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Internet Draft
Expires: March 2004

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Secure Nested Tunnels Optimization using Nested Path Info draft-na-nemo-nested-path-info-00

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Abstract

This document addresses how to securely achieve the nested tunnels optimization using nested path information that reflects the optimized path from Top Level Mobile Router(TLMR) to Mobile Router(MR) in nested mobile networks. The solution is based on the Reverse Routing Header(RRH) idea and the concern of security.

problem in RRH. By carefully taking a look at the simplicity of Routing Header Type 2 routing mechanism and the complexity of Access Router Option(ARO) based solution to get rid of the problem of possible attack for RRH, the proposed solution has been considered to preserve the efficiency of RRH without the loss of security.

Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119](#).

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1. Introduction

NEMO Basic Support Solution[15] would suppose to support transparent mobility to mobile network nodes(MNNs) in mobile networks by using MR-HA bi-directional tunneling. However, multiple mobile networks are nested, that brings an routing overhead to us which is well known as "pinball" routing problem. So, it needs to avoid routing overhead like this because we can easily imagine the applications of nested mobile networks such as NEMO in public transportations e.g. train, bus, airplane. In [4] and [5], the nested routing problem has been broadly touched but the general still not acceptable we think.

To get generally acceptable solution for this problem, this document addresses how to securely achieve the nested tunneling optimization using nested path information that reflects the optimized path from Top Level Mobile Router(TLMR) to Mobile Router(MR) in nested mobile networks. The solution is based on Reverse Routing Header(RRH)[4] idea and the concern of spoofing attack(or redirect attack) from [5]. By carefully taking a balance between the simplicity of Routing Header Type 2 routing mechanism and the complexity of Access Router Option(ARO) solution to get rid of the threat of possible attack for RRH, the proposed solution has been considered to preserve the efficiency of RRH without the loss of security.

In proposed solution, MR uses Nested Path Information(NPI)

inform the optimized routing path of its HA. It discovers NPI sent from its Access Router(AR) and deliver that information to HA through BU. Unlike RRH of [4], NPI cannot be modified or forged by the intermediate ARs. In case of the existence of fake AR on a nested path, Of course, false NPI information may be used by the fake AR. It's impossible that there is unauthenticated fake AR if on the network access control properly applied. But, although it's possible, the fake AR would not get any reward for such an impersonating if the HA-MR tunnel could be protected by IPSec. The integrity of NPI also additionally protected by Authenticated Header[8]. In [section 6](#), the security considerations will be mentioned.

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[2](#). Terminology

It is assumed that readers are familiar with NEMO terminology described in [2][14], and the terms described in [4][5]. In addition, we define a few of terms used in describing the operation of our solution.

Nested Path Information (NPI)

A form of array of IPv6 global addresses that are the addresses of Mobile Routers on the nested path which is derived from TLMR to any nested MR in nested mobile networks.

RO-enabled

That is a similar with "NEMO-enabled" used in [AR0]. Any tunnel that applied with the scheme of route optimization proposed by this document is referred to as "RO-enabled" tunnel.

Nested Path Option (NP Option)


New type of option added in Router Advertisement to NPI in nested mobile networks. That information is from TLMR to downward by relaying of each AR.

Nested Routing Path Option (NRP Option)

New type of mobility option used in BU message. That NPI to Home Agent(HA).

3. Overview of Operation

We use the nested mobile network example as following Fig.1








Fig.1 An example nested Mobile Network

In this example, we would have three bi-directional nested by using NEMO Basic Solution if any nested tunnel optimization applied.



With the proposed solution, we can get one optimized tunnel follows. From the following optimized tunnel, we can see the solution's optimized result is same with one in [4].



No receiving RA with NP Option in the access link gets MR1 that it is TLMR of nested mobile networks. As in Fig.1, MR1 periodically RA with NP Option to its ingress link. MR2 and each relays its RA with modified NP Option, in which IPv6 address of the egress interface is appended, to ingress link.

Through the NP Option relay of MRs, MR3 results in getting nested path such like MR1-CoA->MR2-CoA->MR3-CoA, the path to from MR3.

