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Common Features for Encrypted Recursive to Authoritative DNS
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Abstract

Encryption between recursive and authoritative DNS servers is currently being defined in two modes: unauthenticated and fully-authenticated. These two modes have some features in common, and this document defines those common features so that the documents defining the modes do not need to point to each other.

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[1.](#) Introduction

The DPRIVE Working Group in the IETF is working on standardizing methods for encrypted communication between DNS recursive resolvers and authoritative servers. At the time of this writing, [\[UNAUTH\]](#) is a work item in the working group, and [\[FULL-AUTH\]](#) has been widely discussed. The working group expressed a desire that the modes share as much design as possible to simplify the working group's process of evaluating the security and operational aspects of the methods. If the DPRIVE Working Group later adopts other modes, those modes should be considered in this document.

This document lists the major technical features that are shared by [\[UNAUTH\]](#) and [\[FULL-AUTH\]](#). Differences from the common features in this document are listed in the respective method documents. The following are the features in common between [\[UNAUTH\]](#) and [\[FULL-AUTH\]](#):

- * Discovery of an authoritative server's encryption support ([Section 2](#))
- * Order of processing discovered authoritative servers ([Section 3](#))
- * Serving with Encryption ([Section 4](#))

Other topics might be added as the working group discusses [\[UNAUTH\]](#) and [\[FULL-AUTH\]](#) (and maybe other methods).

2. Discovery of Authoritative Server Encryption

An authoritative server that supports DNS with encryption makes itself discoverable by publishing one or more DNS SVCB records that contain "alpn" parameter keys. SVCB records are defined in [[SVCB](#)], and the DNS extension to those records is defined in [[DNS-SVCB](#)].

A recursive resolver discovers whether an authoritative server supports DNS with encryption by looking for cached SVCB records for the name of the authoritative server with a positive answer. A cached DNS SVCB record with a negative answer indicates that the authoritative server does not support any encrypted transport.

2.1. DNS SVCB Records in the Parent Zone

DNS SVCB records act as advisory information for resolvers about the encrypted protocols that are supported. They can be thought of as similar to NS records on the parent side of a zone cut: advisory enough to act on, but not authoritative. Given this, authoritative servers that know the DNS SCVB records associated with NS records for any child zones MAY include those DNS SCVB records in the Additional section of responses to queries to a parent authoritative server.

((The question of how a parent zone knows the appropriate SCVB record for the child zone is outside the scope of this document. People have suggested an EPP extension and updating with CSYNC; these and other ideas might be standardized outside the DPRIVE Working Group.))

((Before this is published for real, it would be useful to check whether any resolvers freak out or fall over when they receive SVCB records in the Additional section.))

3. Processing Discovery Responses

After a resolver has DNS SCVB records in its cache (possibly due to having just queried for them), it needs to use those records to try to find an authoritative server that uses DNS with encryption. This section describes how the resolver can make that selection.

A resolver MUST NOT attempt encryption for a server that has a negative response in its cache for the associated DNS SVCB record.

After sending out all requests for SVCB records for the authoritative servers in the NS RRset for a name, if all of the SVCB records for those authoritative servers in the cache are negative responses, the resolver MUST use classic (unencrypted) DNS instead of encryption. Similarly, if none of the DNS SVCB records for the authoritative servers in the cache have supported "alpn" parameters, the resolver MUST use classic (unencrypted) DNS instead of encryption.

If there are any DNS SVCB records in the cache for the authoritative servers for a zone with supported "alpn" parameters, the resolver MUST try each indicated authoritative server using DNS with encryption until it successfully sets up a connection. The resolver only attempts to use the encrypted transports that are in the associated SVCB record for the authoritative server. ((Note that this completely prohibits "simple port 853 probing" even though that is what some operators are currently doing. Does the WG want to be this strict?))

A resolver SHOULD keep a DNS with encryption session to a particular server open if it expects to send additional queries to that server in a short period of time. [[DNS-OVER-TCP](#)] says "both clients and servers SHOULD support connection reuse" for TCP connections, and that advice could apply as well for DNS with encryption, especially as DNS with encryption has far greater overhead for re-establishing a connection. If the server closes the DNS with encryption session, the resolver can possibly re-establish a DNS with encryption session using encrypted session resumption.

