicate how the salt value is to be generated as a function of parameters in the algorithm ID, application data, or both. For instance, it may indicate that the salt value is produced from the encoding of a structure that specifies detailed information about the derived key as suggested in [Section 4.1](#). Some of the information may be carried elsewhere, e.g., in the encryption algorithm ID. However, such facilities are deferred to a future version of PKCS #5.

In this version, an application may achieve the benefits mentioned in [Section 4.1](#) by choosing a particular interpretation of the salt value in the specified alternative.

PBKDF2-SaltSources ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... }

- iterationCount specifies the iteration count. The maximum iteration count allowed depends on the implementation. It is expected that implementation profiles may further constrain the bounds.
- keyLength, an optional field, is the length in octets of the derived key. The maximum key length allowed depends on the implementation; it is expected that implementation profiles may further constrain the bounds. The field is provided for convenience only; the key length is not cryptographically protected. If there is concern about interaction between operations with different key lengths for a given salt (see [Section 4.1](#)), the salt should distinguish among the different key lengths.
- prf identifies the underlying pseudorandom function. It shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PBKDF2-PRFs, which for this version of PKCS #5 shall consist of id-hmacWithSHA1 (see [Appendix B.1.1](#)) and any other OIDs defined by the application.

```
PBKDF2-PRFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {  
  {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA1},  
  {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA224},  
  {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA256},  
  {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA384},  
  {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA512},  
  {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA512-224},  
  {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA512-256},  
  ...  
}
```

The default pseudorandom function is HMAC-SHA-1:

algid-hmacWithSHA1 AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}} ::=

```
{algorithm id-hmacWithSHA1, parameters NULL : NULL}
```

A.3. PBES1

Different object identifiers identify the PBES1 encryption scheme ([Section 6.1](#)) according to the underlying hash function in the key derivation function and the underlying block cipher, as summarized in the following table:

Hash Function	Block Cipher	OID
MD2	DES	pkcs-5.1
MD2	RC2	pkcs-5.4
MD5	DES	pkcs-5.3
MD5	RC2	pkcs-5.6
SHA-1	DES	pkcs-5.10
SHA-1	RC2	pkcs-5.11

```
pbewithMD2AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 1}
pbewithMD2AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 4}
pbewithMD5AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 3}
pbewithMD5AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 6}
pbewithSHA1AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 10}
pbewithSHA1AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 11}
```

For each OID, the parameters field associated with the OID in an AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBEPParameter:

```
PBEPParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
    salt OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)),
    iterationCount INTEGER }
```

The fields of type PBEPParameter have the following meanings:

- salt specifies the salt value, an eight-octet string.
- iterationCount specifies the iteration count.

A.4. PBES2

The object identifier id-PBES2 identifies the PBES2 encryption scheme ([Section 6.2](#)).

```
id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 13}
```

The parameters field associated with this OID in an AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBES2-params:

```
PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-KDFs}},
    encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-Encs}} }
```

The fields of type PBES2-params have the following meanings:

- keyDerivationFunc identifies the underlying key derivation function. It shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PBES2-KDFs, which for this version of PKCS #5 shall consist of id-PBKDF2 (Appendix A.2).

```
PBES2-KDFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::=
    { {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2}, ... }
```

- encryptionScheme identifies the underlying encryption scheme. It shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PBES2-Encs, whose definition is left to the application. Example underlying encryption schemes are given in [Appendix B.2](#).

```
PBES2-Encs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... }
```

[A.5. PBMAC1](#)

The object identifier id-PBMAC1 identifies the PBMAC1 message authentication scheme ([Section 7.1](#)).

```
id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 14}
```

The parameters field associated with this OID in an AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBMAC1-params:

```
PBMAC1-params ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBMAC1-KDFs}},
    messageAuthScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBMAC1-MACs}} }
```

The keyDerivationFunc field has the same meaning as the corresponding field of PBES2-params (Appendix A.4) except that the set of OIDs is PBMAC1-KDFs.

```
PBMAC1-KDFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::=
    { {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2}, ... }
```

The messageAuthScheme field identifies the underlying message authentication scheme. It shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PBMAC1-MACs, whose definition is left to the application. Example underlying encryption schemes are given in [Appendix B.3](#).

```
PBMAC1-MACs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... }
```

[B. Supporting Techniques](#)

This section gives several examples of underlying functions and schemes supporting the password-based schemes in Sections [5](#), [6](#) and [7](#).

While these supporting techniques are appropriate for applications to implement, none of them is required to be implemented. It is

expected, however, that profiles for PKCS #5 will be developed that specify particular supporting techniques.