MR3 can start extended Binding Update(BU) with HA3 for the optimization after getting NPI from RA with NP Option. MR3 Option, newly introduced mobility option to securely carry

HA3. This kind of BU with NRP Option makes it possible that nested tunnels optimization between MR3 and HA3. Basically, message is exchanged to HA3 through normal nested tunnels. receiving BU with NRP Option makes new Binding Cache(BC) on NPI and R0-enabled tunnel-interface for forward tunneling. receiving successful BACK, MR3 also sets up the R0-enabled interface for reverse tunneling. In R0-enabled tunnel interface each created in MR3 and HA3 through MIPv6 BU/BACK exchange, effectively used in routing that optimizing the nested tunnels.

After the establishment of R0-enabled bi-directional tunnels, MR3 can forward the packets from its ingress interfaces to R0-enabled reverse tunnel interface and HA3 can do the packets destined to MONET3 to R0-enabled forward tunnel interface. For details, following subsections describe the procedure of reverse and forward packet delivery using the R0-enabled tunnel.

3.1 Reverse Packet Delivery(MR3 -> HA3)

In order to forward the packets sent from ingress side to HA3, MR3 makes sure that the correspondent tunnel interface is already established by both MR3 and HA3. If that tunnel interface matches with R0-enabled and NPI available in Binding Update List(BU List), MR3 builds the tunneling packet like below and forwards to HA3 on the nested path. In the outer IPv6 header, Type 6 Routing Header(RH) needs to be used to indicate next-hop MRs that the tunneling packet can be delivered to the Home Agent through nested tunnels optimization using NPI.

```

<----- outer IPv6 header ----->
+-----+-----+-- ++-----+-----+-----+-----+
|oSRC   |oDST   |:   :|oRH |IDX|Addr[1] | Addr[2] ||
MR3: |MR3-CoA| HA3   |:oEXT:|type| 2 |MR1-CoA | MR2-CoA ||
|       |       |:   :| 6  |   |         |         ||
+-----+-----+-- ++-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

In the example, MR2 does not forward packets to HA2 via default reverse tunnel(nested tunnel) if they have RH Type 6 option in the header. Instead of reverse tunneling, MR2 refers to the address Addr[IDX] indexed by IDX field, and makes sure that it is MR's address. If the indexed address matched with any of address on its egress interfaces, MR2 forwards the packet, for which the

source address and IDX field in outer IPv6 header are only as below, to that interface. Otherwise, the packet will be discarded. As like MR2's operation, MR1 does the same thing below.

```

<----- outer IPv6 header ----->
+-----+-----++ -- ++-----+-----+-----+-----+
|oSRC   |oDST   |:    :|oRH |IDX|Addr[1] | Addr[2] ||
MR2: |MR2_CoA| HA3   |:oEXT:|type| 1 |MR1-CoA | MR2-CoA ||
|       |       |:    :| 6  |    |       |       ||
+-----+-----++ -- ++-----+-----+-----+-----+

<----- outer IPv6 header ----->
+-----+-----++ -- ++-----+-----+-----+-----+
|oSRC   |oDST   |:    :|oRH |IDX|Addr[1] | Addr[2] ||
MR1: |MR1_CoA| HA3   |:oEXT:|type| 0 |MR1-CoA | MR2-CoA ||
|       |       |:    :| 6  |    |       |       ||
+-----+-----++ -- ++-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

The packet sent from MR1 through the R0-enabled tunnel is delivered to HA3. HA3 detects the existence of Type 6 RH optional header and searches a BC entry with NPI that has TLMR on the nested path. If it is exactly matched with the source address of the packet. If the entry is valid and the correspondent R0-enabled tunnel interface exists, the packet is forwarded to the interface so that it can be properly decapsulated. As a result of the MR3-HA3 tunneling, the inner packet is properly routed to the original destination by MR3.

[3.2](#) Forward Packet Delivery(HA3 -> MR3)

The packet destined to the LFN in MONET3 is intercepted by MR1 and delivered by the procedure as follows. HA3 gets to know that MR1's tunnel is R0-enabled. Therefore, the packet is forwarded to MR1 with encapsulation as below via R0-enabled tunnel interface.

```

<----- outer IPv6 header ----->
+-----+-----++ -- ++-----+-----+-----+-----+
|oSRC   |oDST   |:    :|oRH |LS |Addr[1] | Addr[2] ||
HA3: |HA3   |MR1-CoA|:oEXT:|type| 2 |MR2-CoA | MR3-CoA || i
|       |       |:    :| 2  |    |       |       ||
+-----+-----++ -- ++-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

MR1 does routing with extended semantics for the packets that have the RH Type 2 optional header as in [4]. The packets with the RH Type 2 header sent from HA3 are properly delivered to MR3 by MR1 and MR3 follows the nested path as follows:

