

Network Working Group  
Internet-Draft  
Intended status: Informational  
Expires: January 15, 2009

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July 14, 2008

**Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Security Mechanism**  
**draft-perkins-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-01.txt**

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Abstract

This memo discusses the problem of securing real-time multimedia sessions, and explains why the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) does not mandate a single media security mechanism.

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## **1. Introduction**

The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [[1](#)] is widely used for voice over IP, Internet television, video conferencing, and various other real-time and streaming media applications. Despite this, the base RTP specification provides very limited options for media security, and defines no standard key exchange mechanism. Rather, a number of extensions are defined to provide confidentiality and authentication of media streams, and to exchange security keys. This memo outlines why it is appropriate that multiple extension mechanisms are defined, rather than mandating a single media security and keying mechanism.

This memo provides information for the community; it does not specify a standard of any kind.

The structure of this memo is as follows: we begin, in [Section 2](#) by describing the scenarios in which RTP is deployed. Following this, [Section 3](#) outlines the implications of this range of scenarios for media confidentiality and authentication, and [Section 4](#) outlines the implications for key exchange. [Section 5](#) outlines how the RTP framework meets the requirement of [BCP 61](#). [Section 6](#) then concludes and gives some recommendations. Finally, [Section 7](#) outlines the security considerations, and [Section 8](#) outlines IANA considerations.

## **2. RTP Applications and Deployment Scenarios**

The range of application and deployment scenarios where RTP has been used includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- o Point-to-point voice telephony (fixed and wireless networks)
- o Point-to-point video conferencing
- o Centralised group video conferencing with a multipoint conference unit (MCU)
- o Any Source Multicast video conferencing (light-weight sessions; Mbone conferencing)
- o Point-to-point streaming audio and/or video
- o Single Source Multicast streaming to large group (IPTV and MBMS [[2](#)])
- o Replicated unicast streaming to a group



- o Interconnecting components in music production studios and video editing suites
- o Interconnecting components of distributed simulation systems
- o Streaming real-time sensor data

As can be seen, these scenarios vary from point-to-point to very large multicast groups, from interactive to non-interactive, and from low bandwidth (kilobits per second) to very high bandwidth (multiple gigabits per second). While most of these applications run over UDP, some use TCP or DCCP as their transport. Some run on highly reliable optical networks, others use low rate unreliable wireless networks. Some applications of RTP operate entirely within a single trust domain, others are inter-domain, with untrusted (and potentially unknown) users. The range of scenarios is wide, and growing both in number and in heterogeneity.

### **3. Implications for RTP Media Security**

The wide range of application scenarios where RTP is used has led to the development of multiple solutions for media security, considering different requirements. Perhaps the most general of these solutions is the Secure RTP (SRTP) framework [3]. This is an application-level media security solution, encrypting the media payload data (not the RTP headers) to provide some degree of confidentiality, and providing optional source origin authentication. It was carefully designed to be both low overhead, and to support the group communication features of RTP, across a range of networks.

SRTP is not the only media security solution in use, however, and alternatives are more appropriate for some scenarios. For example, many client-server streaming media applications run over a single TCP connection, multiplexing media data with control information on that connection (for example, on an RTSP connection). The natural way to provide media security for such client-server media applications is to use TLS to protect the TCP connection, sending the RTP media data over the TLS connection. Using the SRTP framework in addition to TLS is unnecessary, and would result in double encryption of the media, and SRTP cannot be used instead of TLS since it is RTP-specific, and so cannot protect the control traffic.

Finally, the link layer may be secure, and it may be known that the RTP media data is constrained to that single link (for example, when operating in a studio environment, with physical link security). An environment like this is inherently constrained, but might avoid the need for application, transport, or network layer media security.



All these are application scenarios where RTP has seen commercial deployment. Other use cases also exist, with additional requirements. There is no media security protocol that is appropriate for all these environments. Accordingly, multiple RTP media security protocols can be expected to remain in wide use.

