

<[draft-murray-auth-ftp-ssl-11.txt](#)>

INTERNET-DRAFT (draft)

Paul Ford-Hutchinson
IBM UK Ltd
Martin Carpenter
Verisign Inc
Tim Hudson
RSA Australia Ltd
Eric Murray
Wave Systems Inc
Volker Wiegand
SuSE Linux

27th March, 2003

This document expires on 27th September, 2003

Securing FTP with TLS

Status of this Memo

This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of [Section 10 of RFC2026](#).

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at <http://www.ietf.org/lid-abstracts.txt>

The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at <http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html>

Index

1. Abstract
2. Introduction
3. Audience
4. Session negotiation on the control port
5. Response to FEAT command
6. Data Connection Behaviour
7. Mechanisms for the AUTH Command
8. Data Connection Security
9. A discussion of negotiation behaviour
10. Who negotiates what, where and how
11. Timing Diagrams
12. Discussion of the REIN command
13. Discussion of the STAT and ABOR commands
14. Security Considerations
15. IANA Considerations
16. Other Parameters
17. Network Management
18. Internationalization
19. Scalability & Limits
20. Applicability
21. Acknowledgements
22. References
23. Authors' Contact Addresses

1. Abstract

This document describes a mechanism that can be used by FTP clients and servers to implement security and authentication using the TLS protocol defined by [\[RFC-2246\]](#) and the extensions to the FTP protocol defined by [\[RFC-2228\]](#). It describes the subset of the extensions that are required and the parameters to be used; discusses some of the policy issues that clients and servers will need to take; considers some of the implications of those policies and discusses some expected behaviours of implementations to allow interoperation. This document is intended to provide TLS support for FTP in a similar way to that provided for SMTP in [\[RFC-2487\]](#) and HTTP in [\[RFC-2817\]](#).

TLS is not the only mechanism for securing file transfer, however it does offer some of the following positive attributes:-

- Flexible security levels. TLS can support confidentiality, integrity, authentication or some combination of all of these. This allows clients and servers to dynamically, during a session, decide on the level of security required for a particular data transfer,
- It is possible to use TLS identities to authenticate client users and not just client hosts.
- Formalised public key management. By use of well established client identity mechanisms (supported by TLS) during the authentication phase, certificate management may be built into a central function. Whilst this may not be desirable for all uses of secured file transfer, it offers advantages in certain structured environments.
- Co-existence and interoperation with authentication mechanisms that are already in place for the HTTPS protocol. This allows web browsers to incorporate secure file transfer using the same infrastructure that has been set up to allow secure web browsing.

The TLS protocol is a development of the Netscape Communication Corporation's SSL protocol and this document can be used to allow the FTP protocol to be used with either SSL or TLS. The actual protocol used will be decided by the negotiation of the protected session by the TLS/SSL layer. This document will only refer to the TLS protocol, however, it is understood that the Client and Server MAY actually be using SSL if they are so configured.

Note that this specification is in accordance with the FTP RFC [\[RFC-959\]](#) and relies on the TLS protocol [\[RFC-2246\]](#) and the FTP security extensions [\[RFC-2228\]](#).

2. Introduction

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and "OPTIONAL" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC-2119](#)].

This document is an attempt to describe how three other documents should combined to provide a useful, interoperable, secure file transfer protocol. Those documents are:-

[RFC 959](#) [[RFC-959](#)]

The description of the Internet File Transfer Protocol

[RFC 2246](#) [[RFC-2246](#)]

The description of the Transport Layer Security protocol (developed from the Netscape Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol version 3.0).

[RFC 2228](#) [[RFC-2228](#)]

Extensions to the FTP protocol to allow negotiation of security mechanisms to allow authentication, confidentiality and message integrity.

The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) currently defined in [[RFC-959](#)] and in place on the Internet is an excellent mechanism for exchanging files. The security extensions to FTP in [[RFC-2228](#)] offer a comprehensive set of commands and responses that can be used to add authentication, integrity and confidentiality to the FTP protocol. The TLS protocol is a popular (due to its wholesale adoption in the HTTP environment) mechanism for generally securing a socket connection.

