Connected Identity for STIR
draft-peterson-stir-rfc4916-update-04

Abstract

   The SIP Identity header conveys cryptographic identity information
   about the originators of SIP requests. The Secure Telephone Identity
   Revisited (STIR) framework however provides no means for determining
   the identity of the called party in a traditional telephone calling
   scenario. This document updates prior guidance on the "connected
   identity" problem to reflect the changes to SIP Identity that
   accompanied STIR, and considers a revised problem space for connected
   identity as a means of detecting calls that have been retargeted to a
   party impersonating the intended destination, as well as the spoofing
   of mid-dialog or dialog-terminating events by intermediaries or third
   parties.

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1. Introduction

The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] initiates sessions,
and as a step in establishing sessions, it exchanges information
about the parties at both ends of a session. Users review
information about the calling party, for example, to determine
whether to accept communications initiated by a SIP, in the same way
that users of the telephone network assess "Caller ID" information
before picking up calls. This information may sometimes be consumed
by automata to make authorization decisions.

STIR [RFC8224] provides a cryptographic assurance of the identity of
calling parties in order to prevent impersonation, which is a key
enabler of unwanted robocalls, swatting, vishing, voicemail hacking,
and similar attacks (see [RFC7340]). There also exists a related
problem: the identity of the party who answers a call can differ from
that of the initial called party for various innocuous reasons such
as call forwarding, but in certain network environments, it is

possible for attackers to hijack the route of a called number and
direct it to a resource controlled by the attacker. It can
potentially be difficult to determine why a call reached a target
other than the one originally intended, and whether the party
ultimately reached by the call is one that the caller should trust.
The lack of mutual authentication of parties moreover makes it
possible for outside attackers to inject forged messages (e.g. BYE)
into a SIP session.

The property of providing identity in the backwards direction of a
call is here called "connected identity." Previous work on connected
identity focused on fixing the core semantics of SIP. [RFC4916]
allowed a mid-dialog request, such as an UPDATE [RFC3311], to convey
identity in either direction within the context of an existing
INVITE-initiated dialog. In an update to the original [RFC3261]
behavior, [RFC4916] allowed that UPDATE to alter the From header
field value for requests in the backwards direction: previously
[RFC3261] required that the From header field values sent in requests
in the backwards direction reflect the To header field value of the
dialog-forming request, for various backwards-compatibility reasons.
Under the original [RFC3261] rules, if Alice sent a dialog-forming
request to Bob, then even if Bob's SIP service forwarded that dialog-
forming request to Carol, Carol would still be required to put Bob's
identity in the From header field value in any mid-dialog requests in
the backwards direction.

One of the original motivating use cases for [RFC4916] was the use of
connected identity with the SIP Identity [RFC4474] header field.
While a mid-dialog request in the backwards direction (e.g. UPDATE)
can be signed with Identity like any other SIP request, forwarded
requests would not be signable without the ability to change the mid-
dialog From header field value: Carol, say, would not be able to
furnish a key to sign for Bob's identity, if Carol wanted to sign
requests in the backwards direction. Carol would however be able to
sign for her own identity in the From header field value, if mid-
dialog requests in the backwards direction were permitted to vary
from the original To header field value.

With the obsolence of [RFC4474] by [RFC8224], this specification
updates [RFC4916] to reflect the changes to the SIP Identity header
and the revised problem space of STIR. It also explores some new
features that would be enabled by connected identity for STIR,
including the use of connected identity to prevent route hijacking
and to notify callers when an expected called party has successfully
been reached. This document also addresses concerns about applying
[RFC4916] connected identity to STIR discussed in the SIPBRANDY
framework [RFC8862].

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

3. Connected Identity Problem Statement for STIR

The STIR problem statement [RFC7340] enumerates robocalling,
voicemail hacking, vishing, and swatting as problems with the modern
telephone network that are enabled, or abetted, by impersonation: by
the ability of a calling party to arbitrarily set the telephone
number that will be rendered to end users to identify the caller.