```

<----- outer IPv6 header ----->
+-----+-----+ -- +-----+-----+-----+-----+
|oSRC   |oDST   |:    :|oRH |LS |Addr[1] | Addr[2] ||
MR1:|_HA3   |MR2-CoA|:oEXT:|type| 1 |MR2-CoA | MR3-CoA || i
|       |       |:    :| 2  |   |       |       ||
+-----+-----+ -- +-----+-----+-----+-----+

```


```

<----- outer IPv6 header ----->
+-----+-----+ -- +-----+-----+-----+-----+
|oSRC   |oDST   |:    :|oRH |LS |Addr[1] | Addr[2] ||
MR2:| HA3   |MR3-CoA|:oEXT:|type| 0 |MR2-CoA | MR3-CoA || i
|       |       |:    :| 2  |   |       |       ||
+-----+-----+ -- +-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

The packets with LS=0 are no more routed in MR3, therefore processed by MR3 as if sent from nested forward tunneling between MR3 and HA3. In the end, the packets decapsulated, and forwarded to the destination.

[illegible]



This format represents the following changes over the original format specified for Tree Information Option in [\[4\]](#):

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Type

8-bit unsigned integer set to the assigned value by the TLMR. TBD.

Length

8-bit unsigned integer updated by each MR on the way. The length of the option (including the type and length fields) in units of 8 octets.

NP_Length

4.1.2 8-bit unsigned integer set to 1 by the TLMR. That indicates the size of Addr[] array.

Addr[1]

TLMR's IPv6 global address, set by the TLMR. Identifies the tree.

Addr[n]

IPv6 global address of n-th MRs on the way, set by n-th MR.

The TLMR MUST include this option in its Router Advertisement.

A MR receiving this option from its Attachment Router MUST update the Length, TreeDepth, MRPreference, BootTimeRandom and PathCost.

fields, and additionally MUST append its IPv6 global address Addr[n] slot if it is n-th MR on the path, and MUST propagate its ingress interface(s). The alignment requirement of the Option is 8n.


4.2 MIPv6 Extensions

4.2.1 Nested Routing Path Option(NRP Option)


MR adds new mobility option, NRP Option in BU message to set up an RO-enabled tunnel with its HA. The format of this option is as follows:

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routing by MRs on the nested path. the format of this header follows:



8-bit selector. Identifies the type of header immed following the Routing Header. Uses the same value a IPv6 Next Header field [10].

Hdr Ext Len

8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the routing heade

octet units, not including the first 8 octets. This is always equal to twice the number of addresses in Address vector.

Routing Type

8-bit unsigned integer that contains the value 6. The type value unconfirmed by IANA. TBD.

NextIndex

8-bit unsigned integer. This value identifies the index of the address vector. The forwarder needs to make sure that the indexed address is same with its address. If yes, it updates the source address of the packet to its address and forwards the packet. By hop-by-hop, the mobile router that understands this type of routing header MUST decrement NextIndex by 1 at forwarding. If NextIndex is 0, ignore this option.

Address[1..n]

Vector of 128-bit addresses, numbered 1 to n.

[4.3](#) MR Extension

According to MIPv6 Spec.[\[1\]](#), MR MUST maintain Binding Update List(BU List). In managing BU List, the following information should be maintained additionally to use RO-enabled MR-HA tunnel discovery in this proposed solution.

Nested Tunnels Optimization(NTO) flag :

When set indicates that the associated BU entry is RO-enabled for nested tunnels optimization.

Nested Path Information(NPI) Address Vector :

The path vector information transferred in Nested RO-enabled Path Option at BU.

The successful BU with NRP Option allows the ready of R0-enabled tunnel interface that would be associated with the corresponding entry of BU List. That tunnel interface is set up to add Type 6 RH optional header at the encapsulation of tunneled packets. At an enabled BU, all packets through R0-enabled reverse tunnel have a Type 6 RH optional header in tunnel extension header so that they are properly delivered to HA through the optimized nested path.

For packets sent from HA through Type 2 RH, MR decapsulates the outer packet, and forwards the inner packet to the ingress router. There is no difference with normal packets routed via nested path because source address is HA and destination address is MR.