There are many ways in which these three protocols can be combined which would ensure that interoperation is impossible. This document describes one method by which FTP can operate securely in such a way as to provide both flexibility and interoperation. This necessitates a brief description of the actual negotiation mechanism ; a much more detailed description of the policies and practices that would be required and a discussion of the expected behaviours of clients and servers to allow either party to impose their security requirements on the FTP session.

3. Audience

This document is aimed at developers who wish to implement TLS as a security mechanism to secure FTP clients and/or servers.

4. Session negotiation on the control port

The server listens on the normal FTP control port {FTP-PORT} and the session initiation is not secured at all. Once the client wishes to secure the session, the AUTH command is sent and the server MAY then allow TLS negotiation to take place.

4.1 Client wants a secured session

If a client wishes to attempt to secure a session then it SHOULD, in accordance with [\[RFC-2228\]](#) send the AUTH command with the parameter requesting TLS {TLS-PARM}.

The client then needs to behave according to its policies depending on the response received from the server and also the result of the TLS negotiation. i.e. A client which receives an AUTH rejection MAY choose to continue with the session unprotected if it so desires.

4.2 Server wants a secured session

The FTP protocol does not allow a server to directly dictate client behaviour, however the same effect can be achieved by refusing to accept certain FTP commands until the session is secured to an acceptable level to the server.

The server response to an 'AUTH TLS' command which it will honour, is '234'.

Note. The '334' response as defined in [\[RFC-2228\]](#) implies that an ADAT exchange will follow. This document does not use the ADAT command and so the '334' reply is incorrect.

Note. The FTP protocol insists that a USER command be used to identify the entity attempting to use the ftp server. Although the TLS negotiation may be providing authentication information the USER command must still be issued by the client. However, it will be a server implementation issue to decide which credentials to accept and what consistency checks to make between any client cert used and the parameter on the USER command.

5. Response to the FEAT command

The FEAT command (introduced in [[RFC-2389](#)]) allows servers with additional features to advertise these to a client by responding to the FEAT command. If a server supports the FEAT command then it MUST advertise supported AUTH, PBSZ and PROT commands in the reply as described in [section 3.2 of \[RFC-2389\]](#). Additionally, the AUTH command should have a reply that identifies 'TLS' as one of the possible parameters to AUTH. It is not necessary to identify the 'TLS-C' synonym separately.

Example reply (in same style as [[RFC-2389](#)])

```
C> FEAT
S> 211-Extensions supported
S> AUTH TLS
S> PBSZ
S> PROT
S> 211 END
```

6. Data Connection Behaviour

The Data Connection in the FTP model can be used in one of three ways. (Note: these descriptions are not necessarily placed in exact chronological order, but do describe the steps required. - See diagrams later for clarification)

i) Classic FTP client/server data exchange

- The client obtains a port; sends the port number to the server; the server connects to the client. The client issues a send or receive request to the server on the control connection and the data transfer commences on the data connection.

ii) Firewall-Friendly client/server data exchange (as discussed in [[RFC-1579](#)]) using the PASV command to reverse the direction of the data connection.

- The client requests that the server open a port; the server obtains a port and returns the address and port number to the client; the client connects to the server on this port. The client issues a send or receive request on the control connection and the data transfer commences on the data connection.

iii) Client initiated server/server data exchange (proxy or PASV connections)

- The client requests that server A opens a port; server A obtains a port and returns it to the client; the client sends

this port number to server B. Server B connects to server A. The client sends a send or receive request to server A and the complement to server B and the data transfer commences. In this model server A is the proxy or PASV host and is a client for the Data Connection to server B.

For i) and ii) the FTP client MUST be the TLS client and the FTP server MUST be the TLS server.

That is to say, it does not matter which side initiates the connection with a connect() call or which side reacts to the connection via the accept() call; the FTP client as defined in [\[RFC-959\]](#) is always the TLS client as defined in [\[RFC-2246\]](#).