This section also gives object identifiers for the supporting techniques. The object identifiers `digestAlgorithm` and `encryptionAlgorithm` identify the arcs from which certain algorithm OIDs referenced in this section are derived:

```
digestAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 2}
encryptionAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 3}
```

B.1. Pseudorandom functions

Examples of pseudorandom function for PBKDF2 ([Section 5.2](#)) include HMAC with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, and SHA512/256. Applications may employ other schemes as well.

B.1.1. HMAC-SHA-1

HMAC-SHA-1 is the pseudorandom function corresponding to the HMAC message authentication code [[13](#)] based on the SHA-1 hash function [[17](#)]. The pseudorandom function is the same function by which the message authentication code is computed, with a full-length output. (The first argument to the pseudorandom function PRF serves as HMAC's "key," and the second serves as HMAC's "text." In the case of PBKDF2, the "key" is thus the password and the "text" is the salt.) HMAC-SHA-1 has a variable key length and a 20-octet (160-bit) output value.

Although the length of the key to HMAC-SHA-1 is essentially unbounded, the effective search space for pseudorandom function outputs may be limited by the structure of the function. In particular, when the key is longer than 512 bits, HMAC-SHA-1 will first hash it to 160 bits. Thus, even if a long derived key consisting of several pseudorandom function outputs is produced from a key, the effective search space for the derived key will be at most 160 bits. Although the specific limitation for other key sizes depends on details of the HMAC construction, one should assume, to be conservative, that the effective search space is limited to 160 bits for other key sizes as well.

(The 160-bit limitation should not generally pose a practical limitation in the case of password-based cryptography, since the search space for a password is unlikely to be greater than 160 bits.)

The object identifier `id-hmacWithSHA1` identifies the HMAC-SHA-1 pseudorandom function:

```
id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 7}
```

The parameters field associated with this OID in an `AlgorithmIdentifier` shall have type `NULL`. This object identifier is

employed in the object set PBKDF2-PRFs (Appendix A.2).

Note. Although HMAC-SHA-1 was designed as a message authentication code, its proof of security is readily modified to accommodate requirements for a pseudorandom function, under stronger assumptions. A hash function may also meet the requirements of a pseudorandom function under certain assumptions. For instance, the direct application of a hash function to the concatenation of the "key" and the "text" may be appropriate, provided that "text" has appropriate structure to prevent certain attacks. HMAC-SHA-1 is preferable, however, because it treats "key" and "text" as separate arguments and does not require "text" to have any structure.

During 2004 and 2005 there were a number of attacks on SHA-1 that reduced its perceived effective strength against collision attacks to 62 bits instead of the expected 80 bits (e.g. Wang et al. [30], confirmed by M. Cochran [5]). However, since these attacks centered on finding collisions between values they are not a direct security consideration here because the collision-resistant property is not required by the HMAC authentication scheme.

B.1.2. HMAC-SHA-2

HMAC-SHA-2 refers to the set of pseudo-random functions corresponding to the HMAC message authentication code (now a FIPS standard [19]) based on the new SHA-2 functions (FIPS 180-4 [17]). HMAC-SHA-2 has a variable key length and variable output value depending on the hash function chosen (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, or SHA-512/256), that is 28, 32, 48, or 64 octets.

Using the new hash functions extends the search space for the produced keys. Where SHA-1 limits the search space to 20 octets, SHA-2 sets new limits of 28, 32, 48 and 64 octets.

Object identifiers for HMAC are defined as follows:

```
id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 8}
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 9}
id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 10}
id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 11}
id-hmacWithSHA512-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 12}
id-hmacWithSHA512-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 13}
```

B.2. Encryption Schemes

An example encryption scheme for PBES2 (Section 6.2) is AES-CBC-Pad. The schemes defined in PKCS #5 v2.0 [28], DES-CBC-Pad, DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad, RC2-CBC-Pad, and RC5-CBC-Pad, are still supported, but DES-CBC-Pad, DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad, RC2-CBC-Pad are now considered legacy and should only be used for backwards compatibility reasons.

The object identifiers given in this section are intended to be

employed in the object set PBES2-Encs (Appendix A.4).

B.2.1. DES-CBC-Pad

DES-CBC-Pad is single-key DES [15] in CBC mode [16] with the RFC 1423 [3] padding operation (see Section 6.1.1). DES-CBC-Pad has an eight-octet encryption key and an eight-octet initialization vector. The key is considered as a 64-bit encoding of a 56-bit DES key with parity bits ignored.