Today, sophisticated adversaries can redirect calls on the PSTN to
destinations other than the intended called party. For some call
centers, like those associated with financial institutions,
healthcare, and emergency services, an attacker could hope to gain
valuable information about people or to prevent some classes of
important services. Moreover, on the Internet, the lack of any
centralized or even federated routing system for telephone numbers
has resulted in deployments where the routing of calls is arbitrary:
calls to telephone numbers might be unceremoniously dumped on a PSTN
gateway, they might be sent to a default intermediary that makes
forwarding decisions based on a local flat file, various mechanisms
like private ENUM [RFC6116] might be consulted, or routing might be
determined in some other, domain-specific way. In short, there are
numerous attack surfaces that an adversary could explore to attempt
to redirect calls to a particular number to someplace other than the
intended destination.

Another motivating use case for connected identity is mid-dialog
requests, including BYE. The potential for an intermediary to
generate a forged BYE in the backwards direction has always been
built-in to the stateful dialog management of SIP. For example,
there is a class of mobile fraud attacks ("short-stopping") that rely
on intermediary networks making it appear as if a call has terminated
to one side, while maintaining that the call is still active to the
other, in order to create a billing discrepancy that could be
pocketed by the intermediary. If BYE requests in both directions of
a SIP dialog could be authenticated with STIR, just like dialog-
forming requests, then another impersonation vector leading to fraud
in the telephone network could be shut down.

There are however practical limits to what securing the signaling can
achieve. [RFC4916] rightly observed that once a SIP call has been

answered, the called party can be replaced by a different party (with
a different identity) due to call transfer, call park and retrieval,
and so on. In some cases, due to the presence of a back-to-back user
agent, it can be effectively impossible for the calling party to know
that this has happened. The problem statement considered for STIR
focuses solely on signaling, not whether media from the connected
party should be rendered to the caller when a dialog has been
established. This specification does not consider further any
threats that arise from a substitution of media.

4. Connected Identity in Provisional Dialogs

[RFC4916] identified a means of sending Identity header field values
in the backwards direction before a final response to a dialog has
been received by the UAC. It relied on the use of the UPDATE method
to send the connected identity in the backwards direction after the
UAS had received and responded to a PRACK [RFC3262] from the UAC,
which would in turn have been triggered by a provisional 1xx response
sent earlier by the UAC. [RFC4916] permits the From header field of
the UPDATE to change the address of record of the recipient: if the
original INVITE had been sent with a To header field value of
"sip:bob@example.com", the UAS in its UPDATE could set the From
header field value to "sip:carol@example.com." For STIR, this is a
very important property, as Carol might not even possess a credential
that can legitimately sign for Bob.

Per [RFC3262], UAC's that require connected identity MUST thus send a
Require header field with the option tag 100rel in INVITEs in
addition to an Identity header field value containing a PASSporT.
UAS's that support this mechanism will first send a Require header
field with the option tag 100rel in 1xx class responses to INVITEs
that they receive, along with the necessary RSeq header field. The
UAC will send a PRACK when it receives the reliable 1xx response from
the UAS; the UAS, upon receiving a PRACK, responds with a 200 OK. At
this point, the terminating UA is free to send an UPDATE [RFC3311]
request in the backwards direction to the originating UA. This
update will contain an Identity header, with a PASSporT that signs
for the connected identity in its "orig" claim, which typically
corresponds to the From header field value of the UPDATE request. If
the PASSporT is valid, the originating UA will respond with an OK,
and may perform any behaviors associated with the updated identity
(see Section 7). Even if connected identity is not required by the
originator of an INVITE request, it can still be solicited if
available by sending the 100rel option tag in a Supported header
field when sending an INVITE with an Identity header, which will
trigger the preceding flow if the UAS supports connected identity.