In scenario iii) there is a problem in that neither server A nor server B is the TLS client given the fact that an FTP server must act as a TLS server for Firewall-Friendly FTP [\[RFC-1579\]](#). Thus this is explicitly excluded in the security extensions document [\[RFC-2228\]](#), and in this document.

[7.](#) Mechanisms for the AUTH Command

The AUTH command takes a single parameter to define the security mechanism to be negotiated. As the SSL/TLS protocols self-negotiate their levels there is no need to distinguish SSL vs TLS in the application layer. The proposed mechanism name for negotiating TLS will be the character string identified in {TLS-PARM}. This will allow the client and server to negotiate TLS on the control connection without altering the protection of the data channel. To protect the data channel as well, the PBSZ:PROT command sequence MUST be used.

Note: The data connection state MAY be modified by the client issuing the PROT command with the new desired level of data channel protection and the server replying in the affirmative. This data channel protection negotiation can happen at any point in the session (even straight after a PORT or PASV command) and as often as is required.

See also [Section 15](#), "IANA Considerations".

[8.](#) Data Connection Security

The Data Connection security level is determined by the PROT command

The PROT command, as specified in [[RFC-2228](#)] allows client/server negotiation of the security level of the data connection. Once a PROT command has been issued by the client and accepted by the server returning the '200' reply, the security of subsequent data connections MUST be at that level until another PROT command is issued and accepted; the session ends; a REIN command is issued; or the security of the session (via an AUTH command) is re-negotiated.

Data Connection Security Negotiation (the PROT command)

Note: In line with [[RFC-2228](#)], there is no facility for securing the Data connection with an insecure Control connection. Specifically, the PROT command MUST be preceded by a PBSZ command and a PBSZ command MUST be preceded by a successful security data exchange (the TLS negotiation in this case)

The command defined in [[RFC-2228](#)] to negotiate data connection security is the PROT command. As defined there are four values that the PROT command parameter can take.

'C' - Clear - neither Integrity nor Privacy

'S' - Safe - Integrity without Privacy

'E' - Confidential - Privacy without Integrity

'P' - Private - Integrity and Privacy

As TLS negotiation encompasses (and exceeds) the Safe / Confidential / Private distinction, only Private (use TLS) and Clear (don't use TLS) are used.

For TLS, the data connection can have one of two security levels.

1)Clear (requested by 'PROT C')

2)Private (requested by 'PROT P')

With 'Clear' protection level, the data connection is made without TLS at all. Thus the connection is unauthenticated and has no confidentiality or integrity. This might be the desired behaviour for servers sending file lists, pre-encrypted data or non-sensitive data (e.g. for anonymous FTP servers).

If the data connection security level is 'Private' then a TLS negotiation must take place on the data connection, to the satisfaction of the Client and Server prior to any data being

transmitted over the connection. The TLS layers of the Client and Server will be responsible for negotiating the exact TLS Cipher Suites that will be used (and thus the eventual security of the connection).

In addition, the PBSZ (protection buffer size) command, as detailed in [\[RFC-2228\]](#), is compulsory prior to any PROT command. This document also defines a data channel encapsulation mechanism for protected data buffers. For FTP-TLS, which appears to the FTP application as a streaming protection mechanism, this is not required. Thus the PBSZ command must still be issued, but must have a parameter of '0' to indicate that no buffering is taking place and the data connection should not be encapsulated.

Note that PBSZ 0 is not in the grammar of [\[RFC-2228\]](#), [section 8.1](#), where it is stated:

PBSZ <sp> <decimal-integer> <CRLF> <decimal-integer> ::= any decimal integer from 1 to $(2^{32})-1$

However it should be noted that using a value of '0' to mean a streaming protocol is a reasonable use of '0' for that parameter and is not ambiguous.

Initial Data Connection Security

The initial state of the data connection MUST be 'Clear' (this is the behaviour as indicated by [\[RFC-2228\]](#).)