For any DNS with encryption protocols, TLS version 1.3 [[TLS-13](#)] or later MUST be used.

3.1. Resolver Process as Pseudocode

This section is meant as an informal clarification of the protocol, and is not normative. The pseudocode here is designed to show the intent of the protocol, so it is not optimized for things like intersection of sets and other shortcuts.

In this code, "signal_rrset(this_name)" means an "SVCB" query for the "_dns" prefix of "this_name". The "Query over secure transport until successful" section ignores differences in name server selection and retry behaviour in different resolvers. The pseudocode was written to roughly cover the shared behaviour between [[UNAUTH](#)] and [[FULL-AUTH](#)]. Specifically, whether an implementation waits for the resolution of "queue a query" would differ between the two.


```
# Inputs
ns_names = List of NS Rdatas from the NS RRset for the queried name
can_do_secure = List of secure transports supported by resolver
secure_names_and_transports = Empty list, filled in below

# Fill secure_names_and_transports with (name, transport) tuples
for this_name in ns_names:
    if signal_rrset(this_name) is in the resolver cache:
        if signal_rrset(this_name) positively does not exist:
            continue
        for this_transport in signal_rrset(this_name):
            if this_transport in can_do_secure:
                add (this_name, this_transport) to secure_names_and_transports
    else: # signal_rrset(this_name) is not in the resolver cache
        queue a query for signal_rrset(this_name) for later caching

# Query over secure transport until successful
for (this_name, this_transport) tuple in secure_names_and_transports:
    query using this_transport on this_name
    if successful:
        finished

# Got here if no this_name/this_transport query was successful
# or if secure_names_and_transports was empty
query using classic DNS on any/all ns_names; finished
```

4. Serving with Encryption

An operator of an authoritative server following this protocol SHOULD publish SVCB records as described in [Section 2](#). If they cannot publish such records, the security properties of their authoritative servers will not be found. If an operator wants to test serving using encryption, they can publish SVCB records with short TTLs and then stop serving with encryption after removing the SVCB records and waiting for the TTLs to expire.

It is acceptable for an operator of authoritative servers to only offer encryption on some of the named authoritative servers, such as when the operator is determining how far to roll out encrypted service.

A server MAY close an encrypted connection at any time. For example, it can close the session if it has not received a DNS query in a defined length of time. The server MAY close an encrypted session after it sends a DNS response; however, it might also want to keep the session open waiting for another DNS query from the resolver. [\[DNS-OVER-TCP\]](#) says "both clients and servers SHOULD support connection reuse" for TCP connections, and that advice could apply as

well for DNS with encryption, especially as DNS with encryption has far greater overhead for re-establishing a connection. If the server closes the DNS with encryption session, the resolver can possibly re-establish a DNS with encryption session using encrypted session resumption.

For any DNS with encryption protocols, TLS version 1.3 [[TLS-13](#)] or later MUST be used.

5. Resolvers Reporting Errors to Authoritative Servers

Resolvers should have a method of telling authoritative servers that there are problems with the encrypted service they are offering. There is a proposal that the DNSOP Working Group might adopt [[ERROR-REPORTING](#)], which would enable such reporting.

((Clearly, more will need to go here.))

6. IANA Considerations

((Update registration for TCP/853 to also include ADoT))

((Maybe other updates for DoH and DoQ))

7. Security Considerations

An authoritative server that wants to only serve data to resolvers that use fully-authenticated encryption as described in [[FULL-AUTH](#)] cannot differentiate between those resolvers and resolvers using the mechanisms described in this document.

((Talk about requiring TLS 1.3))

8. Acknowledgements

The use of SVCB records for discovering whether an authoritative server supports encryption was first described by the authors of [[FULL-AUTH](#)].

The DPRIVE Working Group has contributed many ideas that keep shifting the focus and content of this document.

9. References

9.1. Normative References

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[FULL-AUTH]

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[ERROR-REPORTING]

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