4.4 HA Extension

According to MIPv6 Spec.[\[1\]](#), HA MUST maintain Binding Cache Entry. Like MR extension, HA MUST maintain additionally the following information in associated BC entry in case of receiving BU with NRP Option.

Nested Tunnels Optimization(NTO) flag :

When set indicates that NTO is enabled for nested tunnels optimization.

Nested Path Information(NPI) Address Vector :

The path vector information carried in Nested Routing Option during BU.

With the success of BU, HA has to add new entry in tunnel interface table. At that time, the tunnel interface is being marked as R0-enabled so that Extended Type 2 RH[4] is inserted into Tunnel Extension Header[16] at processing packet tunneling encapsulation. As a result of applying Type 2 RH based on NPI, all packets destined to mobile networks are forwarded to TLMR on the nested path through the R0-enabled forward tunnel.

For the packets forwarded via R0-enabled reverse tunnel by MR, HA decapsulates them, and checks the validity of Type 6 RH. the conditions are as follows:

(1) NextIndex MUST be zero.

(2) There is at least one entry registered by BU with which TLMR address matches the source address of incoming outer packet.

(3) CareOf address of the BC entry MUST match the last address(e.g. MR3) which is the result of subtracting NPI address vector(e.g. MR1->MR2->MR3) to the address of Type 6 RH(e.g. MR1->MR2) in order.

If above conditions are all satisfied, inner packets are forwarded by MIPv6 specification. Otherwise, they are discarded by HA.

[5.](#) Further Route Optimization

[5.1](#) MN-HA Tunnel Optimization in Mobile Networks

In Fig.1, VMN can do R0-enabled binding update with MR4_HA nested path MR1_CoA->MR4_CoA. VMN-VMN_HA tunnel can be optimized. VMN follows faithfully extension of the operation like MR d [section 4.4](#).

[5.2](#) MN-CN Route Optimization in Mobile Networks

MIPv6 Route Optimization can be considered in nested mobile networks. To apply our solution, the following extensions are required to MN and CN.

- (1) MN and CN MUST use the nested routing path option when doing BU.
- (2) RH Type 6 optional header MUST be applied to the packets sent from MN to CN.
- (3) Extended RH Type 2 optional header MUST be applied to the packets sent from CN to MN.

We see the possibility and detailed protocol design of MN-CN route optimization using NPI will be next our work item.

[6.](#) Security Considerations

Basically, MR-HA bi-directional tunneling is protected by IPSEC[7][[8](#)][9]. However, we can suspect that the part of NP is untrustworthy by itself or can be modified by the intermediate that be fake. In case of [\[4\]](#), the vulnerability for spoofing by an attacker on the nested path has been known. Those kind of attack can be avoided in the proposed solution as the integrity of NPI is guaranteed on the fly.

[6.1](#) NPI Authenticity

We need to assure that NPI is an available path and intact. For the assurance, there MUST be any security mechanism to authenticate AR on access link by MR each other. That would be implemented by some types of Network Access Control(NAC) or domain-specific authentication method. Due to out of scope of this document, details for those mechanisms will not be described in here, but the solution needs to assume pre-established security association between visited AR and visiting MR for NPI authenticity.

[6.2](#) How to avoid the spoofing attack

The integrity of information chunks of RH Type 6/2 used in the proposed solution can be guaranteed by using AH[8]. It means that the intermediate forwarders on the nested path for RH Type 6/2 cannot modify any part of NPI. Unlike RRH, NPI is immutable except NextIndex so that it can be protected by AH. Any attacker that doesn't know secret key used in MR-HA tunnel cannot forge NPI protected by AH for its own benefit.

[6.3](#) The existence of fake MR

There may be a fake MR acting as a forwarder on NPI path. Inadvertently or not, it's possible because of the lack of access security mentioned in [section 6.1](#). Although in this NPI in RH Type 6/2 cannot be modified because of AH protect Any contents through MR-HA tunnel cannot be disclosed because can be protected by ESP[9]. Merely, the possible attack is passive denial-of-service that means the denial of routing. However, as these types of attacks can be easily detected, cannot be an effective attack in itself.

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Acknowledgments

Authors would like to thank you the authors of [4] and [5] for their fruitful comments on this problem area.

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