9. A Discussion of Negotiation Behaviour

9.1. The server's view of the control connection

A server MAY have a policy statement somewhere that might:

- Deny any command before TLS is negotiated (this might cause problems if a SITE or some such command is required prior to login)
- Deny certain commands before TLS is negotiated (such as USER, PASS or ACCT)
- Deny insecure USER commands for certain users (e.g. not ftp/anonymous)
- Deny secure USER commands for certain users (e.g. ftp/anonymous)
- Define the level(s) of TLS to be allowed
- Define the CipherSuites allowed to be used (perhaps on a per host/domain/... basis)
- Allow TLS authentication as a substitute for local authentication.

- Define data connection policies (see next section)

It is possible that the TLS negotiation may not be completed satisfactorily for the server, in which case it can be one of these states.

The TLS negotiation failed completely

In this case, the control connection should still be up in unprotected mode and the server SHOULD issue an unprotected '421' reply to end the session.

The TLS negotiation completed successfully, but the server decides that the session parameters are not acceptable (e.g. Distinguished Name in the client certificate is not permitted to use the server)

In this case, the control connection should still be up in a protected state, so the server MAY either continue to refuse to service commands or issue a protected '421' reply and close the connection.

The TLS negotiation failed during the TLS handshake

In this case, the control connection is in an unknown state and the server SHOULD simply drop the control connection.

Server code will be responsible for implementing the required policies and ensuring that the client is prevented from circumventing the chosen security by refusing to service those commands that are against policy.

9.2. The server's view of the data connection

The server can take one of four basic views of the data connection

- 1 - Don't allow encryption at all (in which case the PROT command should not allow any value other than 'C' - if it is allowed at all)
- 2 - Allow the client to choose protection or not
- 3 - Insist on data protection (in which case the PROT command must be issued prior to the first attempted data transfer)
- 4 - Decide on one of the above three for each and every data connection

The server SHOULD only check the status of the data protection level (for options 3 and 4 above) on the actual command that will initiate the data transfer (and not on the PORT or PASV). The

following commands, defined in [[RFC-959](#)] cause data connections to be opened and thus may be rejected (before any 1xx) message due to an incorrect PROT setting.

STOR
RETR
NLST
LIST
STOU
APPE

The reply to indicate that the PROT setting is incorrect is '521 data connection cannot be opened with this PROT setting'. If the protection level indicates that TLS is required, then it should be negotiated once the data connection is made. Thus, the '150' reply only states that the command can be used given the current PROT level. Should the server not like the TLS negotiation then it will close the data port immediately and follow the '150' command with a '522' reply indicating that the TLS negotiation failed or was unacceptable. (Note: this means that the application can pass a standard list of CipherSuites to the TLS layer for negotiation and review the one negotiated for applicability in each instance).

It is quite reasonable for the server to insist that the data connection uses a TLS cached session. This might be a cache of a previous data connection or of the control connection. If this is the reason for the the refusal to allow the data transfer then the '522' reply should indicate this.

Note: this has an important impact on client design, but allows servers to minimise the cycles used during TLS negotiation by refusing to perform a full negotiation with a previously authenticated client.

It should be noted that the TLS authentication of the server will be authentication of the server host itself and not a user on the server host.

9.3. The client's view of the control connection

In most cases it is likely that the client will be using TLS because the server would refuse to interact insecurely. To allow for this, clients SHOULD be able to be flexible enough to manage the securing of a session at the appropriate time and still allow the user/server policies to dictate exactly when in the session the security is negotiated.

In the case where it is the client that is insisting on the securing of the session, it will need to ensure that the negotiations are all completed satisfactorily and will need to be able to inform the user sensibly should the server not support, or be prepared to use, the required security levels.

Clients SHOULD be coded in such a manner as to allow the timing of the AUTH, PBSZ and PROT commands to be flexible and dictated by the server. It is quite reasonable for a server to refuse certain commands prior to these commands, similarly it is quite possible that a SITE or quoted command might be needed by a server prior to the AUTH. A client MUST allow a user to override the timing of these commands to suit a specific server.

For example, a client SHOULD NOT insist on sending the AUTH as the first command in a session, nor should it insist on issuing a PBSZ, PROT pair directly after the AUTH. This may well be the default behaviour, but must be overridable by a user.