The object identifier desCBC (defined in the NIST/OSI Implementors' Workshop agreements) identifies the DES-CBC-Pad encryption scheme:

```
desCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
    {iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
      algorithms(2) 7}
```

The parameters field associated with this OID in an AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)), specifying the initialization vector for CBC mode.

B.2.2. DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad

DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad is three-key triple-DES in CBC mode [1] with the RFC 1423 [3] padding operation. DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad has a 24-octet encryption key and an eight-octet initialization vector. The key is considered as the concatenation of three eight-octet keys, each of which is a 64-bit encoding of a 56-bit DES key with parity bits ignored.

The object identifier des-EDE3-CBC identifies the DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad encryption scheme:

```
des-EDE3-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 7}
```

The parameters field associated with this OID in an AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)), specifying the initialization vector for CBC mode.

Note. An OID for DES-EDE3-CBC without padding is given in ANSI X9.52 [1]; the one given here is preferred since it specifies padding.

B.2.3. RC2-CBC-Pad

RC2-CBC-Pad is the RC2(tm) encryption algorithm [24] in CBC mode with the RFC 1423 [3] padding operation. RC2-CBC-Pad has a variable key length, from one to 128 octets, a separate "effective key bits" parameter from one to 1024 bits that limits the effective search space independent of the key length, and an eight-octet initialization vector.

The object identifier rc2CBC identifies the RC2-CBC-Pad encryption

scheme:

rc2CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 2}

The parameters field associated with OID in an AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type RC2-CBC-Parameter:

RC2-CBC-Parameter ::= SEQUENCE {
 rc2ParameterVersion INTEGER OPTIONAL,
 iv OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) }

The fields of type RC2-CBCParameter have the following meanings:

- rc2ParameterVersion is a proprietary RSA Security Inc. encoding of the "effective key bits" for RC2. The following encodings are defined:

Effective Key Bits	Encoding
40	160
64	120
128	58
b >= 256	b

If the rc2ParameterVersion field is omitted, the "effective key bits" defaults to 32. (This is for backward compatibility with certain very old implementations.)

- iv is the eight-octet initialization vector.

B.2.4. RC5-CBC-Pad

RC5-CBC-Pad is the RC5(tm) encryption algorithm [23] in CBC mode with [RFC 5652](#) [6] padding operation, which is a generalization of the [RFC 1423](#) [3] padding operation. The scheme is fully specified in [2]. RC5-CBC-Pad has a variable key length, from 0 to 256 octets, and supports both a 64-bit block size and a 128-bit block size. For the former, it has an eight-octet initialization vector, and for the latter, a 16-octet initialization vector. RC5-CBC-Pad also has a variable number of "rounds" in the encryption operation, from 8 to 127.

Note: For RC5 with a 64-bit block size, the padding string is as defined in [RFC 1423](#) [3]. For RC5 with a 128-bit block size, the padding string consists of $16 - (||M|| \bmod 16)$ octets each with value $16 - (||M|| \bmod 16)$.

The object identifier rc5-CBC-PAD [2] identifies RC5-CBC-Pad encryption scheme:

rc5-CBC-PAD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 9}

The parameters field associated with this OID in an

AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type RC5-CBC-Parameters:

```
RC5-CBC-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE {  
    version INTEGER {v1-0(16)} (v1-0),  
    rounds INTEGER (8..127),  
    blockSizeInBits INTEGER (64 | 128),  
    iv OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
```

The fields of type RC5-CBC-Parameters have the following meanings:

- version is the version of the algorithm, which shall be v1-0.
- rounds is the number of rounds in the encryption operation, which shall be between 8 and 127.
- blockSizeInBits is the block size in bits, which shall be 64 or 128.
- iv is the initialization vector, an eight-octet string for 64-bit RC5 and a 16-octet string for 128-bit RC5. The default is a string of the appropriate length consisting of zero octets.

[B.2.5.](#) AES-CBC-Pad

AES-CBC-Pad is the AES encryption algorithm [[18](#)] in CBC mode with [RFC 5652](#) [[6](#)] padding operation. AES-CBC-Pad has a variable key length of 16, 24, or 32 octets and has a 16-octet block size. It has a 16-octet initialization vector.

Note: For AES, the padding string consists of $16 - (||M|| \bmod 16)$ octets each with value $16 - (||M|| \bmod 16)$.

For AES, object identifiers are defined depending on key size and operation mode. For example, the 16-octet (128 bit) key AES encryption scheme in CBC mode would be aes128-CBC-Pad identifying the AES-CBC-PAD encryption scheme using a 16-octet key:

```
aes128-CBC-PAD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {aes 2}
```

The AES object identifier is defined in [Appendix C](#).