#### **4. Implications for Key Management**

More diverse than the different use cases is the different protocols used for RTP session establishment. Providing keying for these different session establishment can basically be put into two categories, inband and out-of-band in relation to the session establishment mechanism. The requirement on these solutions are highly varying. Thus a wide range of solutions have been developed in this space:

- o The most common use case for RTP is probably point-to-point voice calls or centralised group conferences, negotiated using SIP with the SDP offer/answer model, operating on a trusted infrastructure. In such environments, SDP security descriptions [4] or the MIKEY [5] protocol are appropriate keying mechanisms, piggybacked onto the SDP exchange.
- o SIP/SDP with SIPS
- o SIP/SDP with S/MIME
- o Point-to-point RTP sessions may be negotiated using SIP with the offer/answer model, but operating over a network with untrusted infrastructure. In such environments, the key management protocol is run on the media path, bypassing the untrusted infrastructure. Protocols such as ZRTP or DTLS protocols are useful here.
- o For point-to-point client-server streaming of RTP over RTSP, a TLS association is appropriate to manage keying material, in much the same manner as would be used to secure an HTTP session.
- o Email with SDP, secured using X.509 or PGP
- o SDP file retrieved using HTTPS
- o FLUTE using S/MIME to secure SDP
- o SAP with SDP
- o OMA's DRM keymanagement [6] with pointer from SDP for point to point streaming setup with RTSP in 3GPP [7].





- o Usage of HTTP and MIKEY for key management in MBMS [8].

A more detailed survey of requirements for media security management protocols can be found in [9]. As can be seen, the range of use cases is wide, and there is no single protocol that is appropriate for all scenarios. These solutions have to be further diversified by the existence of infrastructure elements such as authentication solutions that is tied into the key management.

## 5. On the Requirement for Strong Security in IETF protocols

BCP 61 [10] puts a requirement on IETF protocols to provide strong, mandatory to implement, security solutions. This is actually quite a difficult requirement for any type of framework protocol, like RTP, since one can never know all the deployment scenarios, and if the security solution provided covers them. It would clearly be desirable if a single media security solution and a single key management solution could be developed, satisfying the range of use cases for RTP. The authors are not aware of any such solution, however, and it is not clear that any single solution can be developed.

For a framework protocol it appears that the only sensible solution to the requirement of BCP 61 is to develop or use security building blocks, like SRTP, SDP, MIKEY, DTLS, or IPsec, to provide the basic security services of authorization, data integrity protection and data confidentiality protection. When new usages of the RTP framework arise, one needs to analyze the situation, to determine if the existing building blocks satisfy the requirements. If not, it is necessary to develop new security building blocks.

When it comes to fulfilling the "MUST Implement" strong security for a specific application, it will fall on that application to actually consider what building blocks it is required to support. To maximize interoperability it is desirable if certain applications, or classes of application with similar requirements, agree on what data security mechanisms and key-management should be used. If such agreement is not possible, there will be increased cost, either in the lack of interoperability, or in the need to implement more solutions. Unfortunately this situation, if not handled reasonably well, can result in a failure to satisfy the requirement of providing the users with an option of turning on strong security when desired.

## 6. Conclusions

As discussed earlier it appears that a single solution can't be



designed meet the diverse requirements. In the absense of such a solution, it is hoped that this memo explains why SRTP is not mandatory as the media security solution for RTP-based systems, and why we can expect multiple key management solutions for systems using RTP.

In respect to the above it is important for any RTP-based application to consider how they meet the application's security requirements. This will requires some analysis to determine these requirements. Followed by a selection of preferably a single to mandatory to implement solution including the desired RTP traffic protection and key-management. As SRTP can be used in a large number of use cases, it is a preferred solution for the protection of the RTP traffic, for those use cases where it is applicable. Currently it is much harder to point out a preferred key-management solution.

## **7. Security Considerations**

This entire memo is about security.

## **8. IANA Considerations**

No IANA actions are required.

## **9. To Do**

Update references

IPsec example

## **10. Informative References**

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## Acknowledgment

Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF Administrative Support Activity (IASA).