Note: The TLS negotiation may not be completed satisfactorily for the client, in which case it will be in one of these states:

The TLS negotiation failed completely

In this case, the control connection should still be up in unprotected mode and the client should issue an unprotected QUIT command to end the session.

The TLS negotiation completed successfully, but the client decides that the session parameters are not acceptable (e.g. Distinguished Name in certificate is not the actual server expected)

In this case, the control connection should still be up in a protected state, so the client should issue a protected QUIT command to end the session.

The TLS negotiation failed during the TLS handshake

In this case, the control connection is in an unknown state and the client should simply drop the control connection.

9.4. The client's view of the data connection

Client security policies

Clients do not typically have 'policies' as such, instead they rely on the user defining their actions and, to a certain extent, are reactive to the server policy. Thus a client will need to

have commands that will allow the user to switch the protection level of the data connection dynamically, however, there may be a general 'policy' that attempts all LIST and NLST commands on a Clear connection first (and automatically switches to Private if it fails). In this case there would need to be a user command available to ensure that a given data transfer was not attempted on an insecure data connection.

Clients also need to understand that the level of the PROT setting is only checked for a particular data transfer after that transfer has been requested. Thus a refusal by the server to accept a particular data transfer should not be read by the client as a refusal to accept that data protection level in toto, as not only may other data transfers be acceptable at that protection level, but it is entirely possible that the same transfer may be accepted at the same protection level at a later point in the session.

It should be noted that the TLS authentication of the client should be authentication of a user on the client host and not the client host itself.

10. Who negotiates what, where and how**10.1. Do we protect at all ?**

Client issues 'AUTH TLS', server accepts or rejects.
If server needs AUTH, then it refuses to accept certain commands until it gets a successfully protected session.

10.2. What level of protection do we use on the Control connection ?

Decided entirely by the TLS CipherSuite negotiation.

10.3. Do we protect data connections in general ?

Client issues PROT command, server accepts or rejects.

10.4. Is protection required for a particular data transfer ?

A client would already have issued a PROT command if it required the connection to be protected.
If a server needs to have the connection protected then it will reply to the STOR/RETR/NLST/... command with a '522' indicating that the current state of the data connection protection level is not sufficient for that data transfer at that time.


10.5. What level of protection is required for a particular data transfer ?

Decided entirely by the TLS CipherSuite negotiation.

Thus it can be seen that, for flexibility, it is desirable for the FTP application to be able to interact with the TLS layer upon which it sits to define and discover the exact TLS CipherSuites that are to be/have been negotiated and make decisions accordingly.

11. Timing Diagrams

11.1. Establishing a protected session



Note 1: the order of the PBSZ/PROT pair and the USER/PASS pair (with respect to each other) is not important (i.e. the USER/PASS can happen prior to the PBSZ/PROT - or indeed the server can refuse to allow a PBSZ/PROT pair until the USER/PASS pair has happened).

Note 2: the PASS command might not be required at all (if the USER parameter and any client identity presented provide sufficient authentication). The server would indicate this by issuing a '232' reply to the USER command instead of the '331' which requests a PASS from the client.

Note 3: the AUTH command might not be the first command after the receipt of the 220 welcome message.

11.2. A standard data transfer without protection.

	Client		Server	
	control	data	data	control
=====				
		socket()		
		bind()		
PORT w,x,y,z,a,b	----->			
	<-----			200
STOR file	----->			
			socket()	
			bind()	
				<----- 150
	accept() <-----		connect()	
	write() ----->		read()	
	close() ----->		close()	
	<-----			226

11.3. A firewall-friendly data transfer without protection



Note: Implementors should be aware that then connect()/accept() function is performed prior to the receipt of the reply from the STOR command. This contrasts with situation when (non-firewall-friendly) PORT is used prior to the STOR, and the accept()/connect() is performed after the reply from the aforementioned STOR has been dealt with.


```

Client
control      data
Server
data      control
=====
socket()
bind()
PORT w,x,y,z,a,b ----->
<----- 200
STOR file ----->
socket()
bind()
<----- 150
accept() <----- connect()
TLNeg() <-----> TLNeg()
TLNeg() -----> TLNeg()
TLNeg() -----> TLNeg()
TLNeg() -----> TLNeg()
close() -----> close()
<----- 226