Usually, the updated Identity reflects a changed to the From header
field value. But in many operating environments, the From header
field value does not contain the identity of the caller that has been
asserted by the network, which is instead conveyed by the P-Asserted-
Identity header field [RFC3325]. The contents of PAID are not used
for dialog matching, and so in environments where PAID is used, it
can be altered more dynamically. However, in order for the connected
identity and a PASSporT to be conveyed in the backwards direction, a
provisional dialog still needs to be established, and an UPDATE sent:
in this case, it will be the UDPATE that contains the connected
identity in its P-Asserted-Identity header field value, and that
value will be signed by the PASSporT in its "orig" claim.

5. Connected Identity in Mid-Dialog and Dialog-Terminating Requests

The use of the connected identity mechanism here specified is not
limited to provisional dialog requests. Once a dialog has been
established with connected identity, any re-INVITEs from either the
originating and terminating side, as well as any BYE requests, MUST
contain Identity headers with valid PASSporTs based on the current
To/From header field values for the dialog. This prevents third-
parties from spoofing any mid-dialog requests in order to redirect
media or similarly interfere with communications, as well as
preventing denial of service teardowns by attackers.

Theoretically, any SIP requests in a dialog could be signed in this
fashion, though it is unclear how valuable it would be for some (e.g.
OPTIONS). Requests with specialized payloads such as INFO or
MESSAGE, however, would require additional specification for how
integrity protection for their bodies could be implemented. Some
work has been done toward that for MESSAGE (see
[I-D.peterson-stir-messaging]. This specification thus does not
mandate PASSporTs for any requests sent in a dialog other than
INVITE, UPDATE, and BYE.

It might seem tempting to require that, if an INVITE has been with an
Identity header containing a PASSporT, any CANCEL request received
for the dialog initiated by that INVITE must also contain an Identity
header with a PASSporT. However, CANCEL requests can also sent be
sent by stateful proxy servers engaged in parallel forking; for
example, when branches need to be canceled because a final response
has been received from a UAS. It is however REQUIRED by this
specification that if a UAC sends a CANCEL for its own PASSporT-
protected INVITE request, that it include an Identity header with a
valid PASSporT in the CANCEL. UAS policy will have to determine the
instances where it will accept unsigned CANCEL requests for a dialog
initiated with a signed INVITE.

6. Interaction with Divert PASSporT

   Many of the use cases that motivate connected identity involve
   retargeting: when a call acquires a new target (in its Request-URI)
   during transit, the terminating side needs a way to express to the
   originating side which destination the INVITE reached. In STIR, the
   "div PASSporT type [RFC8946] was created to securely record when a
   call was retargeted from one destination to another. Those "div"
   PASSporTs can be consumed on the terminating side by verification
   services to determine that a call has reached its eventual
   destination for the right reasons.

   As specified in [RFC8946], the only way those diversion PASSporTs
   will be seen by the calling party is if redirection is used (SIP 3XX
   responses) instead of retargeting; while some network policies may
   want to conceal service logic from the originating party, sending
   redirections in the backwards direction is the only current defined
   way for secure indications of redirection to be revealed to the
   calling party. That in turn would allow the calling user agent to
   have a strong assurance that legitimate entities in the call path
   caused the request to reach a party that the caller did not
   anticipate.

   This specification introduces another alternative. When per
   Section 4 the terminating side sends an UPDATE with an Identity
   header containing a PASSporT for its current From (or PAID) header
   field value, it MAY include in Identity header field values any "div"
   PASSporTs it received in the INVITE that initiated this provisional
   dialog. These "div" PASSporTs will enable the originating side to
   receive a secure assurance that the call is being fielded by the
   proper recipient per the routing of the call. Note however that
   "div" is not universally supported, and thus calls may be retargeted
   with generating a "div" PASSporT, so sending those PASSporTs in the
   backwards direction cannot be mandated. Also note that this will
   potentially reveal service logic to the called party.