The parameters field associated with this OID in an AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)), specifying the initialization vector for CBC mode.

[B.3.](#) Message Authentication Schemes

An example message authentication scheme for PBMAC1 ([Section 7.1](#)) is HMAC-SHA-1.

[B.3.1.](#) HMAC-SHA-1

HMAC-SHA-1 is the HMAC message authentication scheme [13] based on the SHA-1 hash function [17]. HMAC-SHA-1 has a variable key length and a 20-octet (160-bit) message authentication code.

The object identifier id-hmacWithSHA1 (see [Appendix B.1.1](#)) identifies the HMAC-SHA-1 message authentication scheme. (The object identifier is the same for both the pseudorandom function and the message authentication scheme; the distinction is to be understood by context.) This object identifier is intended to be employed in the object set PBMAC1-Macs (Appendix A.5).

[B.3.2.](#) HMAC-SHA-2

HMAC-SHA-2 refers to the set of HMAC message authentication schemes [19] based on the SHA-2 functions [17]. HMAC-SHA-2 has a variable key length and a message authentication code whose length is based on the hash function chosen (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, or SHA-512/256 giving 28, 32, 48 or 64 octets).

The object identifiers id-hmacWithSHA224, id-hmacWithSHA256, id-hmacWithSHA384, id-hmacWithSHA512, id-hmacWithSHA512-224, and id-hmacWithSHA512-256 (see [Appendix B.1.2](#)) identify the HMAC-SHA-2 schemes. The object identifiers are the same for both the pseudo-random functions and the message authentication schemes; the distinction is to be understood by context. These object identifiers are intended to be employed in the object set PBMAC1-Macs (Appendix A.5)

[C.](#) ASN.1 Module

For reference purposes, the ASN.1 syntax in the preceding sections is presented as an ASN.1 module here.

```
-- PKCS #5 v2.1 ASN.1 Module
-- Revised October 27, 2012
```

```
-- This module has been checked for conformance with the
-- ASN.1 standard by the OSS ASN.1 Tools
```

```
PKCS5v2-1 {
    iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-5(5)
    modules(16) pkcs5v2-1(2)
}
```

```
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
```

```
BEGIN
```

```
-- =====
-- Basic object identifiers
-- =====
```

```

nistAlgorithms OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
                                         us(840) organization(1)
                                         gov(101) csor(3) 4}
oiw    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) identified-organization(3) 14}
rsadsi OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 113549}
pkcs   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 1}
pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs 5}

-- =====
-- Basic types and classes
-- =====

AlgorithmIdentifier { ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER:InfoObjectSet } ::=
    SEQUENCE {
        algorithm ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER.&id({InfoObjectSet}),
        parameters ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER.&Type({InfoObjectSet}
            {@algorithm}) OPTIONAL
    }

ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

-- =====
-- PBKDF2
-- =====

PBKDF2Algorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
    {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2},
    ...
}

id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 12}

algid-hmacWithSHA1 AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}} ::=
    {algorithm id-hmacWithSHA1, parameters NULL : NULL}

PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
    salt CHOICE {
        specified OCTET STRING,
        otherSource AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-SaltSources}}
    },
    iterationCount INTEGER (1..MAX),
    keyLength INTEGER (1..MAX) OPTIONAL,
    prf AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}} DEFAULT
        algid-hmacWithSHA1
}

PBKDF2-SaltSources ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... }

PBKDF2-PRFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
    {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA1},
    {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA224},

```

```

    {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA256},
    {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA384},
    {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA512},
    {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA512-224},
    {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA512-256},
    ...
}

-- =====
-- PBES1
-- =====

PBES1Algorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
    {PBES1Parameter IDENTIFIED BY pbewithMD2AndDES-CBC} |
    {PBES1Parameter IDENTIFIED BY pbewithMD2AndRC2-CBC} |
    {PBES1Parameter IDENTIFIED BY pbewithMD5AndDES-CBC} |
    {PBES1Parameter IDENTIFIED BY pbewithMD5AndRC2-CBC} |
    {PBES1Parameter IDENTIFIED BY pbewithSHA1AndDES-CBC} |
    {PBES1Parameter IDENTIFIED BY pbewithSHA1AndRC2-CBC},
    ...
}

pbewithMD2AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 1}
pbewithMD2AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 4}
pbewithMD5AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 3}
pbewithMD5AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 6}
pbewithSHA1AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 10}
pbewithSHA1AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 11}

PBES1Parameter ::= SEQUENCE {
    salt OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)),
    iterationCount INTEGER
}

-- =====
-- PBES2
-- =====

PBES2Algorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
    {PBES2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBES2},
    ...
}

id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 13}

PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-KDFs}},
    encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-Encs}}
}

PBES2-KDFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {

```

```

        {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2},
        ...
    }

PBES2-Encs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... }

-- =====
-- PBMAC1
-- =====

PBMAC1Algorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
    {PBMAC1-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBMAC1},
    ...
}

id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 14}

PBMAC1-params ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBMAC1-KDFs}},
    messageAuthScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBMAC1-MACs}}
}

PBMAC1-KDFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
    {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2},
    ...
}

PBMAC1-MACs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... }

-- =====
-- Supporting techniques
-- =====

digestAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER      ::= {rsadsi 2}
encryptionAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 3}

SupportingAlgorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
    {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA1}
    {OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) IDENTIFIED BY desCBC}
    {OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) IDENTIFIED BY des-EDE3-CBC}
    {RC2-CBC-Parameter IDENTIFIED BY rc2CBC}
    {RC5-CBC-Parameters IDENTIFIED BY rc5-CBC-PAD},
    {OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) IDENTIFIED BY aes128-CBC-PAD}
    {OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) IDENTIFIED BY aes192-CBC-PAD}
    {OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) IDENTIFIED BY aes256-CBC-PAD},
    ...
}

id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 7}
id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 8}
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 9}
id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 10}

```

```

id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 11}
id-hmacWithSHA512-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 12}
id-hmacWithSHA512-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 13}

desCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {oiw secsig(3) algorithms(2) 7}

des-EDE3-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 7}

rc2CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 2}

RC2-CBC-Parameter ::= SEQUENCE {
    rc2ParameterVersion INTEGER OPTIONAL,
    iv OCTET STRING (SIZE(8))
}

rc5-CBC-PAD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 9}

RC5-CBC-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE {
    version INTEGER {v1-0(16)} (v1-0),
    rounds INTEGER (8..127),
    blockSizeInBits INTEGER (64 | 128),
    iv OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}

aes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { nistAlgorithms 1 }
aes128-CBC-PAD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 2 }
aes192-CBC-PAD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 22 }
aes256-CBC-PAD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 42 }

END

```

D. Intellectual Property Considerations

EMC Corporation makes no patent claims on the general constructions described in this document, although specific underlying techniques may be covered. Among the underlying techniques, the RC5 encryption algorithm (Appendix B.2.4) is protected by U.S. Patents 5,724,428 [[25](#)] and 5,835,600 [[26](#)].

RC2 and RC5 are trademarks of EMC Corporation.

EMC Corporation makes no representation regarding intellectual property claims by other parties. Such determination is the responsibility of the user.

E. Revision History

Versions 1.0-1.3

Versions 1.0-1.3 were distributed to participants in RSA Data Security Inc.'s Public-Key Cryptography Standards meetings in February and March 1991.

Version 1.4

Version 1.4 was part of the June 3, 1991 initial public release of PKCS. Version 1.4 was published as NIST/OSI Implementors' Workshop document SEC-SIG-91-20.

Version 1.5

Version 1.5 incorporated several editorial changes, including updates to the references and the addition of a revision history.

Version 2.0

Version 2.0 incorporates major editorial changes in terms of the document structure, and introduces the PBES2 encryption scheme, the PBMAC1 message authentication scheme, and independent password-based key derivation functions. This version continues to support the encryption process in version 1.5.

Version 2.1

This document transfers PKCS #5 into the IETF and includes some minor changes from the authors for this submission.

- o Introduces AES/CBC as an encryption scheme for PBES2 and HMAC with the hash functions SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, and SHA512/256 as pseudo-random functions for PBKDF2 and message authentication schemes for PBMAC1.

- o Replacement of RSA with EMC in the "Intellectual Property Considerations".

- o Changes references to PKCS #5 and PKCS #8 to RSA 2898 and [RFC 5208](#)/5898.

- o Incorporates two editorial errata reported on PKCS #5 [[28](#)].

- o Added security considerations for MD2, MD5, and SHA-1.

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[G](#). About PKCS

The Public-Key Cryptography Standards are specifications produced by RSA Laboratories in cooperation with secure systems developers worldwide for the purpose of accelerating the deployment of public-key cryptography. First published in 1991 as a result of meetings with a small group of early adopters of public-key technology, the PKCS documents have become widely referenced and implemented. Contributions from the PKCS series have become part of many formal and de facto standards, including ANSI X9 documents, PKIX, SET, S/MIME, and SSL.

Further development of PKCS occurs through the IETF. Suggestions for improvement are welcome.

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