```


11.5. A firewall-friendly data transfer with protection

	Client		Server	
	control	data	data	control
=====				
PASV	----->			
			socket()	
			bind()	
	<-----		227 (w,x,y,z,a,b)	
		socket()		
STOR file	----->			
	connect()		accept()	
	<-----		150	
	TLSneg()	<----->	TLSneg()	
	TLSwrite()	----->	TLSread()	
	TLSshutdown()	----->	TLSshutdown()	
	close()	----->	close()	
	<-----		226	

12. Discussion of the REIN command

The REIN command, defined in [[RFC-959](#)], allows the user to reset the state of the FTP session. From [[RFC-959](#)]:

REINITIALIZE (REIN)

This command terminates a USER, flushing all I/O and account information, except to allow any transfer in progress to be completed. All parameters are reset to the default settings and the control connection is left open. This is identical to the state in which a user finds himself immediately after the control connection is opened. A USER command may be expected to follow.

When this command is processed by the server, the TLS session(s) MUST be cleared and the control and data connections revert to unprotected, clear communications. It MAY be acceptable to use cached TLS sessions for subsequent connections, however a server MUST not mandate this.

13. Discussion of the STAT and ABOR commands

The ABOR and STAT commands and the use of TCP Urgent Pointers

[RFC-959] describes the use of Telnet commands (IP and DM) and the TCP Urgent pointer to indicate the transmission of commands on the control channel during the execution of a data transfer. FTP uses the Telnet Interrupt Process and Data Mark commands in conjunction with Urgent data to preface two commands: ABOR (Abort Transfer) and STAT (Status request).

The Urgent Pointer was used because in a Unix implementation the receipt of a TCP packet marked as Urgent would result in the the execution of the SIGURG interrupt handler. This reliance on interrupt handlers was necessary on systems which did not implement select() or did not support multiple threads. TLS does not support the notion of Urgent data.

When TLS is implemented as a security method in FTP the server SHOULD NOT rely on the use of SIGURG to process input on the control channel during data transfers. The client MUST send all data including Telnet commands across the TLS session. The TLS session will be corrupted if any data is sent on a socket while TLS is active.

14. Security Considerations

This entire document deals with security considerations related to the File Transfer Protocol.

14.1. Verification of Authentication tokens

14.1.1. Server Certificates

Although it is entirely an implementation decision, it is recommended that certificates used for server authentication of the TLS session contain the server identification information in a similar manner to those used for http servers. (see [[RFC-2818](#)])

Similarly, it is recommended that the certificate used for server authentication of Data connections is the same certificate as that used for the corresponding Control connection.

14.1.2. Client Certificates

- Deciding which client certificates to allow and defining which fields define what authentication information is entirely a server implementation issue.
- It is also server implementation issue to decide if the authentication token presented for the data connection must match the one used for the corresponding control connection.

14.2. Addressing FTP Security Considerations [[RFC-2577](#)]

14.2.1. Bounce Attack

A bounce attack should be harder in a secured FTP environment because:

- The FTP server that is being used to initiate a false connection will always be a 'server' in the TLS context. Therefore, only services that act as 'clients' in the TLS context could be vulnerable. This would be a counter-intuitive way to implement TLS on a service.
- The FTP server would detect that the authentication credentials for the data connection are not the same as those for the control connection, thus the server policies COULD be set to drop the data connection.

- Genuine users are less likely to initiate such attacks when the authentication is strong and malicious users are less likely to gain access to the FTP server if the authentication is not easily subverted (password guessing, network tracing, etc...)

14.2.2. Restricting Access

This document presents a strong mechanism for solving the issue raised in this section.

14.2.3. Protecting Passwords

The twin solutions of strong authentication and data confidentiality ensure that this is not an issue when TLS is used to protect the control session.