7. Authorization Policy for Callers

   In a traditional telephone call, the called party receives an
   alerting signal and can make a decision about whether or not to pick
   up a phone. They may have access to displayed information, like
   "Caller ID", to help them arrive at an authorization decision. The
   situation is more complicated for callers, however: callers typically
   expect to be connected to the proper destination and are often
   holding telephones in a position that would not enable them to see
   displayed information, if any were available for them to review--and
   moreover, their most direct response to a security breach would be to
   hang up the call they were in the middle of placing.

While this specification will not prescribe any user experience
associated with placing a call, it assumes that callers might have
some way to a set an authorization posture that will result in the
right thing happening when the connected identity is not expected.
This is analogous to a situation where SRTP negotiation fails because
the keys exchanges at the media layer do not match fingerprints
exchanged at the signaling layer: when a user requests
confidentiality services, and they are unavailable, media should not
be exchanged. Thus we assume that users have a way in their
interface to require this criticality, on a per-call basis, or
perhaps on a per-destination basis, that would cause their user agent
to send the INVITE with a Require for 100rel. Similarly, users will
not always place calls where the connected identity is crucial--but
when they do, they should have a way to tell their devices that the
call should not be completed if it arrives at an unexpected party.

Ultimately, authorization policy for called parties is difficult to
set, as calls can end up at unexpected places for legitimate reasons.
Some work has been done to make sure that secure diversion works with
STIR, as described in Section 6.

8. Pre-Association with Destinations

Any connected identity mechanism will work best if the user knows
before initiating a call that connected identity is supported by the
destination side. Not every institution that a user wants to connect
to securely will support STIR and connected identity out of the gate.

The user interface of modern smartphones support an address book from
which users select telephone numbers to dial. Even when dialing a
number manually, the interface frequently checks the address book and
will display to users any provisioned name for the target of the call
if one exists. Similarly, when clicking on a telephone number viewed
on a web page, or similar service, smartphones often prompt users
approve the access to the outbound dialer. These sorts of decision
points, when the user is still interacting with the user interface,
provide an opportunity to form a pre-association with the
destination, and potentially even to exchange STIR PASSporTs in order
to validate whether or not the expected destination can be reached
securely. Again, this is probably most meaningful for contacting
financial, government, or emergency services, for cases where
reaching an unintended destination may have serious consequences.

The establishment of media-less dialogs has long been specified as a
component of third-party call control in SIP [RFC3375], in which an
INVITE is sent with no SDP. Similar media-less dialogs have been
proposed for certain automata per [RFC5552]. In the STIR context, a
media-less dialog is established by sending an INVITE with an

Identity header but no SDP. STIR-aware UAS's that support this
specification, upon receiving an INVITE with no SDP, carrying a
PASSporT with a 100rel in the Require header field value, SHOULD
follow the mechanism described in Section 4 to send a provisional
response and then an UPDATE carrying a PASSporT in the backwards
direction. The PASSporT received in the backwards direction could be
rendered to the originating user to help them decide if they want to
place the call.

[More TBD. In some environments, that may require the use of
mechanisms defined by [RFC8816].]

9. Connected Identity and Conferencing

The establishment of connected identity when there are more than two
parties in a session will depend on the conferencing mechanism used.

[More TBD.]

10. Examples

[TBD: Revise RFC4916 examples to show new Identity header present in
UPDATE and in a backwards-direction BYE.]

11. Updates to RFC4916

[TBD - ways that UPDATEs in the backwards direction can carry
additional information in support of the above]

In general, the guidance of RFC4916 remains valid for RFC8224.

The deprecation of the Identity-Info header has a number of
implications for RFC4916; all of the protocol examples need to be
updated to reflect that.

12. Acknowledgments

We would like to thank YOU for your contributions to this
specification.

13. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

14. Security Considerations

    TBD.

15. References

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Authors' Addresses

   Jon Peterson
   Neustar, Inc.
   1800 Sutter St Suite 570
   Concord, CA 94520
   US

   Email: jon.peterson@team.neustar

   Chris Wendt
   Comcast
   One Comcast Center
   Philadelphia, PA 19103
   USA

   Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net