14.2.4. Privacy

The TLS protocol ensures data confidentiality by encryption. Privacy (e.g. access to download logs, user profile information, etc...) is outside the scope of this document (and [\[RFC-2577\]](#) presumably)

14.2.5. Protecting Usernames

This is not an issue when TLS is used as the primary authentication mechanism.

14.2.6. Port Stealing

This proposal will do little for the Denial of Service element of this section, however, strong authentication on the data connection will prevent unauthorised connections retrieving or submitting files.

14.2.7. Software-Base Security Problems

Nothing in this proposal will affect the discussion in this section.

[15.](#) IANA Considerations

{FTP-PORT} - The port assigned to the FTP control connection is 21.

[16.](#) Other Parameters

{TLS-PARM} - The parameter for the AUTH command to indicate that TLS is required. To request the TLS protocol in accordance with this document, the client MUST use 'TLS'

To maintain backward compatability with older versions of this document, the server SHOULD accept 'TLS-C' as a synonym for 'TLS'

Note - [[RFC-2228](#)] states that these parameters are case-insensitive.

17. Network Management

NONE

18. Internationalization

NONE

19. Scalability & Limits

There are no issues other than those concerned with the ability of the server to refuse to have a complete TLS negotiation for each and every data connection, which will allow servers to retain throughput whilst using cycles only when necessary.

20. Applicability

This mechanism is generally applicable as a mechanism for securing the FTP protocol. It is unlikely that anonymous FTP clients or servers will require such security (although some might like the authentication features without the confidentiality).

21. Acknowledgements

- o Netscape Communications Corporation for the original SSL protocol.
- o Eric Young for the SSLeay libraries.
- o University of California, Berkley for the original implementations of FTP and ftpd on which the initial implementation of these extensions were layered.
- o IETF CAT working group.
- o IETF TLS working group.
- o IETF FTPEXT working group.
- o Jeff Altman for the ABOR and STAT discussion.

22. References

- [RFC-959] J. Postel, "File Transfer Protocol"
[RFC 959](#), October 1985.
- [RFC-1579] S. Bellovin, "Firewall-Friendly FTP"
[RFC 1579](#), February 1994.
- [RFC-2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"
[RFC 2119](#), March 1997.
- [RFC-2222] J. Myers, "Simple Authentication and Security Layer"
[RFC 2222](#), October 1997.
- [RFC-2228] M. Horowitz, S. Lunt, "FTP Security Extensions"
[RFC 2228](#), October 1997.
- [RFC-2246] T. Dierks, C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0"
[RFC 2246](#), January 1999.
- [RFC-2389] P. Hethmon, R. Elz, "Feature Negotiation Mechanism for the File Transfer Protocol"
[RFC 2389](#), August 1998.
- [RFC-2487] P. Hoffman, "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over TLS"
[RFC 2487](#), January 1999.
- [RFC-2577] M. Allman, S. Ostermann, "FTP Security Considerations"
[RFC 2577](#), May 1999.
- [RFC-2817] R. Khare, S. Lawrence, "Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1"
[RFC 2817](#), May 2000.
- [RFC-2818] E. Rescorla, "HTTP Over TLS"
[RFC 2818](#), May 2000.

23. Authors' Contact Addresses

The FTP-TLS draft information site is at <http://www.ford-hutchinson.com/~fh-1-pfh/ftps-ext.html>

Please send comments to Paul Ford-Hutchinson at the address below

Tim Hudson
RSA Data Security
Australia Pty Ltd

tel - +61 7 3227 4444
fax - +61 7 3227 4400
email - tjh@rsasecurity.com.au

Martin Carpenter
Verisign Ltd
email - mcarpenter@verisign.com

Volker Wiegand
SuSE Linux
email - wiegand@suse.de

Paul Ford-Hutchinson
IBM UK Ltd
PO Box 31
Birmingham Road
Warwick
United Kingdom
+44 1926 462005
+44 1926 496482
paulfordh@uk.ibm.com

Eric Murray
Wave Systems Inc.
ericm@lne.com

The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and standards-related documentation can be found in [BCP-11](#). Copies of claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.

The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive Director.

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.

This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English.

The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

This document expires on 27th September, 2003

